fix(connection): require trustedHosts entries in canonical authority form
A dangling colon (harness.internal:) or zero-padded port parses cleanly while WHATWG silently rewrites it, turning an intended exact-port grant into an any-port grant. Replace the character blacklist with a round-trip check: an entry must read back from parsing exactly as written (case aside), refusing the whole rewrite class at load.
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@@ -42,30 +42,35 @@ function parseAuthority(authority: string): URL | undefined {
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/**
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* Assert one configured `trustedHosts` entry is a bare authority (`host` or
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* `host:port`) and nothing else. WHATWG parsing would quietly read a hostname
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* out of `harness.internal/path` or `user@harness.internal` — a typo must fail
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* the load loudly instead of authorizing its hostname or being ignored until
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* requests 403. The character test refuses every URL part beyond the authority
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* (path, backslash path, query, fragment, userinfo) and all whitespace, which
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* WHATWG trimming would otherwise strip silently; IPv6 brackets use none of
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* them.
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* `host:port`) in canonical form: it must survive WHATWG parsing unchanged
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* (case aside). Anything parsing would silently rewrite is refused as a typo
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* that must fail the load loudly instead of being ignored until requests 403
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* or quietly changing the grant: URL parts beyond the authority
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* (`harness.internal/path`, `user@harness.internal` — which would authorize
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* the embedded hostname), stripped whitespace, a dangling colon or
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* zero-padded port (which would broaden an intended exact-port grant to every
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* port), and non-canonical host spellings (`0x7f.0.0.1`, percent-encoding,
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* unbracketed IPv6; IDN hosts are declared in punycode, the form the wire
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* carries).
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* @param entry - the configured value, verbatim.
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*/
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export function assertTrustedAuthority(entry: string): void {
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if (parseAuthority(entry) !== undefined && !/[/\\?#@\s]/.test(entry)) return
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const entryUrl = parseAuthority(entry)
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if (entryUrl !== undefined && canonicalAuthority(entry, entryUrl) === entry.toLowerCase()) return
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throw new Error(`client-connection: trustedHosts entry ${JSON.stringify(entry)} is not a bare host[:port] authority`)
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}
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/**
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* Whether the parsed authority carries an explicit port: judged from URL
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* parses under both special schemes (their default ports differ, so `:80` and
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* `:443` still count as explicit), never from the raw string, where WHATWG
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* trimming of stray whitespace would misread `host:port ` as port-less and
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* broaden an exact-port grant to every port.
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* Canonical form of a parsed authority: `hostname` when no port was written,
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* else `hostname:port`. The port is judged from URL parses under both special
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* schemes (their default ports differ, so `:80` and `:443` still count as
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* explicit), never from the raw string, where WHATWG trimming would misread
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* shapes like `host:port ` as port-less.
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*/
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function hasExplicitPort(entry: string, entryUrl: URL): boolean {
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function canonicalAuthority(entry: string, entryUrl: URL): string {
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// An authority that parsed under http cannot fail under https.
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return entryUrl.port !== '' || new URL(`https://${entry}`).port !== ''
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const port = entryUrl.port !== '' ? entryUrl.port : new URL(`https://${entry}`).port
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return port === '' ? entryUrl.hostname : `${entryUrl.hostname}:${port}`
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}
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/**
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@@ -79,9 +84,9 @@ function isTrustedAuthority(hostUrl: URL, trustedHosts: readonly string[]): bool
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return trustedHosts.some((entry) => {
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const entryUrl = parseAuthority(entry)
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if (entryUrl === undefined) return false
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return hasExplicitPort(entry, entryUrl)
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? entryUrl.host === hostUrl.host
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: entryUrl.hostname === hostUrl.hostname
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return canonicalAuthority(entry, entryUrl) === entryUrl.hostname
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? entryUrl.hostname === hostUrl.hostname
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: entryUrl.host === hostUrl.host
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})
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}
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