fix(code-mode): render deep results iteratively

packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/README.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Every field is validated and defaulted; `maxOutputBytes` is a safe integer of at
 - **The port assumes a hostile peer** — model code can reach `parentPort` and forge traffic, so every inbound message is shape-validated and REBUILT before anything reads it (`null`, primitives, junk types, and malformed payloads drop without a throw; forged extra fields never ride along), the host answers each call id at most once, resolves binding names as OWN properties only (a forged `constructor` cannot walk a prototype chain), drops post-settlement replies, and validates every binding resolution and completion as lossless JSON. Forged `log`/`done` messages cannot bypass the outer cap: the host repeats validation and accounts every admitted log plus the completion or diagnostic. Worker-side namespaces are null-prototype with `defineProperty`, so `__proto__`-shaped binding names are ordinary keys.
 - **Two independent budgets, because the peer is hostile** — `computeMs` meters the worker's MEASURED busy time (`worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()` polling): a hot loop cannot hide behind a pending decoy dispatch, and a program awaiting a slow tool accrues nothing. `maxWallMs` backstops what busy time cannot see (awaiting a promise nobody resolves). Both funnel into `worker.terminate()`, which ends hot synchronous loops too; heap overflow surfaces as the worker's OOM exit (`kind: 'worker-exit'`).
 - **Intermediate binding values are complete JSON** — binding arguments and resolutions undergo iterative lossless-JSON validation, flatten into a bounded-depth pre-order wire value for structured clone, and rebuild iteratively on the other side. They have no byte, JavaScript call-stack, or nested structured-clone depth cap. They never enter the outer-output ledger or model context; provider/executor acquisition bounds and process/worker memory remain the limits.
-- **Logs stream eagerly into one outer ledger** — console/stdout/stderr text crosses the port in emission order, so a timed-out or killed program still shows what it printed. Native writes that bypass the patched stream slots arrive on pipes independent of the completion port; settlement therefore continues bounded pipe capture until worker termination completes before materializing the result. `maxOutputBytes` accounts the JSON serialization of the outer `logs` array plus the completion value or failure diagnostic. At or below the cap the exact value returns; a lossy completion is `invalid-output`, and a combined overflow is `output-limit` rather than a substituted inspected string. The failure retains the fitting captured prefix and later follows the normal outer `run_code` spill policy.
+- **Logs stream eagerly into one outer ledger** — console/stdout/stderr text crosses the port in emission order, so a timed-out or killed program still shows what it printed. Native writes that bypass the patched stream slots arrive on pipes independent of the completion port; settlement therefore continues bounded pipe capture until worker termination completes before materializing the result. `maxOutputBytes` accounts the JSON serialization of the outer `logs` array plus the completion value or failure-message payload; fixed `CodeRunResult` field names, braces, the bounded error-kind tag, and later presentation whitespace are outside that variable-payload ledger. At or below the cap the exact value returns; a lossy completion is `invalid-output`, and a combined overflow is `output-limit` rather than a substituted inspected string. The failure retains the fitting captured prefix and later follows the normal outer `run_code` spill policy.
 - **Empty environment** — the worker gets `env: {}` and `execArgv: []`: no ambient credentials (stronger than the scrubbed-env rule for spawned commands) and no inherited loader flags.
 - **Dispose to quiescence** — teardown fails in-flight runs as `abort` and AWAITS each worker's exit before resolving.
 

packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/src/index.ts

@@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ export interface Config {
    * nobody will resolve).
    */
   maxWallMs?: number
-  /** Hard cap for the combined serialized outer logs, completion value, and failure diagnostic. */
+  /**
+   * Hard cap for serialized log-array, completion-value, and failure-message payloads;
+   * fixed result-envelope syntax is excluded.
+   */
   maxOutputBytes?: number
   /** The worker's max old-generation heap in MiB (`resourceLimits`); overflow kills the worker, surfacing as kind `'worker-exit'`. */
   maxOldGenerationSizeMb?: number
@@ -56,7 +59,7 @@ type ResolvedConfig = Required<Config>
  */
 const ELU_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 25
 
-/** Smallest cap that can represent the empty logs array plus an empty JSON failure diagnostic. */
+/** Smallest cap that can represent the counted payloads: an empty logs array plus an empty JSON failure message. */
 const MIN_OUTPUT_BYTES = 4
 
 /** ECMAScript reserved words that cannot be async-function parameter names — rejected as binding globals. */

packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/tests/runtime.spec.ts

@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ describe('WorkerCodeRuntime — seam misuse and lifecycle', () => {
     await expect(ctx.plugin(WorkerCodeRuntime, { computeMs: -1 })).rejects.toThrow(/positive number/)
   })
 
-  it('requires maxOutputBytes to fit the smallest outer failure envelope', async () => {
+  it('requires maxOutputBytes to fit the smallest counted outer payloads', async () => {
     const ctx = new Context()
     await expect(ctx.plugin(WorkerCodeRuntime, { maxOutputBytes: 3 })).rejects.toThrow(/safe integer of at least 4/)
     await expect(ctx.plugin(WorkerCodeRuntime, { maxOutputBytes: 4.5 })).rejects.toThrow(/safe integer of at least 4/)