fix(core): enforce agent-scoped ownership boundaries

This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
2026-07-11 22:55:26 +08:00
parent 850796bb35
commit 3263dab822
62 files changed
+3982 -857

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+10 -7
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@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
/**
* Code Mode: the `run_code` tool and its dispatch bridge. The model writes a
* TypeScript program; the bridge hands it to `ctx.codeRuntime` with one
* async binding per registered tool, serializes every binding call through a
* per-run queue onto `ToolRegistry.execute()` (so `tools/pre-execute` /
* `tools/post-execute` gate sub-calls exactly like native ones), logs each
* sub-dispatch as a `tool/code-dispatch` session event, and returns only the
* program's curated output. The registry itself decides WHEN this tool
* exists (its `mode` config); this module owns only the tool and the bridge.
* TypeScript program; the bridge hands it to `ctx.codeRuntime` with one async
* binding per end capability visible to the calling agent, then serializes
* every binding call through a per-run queue onto `ToolRegistry.execute()`.
* Sub-calls therefore traverse the complete pre/guard/around/post/final-result
* pipeline exactly like native calls and carry the outer execution's opaque
* token for correlation. The bridge logs each sub-dispatch as a
* `tool/code-dispatch` session event and returns only the program's curated
* output. The registry itself decides WHEN this tool exists (its `mode`
* config); this module owns only the tool and the bridge.
*
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-tools/src/code-mode
*/
@@ -205,6 +207,7 @@ export function createRunCodeTool(registry: ToolRegistry, requireRuntime: () =>
name,
arguments: normalized.dispatched,
...exec.agent ? { agent: exec.agent } : {},
parent: exec.token,
signal: runController.signal,
})
const text = textOf(result.content)
+467 -121
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@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
/**
* Tool registry and execution pipeline. Plugins register tools; the registry
* feeds schemas into the system prompt, and `execute()` dispatches each call
* through `tools/pre-execute` (the allow/deny gate) → `tools/execute` (an
* around-dispatch wrapper for timeout/retry/metrics plugins) → `tools/post-execute`
* (inspect/replace the result, attach context) for sandbox, permission, and hook
* plugins to gate or transform a call.
* through `tools/pre-execute` (the extensible allow/deny gate) → monotonic
* registered guards → `tools/execute` (an around-dispatch wrapper for
* timeout/retry/metrics plugins) → `tools/post-execute` (inspect/replace the
* result, attach context) → the observe-only `tools/result` notification.
*
* The registry also owns HOW its tools are presented to the model — its
* `mode` config: `'native'` (every tool as a wire function definition,
* today's behavior and the default), `'code'` (the wire carries exactly one
* tool, `run_code`, plus a generated TypeScript SDK prompt section), or
* today's behavior and the default), `'code'` (the registry's canonical wire
* contribution is one tool, `run_code`, plus a generated TypeScript SDK prompt section), or
* `'both'`. See `code-mode.ts` (the tool + dispatch bridge) and
* `ts-types.ts` (the SDK codegen); design in the Code Mode RFC.
*
@@ -21,8 +21,9 @@ import z from 'schemastery'
import { scopeOf, scopeTarget } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope'
import type { ScopeKey, Scoped } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope'
import type { CallId, ContentBlock, ToolSchema } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm'
import { HarnessError } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm'
import { deepFreeze, HarnessError } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm'
import type { Agent, HookContext } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
import { isJsonValue } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
import type { ToolProviderResult } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
import type { CodeRuntime } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime'
import type { ToolCallView, ToolResultView } from './presentation.ts'
@@ -105,10 +106,13 @@ declare module 'cordis' {
* unknown tool) is already normalized to an `isError` result by the time a
* listener's `await next()` returns, so a wrapper never sees a raw throw from
* the tool body. This is the seam a timeout/retry/metrics plugin wraps: it can
* mutate `exec` (e.g. replace `exec.signal` with a per-call deadline) BEFORE
* `next()` and inspect the result AFTER. (Cordis `next()` ignores any passed
* arguments and re-invokes downstream with the shared payload, so a wrapper
* mutates `exec` in place rather than passing a new object to `next()`.)
* set or replace the one mutable field, `exec.signal` (e.g. with a per-call
* deadline), BEFORE `next()`, restore/delete it afterward, and inspect the result AFTER. Call identity
* (`token`, `callId`, `name`, `arguments`, `agent`, and `parent`) is immutable throughout the
* pipeline so a wrapper cannot change which capability or scope was
* authorized. (Cordis `next()` ignores passed arguments and re-invokes
* downstream with the shared payload, so a wrapper changes `exec.signal` in
* place rather than passing a new object to `next()`.)
* Multiple listeners compose by registration order — an outer one wraps the
* inner ones plus dispatch.
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): the carrier is keyed by
@@ -139,6 +143,21 @@ declare module 'cordis' {
* @mode waterfall
*/
'tools/post-execute'(this: Scoped<ToolRegistry>, exec: ToolExecution, result: ToolExecutionResult, next: () => Promise<PostToolDecision>): Promise<PostToolDecision>
/**
* Awaited notification of the authoritative FINAL tool outcome, after the
* complete pre/execute/post pipeline, final lossless-JSON validation, and
* outer error normalization.
* Unlike the three waterfalls, this seam cannot transform the result: each
* listener receives the now-frozen execution object and a deep-frozen result
* snapshot; listener failures are contained and logged, and
* {@link ToolRegistry.execute} still returns the outcome.
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): keyed by
* `exec.agent`, using the same carrier as the pipeline.
* @param exec - the execution object that traversed the pipeline.
* @param result - a deep-frozen snapshot of the final returned result.
* @mode parallel
*/
'tools/result'(this: Scoped<ToolRegistry>, exec: Readonly<ToolExecution>, result: Readonly<ToolExecutionResult>): Promise<void> | void
/**
* A tool was registered or unregistered, or a scoped restriction changed
* (the available tool set changed — possibly for one scope only). An
@@ -152,10 +171,8 @@ declare module 'cordis' {
}
}
// TODO(review): revisit these shapes when the first real tools and
// sandbox/permission plugins land (e.g. a concurrency-safety hint for
// parallel execution — Claude Code partitions read-only tools; phase 1
// executes sequentially).
// TODO(review): revisit these shapes when concurrency metadata becomes useful
// (for example, a read-only hint that would permit safe parallel execution).
/**
* What a tool's `execute` returns. The bare {@link ContentBlock}`[]` form is the
@@ -214,17 +231,54 @@ export interface ToolResult {
meta?: unknown
}
/** One pending tool call, as it flows through the execution pipeline (`tools/pre-execute` → dispatch → `tools/post-execute`). */
export interface ToolExecution {
callId: CallId
name: string
/** Parsed JSON arguments (unknown — tools validate their own input). */
arguments: unknown
declare const toolExecutionTokenBrand: unique symbol
/** Tokens minted in this module; a cast or JavaScript object cannot forge membership. */
const executionTokens = new WeakSet<object>()
/**
* Opaque, immutable identity for one trip through the tool pipeline. Nested
* transports carry the enclosing execution's token instead of its live object,
* so observe-only result listeners can correlate calls without gaining a
* mutation path into an outer around-dispatch wrapper.
*/
export interface ToolExecutionToken {
readonly [toolExecutionTokenBrand]: true
}
/**
* Caller-supplied description of one tool call. {@link ToolRegistry.execute}
* snapshots this input into a pipeline-owned {@link ToolExecution}; callers do
* not choose the execution token.
*/
export interface ToolExecutionInput {
readonly callId: CallId
readonly name: string
/** Losslessly JSON-serializable parsed arguments (tools validate their own schema). */
readonly arguments: unknown
/** The agent on whose behalf the call runs (set by the agent loop). */
agent?: Agent
readonly agent?: Agent
/**
* Opaque token of the enclosing transport execution, when one exists. Code
* Mode sets this on SDK sub-dispatches so commit-style observers can wait for
* the outer `run_code` outcome without receiving its live mutable execution.
*/
readonly parent?: ToolExecutionToken
signal?: AbortSignal
}
/**
* One pending tool call inside the registry pipeline. Call identity, the
* registry-assigned {@link token}, and a lossless-JSON-validated, deep-frozen
* clone of the parsed arguments are immutable from the first policy listener onward, while an
* around-dispatch wrapper may set, replace, or remove only `signal`. The
* registry freezes the complete object before `tools/result` observers run.
*/
export interface ToolExecution extends ToolExecutionInput {
/** Registry-assigned identity shared with nested calls only as their opaque `parent` token. */
readonly token: ToolExecutionToken
}
/** Structured error metadata for a failed tool call (alongside the model-facing text). */
export interface ToolErrorInfo {
name: string
@@ -255,7 +309,6 @@ export interface ToolExecutionResult {
* text in `content` is always present; this is extra structure for code.
*/
error?: ToolErrorInfo
/**
/**
* Extra model-facing context a `tools/post-execute` listener attached for the
* NEXT request (Claude Code's PostToolUse `additionalContext`). It is NOT part
@@ -318,17 +371,28 @@ export type PostToolDecision =
* is stringified.
*/
function errorMessage(error: unknown): string {
if (error instanceof Error) return error.message
if (typeof error === 'object' && error !== null
&& 'message' in error && typeof error.message === 'string') {
return error.message
try {
if (error instanceof Error) return error.message
if (typeof error === 'object' && error !== null
&& 'message' in error && typeof error.message === 'string') {
return error.message
}
return String(error)
} catch {
// A hostile thrown value can trap `instanceof`, property access, or string
// coercion. Error normalization is the outermost safety boundary, so its
// fallback must itself be total.
return '<unprintable thrown value>'
}
return String(error)
}
/** Structured `{ name, code }` for a thrown HarnessError, else undefined. */
function errorInfo(error: unknown): ToolErrorInfo | undefined {
return error instanceof HarnessError ? { name: error.name, code: error.code } : undefined
try {
return error instanceof HarnessError ? { name: error.name, code: error.code } : undefined
} catch {
return undefined
}
}
/** How the registry presents its tools to the model (see {@link Config.mode}). */
@@ -338,9 +402,9 @@ export type ToolPresentationMode = 'native' | 'code' | 'both'
export interface Config {
/**
* The presentation mode. `'native'` (the default) contributes every
* registered tool as a wire function definition — byte-for-byte today's
* behavior. `'code'` contributes exactly ONE wire tool, `run_code`, plus
* the generated `tools:sdk` prompt section declaring every other tool as a
* visible end capability as a native wire function definition. Under
* `'code'` this registry contributes exactly ONE wire tool,
* `run_code`, plus the generated `tools:sdk` prompt section declaring every other tool as a
* TypeScript API the program calls. `'both'` contributes every native
* definition AND `run_code` + the SDK section. Non-native modes require a
* loaded `ctx.codeRuntime` whose `language` is `'typescript'` — a missing
@@ -371,11 +435,27 @@ export interface ToolRestriction {
deny?: string[]
}
/**
* A monotonic execution guard evaluated after every `tools/pre-execute`
* listener and before the tool body. Returning a reason denies the call;
* returning `undefined` leaves it unchanged. Because guards have no allow
* result, listener ordering cannot turn a denial back into permission.
* @param execution - the identity-protected call after extensible pre-execute policy completed.
* @returns a final denial reason, or `undefined` to leave the call allowed.
*/
export type ToolGuard = (execution: Readonly<ToolExecution>) => string | undefined
/** One guard registration; the wrapper preserves independent duplicate registrations. */
interface ToolGuardRegistration {
guard: ToolGuard
}
/**
* Tool registry (`ctx.tools`): tool plugins register definitions; the agent
* loop executes calls through the `tools/pre-execute` → `tools/execute`
* `tools/post-execute` pipeline. The registry contributes its schemas into the
* system-prompt assembly — WHICH schemas is governed by its `mode` config
* loop executes calls through the `tools/pre-execute` → guards
* `tools/execute` → `tools/post-execute` → `tools/result` pipeline. The
* registry contributes its schemas into the system-prompt assembly — WHICH
* schemas is governed by its `mode` config
* (see {@link Config.mode}); under a non-native mode it also owns the reserved
* `run_code` presentation transport and the `tools:sdk` prompt section.
*
@@ -402,6 +482,9 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
private scoped = new Map<ScopeKey, Map<string, ToolDefinition>>()
/** Snapshot-at-registration restriction filters, per scope (see {@link restrict}). */
private restrictions = new Map<ScopeKey, ToolRestriction[]>()
/** Monotonic post-policy guards, split into global and per-agent layers. */
private globalGuards = new Set<ToolGuardRegistration>()
private scopedGuards = new Map<ScopeKey, Set<ToolGuardRegistration>>()
private readonly mode: ToolPresentationMode
/** Reserved presentation transport, kept outside the filterable registration layers. */
private readonly codeTransport: ToolDefinition | undefined
@@ -418,7 +501,7 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
// the filterable global/scoped capability layers.
this.codeTransport = this.mode === 'native'
? undefined
: createRunCodeTool(this, () => this.requireCodeRuntime())
: deepFreeze(createRunCodeTool(this, () => this.requireCodeRuntime()))
ctx.systemPrompt.tools(context => this.wireSchemas(context.scope))
if (this.mode !== 'native') {
ctx.systemPrompt.section({
@@ -436,6 +519,11 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
return renderToolsSdk(this.schemas(context.scope).filter(schema => schema.name !== RUN_CODE_NAME))
},
})
// These are presentation infrastructure, not optional end capabilities.
// Protect them at their owner: assembly listeners may still transform
// ordinary tools and prose, but cannot silently leave Code Mode without
// its only wire transport or the SDK that tells the model how to use it.
ctx.systemPrompt.protect({ sections: ['tools:sdk'], tools: [RUN_CODE_NAME] })
}
}
@@ -495,8 +583,12 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
* the shadowing feature, not an error; the global-duplicate message names
* `agent.ctx` as the per-agent alternative), or if a non-native mode reserves
* the `run_code` name for its presentation transport. The visible schema set
* flows into prompt assembly automatically. Disposed with the calling
* fiber. Emits `tools/change` on register/unregister.
* flows into prompt assembly automatically. Registration validates and
* clones the JSON parameters, copies scalar fields, binds each callback once
* to the caller's definition as its method receiver, and freezes the stored
* snapshot; later mutation or callback replacement on the input object does
* not rewrite the registry. Disposed with the calling fiber. Emits
* `tools/change` on register/unregister.
* @param definition - the tool's schema plus its execute (and optional
* presentation) functions.
* @returns the disposer that unregisters the tool. The exact
@@ -505,24 +597,52 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
*/
register(definition: ToolDefinition): () => Promise<void> | void {
const scope = scopeOf(this.ctx)
if (this.codeTransport !== undefined && definition.name === RUN_CODE_NAME) {
// A schema crosses the same model/log boundary as execution arguments.
// Validate BEFORE cloning because structuredClone silently turns some
// forbidden values (for example class instances) into plain records, then
// validate the detached value again to contain hostile getters that change
// between inspection and snapshotting. A frozen Map is still mutable, so
// deepFreeze alone is not a sufficient registration boundary.
if (!isJsonValue(definition.parameters)) {
throw new TypeError('tool parameters must be losslessly JSON-serializable')
}
const parameters = structuredClone(definition.parameters)
if (!isJsonValue(parameters)) {
throw new TypeError('tool parameters must be stable losslessly JSON-serializable data')
}
// Bind once so replacing a callback on the caller-owned definition after
// registration cannot change dispatch, while preserving the historical
// method receiver (`this === definition`) for callbacks that use it.
const execute = definition.execute.bind(definition)
const presentCall = definition.presentCall?.bind(definition)
const presentResult = definition.presentResult?.bind(definition)
const snapshot: ToolDefinition = deepFreeze({
name: definition.name,
description: definition.description,
parameters,
execute,
...definition.timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs: definition.timeoutMs } : {},
...presentCall !== undefined ? { presentCall } : {},
...presentResult !== undefined ? { presentResult } : {},
})
if (this.codeTransport !== undefined && snapshot.name === RUN_CODE_NAME) {
throw new Error(`tool name "${RUN_CODE_NAME}" is reserved for the Code Mode presentation transport and cannot be registered or shadowed`)
}
const dispose = this.ctx.effect(function* (this: ToolRegistry) {
const layer = scope === undefined ? this.global : this.layerFor(scope)
if (layer.has(definition.name)) {
if (layer.has(snapshot.name)) {
throw new Error(scope === undefined
? `tool "${definition.name}" is already registered (for a per-agent variant, register through that agent's \`agent.ctx\` instead)`
: `tool "${definition.name}" is already registered in this scope`)
? `tool "${snapshot.name}" is already registered (for a per-agent variant, register through that agent's \`agent.ctx\` instead)`
: `tool "${snapshot.name}" is already registered in this scope`)
}
layer.set(definition.name, definition)
layer.set(snapshot.name, snapshot)
// Yield the rollback BEFORE emitting `tools/change`: a generator effect
// collects each yielded disposer before the next step runs, so a throwing
// `tools/change` listener removes the tool instead of leaking it (a leak
// would wedge the duplicate-name check until restart). The duplicate
// throw above fires before any mutation — it leaks nothing.
yield () => {
layer.delete(definition.name)
layer.delete(snapshot.name)
// An emptied scope layer is dropped so a disposed scope leaves no
// residue keyed by its (dead) key.
if (scope !== undefined && layer.size === 0) this.scoped.delete(scope)
@@ -604,6 +724,30 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
return dispose
}
/**
* Register a monotonic guard after the extensible `tools/pre-execute`
* waterfall. A plain-context guard applies globally; one registered through
* `agent.ctx` applies only to that agent. Any matching guard may deny by
* returning a reason, while no guard can force-allow a call another guard
* denied. The exact effect disposer is returned for ordered ownership and
* HMR cleanup.
* @param guard - synchronous check; a returned string denies the execution.
* @returns the exact disposer that unregisters the guard.
*/
guard(guard: ToolGuard): () => Promise<void> | void {
const scope = scopeOf(this.ctx)
const registration = { guard }
const dispose = this.ctx.effect(function* (this: ToolRegistry) {
const layer = scope === undefined ? this.globalGuards : this.guardLayerFor(scope)
layer.add(registration)
yield () => {
layer.delete(registration)
if (scope !== undefined && layer.size === 0) this.scopedGuards.delete(scope)
}
}.bind(this), 'tools.guard()')
return dispose
}
/** The (created-on-demand) scoped layer for `scope`. */
private layerFor(scope: ScopeKey): Map<string, ToolDefinition> {
let layer = this.scoped.get(scope)
@@ -614,6 +758,43 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
return layer
}
/** Get or create the guard layer for one agent scope. */
private guardLayerFor(scope: ScopeKey): Set<ToolGuardRegistration> {
let layer = this.scopedGuards.get(scope)
if (layer === undefined) {
layer = new Set()
this.scopedGuards.set(scope, layer)
}
return layer
}
/** First monotonic denial from the global then matching scoped guard layers. */
private guardReason(exec: ToolExecution): string | undefined {
// Guards are policy, not another transform seam. The pipeline execution's
// identity and arguments are already protected; freeze a detached view so
// an untyped guard cannot replace the wrapper-mutable signal either.
const view: Readonly<ToolExecution> = Object.freeze({ ...exec })
for (const { guard } of this.globalGuards) {
const reason = guard(view)
if (reason !== undefined) return this.assertGuardReason(reason)
}
if (exec.agent !== undefined) {
for (const { guard } of this.scopedGuards.get(exec.agent) ?? []) {
const reason = guard(view)
if (reason !== undefined) return this.assertGuardReason(reason)
}
}
return undefined
}
/** Runtime boundary for JavaScript/casted guards: only strings can deny. */
private assertGuardReason(reason: unknown): string {
if (typeof reason !== 'string') {
throw new TypeError(`tools.guard() must return a denial string or undefined, got ${typeof reason}`)
}
return reason
}
/** Whether every restriction registered for `scope` admits the global tool `name` (intersection semantics). */
private admits(scope: ScopeKey | undefined, name: string): boolean {
if (scope === undefined) return true
@@ -707,8 +888,9 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
}
/**
* Execute one tool call through the `tools/pre-execute` → `tools/execute`
* (around dispatch) → `tools/post-execute` pipeline. `pre-execute` is the gate
* Execute one tool call through the `tools/pre-execute` → guards →
* `tools/execute` (around dispatch) → `tools/post-execute` → `tools/result`
* pipeline. `pre-execute` is the extensible gate
* (allow/deny), `tools/execute` wraps core dispatch (a timeout/retry/metrics
* seam), and `post-execute` is the inspect/transform seam; core dispatch sits
* as the base `next()` of the `tools/execute` waterfall. The whole thing is
@@ -719,74 +901,177 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
* tool is not registered (or not visible to the calling agent — a
* restricted-away global is exactly as absent as a nonexistent one), the
* result is an `isError` carrying a `UNKNOWN_TOOL` structured error. A thrown
* {@link HarnessError} surfaces its `{ name, code }` on the result.
* @param exec - the call to run (name, parsed arguments, caller agent, signal).
* {@link HarnessError} surfaces its `{ name, code }` on the result. Before
* the final observe-only notification, the authoritative outcome must survive
* a lossless JSON round trip; an invalid outcome is normalized to an error.
* Caller-owned arguments must survive lossless-JSON validation before and
* after cloning; a violation normalizes to an error before policy or dispatch.
* @param exec - the single-use call input; its identity is snapshotted and
* protected before policy runs.
* @returns the final result after every waterfall; failures resolve as
* `isError` results, never rejections.
*/
async execute(exec: ToolExecution): Promise<ToolExecutionResult> {
async execute(exec: ToolExecutionInput): Promise<ToolExecutionResult> {
let execution: ToolExecution
try {
// --- Gate: tools/pre-execute. A deny (or an ask, which degrades to deny
// until the permission system lands) skips dispatch entirely. The
// carrier keys the dispatch by exec.agent, so an `agent.ctx` listener
// gates only its own agent's calls (agent-less calls are subject-less).
const carrier = scopeTarget(this, exec.agent)
const decision = await this.ctx.waterfall(
carrier, 'tools/pre-execute', exec,
() => Promise.resolve<PreToolDecision>({ kind: 'allow' }),
)
if (decision.kind !== 'allow') {
// deny → isError. ask has no permission UI yet, so degrade to deny
// (FIXME(permissions)): a forthcoming permission system turns `ask` into
// a real prompt; today it is the conservative "not allowed".
const reason = decision.kind === 'deny'
? decision.reason
: decision.reason ?? `tool "${exec.name}" requires approval (not yet supported)`
const denied: ToolExecutionResult = {
callId: exec.callId,
content: [{ type: 'text', text: `Error: ${reason}` }],
isError: true,
}
return await this.postExecute(exec, denied)
}
// --- Around-dispatch: tools/execute. The base `next` is the dispatch-
// with-normalization thunk — the tool body's own try/catch turns a throw
// into an isError result so a wrapper (and post-execute) can inspect it;
// an unknown tool routes through the same catch. A `tools/execute` listener
// (e.g. a timeout plugin) wraps this thunk: it may mutate `exec` before
// delegating and inspect the normalized result after. Dispatched with the
// same carrier as the gate, so an `agent.ctx` wrapper wraps only its own
// agent's calls. ---
const result = await this.ctx.waterfall(
carrier, 'tools/execute', exec,
async (): Promise<ToolExecutionResult> => {
try {
// Resolve through the CALLER's visible view ({@link get}): a scoped
// tool shadows its global name-twin for that agent, and a
// restricted-away global tool is exactly as absent as a nonexistent
// one — same UNKNOWN_TOOL result, no capability leak in the error.
const tool = this.get(exec.name, exec.agent)
if (!tool) throw new ToolNotFoundError(exec.name)
// Normalize the two `execute` return shapes: a bare ContentBlock[] (no
// meta) or a { content, meta } object (a tool attaching a private
// presentation payload). An array IS the content; the object carries it.
const returned = await tool.execute(exec.arguments, exec)
const content = Array.isArray(returned) ? returned : returned.content
const meta = Array.isArray(returned) ? undefined : returned.meta
return { callId: exec.callId, content, isError: false, ...meta !== undefined ? { meta } : {} }
} catch (error: unknown) {
return toolErrorResult(exec.callId, error)
}
},
)
return await this.postExecute(exec, result)
execution = this.prepareExecution(exec)
} catch (error: unknown) {
// Outer backstop: a throwing pre/post-execute listener (or the waterfall
// machinery) becomes an isError result, never a turn failure.
return toolErrorResult(exec.callId, error)
// Contract-violating non-JSON or non-cloneable arguments cannot enter a
// pipeline whose logged and executed forms must agree. Still publish one
// scoped final outcome, using an immutable identity shell, so result
// observers retain their every-call guarantee without seeing the invalid
// value.
execution = Object.freeze({
token: createExecutionToken(),
callId: exec.callId,
name: exec.name,
arguments: undefined,
...exec.agent !== undefined ? { agent: exec.agent } : {},
...isExecutionToken(exec.parent) ? { parent: exec.parent } : {},
...exec.signal !== undefined ? { signal: exec.signal } : {},
})
const result = toolErrorResult(execution.callId, error)
await this.notifyResult(execution, result)
return result
}
let result: ToolExecutionResult
try {
// Validate the authoritative FINAL result, not merely the tool body's
// intermediate return. Post-policy may replace content or attach context,
// and every one of these fields is session-bound. Reject anything that
// cannot round-trip losslessly through the durable JSON log before the
// observe-only `tools/result` commit point sees success.
result = this.snapshotExecutionResult(execution, await this.executePipeline(execution))
} catch (error: unknown) {
// Outer backstop: a throwing pre/post-execute listener, guard, or the
// waterfall machinery becomes an isError result, never a turn failure.
result = toolErrorResult(execution.callId, error)
}
await this.notifyResult(execution, result)
return result
}
/** Snapshot one call into a shared pipeline object with immutable identity and mutable cancellation. */
private prepareExecution(input: ToolExecutionInput): ToolExecution {
if (input.parent !== undefined && !isExecutionToken(input.parent)) {
throw new TypeError('tool execution parent must be a registry-minted opaque token')
}
if (!isJsonValue(input.arguments)) {
throw new TypeError('tool execution arguments must be losslessly JSON-serializable')
}
const args = structuredClone(input.arguments)
if (!isJsonValue(args)) {
throw new TypeError('tool execution arguments must be stable losslessly JSON-serializable data')
}
const execution: ToolExecution = {
token: createExecutionToken(),
callId: input.callId,
name: input.name,
arguments: deepFreeze(args),
...input.agent !== undefined ? { agent: input.agent } : {},
...input.parent !== undefined ? { parent: input.parent } : {},
...input.signal !== undefined ? { signal: input.signal } : {},
}
Object.defineProperties(execution, {
token: { value: execution.token, enumerable: true, writable: false, configurable: false },
callId: { value: execution.callId, enumerable: true, writable: false, configurable: false },
name: { value: execution.name, enumerable: true, writable: false, configurable: false },
arguments: { value: execution.arguments, enumerable: true, writable: false, configurable: false },
agent: { value: input.agent, enumerable: true, writable: false, configurable: false },
parent: { value: input.parent, enumerable: true, writable: false, configurable: false },
})
if (input.signal !== undefined) {
Object.defineProperty(execution, 'signal', {
value: input.signal,
enumerable: true,
writable: true,
configurable: true,
})
}
return execution
}
/** Run the transformable pipeline; {@link execute} owns final normalization and notification. */
private async executePipeline(exec: ToolExecution): Promise<ToolExecutionResult> {
// --- Gate: tools/pre-execute. A deny (or an ask, which degrades to deny
// until the permission system lands) skips dispatch entirely. The
// carrier keys the dispatch by exec.agent, so an `agent.ctx` listener
// gates only its own agent's calls (agent-less calls are subject-less).
const carrier = scopeTarget(this, exec.agent)
const decision = await this.ctx.waterfall(
carrier, 'tools/pre-execute', exec,
() => Promise.resolve<PreToolDecision>({ kind: 'allow' }),
)
const denialReason = decision.kind === 'allow'
? this.guardReason(exec)
: decision.kind === 'deny'
? decision.reason
: decision.reason ?? `tool "${exec.name}" requires approval (not yet supported)`
if (denialReason !== undefined) {
// deny → isError. ask has no permission UI yet, so degrade to deny
// (FIXME(permissions)): a forthcoming permission system turns `ask` into
// a real prompt; today it is the conservative "not allowed".
const denied: ToolExecutionResult = {
callId: exec.callId,
content: [{ type: 'text', text: `Error: ${denialReason}` }],
isError: true,
}
return await this.postExecute(exec, denied)
}
// --- Around-dispatch: tools/execute. The base `next` is the dispatch-
// with-normalization thunk — the tool body's own try/catch turns a throw
// into an isError result so a wrapper (and post-execute) can inspect it;
// an unknown tool routes through the same catch. A `tools/execute` listener
// (e.g. a timeout plugin) wraps this thunk: it may replace `exec.signal`
// before delegating and inspect the normalized result after. Dispatched with the
// same carrier as the gate, so an `agent.ctx` wrapper wraps only its own
// agent's calls. ---
const result = this.snapshotExecutionResult(exec, await this.ctx.waterfall(
carrier, 'tools/execute', exec,
async (): Promise<ToolExecutionResult> => {
try {
// Resolve through the CALLER's visible view ({@link get}): a scoped
// tool shadows its global name-twin for that agent, and a
// restricted-away global tool is exactly as absent as a nonexistent
// one — same UNKNOWN_TOOL result, no capability leak in the error.
const tool = this.get(exec.name, exec.agent)
if (!tool) throw new ToolNotFoundError(exec.name)
// Normalize the two `execute` return shapes: a bare ContentBlock[] (no
// meta) or a { content, meta } object (a tool attaching a private
// presentation payload). An array IS the content; the object carries it.
const returned = await tool.execute(exec.arguments, exec)
const content = Array.isArray(returned) ? returned : returned.content
const meta = Array.isArray(returned) ? undefined : returned.meta
return { callId: exec.callId, content, isError: false, ...meta !== undefined ? { meta } : {} }
} catch (error: unknown) {
return toolErrorResult(exec.callId, error)
}
},
))
return await this.postExecute(exec, result)
}
/** Notify final-result observers without giving them a mutation/error channel into the outcome. */
private async notifyResult(exec: ToolExecution, result: ToolExecutionResult): Promise<void> {
// The pipeline is over: freeze the remaining mutable signal slot so every
// observer sees the SAME WeakMap-keyable execution without a mutation race.
Object.freeze(exec)
// postExecute clones every accepted result/decision before rebuilding the
// outcome; all error paths construct plain data. The final result is thus
// structurally cloneable before it reaches this observe-only boundary.
const snapshot = deepFreeze(structuredClone(result))
const callbacks = this.ctx.events.dispatch('parallel', [
scopeTarget(this, exec.agent), 'tools/result', exec, snapshot,
])
await Promise.all(callbacks.map(async (callback) => {
try {
await callback(exec, snapshot)
} catch (error: unknown) {
this.ctx.logger.warn(`tool "${exec.name}" (${exec.callId}): tools/result observer failed: ${errorMessage(error)}`)
}
}))
}
/**
@@ -804,21 +1089,14 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
// authoritative-call-id requirement and the "preserve the dispatched
// isError/error" contract. The decision is the ONLY sanctioned channel for a
// listener to change the outcome (block, or accept-with-replacement); the
// call id is always the authoritative `exec.callId`. `content` is copied into
// a fresh array so a listener's in-place `push`/`splice` on `result.content`
// cannot leak into the returned content either (the elements are the same
// references — the snapshot guards the array structure, not deep immutability).
const dispatched = {
callId: exec.callId,
content: [...result.content],
isError: result.isError,
...result.error ? { error: result.error } : {},
...result.meta !== undefined ? { meta: result.meta } : {},
}
const decision = await this.ctx.waterfall(
// call id is always the authoritative `exec.callId`. Deep cloning protects
// nested content, error, and meta data from in-place listener mutation.
const dispatched = this.snapshotExecutionResult(exec, result)
const decision = structuredClone(await this.ctx.waterfall(
scopeTarget(this, exec.agent), 'tools/post-execute', exec, result,
() => Promise.resolve<PostToolDecision>({ kind: 'accept' }),
)
))
this.assertPostDecision(decision)
const additionalContext = decision.additionalContext
if (decision.kind === 'block') {
return {
@@ -835,6 +1113,74 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
...additionalContext ? { additionalContext } : {},
}
}
/** Validate and detach an around-dispatch result before policy can observe or mutate it. */
private snapshotExecutionResult(exec: ToolExecution, value: unknown): ToolExecutionResult {
if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
throw new TypeError('tools/execute must return a ToolExecutionResult object')
}
const result = value as Partial<ToolExecutionResult>
if (!Array.isArray(result.content) || typeof result.isError !== 'boolean') {
throw new TypeError('tools/execute must return a ToolExecutionResult with content[] and boolean isError')
}
if (result.callId !== exec.callId) {
throw new TypeError(`tools/execute returned callId "${String(result.callId)}" for authoritative call "${exec.callId}"`)
}
const candidate = {
callId: exec.callId,
content: result.content,
isError: result.isError,
...result.error !== undefined ? { error: result.error } : {},
...result.additionalContext !== undefined ? { additionalContext: result.additionalContext } : {},
...result.meta !== undefined ? { meta: result.meta } : {},
}
// Validate BEFORE cloning: structuredClone turns some forbidden exotic or
// class instances into plain objects, which would hide a lossy JSON
// boundary violation. Validate the detached clone again to contain hostile
// getters whose value changes between inspection and snapshotting.
if (!isJsonValue(candidate)) {
throw new TypeError('tools/execute must return a losslessly JSON-serializable ToolExecutionResult')
}
const snapshot = structuredClone(candidate)
if (!isJsonValue(snapshot)) {
throw new TypeError('tools/execute must return a stable losslessly JSON-serializable ToolExecutionResult')
}
return snapshot
}
/** Reject malformed JavaScript/casted post decisions at the public event boundary. */
private assertPostDecision(value: unknown): asserts value is PostToolDecision {
if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
throw new TypeError('tools/post-execute must return a PostToolDecision object')
}
const decision = value as Partial<PostToolDecision>
switch (decision.kind) {
case 'accept':
if (decision.content !== undefined && !Array.isArray(decision.content)) {
throw new TypeError('tools/post-execute accept content must be an array')
}
return
case 'block':
if (!Array.isArray(decision.feedback)) {
throw new TypeError('tools/post-execute block feedback must be an array')
}
return
default:
throw new TypeError('tools/post-execute must return an accept or block decision')
}
}
}
/** Mint a frozen, property-free correlation token whose identity is its value. */
function createExecutionToken(): ToolExecutionToken {
const token = Object.freeze(Object.create(null)) as ToolExecutionToken
executionTokens.add(token)
return token
}
/** Runtime counterpart of the opaque token type, including `undefined` input. */
function isExecutionToken(value: unknown): value is ToolExecutionToken {
return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && executionTokens.has(value)
}
function toolErrorResult(callId: ToolExecution['callId'], error: unknown): ToolExecutionResult {