Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/worktree/ci-native-windows-20260808' into worktree/ci-native-windows-coverage-20260808

2026-08-09 02:15:46 +08:00
parent bb0cdc2da5 da45d66b14
commit 1ce84853de
1062 changed files with 17432 additions and 9494 deletions
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/credentials/README.md
-README.md: c08831c90333f8515bf86a5af717c38c50b50817
-README.zh.md: c9756c010af5d2db0fc41f3108eabdc7f1161293
+README.md: 75e3941ff6421ca7e41a71ab2bfe8b30209ce598
+README.zh.md: d7c958689fdffc82830a82b04e2a06802bc81634
@@ -10,3 +10,5 @@ The credential capability family separates reference resolution from its provide
 | [`credentials-local/`](credentials-local/README.md) | Environment and local-file provider | registers `ctx.credentials` |

 Configuration carries references, not secret values. Consumers resolve those references at their operation boundary; the child READMEs own mutation, precedence, and storage semantics.
+
+The subsystem reference — `CredentialRef`, per-operation resolution, UI-safe `CredentialInfo`, provider layers — is [docs/subsystems/credentials.md](../../docs/subsystems/credentials.md).
@@ -10,3 +10,5 @@
 | [`credentials-local/`](credentials-local/README.md) | 环境与本地文件提供方 | 注册 `ctx.credentials` |

 配置携带引用而非机密值。消费方在其操作边界解析这些引用；变更、优先级与存储语义由子级 README 负责。
+
+子系统参考——`CredentialRef`、按操作解析、对 UI 安全的 `CredentialInfo`、提供方层——见 [docs/subsystems/credentials.md](../../docs/subsystems/credentials.md)。
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/credentials/credentials-local/README.md
-README.md: 035d558d8cbd51ce46af72d7bd9cd56bed85ebcd
-README.zh.md: 11c772951dab3ce0cea3a13e739198d41028d598
+README.md: 462618b990f8d07e9b855248db1e149b3c673964
+README.zh.md: 55cc4411fcc9db9f13ae0077eaf2bce7871a0cd5
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ External edits publish `credentials/updated` per changed reference after the sna

 ## Security boundary

-The document is `0600` under a `0700` directory, which stops other OS users — **not** the model. Tool processes (bash, the filesystem tools) run as the same user, and the shipped `workspace-write` file policy confines mutations rather than reads, so they can read this file exactly like any other file the user owns; no sandbox mode singles it out. What the harness does hold to is narrower: it never hands the model a resolved path to the document, and never loads it into the process environment — unlike `$DSH_HOME/.env`, which is the user's ordinary environment layer (see [app-boot's Harness-home layers](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#profiles)) — so reaching the value takes a deliberate read of a path the agent was not given.
+The document is `0600` under a `0700` directory, which stops other OS users — **not** the model. Tool processes (bash, the filesystem tools) run as the same user, and the shipped `workspace-write` file policy confines mutations rather than reads, so they can read this file exactly like any other file the user owns; no sandbox mode singles it out. What the harness does hold to is narrower: it never hands the model a resolved path to the document, and never loads it into the process environment — unlike `$DSH_HOME/.env`, which is the user's ordinary environment layer (see [app-boot's Harness-home layers](../../boot/app-boot/README.md#profiles)) — so reaching the value takes a deliberate read of a path the agent was not given.

 That is discretion, not a boundary. A deployment that must keep provider keys away from its own agent cannot get there with file permissions; an OS-keychain provider — a store the model's processes cannot read at all — is the deferred answer and belongs beside this provider as a sibling package.

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ OPENAI_API_KEY: sk-…

 ## 安全边界

-文档在 `0700` 目录下以 `0600` 权限存放，这挡得住其他 OS 用户，**挡不住**模型。工具进程（bash、文件系统工具）以同一用户身份运行，而已交付的 `workspace-write` 文件策略限制的是修改而非读取，因此它们读这个文件与读该用户拥有的任何其他文件毫无二致；也没有任何沙箱模式会把它单独挑出来。harness 真正守住的更窄：它绝不把该文档的解析后路径交给模型，也绝不把它载入进程环境——这与用户的普通环境层 `$DSH_HOME/.env` 不同（见 [app-boot 的 Harness home 各层](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#profiles)）——因此要拿到这个值，需要刻意去读一条并未交给 agent（智能体）的路径。
+文档在 `0700` 目录下以 `0600` 权限存放，这挡得住其他 OS 用户，**挡不住**模型。工具进程（bash、文件系统工具）以同一用户身份运行，而已交付的 `workspace-write` 文件策略限制的是修改而非读取，因此它们读这个文件与读该用户拥有的任何其他文件毫无二致；也没有任何沙箱模式会把它单独挑出来。harness 真正守住的更窄：它绝不把该文档的解析后路径交给模型，也绝不把它载入进程环境——这与用户的普通环境层 `$DSH_HOME/.env` 不同（见 [app-boot 的 Harness home 各层](../../boot/app-boot/README.md#profiles)）——因此要拿到这个值，需要刻意去读一条并未交给 agent（智能体）的路径。

 这是审慎，不是边界。必须让提供方密钥远离自身 agent 的部署无法靠文件权限做到；OS 钥匙串提供方——一个模型的进程根本读不到的存储——才是延后的答案，它应当作为平级包与本提供方并列。