package web // P0 回归测试:验证会话 cookie 由配置中的 secret_key 签名, // 且旧版硬编码密钥(源码公开,视为已泄露)无法再伪造有效会话。 import ( "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "net/url" "os" "path/filepath" "strings" "testing" "mail_go/config" "mail_go/internal/db" "mail_go/internal/storage" "mail_go/internal/store" "github.com/gorilla/securecookie" "golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt" "gorm.io/driver/sqlite" "gorm.io/gorm" ) func chdirRepoRoot(t *testing.T) { t.Helper() // NewWebServer 以相对路径加载 internal/web/templates/, // 测试进程的 CWD 是 internal/web,需要切到仓库根目录。 if err := os.Chdir(filepath.Join("..", "..")); err != nil { t.Fatalf("chdir to repo root: %v", err) } t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chdir(filepath.Join("internal", "web")) }) } func newTestStores(t *testing.T) *store.Stores { t.Helper() gdb, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db")), &gorm.Config{}) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("open sqlite: %v", err) } if err := gdb.AutoMigrate(&db.User{}, &db.Domain{}, &db.Message{}, &db.Attachment{}, &db.BanEntry{}, &db.OutboundMessage{}); err != nil { t.Fatalf("migrate: %v", err) } return store.NewStores(gdb) } func newTestWebServer(t *testing.T, secretKey string) (*WebServer, *store.Stores) { t.Helper() chdirRepoRoot(t) stores := newTestStores(t) domain := &db.Domain{Name: "example.com", SmtpPort: 25, ImapPort: 143, Pop3Port: 110} if err := stores.Domains.Create(domain); err != nil { t.Fatalf("create domain: %v", err) } hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("test-password-123"), bcrypt.MinCost) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } if err := stores.Users.Create(&db.User{ Username: "alice", PasswordHash: string(hash), DomainID: domain.ID, IsActive: true, }); err != nil { t.Fatalf("create user: %v", err) } baseDir := t.TempDir() attStorage := storage.NewAttachmentStorage(filepath.Join(baseDir, "attachments")) cfg := config.WebConfig{Addr: "127.0.0.1:0", SecretKey: secretKey, CookieSecure: true} ws, err := NewWebServer(cfg, stores, attStorage, config.StorageConfig{BaseDir: baseDir}, config.AuthConfig{}, config.BanConfig{MaxFailAttempts: 100}, config.CaddyConfig{}, nil) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("NewWebServer: %v", err) } return ws, stores } func TestSessionSignedWithConfiguredSecretKey(t *testing.T) { ws, _ := newTestWebServer(t, "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef") srv := httptest.NewServer(ws.Handler()) defer srv.Close() // 登录成功 -> 返回会话 cookie(禁用自动重定向以获取原始 302 响应) form := url.Values{"email": {"alice@example.com"}, "password": {"test-password-123"}} loginReq, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, srv.URL+"/login", strings.NewReader(form.Encode())) loginReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded") client := &http.Client{CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error { return http.ErrUseLastResponse }} resp, err := client.Do(loginReq) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("login request: %v", err) } defer resp.Body.Close() if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusFound { t.Fatalf("login status = %d, want 302", resp.StatusCode) } var sessionCookie string for _, c := range resp.Cookies() { if c.Name == "mail_go_session" { sessionCookie = c.Value if !c.HttpOnly { t.Error("session cookie must be HttpOnly") } if !c.Secure { t.Error("session cookie must be Secure") } if c.SameSite != http.SameSiteStrictMode { t.Errorf("session cookie SameSite = %v, want Strict", c.SameSite) } } } if sessionCookie == "" { t.Fatal("login should set mail_go_session cookie") } // 合法会话可以访问收件箱 req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, srv.URL+"/inbox", nil) req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "mail_go_session", Value: sessionCookie}) resp2, err := client.Do(req) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("inbox request: %v", err) } defer resp2.Body.Close() if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { t.Fatalf("inbox with valid session: status = %d, want 200", resp2.StatusCode) } } func TestLegacyHardcodedKeyCannotForgeSession(t *testing.T) { // 服务端使用随机生成的新密钥 ws, _ := newTestWebServer(t, "9f8e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c2b1a09f8e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c2b1a0") srv := httptest.NewServer(ws.Handler()) defer srv.Close() // 攻击者用旧硬编码密钥(源码中公开)伪造管理员会话 forger := securecookie.New([]byte(config.InsecureLegacySecretKey), nil) forged, err := forger.Encode("mail_go_session", map[interface{}]interface{}{ "userID": uint(1), "userEmail": "admin@example.com", "isAdmin": true, }) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("forge cookie: %v", err) } req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, srv.URL+"/inbox", nil) req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "mail_go_session", Value: forged}) client := &http.Client{CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error { return http.ErrUseLastResponse }} resp, err := client.Do(req) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("request with forged cookie: %v", err) } defer resp.Body.Close() // 签名校验失败 -> 未认证,必须被重定向到登录页 if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusFound { t.Fatalf("forged legacy-key session must be rejected: status = %d, want 302 redirect to /login", resp.StatusCode) } if loc := resp.Header.Get("Location"); !strings.HasPrefix(loc, "/login") { t.Fatalf("forged session should redirect to /login, got Location: %q", loc) } } func TestNewWebServerRejectsBadSecretKeys(t *testing.T) { chdirRepoRoot(t) stores := newTestStores(t) baseDir := t.TempDir() attStorage := storage.NewAttachmentStorage(filepath.Join(baseDir, "attachments")) cases := []struct { name string key string }{ {"empty", ""}, {"legacy default", config.InsecureLegacySecretKey}, {"too short", "short-key"}, } for _, tc := range cases { t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { _, err := NewWebServer(config.WebConfig{Addr: "127.0.0.1:0", SecretKey: tc.key}, stores, attStorage, config.StorageConfig{BaseDir: baseDir}, config.AuthConfig{}, config.BanConfig{}, config.CaddyConfig{}, nil) if err == nil { t.Fatalf("NewWebServer should reject secret key %q", tc.key) } }) } }