diff --git a/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.i18n.yaml b/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.i18n.yaml
index 7110763e72..5de8fc8e5f 100644
--- a/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.i18n.yaml
+++ b/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.i18n.yaml
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md
-README.md: 5eaa513b7802fe1b4411a5c0bafabafd232d4da7
-README.zh.md: 4924feed26cb7bc50d4863a063d9a4b0bf26d954
+README.md: 222c61176b71042bfcb539a839507a425a1fb9e5
+README.zh.md: 02326bc36c9a7e1fe41817b9ab782e31a6d0b9b9
diff --git a/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md b/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md
index 5eaa513b78..222c61176b 100644
--- a/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md
+++ b/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ The executor inherits [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`](../pwsh-local/)'s process
 
 The model sees the confined command's own stderr (e.g. `Access to the path '...' is denied.` under the Windows ACL runner); the tool layer converts classified denials into the standard permission-denied surface exactly as it does for the bash tool.
 
-## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
+## Known Limitations
 
 - **Reads are unrestricted** on Windows (the ACL runner restricts writes only); the read boundary is documented in `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`.
-- **The Windows workspace-write temp area is the real temp directory** (`GetTempPathW`), mirroring Landlock's `/tmp` grant — a per-run private temp would need an env-block rewrite in the runner and is deferred.
+- **The Windows workspace-write temp area is the real temp directory** (`GetTempPathW`). This is a deliberate backend-defined choice, the same decision Landlock makes (`readWrite: ['/tmp', ...]`): the seam's "backend-defined temp area" permits it, and the escape probe in `tests/acl.e2e.ts` lives outside the temp tree for exactly that reason. A per-run private temp (bwrap's `--tmpfs /tmp` semantics) would additionally need an environment-block rewrite in the runner; it is an optional future hardening, not a correctness gap.
 - **Windows read-only is strict zero-grant** — not even the NUL device is writable; `> $null` redirection still works (documented in the backend package).
diff --git a/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.zh.md b/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.zh.md
index 4924feed26..02326bc36c 100644
--- a/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.zh.md
+++ b/packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.zh.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 [English](README.md) | 中文
 
-沙盒消费型的 [`ctx.bash` 执行器 seam](../bash/) 的 PowerShell 实现：每条命令以 `pwsh -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command <command>` 运行，**经 `ctx.sandbox` 隔离**，选定模式、强制完整性、拒绝事实都盖在每次结算的结果上。它是 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`](../bash-sandbox/) 的 pwsh 孪生，按 [pwsh 执行器与工具决策](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.zh.md) 逐调用镜像——隔离实体本身是平台无关的：Windows 上沙盒 seam 解析到 ACL 受限令牌 runner 链（[`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/)），Linux/macOS 上解析到 bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt。
+沙盒消费型的 [`ctx.bash` 执行器 seam](../bash/) 的 PowerShell 实现：每条命令以 `pwsh -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command <command>` 运行，**经 `ctx.sandbox` 隔离**，选定模式、强制完整性、拒绝事实都盖在每次结算的结果上。它是 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`](../bash-sandbox/) 的 pwsh 孪生，按 [pwsh 执行器与工具决策](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.md) 逐调用镜像——隔离实体本身是平台无关的：Windows 上沙盒 seam 解析到 ACL 受限令牌 runner 链（[`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/)），Linux/macOS 上解析到 bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt。
 
 执行器继承 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`](../pwsh-local/) 的进程机制，并消费其 argv 级 seam（`argv()` / `runArgv()` / `startArgv()` / `onProcessDone()`）把精确的 pwsh 调用经 provider 包装。沙盒策略（模式 + 工作区根目录）不是本包的配置：每次调用由 `ctx.sandboxPolicy` 随行（工具层传调用会话解析后的策略；直接调用回退到部署策略）。
 
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
 
 模型看到受限命令自身的 stderr（Windows ACL runner 下如 `Access to the path '...' is denied.`）；工具层把分类后的拒绝转成标准权限拒绝面，与 bash 工具完全一致。
 
-## 已知限制与后续工作
+## 已知限制
 
 - **Windows 上读不受限**（ACL runner 只限写）；读边界文档在 `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`。
-- **Windows workspace-write 的临时区域是真实临时目录**（`GetTempPathW`），与 Landlock 授予 `/tmp` 同语义——按运行创建私有临时目录需要 runner 改写环境块，留待后续。
+- **Windows workspace-write 的临时区域是真实临时目录**（`GetTempPathW`）。这是有意为之的后端自定义选择，与 Landlock 的决策（`readWrite: ['/tmp', ...]`）同类：seam 的 "backend-defined temp area" 词汇表允许它，`tests/acl.e2e.ts` 的逃逸探针也正是因此位于 temp 树之外。按运行创建私有临时目录（bwrap `--tmpfs /tmp` 的语义）还需 runner 改写环境块——这是可选的进一步加固，而非正确性缺口。
 - **Windows read-only 是严格零授权**——连 NUL 设备都不可写；`> $null` 重定向不受影响（后端包有文档）。