fix(web): address wildcard host review
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ describe('parseDshArgs', () => {
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.toEqual({ mode: 'profile', profile: 'tui', patches: [], args: ['--resume', 'abc'] })
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expect(parse(['--profile', 'web', '-h']))
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.toEqual({ mode: 'profile', profile: 'web', patches: [], args: ['-h'] })
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expect(parse(['web', '--host', '0.0.0.0', '--port', '8080', '--dev']))
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.toEqual({ mode: 'profile', profile: 'web', patches: [], args: ['--host', '0.0.0.0', '--port', '8080', '--dev'] })
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expect(parse(['web', '--host', '127.0.0.1', '--port', '8080', '--dev']))
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.toEqual({ mode: 'profile', profile: 'web', patches: [], args: ['--host', '127.0.0.1', '--port', '8080', '--dev'] })
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expect(parse(['--profile', 'headless', 'run', 'the', 'tests']))
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.toEqual({ mode: 'profile', profile: 'headless', patches: [], args: ['run', 'the', 'tests'] })
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// Launcher flags placed after that boundary belong to the app too.
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@@ -339,6 +339,15 @@ describe.skipIf(!existsSync(dshBin))('dsh BUILT bin (node lib/bin.js, no tsx)',
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expect(web.stdout).toContain('--port <port>')
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expect(web.stdout).not.toContain('dsh web: http://')
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const wildcardHost = await runBuiltBin(['web', '--host', '0.0.0.0'], {
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DSH_HOME: home,
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DSH_TELEMETRY_DISABLED: '1',
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})
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expect(wildcardHost.code).toBe(1)
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expect(wildcardHost.stdout).toBe('')
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expect(wildcardHost.stderr).toContain('--host 0.0.0.0 is intentionally not supported yet for safety: it would expose remote code execution to the network; use 127.0.0.1 instead')
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expect(wildcardHost.stderr).not.toContain('dsh web: http://')
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const headlessHelp = await runBuiltBin(['--profile', 'headless', '--help'], {
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DSH_HOME: home,
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DSH_TELEMETRY_DISABLED: '1',
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@@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ Examples:
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/**
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* Parse and provide the Web invocation as an ordinary Cordis service. The
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* command's action publishes the flags this invocation named; an unsupported
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* `--host` or non-numeric `--port` is a usage error, so on rejection (and on
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* `--help`) nothing is provided.
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* command's action publishes the flags this invocation named; `--host 0.0.0.0`
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* or a non-numeric `--port` is a usage error, so on rejection (and on `--help`)
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* nothing is provided.
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* @param ctx - plugin context carrying the command line.
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*/
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export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
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@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/client/connection/README.md
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README.md: 3315552dd0400697d5a96639598c5f5bb2bb4f5b
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README.zh.md: 0dc251f1e5410bd0d74ef450c6d8df3dc9cdab81
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README.md: f0a707cc5f3a962c7852f7323c727d0a39a57b10
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README.zh.md: b529eebf9af93e36b6b92c19964678b7f5a04ea1
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Wire consumer layer: the client plugin's apply mounts `ctx.connection` (shared a
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## /api browser-trust fence
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The node half guards every entry under `/api` before bridging or upgrading (`src/api-request-trust.ts`). Every request — browser-marked or not — must present a `Host` that is a loopback authority or matches a `trustedHosts` entry: exact on `host:port` entries, any port on port-less entries, both sides compared through WHATWG normalization (DNS-rebinding defense). There is deliberately no shortcut for unmarked HTTP requests: over plain HTTP a browser attaches neither `Origin` nor Fetch-Metadata to image and navigation reads, so an unmarked request may still be a rebound browser read with a readable response, and Host is the one header rebinding cannot forge; a browser WebSocket handshake carries `Origin` and passes the same comparison. Non-browser clients pass the same fence via loopback, the CLI-derived LAN IP literals, or a declared authority. When markers are present, an attached `Origin` must equal the Host authority, and an explicit `sec-fetch-site: cross-site` marker is refused. A `trustedHosts` entry that is not a bare, canonical `host[:port]` authority — one WHATWG parsing reads back exactly as written — fails the plugin load loudly: parsing would otherwise quietly authorize the hostname inside `harness.internal/path`, or broaden a dangling-colon or zero-padded port to an any-port grant. HTTP failures answer plain 403 before any RPC dispatch; upgrade failures reject the handshake before any event stream starts. A non-loopback (`--host 0.0.0.0`) deployment therefore needs its serving authorities trusted: the dsh CLI derives the machine's LAN IP literals itself and its `--trusted-host` flag declares named ones, so `trustedHosts` in cordis.yml is for compositions the CLI does not boot. The fence is a reachability policy, not authentication; the Web carrier provides no authentication layer. Decision record: [the api browser-trust boundary Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md).
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The node half guards every entry under `/api` before bridging or upgrading (`src/api-request-trust.ts`). Every request — browser-marked or not — must present a `Host` that is a loopback authority or matches a `trustedHosts` entry: exact on `host:port` entries, any port on port-less entries, both sides compared through WHATWG normalization (DNS-rebinding defense). There is deliberately no shortcut for unmarked HTTP requests: over plain HTTP a browser attaches neither `Origin` nor Fetch-Metadata to image and navigation reads, so an unmarked request may still be a rebound browser read with a readable response, and Host is the one header rebinding cannot forge; a browser WebSocket handshake carries `Origin` and passes the same comparison. Non-browser clients pass the same fence via loopback, deployment-derived LAN IP literals, or a declared authority. When markers are present, an attached `Origin` must equal the Host authority, and an explicit `sec-fetch-site: cross-site` marker is refused. A `trustedHosts` entry that is not a bare, canonical `host[:port]` authority — one WHATWG parsing reads back exactly as written — fails the plugin load loudly: parsing would otherwise quietly authorize the hostname inside `harness.internal/path`, or broaden a dangling-colon or zero-padded port to an any-port grant. HTTP failures answer plain 403 before any RPC dispatch; upgrade failures reject the handshake before any event stream starts. Non-loopback compositions must trust their serving authorities explicitly: the Web runtime derives LAN IP literals from an all-interfaces server config, while `trustedHosts` in cordis.yml and the CLI's `--trusted-host` flag declare named authorities. `dsh web --host 0.0.0.0` is intentionally unsupported until remote access has an authentication layer. The fence is a reachability policy, not authentication; the Web carrier provides no authentication layer. Decision record: [the api browser-trust boundary Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md).
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## `/api` WebSocket downlinks
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
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## /api 浏览器信任栅栏
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node 半侧在桥接或 upgrade 前守卫 `/api` 下的每个入口（`src/api-request-trust.ts`）。每个请求——无论是否带浏览器标记——`Host` 都必须是回环地址权威，或与某个 `trustedHosts` 条目匹配：带端口的 `host:port` 条目精确匹配，不带端口的条目匹配任意端口，两侧均经 WHATWG 归一化后比较（DNS rebinding 防御）。刻意不为无浏览器标记的 HTTP 请求开捷径：明文 HTTP 下浏览器的图片与导航读取既不带 `Origin` 也不带 Fetch-Metadata，因此无标记请求仍可能是被重绑页面发起的、响应可被读走的读取，而 Host 是重绑唯一伪造不了的请求头；WebSocket 浏览器握手会带 `Origin` 并通过同一道比较。非浏览器客户端经由回环地址、CLI（命令行界面）推导的 LAN IP 字面量或已声明的权威通过同一道栅栏。当标记存在时，如附带 `Origin`，则它必须与 Host 权威完全一致；显式的 `sec-fetch-site: cross-site` 标记一律拒绝。不是纯的、规范形 `host[:port]` 权威的 `trustedHosts` 条目——即 WHATWG 解析读回后与原文不完全一致的——会让插件加载明确报错：否则解析会悄悄授权 `harness.internal/path` 这类笔误里的 hostname，或把悬空冒号、补零端口放大成任意端口授权。HTTP 失败在任何 RPC 分发之前以纯 403 应答，upgrade 失败在启动任何事件流前拒绝握手。因此非回环（`--host 0.0.0.0`）部署需要让自己的服务权威被信任：dsh CLI 会自行推导本机的 LAN IP 字面量，其 `--trusted-host` flag 用于声明具名权威，所以 cordis.yml 中的 `trustedHosts` 面向 CLI 不参与引导的组合。这道栅栏是可达性策略，而不是认证；Web 载体不提供认证层。决策记录：[api 浏览器信任边界 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md)。
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node 半侧在桥接或 upgrade 前守卫 `/api` 下的每个入口（`src/api-request-trust.ts`）。每个请求——无论是否带浏览器标记——`Host` 都必须是回环地址权威，或与某个 `trustedHosts` 条目匹配：带端口的 `host:port` 条目精确匹配，不带端口的条目匹配任意端口，两侧均经 WHATWG 归一化后比较（DNS rebinding 防御）。刻意不为无浏览器标记的 HTTP 请求开捷径：明文 HTTP 下浏览器的图片与导航读取既不带 `Origin` 也不带 Fetch-Metadata，因此无标记请求仍可能是被重绑页面发起的、响应可被读走的读取，而 Host 是重绑唯一伪造不了的请求头；WebSocket 浏览器握手会带 `Origin` 并通过同一道比较。非浏览器客户端经由回环地址、部署推导的 LAN IP 字面量或已声明的权威通过同一道栅栏。当标记存在时，如附带 `Origin`，则它必须与 Host 权威完全一致；显式的 `sec-fetch-site: cross-site` 标记一律拒绝。不是纯的、规范形 `host[:port]` 权威的 `trustedHosts` 条目——即 WHATWG 解析读回后与原文不完全一致的——会让插件加载明确报错：否则解析会悄悄授权 `harness.internal/path` 这类笔误里的 hostname，或把悬空冒号、补零端口放大成任意端口授权。HTTP 失败在任何 RPC 分发之前以纯 403 应答，upgrade 失败在启动任何事件流前拒绝握手。非回环组合必须显式信任其服务权威：Web 运行时从全接口服务器配置推导 LAN IP 字面量，cordis.yml 中的 `trustedHosts` 与 CLI（命令行界面）的 `--trusted-host` flag 则声明具名权威。`dsh web --host 0.0.0.0` 在远程访问具备认证层之前有意不受支持。这道栅栏是可达性策略，而不是认证；Web 载体不提供认证层。决策记录：[api 浏览器信任边界 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md)。
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## `/api` WebSocket 下行
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@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
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* nor Fetch-Metadata to reads (images and navigations — those
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* headers go only to trustworthy destinations), so an unmarked request may
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* still be a rebound browser read and Host is the one header rebinding cannot
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* forge. Non-browser and remote clients pass the same fence via loopback, the
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* CLI-derived LAN IP literals, or a declared `trustedHosts` authority.
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* forge. Non-browser and remote clients pass the same fence via loopback,
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* deployment-derived LAN IP literals, or a declared `trustedHosts` authority.
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* Network reachability and authentication stay out of scope: binding policy
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* belongs to the webserver config, and this fence is not an auth layer.
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*/
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@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@ describe('connection node half', () => {
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const loopback = fakeResponse()
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await routes[0]!.handler(fakeRequest({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080' }), loopback.response)
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expect(loopback.state.status).toBe(404)
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// LAN authority declared as a port-less IP literal — the shape the CLI
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// derives for `--host 0.0.0.0` — passes markerless curl on any port.
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// An all-interfaces composition derives port-less LAN IP literals, which
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// pass markerless curl on any port.
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const lan = fakeResponse()
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await routes[0]!.handler(fakeRequest({ host: '192.168.1.5:3080' }), lan.response)
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expect(lan.state.status).toBe(404)
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