fix(security): 会话密钥改为随机生成,修复硬编码密钥可伪造管理员会话

安全审计 P0 修复:旧版会话签名密钥硬编码在源码中(源码公开即泄露),
任何人可据此伪造 isAdmin 会话接管后台。

- config: 新增 [web].secret_key,首启/升级时用 crypto/rand 自动生成
  32 字节随机密钥并持久化;旧硬编码值自动替换
- config: 支持 MAILGO_SECRET_KEY 环境变量覆盖(覆盖值不落盘)
- config: 配置文件权限收紧为 0600(同时保护 relay_password 等敏感字段)
- web: NewWebServer 校验密钥(空/旧默认值/短于16字节拒绝启动)
- test: 伪造会话拒绝、密钥生命周期(生成/持久化/重启稳定/env不落盘)等
  9 个测试
- docs: README 配置参考、security_todo.md 安全修复清单

部署注意:升级重启后所有用户需重新登录。
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-19 16:21:28 +08:00
parent 6484af7e63
commit 551ed981de
8 changed files with 680 additions and 10 deletions
+17 -5
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"html/template"
"math"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
@@ -166,17 +167,22 @@ func avatarStyle(s string) string {
// NewWebServer creates a new WebServer, initializes the Gin engine,
// configures sessions, middleware, and registers all routes.
func NewWebServer(cfg config.WebConfig, stores *store.Stores, attStorage *storage.AttachmentStorage, storageCfg config.StorageConfig, authCfg config.AuthConfig, banCfg config.BanConfig, caddyCfg config.CaddyConfig, ob *outbound.Manager) *WebServer {
func NewWebServer(cfg config.WebConfig, stores *store.Stores, attStorage *storage.AttachmentStorage, storageCfg config.StorageConfig, authCfg config.AuthConfig, banCfg config.BanConfig, caddyCfg config.CaddyConfig, ob *outbound.Manager) (*WebServer, error) {
if err := config.ValidateSecretKey(cfg.SecretKey); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
gin.SetMode(gin.ReleaseMode)
engine := gin.New()
engine.Use(gin.Logger())
engine.Use(gin.Recovery())
// Session store (cookie-based)
cookieStore := cookie.NewStore([]byte("mail-go-secret-key-change-in-production"))
// Session store (cookie-based). The signing key comes from the config
// file (auto-generated random key) or the MAILGO_SECRET_KEY env var.
cookieStore := cookie.NewStore([]byte(cfg.SecretKey))
cookieStore.Options(sessions.Options{
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: 3, // SameSiteLaxMode
SameSite: 3, // SameSiteStrictMode(比 Lax 更严格)
MaxAge: 86400,
Path: "/",
})
@@ -201,7 +207,7 @@ func NewWebServer(cfg config.WebConfig, stores *store.Stores, attStorage *storag
}
ws.registerRoutes()
return ws
return ws, nil
}
// registerRoutes sets up all HTTP routes with their handlers and middleware.
@@ -278,6 +284,12 @@ func (ws *WebServer) registerRoutes() {
}
}
// Handler returns the underlying Gin engine as an http.Handler, useful for
// integration tests and for embedding behind a reverse proxy.
func (ws *WebServer) Handler() http.Handler {
return ws.engine
}
// Start launches the HTTP server on the configured address.
// Supports both TCP (e.g. ":8080") and Unix socket (e.g. "/run/mail_go/web.sock").
func (ws *WebServer) Start() error {
+187
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
package web
// P0 回归测试:验证会话 cookie 由配置中的 secret_key 签名,
// 且旧版硬编码密钥(源码公开,视为已泄露)无法再伪造有效会话。
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"mail_go/config"
"mail_go/internal/db"
"mail_go/internal/storage"
"mail_go/internal/store"
"github.com/gorilla/securecookie"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
func chdirRepoRoot(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
// NewWebServer 以相对路径加载 internal/web/templates/
// 测试进程的 CWD 是 internal/web,需要切到仓库根目录。
if err := os.Chdir(filepath.Join("..", "..")); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("chdir to repo root: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chdir(filepath.Join("internal", "web")) })
}
func newTestStores(t *testing.T) *store.Stores {
t.Helper()
gdb, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db")), &gorm.Config{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open sqlite: %v", err)
}
if err := gdb.AutoMigrate(&db.User{}, &db.Domain{}, &db.Message{}, &db.Attachment{}, &db.BanEntry{}, &db.OutboundMessage{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("migrate: %v", err)
}
return store.NewStores(gdb)
}
func newTestWebServer(t *testing.T, secretKey string) (*WebServer, *store.Stores) {
t.Helper()
chdirRepoRoot(t)
stores := newTestStores(t)
domain := &db.Domain{Name: "example.com", SmtpPort: 25, ImapPort: 143, Pop3Port: 110}
if err := stores.Domains.Create(domain); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create domain: %v", err)
}
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("test-password-123"), bcrypt.MinCost)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := stores.Users.Create(&db.User{
Username: "alice",
PasswordHash: string(hash),
DomainID: domain.ID,
IsActive: true,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create user: %v", err)
}
baseDir := t.TempDir()
attStorage := storage.NewAttachmentStorage(filepath.Join(baseDir, "attachments"))
cfg := config.WebConfig{Addr: "127.0.0.1:0", SecretKey: secretKey}
ws, err := NewWebServer(cfg, stores, attStorage, config.StorageConfig{BaseDir: baseDir},
config.AuthConfig{}, config.BanConfig{MaxFailAttempts: 100}, config.CaddyConfig{}, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewWebServer: %v", err)
}
return ws, stores
}
func TestSessionSignedWithConfiguredSecretKey(t *testing.T) {
ws, _ := newTestWebServer(t, "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef")
srv := httptest.NewServer(ws.Handler())
defer srv.Close()
// 登录成功 -> 返回会话 cookie(禁用自动重定向以获取原始 302 响应)
form := url.Values{"email": {"alice@example.com"}, "password": {"test-password-123"}}
loginReq, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, srv.URL+"/login", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
loginReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
client := &http.Client{CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
}}
resp, err := client.Do(loginReq)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("login request: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusFound {
t.Fatalf("login status = %d, want 302", resp.StatusCode)
}
var sessionCookie string
for _, c := range resp.Cookies() {
if c.Name == "mail_go_session" {
sessionCookie = c.Value
}
}
if sessionCookie == "" {
t.Fatal("login should set mail_go_session cookie")
}
// 合法会话可以访问收件箱
req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, srv.URL+"/inbox", nil)
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "mail_go_session", Value: sessionCookie})
resp2, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("inbox request: %v", err)
}
defer resp2.Body.Close()
if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("inbox with valid session: status = %d, want 200", resp2.StatusCode)
}
}
func TestLegacyHardcodedKeyCannotForgeSession(t *testing.T) {
// 服务端使用随机生成的新密钥
ws, _ := newTestWebServer(t, "9f8e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c2b1a09f8e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c2b1a0")
srv := httptest.NewServer(ws.Handler())
defer srv.Close()
// 攻击者用旧硬编码密钥(源码中公开)伪造管理员会话
forger := securecookie.New([]byte(config.InsecureLegacySecretKey), nil)
forged, err := forger.Encode("mail_go_session", map[interface{}]interface{}{
"userID": uint(1),
"userEmail": "admin@example.com",
"isAdmin": true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("forge cookie: %v", err)
}
req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, srv.URL+"/inbox", nil)
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "mail_go_session", Value: forged})
client := &http.Client{CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
}}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request with forged cookie: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
// 签名校验失败 -> 未认证,必须被重定向到登录页
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusFound {
t.Fatalf("forged legacy-key session must be rejected: status = %d, want 302 redirect to /login", resp.StatusCode)
}
if loc := resp.Header.Get("Location"); !strings.HasPrefix(loc, "/login") {
t.Fatalf("forged session should redirect to /login, got Location: %q", loc)
}
}
func TestNewWebServerRejectsBadSecretKeys(t *testing.T) {
chdirRepoRoot(t)
stores := newTestStores(t)
baseDir := t.TempDir()
attStorage := storage.NewAttachmentStorage(filepath.Join(baseDir, "attachments"))
cases := []struct {
name string
key string
}{
{"empty", ""},
{"legacy default", config.InsecureLegacySecretKey},
{"too short", "short-key"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := NewWebServer(config.WebConfig{Addr: "127.0.0.1:0", SecretKey: tc.key},
stores, attStorage, config.StorageConfig{BaseDir: baseDir},
config.AuthConfig{}, config.BanConfig{}, config.CaddyConfig{}, nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("NewWebServer should reject secret key %q", tc.key)
}
})
}
}