Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into fix/workspace-blank-session-reuse-membership

# Conflicts:
#	packages/client/runtime/README.i18n.yaml

.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-web-config-plane.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md
-2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md: 6d1a8c242c1888ee4fca9e21ebc814f7a345d633
-2026-07-30-web-config-plane.zh.md: 184299cf0c44b992e55a268c990b468c6d13f947
+2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md: 5225460be1d66b85a05ff2fd5ae2826b0e6c41d7
+2026-07-30-web-config-plane.zh.md: 53a21ddf31640d963c413e1793276de694547311

.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Status: implemented
 
 English | [中文](2026-07-30-web-config-plane.zh.md)
 
-> Scope: the wire face and web UI deferred from the [request-level LLM configuration note](2026-07-29-request-level-llm-config-credentials.md) — the `settings.*`/`credentials.*`/`llm.*` RPC domains with pushed invalidations, layered+redacted `describe()`, the llm configurable-provider directory and topology event, the standalone `dsh-client-schema-form` model layer, and the Models settings page with its hand-written provider editor. The `deepseek` → `deepseek-official` provider-route rename rides along as the enabling breaking change.
+> Scope: the wire face and web UI deferred from the [request-level LLM configuration note](2026-07-29-request-level-llm-config-credentials.md) — the `settings.*`/`credentials.*`/`llm.*` RPC domains with pushed invalidations, layered+redacted `describe()`, the local settings-document handoff, the llm configurable-provider directory and topology event, the standalone `dsh-client-schema-form` model layer, and the Models settings page with its hand-written provider editor. The `deepseek` → `deepseek-official` provider-route rename rides along as the enabling breaking change.
 
 ## Problem
 
@@ -12,15 +12,17 @@ PR1 made LLM adapter configuration restart-free at the seam, but the only writer
 
 ## Decision
 
-**Wire domains on the compiled RPC map, rejections as codes, invalidations as frames.** `settings.describe/update/replace`, `credentials.describe/set/unset`, `llm.providers`, and `llm.models` (claiming the reserved `host.listModels` surface) join `RpcMethodMap`, so the seven compiler-locked wiring sites keep contract, schema, handler, and client in lockstep. Seam rejections fold into `settings-rejected {ns}` / `credential-rejected {ref}` business errors (HTTP stays a carrier), and three `HostFrame`s — `host/settings-changed {ns}`, `host/credentials-changed {ref}`, `host/models-changed` — follow the `host/commands-changed` shape so every client converges without polling. Writes join `pickDirectory`/`openPath` in the connection guard's privileged set: loopback + same-origin or 403, because a LAN-exposed dsh web must not accept config mutation from another origin.
+**Wire domains on the compiled RPC map, rejections as codes, invalidations as frames.** `settings.describe/openDocument/update/replace/mutate`, `credentials.describe/set/unset`, `llm.providers`, and `llm.models` (claiming the reserved `host.listModels` surface) join `RpcMethodMap`, so the seven compiler-locked wiring sites keep contract, schema, handler, and client in lockstep. Seam rejections fold into `settings-rejected {ns}` / `credential-rejected {ref}` business errors (HTTP stays a carrier), and three `HostFrame`s — `host/settings-changed {ns}`, `host/credentials-changed {ref}`, `host/models-changed` — follow the `host/commands-changed` shape so every client converges without polling. Settings reads, native actions, and writes join `pickDirectory`/`openPath` in the connection guard's privileged set: loopback + same-origin or 403, because a LAN-exposed dsh web must not accept configuration access from another origin.
 
 **`describe()` grows layers and structural secret redaction.** `SettingsDescriptor` carries `base`/`user` beside the effective value, so the form marks "overridden" by presence in the user layer, not value inequality (an override *equal* to the base is still an override). `describe({ redactSecrets: true })` — mandatory at every wire face — strips `role('secret')` subtrees from all three layers via a pure structural walk of the schema (object/dict/array containers; a secret-role subtree is one opaque leaf) and enumerates the stripped slots as `{path, set}`, so a page can render write-only inputs without ever receiving a value.
 
+**The Host identifies and opens the local settings document.** The settings seam exposes optional `documentPath` provider metadata and a `prepareDocument()` operation; `settings-local` returns its fully resolved custom or `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml` filename and exclusively creates an absent empty document with owner-only permissions, while non-file providers retain the base `undefined`. The loopback-only `settings.describe` response carries only the boolean `hasDocument` capability beside the redacted namespace views. `ui-settings-general` registers a `settings.action` entry only on loopback pages, shows it only after the metadata confirms that a provider-owned local document can be prepared, and invokes pathless `settings.openDocument`; the Host resolves the provider path again before a text-document handoff (`open -t` on macOS so an arbitrary YAML file association cannot redirect the gesture, `xdg-open` on Linux, and `Invoke-Item` on Windows). Generic workspace paths retain the existing default-application handoff. The browser neither derives `$DSH_HOME` nor receives a filesystem target; remote pages make no privileged settings read for this action.
+
 **The llm seam declares configurability and announces topology.** `registerConfigurableProviders()` is an all-or-nothing, fiber-scoped directory of `{provider, displayName, settingsNs, settingsPath}` — the addressing a config page needs to open the right settings subtree for a route that may not exist yet; `listConfigurableProviders()` merges with live routes in the wire handler so undeclared live routes still report active. The zero-payload `'llm/adapters-updated'` event fires from all four registration/unregistration commit points with contained listener dispatch (INVARIANT rethrow), following the settings/commands precedent. `llm-deepseek`'s route renamed to `deepseek-official` because the pi-ai catalog legitimately owns `deepseek` as an aggregator entry; pre-release stance, no alias.
 
-**A hand-written editor over a schema model layer.** `dsh-client-schema-form` rehydrates the wire's `toJSON()` envelope into live schemastery nodes for validation, path resolution, and immutable draft editing — but no generic rendering: the first cut shipped a full schema-driven form renderer, and the resulting page was an unstyled schema dump (every advanced field flattened onto the card, raw field names as labels, the `retryPolicy` unsupported-fallback in the main flow). The user chose the hand-written direction over adding a hint/grouping system, and a second round removed the reference input entirely: the card's primary field is one **API key** input, a whole-section provider without a configured key opens as its setup card, and the collapsed 自定义设置 fold carries the curated per-family extras (`baseURL` for both families, plus `reasoningEffort` for deepseek / `reasoning` for pi-ai), with every other field owned by `settings.yaml`. Validation still runs the rehydrated schema before writing, so a hand-coded field that drifts from its schema fails loud on save rather than silently.
+**A hand-written editor over a schema model layer.** `dsh-client-schema-form` rehydrates the wire's `toJSON()` envelope into live schemastery nodes for validation, path resolution, and immutable draft editing — but no generic rendering: the first cut shipped a full schema-driven form renderer, and the resulting page was an unstyled schema dump (every advanced field flattened onto the card, raw field names as labels, the `retryPolicy` unsupported-fallback in the main flow). The user chose the hand-written direction over adding a hint/grouping system, and a second round removed the reference input entirely: the card's primary field is one **API key** input, a whole-section provider without a configured key opens as its setup card, and the collapsed 自定义设置 fold carries the curated per-family extras (`baseURL` for both families, `reasoningEffort` for deepseek / `reasoning` for pi-ai, plus direct DeepSeek model rows with `id`, `name`, and `contextWindow`). Existing model fields outside that visible set survive array edits; retry policy, timeouts, and other fields remain owned by `settings.yaml`. Validation still runs the rehydrated schema before writing, while adapter-specific checks reject catalog invariants that the serialized schema cannot express. The card's colors resolve through the `--dsw-alias-*` design tokens; it had named `--border`/`--surface`/`--text-*`, which nothing in this app defines, so it rendered their light-mode fallbacks and stayed light under the dark theme. The model catalog takes the row shape the pi-ai provider form introduces: one bordered entry per model, id and display name on the row, and the capacities behind the row's own disclosure, so the two editors read as one design rather than diverging once both land. Every field keeps the indexed `aria-label` that names it. Both capacities are text fields reading a decimal `K`/`M` suffix (`1M` is 1000K, matching how capacities are quoted) and storing the plain count: a field holds the typed text while it has focus, because re-deriving it from the parsed count on every keystroke would rewrite `1000` to `1K` mid-word, and text that does not parse stays on screen so the save-time rejection names a row the user can still see. The shared class names carry this file's token spellings, not that branch's: `--dsw-alias-border-subtle`, `--dsw-alias-text-tertiary`, and `--dsw-alias-text-primary` are undeclared, so they resolve to the light-mode literals in their fallback slots — the defect this section was moved off. A styles test now rejects any `--dsw-*` name the token sheet does not declare, so the next editor to name one fails rather than shipping a light-only surface.
 
-**The Models page is a three-domain join with seam-shaped apply semantics.** Rows are configured providers; the add card's select is the dormant directory remainder. Route liveness still gates readiness and invalidates the join, but the page does not render it as provider status because configuration presence and runtime availability are distinct. The key path stays reference-shaped without ever showing a reference: a typed key stores **write-only** through `credentials.set` under the profile's `apiKeyEnv`, deriving `<ROUTE>_API_KEY` when none exists (the pi-ai profile records the derivation), so `settings.yaml` never carries a key value. Profile edits and removals land as minimal path-addressed `settings.mutate` operations against the redacted user section, which never names a secret the page did not receive. Removing a user-layer provider first opens a localized model-provider confirmation dialog; cancellation, its close button, and its mask leave the profile untouched, while the destructive confirmation submits the single unset and blocks duplicate submission until it settles.
+**The Models page is a three-domain join with seam-shaped apply semantics.** Rows are configured providers; the add card's select is the dormant directory remainder. Route liveness still gates readiness and invalidates the join, but the page does not render it as provider status because configuration presence and runtime availability are distinct. The key path stays reference-shaped without ever showing a reference: a typed key stores **write-only** through `credentials.set` under the profile's `apiKeyEnv`, deriving `<ROUTE>_API_KEY` when none exists (the pi-ai profile records the derivation), so `settings.yaml` never carries a key value. Profile edits and removals land as minimal path-addressed `settings.mutate` operations against the redacted user section, which never names a secret the page did not receive. Removing a user-layer provider first opens a localized model-provider confirmation dialog; cancellation, its close button, and its mask leave the profile untouched, while the destructive confirmation submits the single unset and blocks duplicate submission until it settles. DeepSeek's model list is array-replace configuration: inherited effective rows remain visible until the first edit materializes the complete list in the user layer, and reset unsets the list override.
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
@@ -30,7 +32,8 @@ PR1 made LLM adapter configuration restart-free at the seam, but the only writer
 - **Storing the typed key as a literal `apiKey` setting** — the v1 "one API key input" requirement could have written the literal into the profile, but every UI removal path rebuilds the user section from the *redacted* layers, so any reset or row deletion would silently drop stored sibling keys; deriving a reference keeps the input single-field while keeping `settings.yaml` secret-free and every replace safe.
 - **A `models` bridge plugin owning provider configuration** — same rejection as PR1: per-plugin namespaces plus a four-field directory declaration give the UI everything it needs; the bridge's unified dict re-imports the adapter-mapping indirection.
 - **Page-side polling instead of pushed frames** — the mux already carries `host/commands-changed`; three more frames cost one shape each and make a second tab, an external `settings.yaml` edit, and a settings-born route converge at event speed.
+- **Hard-coding `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml` or returning `documentPath` through `host.openPath` in the browser** — rejected because `settings-local.path` may select another YAML/JSON document, non-file providers have no Host path, and a general path request makes the browser the authority for a local filesystem target. Provider preparation is the authoritative source, and the Host-owned operation feeds the existing opener.
 
 ## Consequences
 
-The whole loop is pinned keyless in the browser lane (`apps/web/tests/models-settings.e2e.ts`): the add card offers the dormant pi-ai catalog, adding `minimax-cn` with a typed key writes the reference-only profile into `settings.yaml`, stores the value into the harness home's `.env` under the derived `MINIMAX_CN_API_KEY`, registers the route live on the topology frame, and the customized fold merges `reasoning` beside the reference — zero model calls, ARIA goldens for the add-card, configured, and delete-confirmation states, plus a scaffold `harnessHome` so tests never touch a real `~/.dsh` (the provider under test is one whose derived reference cannot collide with a developer's exported keys). The removal scenario proves cancellation leaves the profile intact, confirmation removes it, and the intentionally retained credential survives. The rename touched 239 files (fixtures, goldens, docs, python) in one commit with no compatibility alias. The renderer replacement cost one commit and no wire change: apply semantics, redaction, and the directory join were renderer-agnostic all along. Deferred: a per-row models preview (the picker already lists models), a page address for live routes that never declared configurability, and explicit removal of a provider's retained credential.
+The whole loop is pinned keyless in the browser lane (`apps/web/tests/models-settings.e2e.ts`): the add card offers the dormant pi-ai catalog, adding `minimax-cn` with a typed key writes the reference-only profile into `settings.yaml`, stores the value into the harness home's `.env` under the derived `MINIMAX_CN_API_KEY`, registers the route live on the topology frame, and the customized fold merges `reasoning` beside the reference — zero model calls, ARIA goldens for the add-card, configured, and delete-confirmation states, plus a scaffold `harnessHome` so tests never touch a real `~/.dsh` (the provider under test is one whose derived reference cannot collide with a developer's exported keys). The settings-shell scenario intercepts the pathless native intent; seam, provider, wire, React, and native-opener tests separately pin provider absence, custom-path resolution, absent-file materialization, owner-only permissions, hidden remote/unavailable states, duplicate-click collapse, localized failure, macOS text-editor dispatch, and Linux/Windows desktop dispatch. The removal scenario proves cancellation leaves the profile intact, confirmation removes it, and the intentionally retained credential survives. The DeepSeek onboarding fixture edits the default catalog into a user-owned list, persists an arbitrary model id/name/context window, removes the active row, and observes the model selector's empty-selection fallback. The rename touched 239 files (fixtures, goldens, docs, python) in one commit with no compatibility alias. The renderer replacement cost one commit and no wire change: apply semantics, redaction, and the directory join were renderer-agnostic all along. Deferred: a per-row models preview (the picker already lists models), a page address for live routes that never declared configurability, and explicit removal of a provider's retained credential.

.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-web-config-plane.zh.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Status: implemented
 
 [English](2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md) | 中文
 
-> 范围：[请求级 LLM 配置 note](2026-07-29-request-level-llm-config-credentials.md) 中延后的 wire 面与 web UI——带推送式失效的 `settings.*`/`credentials.*`/`llm.*` RPC 领域、分层且脱敏的 `describe()`、llm 可配置提供方目录与拓扑事件、独立的 `dsh-client-schema-form` 模型层，以及带手写提供方编辑器的 Models 设置页。`deepseek` → `deepseek-official` 提供方路由重命名作为解锁前提的破坏性变更一并搭车合入。
+> 范围：[请求级 LLM 配置 note](2026-07-29-request-level-llm-config-credentials.md) 中延后的 wire 面与 web UI——带推送式失效的 `settings.*`/`credentials.*`/`llm.*` RPC 领域、分层且脱敏的 `describe()`、本地设置文档交接、llm 可配置提供方目录与拓扑事件、独立的 `dsh-client-schema-form` 模型层，以及带手写提供方编辑器的 Models 设置页。`deepseek` → `deepseek-official` 提供方路由重命名作为解锁前提的破坏性变更一并搭车合入。
 
 ## 问题
 
@@ -12,15 +12,17 @@ PR1 让 LLM（大语言模型）适配器配置在 seam 层面免重启，但唯
 
 ## 决策
 
-**wire 领域挂上编译期 RPC 映射，拒绝落为错误码，失效落为帧。**`settings.describe/update/replace`、`credentials.describe/set/unset`、`llm.providers` 与 `llm.models`（认领预留的 `host.listModels` 面）一同加入 `RpcMethodMap`，七处由编译器锁定的接线位点因此让契约、schema、处理器与客户端保持步调一致。seam 侧的拒绝折叠为 `settings-rejected {ns}`/`credential-rejected {ref}` 业务错误（HTTP 仍只是载体），三个 `HostFrame`——`host/settings-changed {ns}`、`host/credentials-changed {ref}`、`host/models-changed`——沿用 `host/commands-changed` 的形状，因此每个客户端都无需轮询即可收敛。写入与 `pickDirectory`/`openPath` 一起进入连接守卫的特权集合：回环 + 同源，否则 403，因为暴露在局域网上的 dsh web 绝不能接受来自其他源的配置修改。
+**wire 领域挂上编译期 RPC 映射，拒绝落为错误码，失效落为帧。**`settings.describe/openDocument/update/replace/mutate`、`credentials.describe/set/unset`、`llm.providers` 与 `llm.models`（认领预留的 `host.listModels` 面）一同加入 `RpcMethodMap`，七处由编译器锁定的接线位点因此让契约、schema、处理器与客户端保持步调一致。seam 侧的拒绝折叠为 `settings-rejected {ns}`/`credential-rejected {ref}` 业务错误（HTTP 仍只是载体），三个 `HostFrame`——`host/settings-changed {ns}`、`host/credentials-changed {ref}`、`host/models-changed`——沿用 `host/commands-changed` 的形状，因此每个客户端都无需轮询即可收敛。settings 读取、原生操作与写入和 `pickDirectory`/`openPath` 一起进入连接守卫的特权集合：回环 + 同源，否则 403，因为暴露在局域网上的 dsh web 绝不能接受来自其他源的配置访问。
 
 **`describe()` 增加分层与结构化 secret 脱敏。**`SettingsDescriptor` 在生效值之外携带 `base`/`user`，表单据此按「字段是否出现在用户层」来标记「已覆盖」，而非按值是否不等（与 base *相等*的覆盖仍然是覆盖）。`describe({ redactSecrets: true })`——在每个 wire 面都强制启用——经由对 schema 的纯结构遍历（object/dict/array 容器；secret 角色子树整体是一个不透明叶节点）从全部三层剥除 `role('secret')` 子树，并把剥除的槽位枚举为 `{path, set}`，页面因此不必收到任何值就能渲染只写输入框。
 
+**Host 识别并打开本地设置文档。** settings seam 暴露可选的 `documentPath` 提供方元数据和 `prepareDocument()` 操作；`settings-local` 返回已完全解析的自定义文件名或 `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml` 文件名，并在文档缺失时以仅属主可访问的权限独占创建空文档，非文件提供方则保留基类的 `undefined`。仅限回环访问的 `settings.describe` 响应会在脱敏 namespace 视图旁只携带布尔型 `hasDocument` 能力。`ui-settings-general` 只在回环页面注册一条 `settings.action` 条目，只有元数据确认可准备好一份由提供方持有的本地文档后才显示，并调用无路径参数的 `settings.openDocument`；Host 会在文本文档交接前再次解析提供方路径（macOS 上使用 `open -t`，使任意 YAML 文件关联无法重定向这次操作；Linux 上使用 `xdg-open`；Windows 上使用 `Invoke-Item`）。通用 Workspace 路径仍保留现有的默认应用交接。浏览器既不推导 `$DSH_HOME`，也不会收到文件系统目标；远程页面不会为这项操作发起特权 settings 读取。
+
 **llm seam 声明可配置性并公布拓扑。**`registerConfigurableProviders()` 是一个全有或全无、以 fiber 为作用域的目录，条目为 `{provider, displayName, settingsNs, settingsPath}`——这正是配置页要为一条可能尚不存在的路由打开正确设置子树时所需要的寻址；`listConfigurableProviders()` 在 wire 处理器里与存活路由合并，未声明的存活路由因此仍报告为激活。零负载的 `'llm/adapters-updated'` 事件从全部四个注册／注销提交点触发，listener 派发带异常隔离（INVARIANT 重抛），沿用 settings/commands 的先例。`llm-deepseek` 的路由重命名为 `deepseek-official`，因为 pi-ai catalog 名正言顺地拥有 `deepseek` 这个聚合器条目；依预发布立场，不设别名。
 
-**架在 schema 模型层之上的手写编辑器。**`dsh-client-schema-form` 把 wire 的 `toJSON()` 信封还原（rehydrate）为活的 schemastery 节点，用于校验、路径解析与不可变草稿编辑——但不做通用渲染：第一版交付了完整的 schema 驱动表单渲染器，得到的却是一个未加样式、把 schema 原样倾倒出来的页面（每个进阶字段都平铺到卡片上、原始字段名直接充当标签、`retryPolicy` 的「不支持」回退落在主流程里）。用户没有再加一套提示／分组系统，而是选择了手写方向，第二轮又把引用输入框整个移除：卡片的主字段是一个 **API 密钥**输入框，未配置密钥的整分节提供方会以其设置卡片的形式打开，收起的「自定义设置」折叠区承载按家族精选的额外字段（两个家族都有 `baseURL`，另加 deepseek 的 `reasoningEffort`／pi-ai 的 `reasoning`），其余每个字段都归 `settings.yaml` 所有。校验仍会在写入前运行还原出的 schema，因此偏离其 schema 的手写字段会在保存时大声失败，而非静默失败。
+**架在 schema 模型层之上的手写编辑器。**`dsh-client-schema-form` 把 wire 的 `toJSON()` 信封还原（rehydrate）为活的 schemastery 节点，用于校验、路径解析与不可变草稿编辑——但不做通用渲染：第一版交付了完整的 schema 驱动表单渲染器，得到的却是一个未加样式、把 schema 原样倾倒出来的页面（每个进阶字段都平铺到卡片上、原始字段名直接充当标签、`retryPolicy` 的「不支持」回退落在主流程里）。用户没有再加一套提示／分组系统，而是选择了手写方向，第二轮又把引用输入框整个移除：卡片的主字段是一个 **API 密钥**输入框，未配置密钥的整分节提供方会以其设置卡片的形式打开，收起的「自定义设置」折叠区承载按家族精选的额外字段（两个家族都有 `baseURL`，deepseek 有 `reasoningEffort`／pi-ai 有 `reasoning`，另有直接 DeepSeek 模型行的 `id`、`name` 和 `contextWindow`）。现有模型字段中不在可见集合内的部分会在数组编辑后保留；重试策略、超时及其他字段仍归 `settings.yaml` 所有。校验仍会在写入前运行还原出的 schema，适配器特有的检查则会拒绝序列化 schema 无法表达的目录不变量。卡片的颜色经 `--dsw-alias-*` 设计 token 解析；它此前引用的 `--border`／`--surface`／`--text-*` 在本应用中无人定义，于是渲染出的是它们的亮色模式回退值，在暗色主题下依旧保持亮色。模型目录采用 pi-ai 提供方表单引入的行形态：每个模型一个带边框的条目，ID 与显示名称落在行上，容量则收在该行自己的折叠区里，使两个编辑器呈现为同一套设计，而不是在双方都落地后各自分岔。每个字段都保留那个为其命名的带序号 `aria-label`。两项容量都是文本输入框，读取十进制的 `K`／`M` 后缀（`1M` 即 1000K，与容量的通行标注方式一致）并存储纯数值：字段持有焦点期间保留键入的文本，因为若每次按键都从解析出的数值重新推导该文本，`1000` 会在尚未输完时就被改写成 `1K`；无法解析的文本也会留在屏幕上，因此保存时的拒绝点名的是用户仍能看见的那一行。共用的类名承载的是本文件的 token 写法，而非那个分支的：`--dsw-alias-border-subtle`、`--dsw-alias-text-tertiary` 和 `--dsw-alias-text-primary` 均未声明，于是它们解析为各自回退槽位中的亮色模式字面值——正是本节此前迁离的那个缺陷。现在有一个样式测试会拒绝 token 表未声明的任何 `--dsw-*` 名称，因此下一个写出这类名称的编辑者会当场失败，而不是交付一个只有亮色的界面。
 
-**Models 页是一次三领域联接，应用语义与 seam 同形。**每一行是一个已配置的提供方；「新增」卡片的选择框是可配置提供方目录中剩余的休眠条目。路由存活状态仍用于就绪判定，并会使该联接失效，但页面不将其渲染为提供方状态，因为配置存在与运行时可用性是两个不同概念。密钥通道保持引用形态，却从不展示任何引用：键入的密钥经 `credentials.set` **只写**存入 profile 的 `apiKeyEnv` 之下，引用不存在时便派生 `<ROUTE>_API_KEY`（pi-ai profile 会记录该派生），因此 `settings.yaml` 从不携带密钥值。profile 的编辑和删除会针对脱敏后的用户分节，以按路径寻址的最小 `settings.mutate` 操作落地，绝不会点名页面未收到的机密。删除用户层提供方时，会先打开本地化的模型提供方确认对话框；取消操作、关闭按钮和遮罩均不会改动 profile，而破坏性确认会提交唯一一条 unset，并在其完成前阻止重复提交。
+**Models 页是一次三领域联接，应用语义与 seam 同形。**每一行是一个已配置的提供方；「新增」卡片的选择框是可配置提供方目录中剩余的休眠条目。路由存活状态仍用于就绪判定，并会使该联接失效，但页面不将其渲染为提供方状态，因为配置存在与运行时可用性是两个不同概念。密钥通道保持引用形态，却从不展示任何引用：键入的密钥经 `credentials.set` **只写**存入 profile 的 `apiKeyEnv` 之下，引用不存在时便派生 `<ROUTE>_API_KEY`（pi-ai profile 会记录该派生），因此 `settings.yaml` 从不携带密钥值。profile 的编辑和删除会针对脱敏后的用户分节，以按路径寻址的最小 `settings.mutate` 操作落地，绝不会点名页面未收到的机密。删除用户层提供方时，会先打开本地化的模型提供方确认对话框；取消操作、关闭按钮和遮罩均不会改动 profile，而破坏性确认会提交唯一一条 unset，并在其完成前阻止重复提交。DeepSeek 的模型列表是数组替换配置：继承而来的生效模型行会一直显示，直到第一次编辑将完整列表具化到用户层；重置则会取消设置该列表覆盖。
 
 ## 曾考虑的替代方案
 
@@ -30,7 +32,8 @@ PR1 让 LLM（大语言模型）适配器配置在 seam 层面免重启，但唯
 - **把键入的密钥存成字面 `apiKey` 设置**——v1「单个 API 密钥输入框」的需求本可以把字面量直接写进 profile，但 UI 的每条删除路径都会从*脱敏后的*各层重建用户分节，任何重置或整行删除都会静默丢掉已存储的兄弟密钥；派生引用让输入保持单字段，同时让 `settings.yaml` 不含机密、每一次 replace 都安全。
 - **由 `models` 桥接插件持有提供方配置**——与 PR1 相同的否决理由：按插件划分的 namespace 加上四字段的目录声明已经给了 UI 需要的一切；桥接层的统一字典会把适配器映射那层间接重新引进来。
 - **页面侧轮询而非推送帧**——mux 已经承载 `host/commands-changed`；再加三个帧各自只多一个形状的成本，就让第二个标签页、外部的 `settings.yaml` 编辑和由设置催生的路由都以事件速度收敛。
+- **在浏览器中硬编码 `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml`，或经 `host.openPath` 回传 `documentPath`**——否决，因为 `settings-local.path` 可能选择另一份 YAML/JSON 文档、非文件提供方没有 Host 路径，而且通用路径请求会让浏览器成为本地文件系统目标的权威。提供方的准备操作才是权威来源，由 Host 持有的操作会把结果交给现有打开器。
 
 ## 后果
 
-整条闭环以无密钥方式固定在浏览器测试通道（`apps/web/tests/models-settings.e2e.ts`）：「新增」卡片提供休眠的 pi-ai catalog，携键入的密钥添加 `minimax-cn` 会把只含引用的 profile 写入 `settings.yaml`、把密钥值存入 harness 家目录 `.env` 中派生的 `MINIMAX_CN_API_KEY` 之下、路由随拓扑帧注册为存活，「自定义设置」折叠区则把 `reasoning` 合并到引用旁边——全程零模型调用，「新增」卡片态、已配置态与删除确认态各有 ARIA golden，另有脚手架式的 `harnessHome`，测试绝不触碰真实的 `~/.dsh`（受测提供方是派生引用不可能与开发者已导出密钥相撞的那一个）。删除场景证明：取消后 profile 保持原样，确认后会将其删除，而刻意保留的凭据依然存在。这次重命名在一次提交中触及 239 个文件（fixture（测试前置数据）、golden、文档、python），未保留兼容别名。替换渲染器只花了一次提交，且没有任何 wire 变更：应用语义、脱敏与目录联接从一开始就与渲染器无关。延后事项：每行的模型预览（选择器已能列出模型）、为从未声明可配置性的存活路由提供页面地址，以及显式删除提供方所保留的凭据。
+整条闭环以无密钥方式固定在浏览器测试通道（`apps/web/tests/models-settings.e2e.ts`）：「新增」卡片提供休眠的 pi-ai catalog，携键入的密钥添加 `minimax-cn` 会把只含引用的 profile 写入 `settings.yaml`、把密钥值存入 harness 家目录 `.env` 中派生的 `MINIMAX_CN_API_KEY` 之下、路由随拓扑帧注册为存活，「自定义设置」折叠区则把 `reasoning` 合并到引用旁边——全程零模型调用，「新增」卡片态、已配置态与删除确认态各有 ARIA golden，另有脚手架式的 `harnessHome`，测试绝不触碰真实的 `~/.dsh`（受测提供方是派生引用不可能与开发者已导出密钥相撞的那一个）。设置外壳场景会截获无路径参数的原生意图；seam、提供方、wire、React 与原生打开器测试分别固定了提供方缺失、自定义路径解析、缺失文件创建、仅属主权限、远程／不可用时隐藏、重复点击合并、本地化失败、macOS 文本编辑器分发，以及 Linux/Windows 桌面分发。删除场景证明：取消后 profile 保持原样，确认后会将其删除，而刻意保留的凭据依然存在。DeepSeek 首次使用 fixture 会把默认目录编辑为用户自有列表、持久化任意模型的 ID／名称／上下文窗口、移除活动模型行，并观察模型选择器的空选择回退。这次重命名在一次提交中触及 239 个文件（fixture（测试前置数据）、golden、文档、python），未保留兼容别名。替换渲染器只花了一次提交，且没有任何 wire 变更：应用语义、脱敏与目录联接从一开始就与渲染器无关。延后事项：每行的模型预览（选择器已能列出模型）、为从未声明可配置性的存活路由提供页面地址，以及显式删除提供方所保留的凭据。

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md
-2026-07-06-sandbox.md: 4355ab57374f77f1733fff39e2fb4ccadcedaf6b
-2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md: bcfadae1d5b4373e1b3def0dcf09c9652c184891
+2026-07-06-sandbox.md: 6934691e9b3f37e50bb02dfec0240a03ec9b5f30
+2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md: cc5b7e5be0f697d77732efbf55667c258b69a95f

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md

@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ Four `cordis.yml` entries turn an unconfined coding agent into the sandboxed pro
   name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-permission'      # one product-facing select over both mechanism knobs
 ```
 
-The swap is invisible to every consumer of `ctx.bash`: the bash tools, hook commands, and background tasks run exactly as before, spawned through the wrapped argv the provider returns. Deleting the `sandbox` and `permission` entries and replacing `bash` with `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local` is the opt-out — execution is unconfined again and the escalation fields vanish from the tool schema, because they are capability-gated on the mounted executor, not on configuration. Omitting only `approval` keeps confinement but fails every escalation closed with its own error text; `permission` also requires the approval seam and a confining executor, so a partially composed preset layer fails loud at load.
+The swap is invisible to every consumer of `ctx.bash`: the bash tools, hook commands, and background tasks run exactly as before by directly spawning the wrapped argv the provider returns. Deleting the `sandbox` and `permission` entries and replacing `bash` with `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local` is the opt-out — execution is unconfined again and the escalation fields vanish from the tool schema, because they are capability-gated on the mounted executor, not on configuration. Omitting only `approval` keeps confinement but fails every escalation closed with its own error text; `permission` also requires the approval seam and a confining executor, so a partially composed preset layer fails loud at load.
 
-Misconfiguration fails loud: `mode` outside the closed vocabulary is rejected at plugin load, and a host with no usable backend throws the structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` — at `confine()` before the command ever spawns — rather than degrading to unconfined execution. `runnerCommand` on `dsh-sandbox-local` is the operator's explicit assertion of a bwrap-compatible runner (chain and probes skipped); it doubles as the deterministic fake-runner seam for keyless tests.
+Misconfiguration fails loud: `mode` outside the closed vocabulary is rejected at plugin load, and a host with no usable backend throws the structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` at `confine()` rather than degrading to unconfined execution. If the selected runner rejects with attributable `ENOENT` or `EACCES`, the consumer reports the same infrastructure error from the spawn channel before any command starts; other spawn errors retain local command-start semantics while still running nothing. `runnerCommand` on `dsh-sandbox-local` is the operator's explicit assertion of a bwrap-compatible runner (chain and probes skipped); it doubles as the deterministic fake-runner seam for keyless tests.
 
 Denied file effects return a `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker and instructions not to work around the denial. A confining executor adds paired `sandbox_permissions` and `justification` fields for one approved retry that must be strictly wider than the session's effective mode. A grant widens only that retry; rejection executes nothing, returns `the user rejected escalating this command to "<mode>"`, and permits no re-ask. The owner-derived runtime context states the current file policy without replacing those enforcement boundaries. When `dsh-permission` is composed with a UI adapter, one preset selects both knob values; unmatched values fold to `custom`. The [ACP automation composition](../../../../examples/acp-agent/README.md) does not mount that UI service and selects its deployment mode explicitly.
 
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ OS subprocess confinement applies to the bash executor, including hook commands,
 
 #### The seam: `ctx.sandbox`
 
-`dsh-sandbox` owns the vocabulary and the `SandboxProvider` contract: `confine(argv, policy)` returns the argv to spawn INSTEAD of the caller's own — wrapped so the process and everything it spawns run confined — plus the `enforcement` completeness the selected backend achieves, its denial dialect (`denialSignatures`, the stderr substrings that backend's kernel prints on a denied file effect), and its runner-failure dialect (`runnerFailureSignatures`, how the runner ITSELF failing — and therefore the command never running — identifies itself); with no usable backend it throws the fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error, never a silent unconfined passthrough. The vocabulary: `SandboxMode` (`read-only` / `workspace-write` / `danger-full-access`, FILE effects only — network and process visibility are not claimed), `SandboxEnforcement` (`full` / `partial`), `SandboxExecutionPolicy` (the complete per-capability-call mode + workspace root), and `SandboxPolicy` (the confined provider subset).
+`dsh-sandbox` owns the vocabulary and the `SandboxProvider` contract: `confine(argv, policy)` returns the argv to spawn INSTEAD of the caller's own — wrapped so the process and everything it spawns run confined — plus the `enforcement` completeness the selected backend achieves, its denial dialect (`denialSignatures`, the stderr substrings that backend's kernel prints on a denied file effect), and its structured runner-failure evidence (`runnerFailureRules`, optional allowed exit codes plus fatal per-line signatures after exact informational-line exclusions); with no usable backend it throws the fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error, never a silent unconfined passthrough. The vocabulary: `SandboxMode` (`read-only` / `workspace-write` / `danger-full-access`, FILE effects only — network and process visibility are not claimed), `SandboxEnforcement` (`full` / `partial`), `SandboxExecutionPolicy` (the complete per-capability-call mode + workspace root), and `SandboxPolicy` (the confined provider subset).
 
 Policy rides each CALL, not the provider: two consumers may confine under different policies at the same instant (bash under `read-only` while a confined child agent keeps its state directory writable), and an approved escalated retry is a new call with a wider policy — inexpressible under a config-fixed provider mode.
 
@@ -60,17 +60,17 @@ Left open, for the phase that needs them: whether network restriction arrives as
 
 #### Local backends and the shipped launcher
 
-`dsh-sandbox-local` selects one platform runner per provider lifetime and caches the verdict. Linux functionally probes `bwrap` then Landlock; macOS uses Seatbelt. Unsupported platforms and unusable runners fail closed. Each wrap carries backend-specific denial and runner-failure signatures so `dsh-bash-sandbox` can distinguish a denied file effect from a broken sandbox. `runnerCommand` skips selection as an operator assertion of a bwrap-shaped runner, but missing or unexecutable commands still classify as sandbox failure and never run the payload unconfined.
+`dsh-sandbox-local` selects one platform runner per provider lifetime and caches the verdict. Linux functionally probes `bwrap` then Landlock; macOS uses Seatbelt. Unsupported platforms and unusable runners fail closed. Each wrap carries backend-specific denial signatures and runner-failure rules so `dsh-bash-sandbox` can distinguish a denied file effect from a broken sandbox. Landlock runner failure requires exit 125 plus a non-notice `landlock-run:` line; the exact partial-enforcement line is informational even when a child exits 1, 2, or 125. Bubblewrap and Seatbelt remain signature-only because neither public contract reserves a launcher-failure status. `runnerCommand` keeps its operator-facing `runnerFailureSignatures` config, requires non-empty single-line entries, and maps them into one internal fatal rule. The consumer directly spawns every returned argv, so a missing runner, a non-executable runner, or an executable script whose shebang interpreter is unavailable fails through the attributable `ENOENT`/`EACCES` spawn channel while a successfully launched child exit 126 or 127 remains ordinary. An operator-configured script necessarily owns its interpreter startup before it applies its profile.
 
-The launcher is a ~300-line C program (plain C11 over the raw Landlock UAPI — no libraries beyond a statically linked musl, so the audit surface is that one file plus the kernel's stable syscall contract): `--ro <path>` / `--rw <path>` grants, `--`, the wrapped argv; it installs the ruleset on itself and `exec`s (rulesets are inherited across `execve`, and it sets `no_new_privs` before restricting); `--probe` enforces a maximal ruleset in a short-lived child and exits 0 only when the kernel actually enforces; launcher failures exit 125 without exec'ing.
+The launcher is a ~300-line C program (plain C11 over the raw Landlock UAPI — no libraries beyond a statically linked musl, so the audit surface is that one file plus the kernel's stable syscall contract): `--ro <path>` / `--rw <path>` grants, `--`, the wrapped argv; it installs the ruleset on itself and `exec`s (rulesets are inherited across `execve`, and it sets `no_new_privs` before restricting); `--probe` enforces a maximal ruleset in a short-lived child and exits 0 only when the kernel actually enforces; every launcher failure exits 125 without running the child and prints a fatal `landlock-run:` line. A successfully exec'd child may also return 125, so status alone is not launcher evidence. An older ABI prints the exact `landlock-run: partial enforcement (older Landlock ABI)` notice before it executes the child, so that line is not fatal evidence.
 
-The Landlock launcher source and package workspace live at `native/landlock-run`, next to the harness consumers. The standalone [`node-addon-landlock-run`](https://github.com/deepseek-harness/node-addon-landlock-run) repository is the release mirror used to pack and publish the npm package family; `native/README.md` owns the export procedure. Platform binaries are selected by npm, and the entry package owns path resolution, probing, and CLI flags while the harness maps sandbox modes to grants. Versioning the entry point with its binaries keeps probe parsing and launch syntax aligned.
+The Landlock launcher source and package workspace live at `native/landlock-run`, next to the harness consumers. The standalone [`node-addon-landlock-run`](https://github.com/deepseek-harness/node-addon-landlock-run) repository is the release mirror used to pack and publish the npm package family; `native/README.md` owns the export procedure. Platform binaries are selected by npm, and the entry package owns path resolution, probing, CLI flags, the fatal prefix, and the partial-enforcement notice while the harness maps sandbox modes to grants. Versioning the entry point with its binaries keeps probe parsing and launch syntax aligned.
 
 Backend profiles share the mode contract but differ in necessary host grants. Landlock and Seatbelt allow only `/dev/null` in read-only mode; workspace-write also permits their required host temp roots. Each wrap carries backend-specific denial signatures. Landlock reports partial enforcement on older ABIs that cannot govern every operation, while successful bwrap and Seatbelt profiles report full enforcement.
 
 #### The bash consumer
 
-`dsh-bash-sandbox` extends `LocalBashExecutor` and hands `ctx.sandbox` the exact `['bash', '-c', command]` argv it is about to spawn. A denial is an orthogonal result fact, conservatively classified from the active runner's stderr dialect. A runner failure outranks denial: foreground execution throws `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`; a settled `BashProcess` stamps `sandbox.runnerFailed`, and the bash producer renders it through generic `task_output`.
+`dsh-bash-sandbox` extends `LocalBashExecutor`, hands `ctx.sandbox` the exact `['bash', '-c', command]` argv, and directly spawns the provider result. This leaves shell semantics and `BASH_ENV` on the inner Bash after the shipped native runner establishes confinement. A provider error propagates unchanged. A pre-process rejection is runner-owned only when the caller-owned workdir is independently usable and Node reports `ENOENT` or `EACCES` with positive provenance for provider argv[0]; a bare `syscall: 'spawn'` without an exact error path, other codes, invalid workdirs, resource failures, unrelated syscalls, and unstructured rejections retain local command-start semantics. Foreground execution converts runner-owned rejections to `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` with the original detail; an asynchronous background rejection stamps `runnerFailed: true`, `denied: false`. A `SubprocessService` that synchronously throws the same provenanced shape makes background start throw `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`, while other synchronous errors propagate unchanged. After a process starts, foreground and background use one runner-failure classifier that requires the rule's exit-code gate and a remaining fatal line after informational exclusions. A match outranks denial: foreground execution throws `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` with that fatal line as detail; a settled `BashProcess` stamps `sandbox.runnerFailed`, and the bash producer renders it through generic `task_output`.
 
 The model sees the current effective file policy in the owner-derived `sandbox:policy` runtime context, while the static tool description explains the denial marker (`[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]`), encourages attempting commands that may be denied, and forbids retrying around a denial; when the escalation fields are advertised, a denied result additionally carries the escalation hint itself, so the sanctioned same-turn retry is prompted at the decision point rather than depending on the model recalling the description (§ Escalation). [The current-policy decision](2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md) owns the context's rationale and boundaries.
 
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ The model sees the current effective file policy in the owner-derived `sandbox:p
 
 `BashExecRequest.sandboxPolicy` is an optional complete per-call input; resolved specs make the field explicit. `BashExecutor.sandboxMode` remains the capability fact advertising whether the mounted executor can honor that policy, so only a confining composition exposes escalation. The seam accepts any explicit policy; the tool owns session resolution and the wider-only escalation rule. Non-sandboxing executors remain honestly unconfined.
 
-`ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve()` stamps the complete execution policy — explicit escalation mode > session override > configured default, with `SessionHeader.cwd` > configured fallback root — before the executor runs. `SandboxBashExecutor.resolve()` retains that policy on the spec, or supplies the deployment fallback for a direct agentless caller, so `run()`/`start()` never read mutable session state. Per-process wrap facts are keyed by the returned `BashProcess`; `onProcessDone()` classifies stderr and stamps that handle before `done` resolves, so overlapping processes retain their own modes and runner dialects.
+`ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve()` stamps the complete execution policy — explicit escalation mode > session override > configured default, with `SessionHeader.cwd` > configured fallback root — before the executor runs. `SandboxBashExecutor.resolve()` retains that policy on the spec, or supplies the deployment fallback for a direct agentless caller, so `run()`/`start()` never read mutable session state. Per-process wrap facts are keyed by the returned `BashProcess`; `onProcessDone()` receives spawn failure out of band from stderr classification and stamps that handle before `done` resolves, so overlapping processes retain their own modes and runner dialects.
 
 When a confining executor is mounted, `bash` advertises paired `sandbox_permissions` and `justification` fields. The schema exposes the full closed escalation vocabulary because effective mode is per-session; execution rejects any target that is not strictly wider than that call's effective mode. Approval resolves before execution. `allowed-once` stamps the granted mode onto only that request, while `rejected`, `cancelled`, `unavailable`, a missing approval service, or a missing agent all fail closed with distinct results. No grant is persisted.
 
@@ -117,10 +117,10 @@ fs/web/todo execute in-process, so their sandbox semantics are policy at their s
 
 ### Testing
 
-- **Unit:** pin platform selection and profiles, fail-closed runner classification, per-call mode/root resolution, per-process facts, escalation validation and outcomes, permission preset folding and write-through, and runtime-context ordering and materialization.
+- **Unit:** pin platform selection and profiles, direct provider-argv handoff, spawn-level failures with invalid-workdir controls, missing/non-executable/missing-interpreter evidence, malformed-runner negative controls, confined `BASH_ENV` ordering, structured runner classification (including partial-Landlock notice-only child outcomes, gated fatal evidence, child exits 126/127, and foreground/background parity), per-call mode/root resolution, per-process facts, escalation validation and outcomes, permission preset folding and write-through, and runtime-context ordering and materialization.
 - **Keyless real-runner:** exercise bwrap, Landlock, and Seatbelt against real filesystem effects at provider and bash-consumer layers; one real Cordis context concurrently drives two project sessions through shipped bash and fs tools, proving own-root success and sibling-root denial. Packed-install coverage proves the registry launcher remains executable. CI rejects a silent all-skip.
 - **With-key:** start the real ACP composition in read-only mode, let a model-driven bash write hit the runner's denial marker, then drive the bridge answerer and disk effect through granted and rejected workspace-write retries; unavailable credentials or runners self-skip.
-- **Snapshot:** pin the atomic current-policy context and both scripted approval branches. A real ACP example scenario places its session under the user home while the deployment fallback points at `/tmp`, then pins both the workspace-write runtime-context message and a successful deployment-selected mutation; this distinguishes session-root resolution from the process fallback without depending on runner-specific denial text. Other snapshots start unconfined so unrelated fixtures remain platform-independent.
+- **Snapshot:** pin the atomic current-policy context and both scripted approval branches. A real ACP example scenario places its session under the user home while the deployment fallback points at `/tmp`, then pins both the workspace-write runtime-context message and a successful deployment-selected mutation; this distinguishes session-root resolution from the process fallback without depending on runner-specific denial text. A POSIX fake partial-Landlock provider pins direct bash `false` as an ordinary child result and a missing provider executable as foreground/background infrastructure failure through the assembled app. Other snapshots start unconfined so unrelated fixtures remain platform-independent.
 
 ## Deferred phases
 
@@ -128,12 +128,12 @@ Each phase gets its full design when picked up, validated against the code at th
 
 - **Second consumer** — `subagent-acp` optionally confines child agents (per-call policy; unconfined default — a child agent must write its own persistence).
 - **More environments** — an environment-coherent capability group example (e.g. bash+fs against one container).
-- **Windows chain** — `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` is reserved and empty (fail-closed); filling it means a confinement runner from the AppContainer/restricted-token family, shipped from its own repository on the `node-addon-landlock-run` template, plus its profile dialect and denial/runner-failure signatures. Wrapping the third-party landstrip runner instead was [considered and rejected](../../rejected/feature/2026-07-26-evaluate-landstrip-for-windows-sandbox-rung.md) — not battle-tested enough for a security invariant.
+- **Windows chain** — `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` is reserved and empty (fail-closed); filling it means a confinement runner from the AppContainer/restricted-token family, shipped from its own repository on the `node-addon-landlock-run` template, plus its profile dialect, denial signatures, and runner-failure rules. Wrapping the third-party landstrip runner instead was [considered and rejected](../../rejected/feature/2026-07-26-evaluate-landstrip-for-windows-sandbox-rung.md) — not battle-tested enough for a security invariant.
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
 - **Command-string heuristic preflight** — rejected: cannot understand expansion/subprocesses/symlinks; the strict attempt (run it, let the kernel decide) is the only trustworthy denial signal.
-- **Functionally probe even a platform's sole backend** — rejected: probing arbitrates between candidates; with one there is nothing to decide, and probe cost taxes the first confined command of every session (prohibitive for heavy future backends). The runner's own exec-time fail-closed refusal plus `runnerFailureSignatures` classification carries the safety property instead.
+- **Functionally probe even a platform's sole backend** — rejected: probing arbitrates between candidates; with one there is nothing to decide, and probe cost taxes the first confined command of every session (prohibitive for heavy future backends). The runner's own exec-time fail-closed refusal plus structured `runnerFailureRules` classification carries the safety property instead.
 - **Commit the built launcher binaries** — rejected: a binary in a diff is unreviewable and churns history; reviewed source + native CI builds + the launcher repo's byte-pinned publish rehearsal keep bytes out of every tree.
 - **Compile the launcher on install** — rejected: pushes a C toolchain onto every consumer; a fallback that exists only where a compiler happens to be is not a fallback.
 - **Cross-compile both architectures from one builder** — rejected: requires carrying a pinned cross toolchain (rustup targets, zig, or a container image) solely to rebuild two ~70 KB binaries; per-architecture native runners already exist and each builds its own platform package (the `node-addon-require-builtin` model, the launcher repo's own pipeline).
@@ -172,19 +172,20 @@ Costs and accepted limits:
 - **The one-wrapper illusion is given up knowingly.** A `tools/pre-execute` wrapper plus prompt conventions does not solve sandbox approval — the correct design costs structured denials, native runner probes, per-call policy carriage, and consistent cross-family enforcement, and this design pays it.
 - **`read-only` became a cross-family boundary through a follow-up.** This RFC shipped bash-only enforcement; the [cross-family fs sandbox RFC](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md) extends the same mode vocabulary to the filesystem tools through a sandboxed `ctx.fs` provider and relocates the mode/root config and the `sandbox/mode` override to `ctx.sandboxPolicy` (§ In-process tools).
 - **Windows has no backend.** Its chain slot is reserved empty — fail-closed, never a fallthrough; filling it is a deferred phase.
-- **The Seatbelt rung leans on Apple's deprecated-but-shipped `sandbox-exec` CLI.** As darwin's sole candidate it is selected without probing, so a future removal surfaces at execution as the runner-failure classification — re-thrown `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`, the command never runs; fail closed, never open.
+- **The Seatbelt rung leans on Apple's deprecated-but-shipped `sandbox-exec` CLI.** As darwin's sole candidate it is selected without probing, so a future removal under a usable workdir surfaces as a runner-attributable spawn failure and an executable refusal through its fatal signature — both become `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`, and the command never runs; fail closed, never open.
 - **Landlock confinement is only as complete as the running kernel's ABI.** Reported as `enforcement: 'partial'` rather than refused — the deliberate trade that keeps the fallback available on older-kernel hosts.
+- **Runner attribution uses an in-band protocol.** Exit status plus stderr cannot cryptographically identify the writer, so a confined child can mimic a fatal runner line and status to cause an availability/diagnostic false attribution. The conjunction and exact notice exclusion reduce accidental matches; this is not a sandbox bypass because the child is already confined.
 - **The launcher arrives as a registry dependency.** Trusted through its own repository's release pipeline (reviewed C source, native CI builders, byte-pinned publish rehearsal) plus this repo's version pin — the real-kernel e2e legs are what vouch for behavior through the installed bytes.
 - **The model may over-ask.** Escalating without denial grounding, or picking `danger-full-access` where `workspace-write` suffices: the description steers and the enum forces the ladder, but the human prompt is the actual gate; the `approval/asked` reasons make over-asking auditable, and a `prepend` policy answerer can auto-reject patterns a deployment never wants.
 - **The advertised target set is static while the effective mode is per-session** (schemas are registry-global) — a session already at the widest mode is still offered the fields. Harmless by construction: the strict-wider check at execution, not the enum, is the safety boundary — a non-widening request fails with its own text and never prompts anyone.
-- **A granted escalation is not a working sandbox.** An unavailable backend still fails closed even for a granted escalation to a confining mode — at `confine()` when the platform has no chain or every probe fails, at execution when an unprobed sole runner refuses (classified as a sandbox failure, not a command failure) — while a granted `danger-full-access` run never touches the provider at all: there the grant, not the probe, is the authority.
+- **A granted escalation is not a working sandbox.** An unavailable backend still fails closed even for a granted escalation to a confining mode — at `confine()` when the platform has no chain or every probe fails, through the spawn channel when the selected executable cannot start, or through a structured rule when a started runner refuses — while a granted `danger-full-access` run never touches the provider at all: there the grant, not the probe, is the authority.
 - **Runtime-context history is append-only.** A policy switch appends a complete superseding snapshot after retained history, preserving the stable system-and-conversation prefix; unchanged state adds no message.
 - **Older policy snapshots remain in history.** Each full snapshot explicitly supersedes earlier runtime-context snapshots, so replay and compaction need only retain the latest materialized message.
 
 ## FAQ
 
 - **A command came back with `[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]` — did it fail?** It RAN, and the kernel refused a file effect: the denial is a result fact orthogonal to exit code. The teaching forbids retrying around it; the one sanctioned move is the same command retried once with an escalation request.
-- **How is a BROKEN sandbox told apart from a failing command?** Runner failure outranks denial in classification: a failed run matching the wrap's `runnerFailureSignatures` means the command NEVER ran — foreground re-throws the structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` with the runner's stderr line, a background task stamps `sandbox.runnerFailed` and renders its own marker. A broken sandbox can never read as a failing command, and the command never runs unconfined.
+- **How is a BROKEN sandbox told apart from a failing command?** Any provider-argv spawn rejection proves the confined launch never started, but it identifies a broken runner only when the caller-owned workdir is usable and Node reports attributable `ENOENT` or `EACCES` for that argv[0]. A bare `syscall: 'spawn'` without an exact error path and all other rejections remain ordinary command-start errors. After a process starts, runner failure outranks denial only when one `runnerFailureRules` entry matches both its optional exit-code gate and a fatal stderr line after exact informational exclusions. Foreground failures throw structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` with spawn or matched-line detail; an asynchronously rejected or settled background task stamps `sandbox.runnerFailed` and renders its own marker. A `SubprocessService` that synchronously throws the same provenanced `ENOENT`/`EACCES` shape makes background start throw the structured error; other synchronous errors propagate unchanged. A Landlock partial-enforcement notice plus an ordinary child failure remains a command result.
 - **What happens on a platform with no backend — Windows today?** `confine()` throws the fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` and the command never spawns; `win32` is a reserved EMPTY chain, pinned by test to fail closed identically until a Windows runner fills it (§ Deferred phases).
 - **`bwrap` is installed on my host but unusable (disabled unprivileged userns, an LSM denying `mount`) — what happens?** The chain probe is functional — it builds and enforces a real profile rather than checking `--version` — so a present-but-unusable `bwrap` fails its probe, selection falls to the registry-installed Landlock launcher, and the verdict is cached for the provider's lifetime.
 - **Does the sandbox restrict network or process visibility?** No — `SandboxMode` claims FILE effects only; the bwrap profile deliberately does not unshare pid, and no backend claims network. Whether network restriction becomes its own knob is left open in § The seam.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md

@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ harness 是一个 SDK，因此约束必须是开发者可组合的能力：是
   name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-permission'      # one product-facing select over both mechanism knobs
 ```
 
-这一替换对 `ctx.bash` 的所有消费方透明：bash 工具、钩子命令和后台任务照常运行，使用提供方返回的包装 argv 启动。删除 `sandbox` 和 `permission` 条目、将 `bash` 替换为 `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local` 即为退出——执行恢复为无约束，升级字段从工具 schema 中消失，因为它们是基于已挂载执行器的能力门控，而非基于配置。仅省略 `approval` 则保留约束，但会以自身错误文本拒绝每次升级；`permission` 还要求 approval seam 和约束执行器同时存在，因此部分组合的 preset 层在加载时即大声失败。
+这一替换对 `ctx.bash` 的所有消费方透明：bash 工具、钩子命令和后台任务照常运行，直接使用提供方返回的已包装 argv 启动。删除 `sandbox` 和 `permission` 条目、将 `bash` 替换为 `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local` 即为退出——执行恢复为无约束，升级字段从工具 schema 中消失，因为它们是基于已挂载执行器的能力门控，而非基于配置。仅省略 `approval` 则保留约束但以自身错误文本关闭每次升级；`permission` 还要求 approval seam 和约束执行器同时存在，因此部分组合的 preset 层在加载时即大声失败。
 
-配置错误会显式导致失败：`mode` 不在封闭词汇中时在插件加载时被拒绝；主机上没有可用后端时在 `confine()` 阶段（命令 spawn 之前）抛出结构化的 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`，而非降级为无约束执行。`dsh-sandbox-local` 上的 `runnerCommand` 是运维人员对一个 bwrap 兼容 runner 的显式断言（跳过链和探测）；它同时充当 keyless 测试的确定性 fake-runner seam。
+配置错误会显式导致失败：`mode` 不在封闭词汇中时在插件加载时被拒绝；主机上没有可用后端时在 `confine()` 阶段抛出结构化的 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`，而非降级为无约束执行。如果所选 runner 以可归因的 `ENOENT` 或 `EACCES` 拒绝，消费方会在任何命令开始前通过 spawn 通道报告同一基础设施错误；其他 spawn 错误仍保留本地命令启动语义，同时也不会运行任何内容。`dsh-sandbox-local` 上的 `runnerCommand` 是运维人员对一个 bwrap 兼容 runner 的显式断言（跳过链和探测）；它同时充当 keyless 测试的确定性 fake-runner seam。
 
 被拒绝的文件操作返回 `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` 标记，并附带不要绕过拒绝的指令。约束执行器添加配对的 `sandbox_permissions` 和 `justification` 字段，用于一次经批准的重试，该重试必须严格宽于会话的有效模式。授权仅放宽该次重试；拒绝则不执行任何内容，返回 `the user rejected escalating this command to "<mode>"`，且不允许再次请求。由归属方派生的运行时上下文会说明当前文件策略，但不会取代这些强制执行边界。当 `dsh-permission` 与某个 UI 适配器一起组合时，一个 preset 会同时选定两个配置项的值；不匹配的组合折叠为 `custom`。[ACP 自动化组合](../../../../examples/acp-agent/README.md)不挂载该 UI 服务，而是显式选定其部署模式。
 
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ OS 子进程约束适用于 bash 执行器（包括钩子命令），后续还
 
 #### seam：`ctx.sandbox`
 
-`dsh-sandbox` 负责定义词汇和 `SandboxProvider` 契约：`confine(argv, policy)` 返回调用方应当 spawn 的替代 argv（经过包装，使进程及其所有子进程在约束下运行），加上所选后端达到的 `enforcement` 完整度、其拒绝方言（`denialSignatures`，该后端内核在拒绝文件操作时打印到 stderr 的子串）、以及其 runner 失败方言（`runnerFailureSignatures`，runner 本身失败——因而命令从未运行——时的自我标识方式）；没有可用后端时抛出失败关闭的 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` 错误，绝不静默放行。词汇：`SandboxMode`（`read-only` / `workspace-write` / `danger-full-access`，仅限文件操作——不声称覆盖网络和进程可见性）、`SandboxEnforcement`（`full` / `partial`）、`SandboxExecutionPolicy`（每次能力调用的完整 mode + 工作区根目录）以及 `SandboxPolicy`（提供给约束后端的子集）。
+`dsh-sandbox` 负责定义词汇和 `SandboxProvider` 契约：`confine(argv, policy)` 返回调用方应当 spawn 的替代 argv（经过包装，使进程及其所有子进程在约束下运行），加上所选后端达到的 `enforcement` 完整度、其拒绝方言（`denialSignatures`，该后端内核在拒绝文件操作时打印到 stderr 的子串），以及其结构化 runner 失败证据（`runnerFailureRules`，可选的允许退出码加上排除整行精确信息性行后按行匹配的致命签名）；没有可用后端时抛出失败关闭的 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` 错误，绝不静默放行。词汇：`SandboxMode`（`read-only` / `workspace-write` / `danger-full-access`，仅限文件操作——不声称覆盖网络和进程可见性）、`SandboxEnforcement`（`full` / `partial`）、`SandboxExecutionPolicy`（每次能力调用的完整 mode + 工作区根目录）以及 `SandboxPolicy`（提供给约束后端的子集）。
 
 策略随每次调用而非提供方携带：两个消费方可以在同一时刻以不同策略约束（bash 在 `read-only` 下运行，而一个受约束的子 agent 保持其状态目录可写），且经批准的升级重试是一次带有更宽策略的新调用——在配置固定的提供方模式下无法表达。
 
@@ -60,17 +60,17 @@ OS 子进程约束适用于 bash 执行器（包括钩子命令），后续还
 
 #### 本地后端与随附 launcher
 
-`dsh-sandbox-local` 在提供方生命周期内选择一个平台 runner 并缓存结论。Linux 功能性探测 `bwrap` 然后 Landlock；macOS 使用 Seatbelt。不支持的平台和不可用的 runner 失败关闭。每次包装携带后端特定的拒绝签名和 runner 失败签名，以便 `dsh-bash-sandbox` 区分被拒绝的文件操作与损坏的沙箱。`runnerCommand` 作为运维人员对 bwrap 形式 runner 的断言跳过选择，但缺失或不可执行的命令仍被归类为沙箱失败，绝不无约束地运行负载。
+`dsh-sandbox-local` 在提供方生命周期内选择一个平台 runner 并缓存结论。Linux 功能性探测 `bwrap` 然后 Landlock；macOS 使用 Seatbelt。不支持的平台和不可用的 runner 失败关闭。每次包装携带后端特定的拒绝签名和 runner 失败规则，以便 `dsh-bash-sandbox` 区分被拒绝的文件操作与损坏的沙箱。Landlock runner 失败需要退出码 125，加上一行不是通知的 `landlock-run:` 诊断；即使子进程以 1、2 或 125 退出，精确匹配的部分强制执行通知仍只是信息。Bubblewrap 和 Seatbelt 仍仅依据签名，因为两者的公开契约均未保留 launcher 失败状态。`runnerCommand` 保留面向运维人员的 `runnerFailureSignatures` 配置，要求其中条目均为非空单行，并将它们映射为一条内部致命规则。消费方会直接 spawn 每个返回的 argv，因此缺失的 runner、不可执行的 runner，或 shebang 解释器不可用的可执行脚本会通过可归因的 `ENOENT`／`EACCES` spawn 通道失败，而成功启动的子进程以 126 或 127 退出时仍按普通结果处理。运维人员配置的脚本必然要先启动解释器，再应用自身 profile。
 
-launcher 是一个约 300 行的 C 程序（纯 C11，直接使用 Landlock UAPI——除静态链接的 musl 外无其他库，因此审计面仅为该文件加内核的稳定 syscall 契约）：`--ro <path>` / `--rw <path>` 授权，`--`，被包装的 argv；它为自身安装规则集并执行 `exec`（规则集跨 `execve` 继承，且它在限制前设置 `no_new_privs`）；`--probe` 在一个短生命周期子进程中强制最大规则集，仅当内核确实强制时才以 0 退出；launcher 失败以 125 退出且不 exec。
+launcher 是一个约 300 行的 C 程序（纯 C11，直接使用 Landlock UAPI——除静态链接的 musl 外无其他库，因此审计面仅为该文件加内核的稳定 syscall 契约）：`--ro <path>` / `--rw <path>` 授权，`--`，被包装的 argv；它为自身安装规则集并执行 `exec`（规则集跨 `execve` 继承，且它在限制前设置 `no_new_privs`）；`--probe` 在一个短生命周期子进程中强制最大规则集，仅当内核确实强制时才以 0 退出；所有 launcher 失败都会以 125 退出且不运行子进程，并打印一行致命的 `landlock-run:` 诊断。成功完成 exec 的子进程也可能返回 125，因此仅凭退出状态不能作为 launcher 失败的证据。较旧的 ABI 会在执行子进程之前打印精确的 `landlock-run: partial enforcement (older Landlock ABI)` 通知，因此该行不是致命证据。
 
-Landlock launcher 源码和包工作区位于 `native/landlock-run`，与 harness 消费方同仓。独立的 [`node-addon-landlock-run`](https://github.com/deepseek-harness/node-addon-landlock-run) 仓库是用于打包并发布 npm 包族的发布镜像；导出流程归 `native/README.md` 所有。平台二进制由 npm 选择，入口包拥有路径解析、探测和 CLI 参数，而 harness 将沙箱模式映射为授权。将入口点与其二进制一起版本化，使探测解析和启动语法保持对齐。
+Landlock launcher 源码和包工作区位于 `native/landlock-run`，与 harness 消费方同仓。独立的 [`node-addon-landlock-run`](https://github.com/deepseek-harness/node-addon-landlock-run) 仓库是用于打包并发布 npm 包族的发布镜像；导出流程归 `native/README.md` 所有。平台二进制由 npm 选择，入口包拥有路径解析、探测、CLI 参数、致命前缀和部分强制执行通知，而 harness 将沙箱模式映射为授权。将入口点与其二进制一起版本化，使探测解析和启动语法保持对齐。
 
 后端 profile 共享模式契约但在必要的主机授权上有所不同。Landlock 和 Seatbelt 在 read-only 模式下仅允许 `/dev/null`；workspace-write 还允许各自所需的主机临时目录根。每次包装携带后端特定的拒绝签名。Landlock 在较旧的 ABI 无法管控所有操作时报告 partial enforcement，而成功的 bwrap 和 Seatbelt profile 报告 full enforcement。
 
 #### bash 消费方
 
-`dsh-bash-sandbox` 扩展 `LocalBashExecutor`，并把即将 spawn 的确切 `['bash', '-c', command]` argv 交给 `ctx.sandbox`。拒绝是与其他结果正交的事实，依据当前 runner 的 stderr 方言保守分类。Runner 失败优先于拒绝：前台执行抛出 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`；结算后的 `BashProcess` 会盖章 `sandbox.runnerFailed`，bash 生产者再通过通用 `task_output` 渲染它。
+`dsh-bash-sandbox` 扩展 `LocalBashExecutor`，把精确的 `['bash', '-c', command]` argv 交给 `ctx.sandbox`，并直接 spawn 提供方返回的 argv。这样，随附的原生 runner 建立约束后，shell 语义与 `BASH_ENV` 仍由内层 Bash 处理。提供方错误原样传播。进程启动前，只有当调用方拥有的 workdir 经独立验证可用，并且 Node 报告 `ENOENT` 或 `EACCES`，且带有明确指向提供方 argv[0] 的来源信息时，拒绝才会归因于 runner；没有精确错误路径的裸 `syscall: 'spawn'`、其他错误码、无效 workdir、资源失败、无关 syscall 与无结构拒绝保留本地命令启动语义。前台执行会将可归因于 runner 的拒绝转为 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` 并附上原始详细信息；异步后台拒绝则盖章 `runnerFailed: true`、`denied: false`。如果 `SubprocessService` 同步抛出同样带有来源信息的 `ENOENT`／`EACCES` 形态，后台启动会抛出 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`；其他同步错误原样传播。进程启动后，前台与后台共用一个 runner 失败分类器：先排除信息性行，再要求规则的退出码门控与余下的一行致命诊断同时匹配。匹配结果优先于拒绝：前台执行抛出 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`，并以该致命行作为详细信息；结算后的 `BashProcess` 会盖章 `sandbox.runnerFailed`，bash 生产者再通过通用 `task_output` 渲染它。
 
 模型会在归属方派生的 `sandbox:policy` 运行时上下文中看到当前有效的文件策略；静态工具描述则解释拒绝标记（`[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]`），鼓励尝试可能被拒绝的命令，并禁止绕过拒绝重试。当升级字段被公布时，被拒绝的结果还会携带升级提示本身，使按规定进行的同轮次重试在决策点得到提示，而非依赖模型回忆描述（§ 升级机制）。[当前策略决策](2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md)负责该上下文的理由与边界。
 
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ Landlock launcher 源码和包工作区位于 `native/landlock-run`，与 harnes
 
 `BashExecRequest.sandboxPolicy` 是可选的完整按调用输入；解析后的 spec 使该字段显式。`BashExecutor.sandboxMode` 仍是公布已挂载执行器能否兑现该策略的能力事实，因此只有约束组合才暴露升级。seam 接受任何显式策略；工具拥有会话解析和「仅更宽」的升级规则。非沙箱执行器诚实地保持无约束。
 
-`ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve()` 在执行器运行前盖章完整执行策略——显式升级模式 > 会话覆盖 > 配置默认值，且 `SessionHeader.cwd` > 配置的后备根目录。`SandboxBashExecutor.resolve()` 在 spec 上保留该策略，或为直接的无 agent 调用方提供部署后备值，使 `run()`/`start()` 永不读取可变会话状态。每进程包装事实以返回的 `BashProcess` 为键；`onProcessDone()` 在 `done` 结算前分类 stderr 并给该句柄盖章，因此重叠进程各自保留自己的模式和 runner 方言。
+`ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve()` 在执行器运行前盖章完整执行策略——显式升级模式 > 会话覆盖 > 配置默认值，且 `SessionHeader.cwd` > 配置的后备根目录。`SandboxBashExecutor.resolve()` 在 spec 上保留该策略，或为直接的无 agent 调用方提供部署后备值，使 `run()`/`start()` 永不读取可变会话状态。每进程包装事实以返回的 `BashProcess` 为键；`onProcessDone()` 会通过 stderr 分类之外的通道接收 spawn 失败，并在 `done` 结算前给该句柄盖章，因此重叠进程各自保留自己的模式和 runner 方言。
 
 当约束执行器被挂载时，`bash` 公布配对的 `sandbox_permissions` 和 `justification` 字段。schema 暴露完整的封闭升级词汇，因为有效模式是按会话的；执行拒绝任何不严格宽于该调用有效模式的目标。批准在执行之前解析。`allowed-once` 仅将授权模式盖章到该请求上，而 `rejected`、`cancelled`、`unavailable`、缺失的 approval 服务或缺失的 agent 都以各自不同的结果文本失败关闭。授权不持久化。
 
@@ -117,10 +117,10 @@ fs/web/todo 在进程内执行，因此它们的沙箱语义是各自 seam 层
 
 ### 测试
 
-- **单元测试：** 固定平台选择和 profile、失败关闭的 runner 分类、按调用的模式/根目录解析、按进程事实、升级验证和结果、权限 preset fold 和写入透传、以及运行时上下文排序与具体化。
+- **单元测试：** 固定平台选择和 profile、直接交接提供方返回的 argv、带有无效 workdir 对照的 spawn 层失败、runner 缺失／不可执行／解释器缺失证据、格式错误 runner 阴性对照、受约束的 `BASH_ENV` 求值顺序、结构化 runner 分类（包括只有部分强制执行通知的子进程结果、带门控的致命证据、子进程退出码 126／127，以及前台／后台一致性）、按调用的模式/根目录解析、按进程事实、升级验证和结果、权限 preset fold 和写入透传，以及运行时上下文排序与具体化。
 - **Keyless 真实 runner：** 在提供方和 bash 消费方层面对 bwrap、Landlock 和 Seatbelt 执行真实文件系统效果测试；一个真实 Cordis 上下文通过已交付的 bash 和 fs 工具并发驱动两个项目会话，证明在自身根目录写入成功、在兄弟根目录写入被拒绝。打包安装测试证明注册表 launcher 保持可执行。CI 拒绝静默全跳过。
 - **With-key：** 以只读模式启动真实 ACP 组合，让模型驱动的 bash 写入命中 runner 的拒绝标记，再通过已授权与被拒绝的 workspace-write 重试驱动 bridge 应答器和磁盘效果；不可用的凭证或 runner 自动跳过。
-- **快照：** 固定原子化的当前策略上下文和两个脚本化的 approval 分支。一个真实 ACP 示例场景把会话放在用户主目录下，同时让部署后备根目录指向 `/tmp`，然后固定 workspace-write 运行时上下文消息与一次成功的、由部署选定的变更；这能区分会话根目录解析与进程后备值，而不依赖 runner 特定的拒绝文本。其他快照以无约束启动，使无关 fixture（测试前置数据）保持平台无关。
+- **快照：** 固定原子化的当前策略上下文和两个脚本化的 approval 分支。一个真实 ACP 示例场景把会话放在用户主目录下，同时让部署后备根目录指向 `/tmp`，然后固定 workspace-write 运行时上下文消息与一次成功的、由部署选定的变更；这能区分会话根目录解析与进程后备值，而不依赖 runner 特定的拒绝文本。一个模拟 Landlock 部分强制执行行为的 POSIX 提供方会在组装后的应用中固定直接执行 bash `false` 时仍得到普通子进程结果，并固定提供方可执行文件缺失时在前台／后台均为基础设施失败。其他快照以无约束启动，使无关 fixture（测试前置数据）保持平台无关。
 
 ## 延迟阶段
 
@@ -128,12 +128,12 @@ fs/web/todo 在进程内执行，因此它们的沙箱语义是各自 seam 层
 
 - **第二个消费方**——`subagent-acp` 可选地约束子 agent（按调用策略；默认无约束——子 agent 必须写入自己的持久化）。
 - **更多环境**——环境一致的能力组示例（如 bash+fs 对一个容器）。
-- **Windows 链**——`PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` 保留为空（失败关闭）；填充它意味着来自 AppContainer/restricted-token 家族的约束 runner，从其自己的仓库按 `node-addon-landlock-run` 模板交付，加上其 profile 方言和拒绝/runner 失败签名。改为包装第三方 landstrip runner 的方案[经考虑后已驳回](../../rejected/feature/2026-07-26-evaluate-landstrip-for-windows-sandbox-rung.md)——它所经受的实战检验还不足以承载安全不变式。
+- **Windows 链**——`PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` 保留为空（失败关闭）；填充它意味着来自 AppContainer/restricted-token 家族的约束 runner，从其自己的仓库按 `node-addon-landlock-run` 模板交付，加上其 profile 方言、拒绝签名和 runner 失败规则。改为包装第三方 landstrip runner 的方案[经考虑后已驳回](../../rejected/feature/2026-07-26-evaluate-landstrip-for-windows-sandbox-rung.md)——它所经受的实战检验还不足以承载安全不变式。
 
 ## 曾考虑的替代方案
 
 - **命令字符串启发式预检**：否决。无法理解展开/子进程/符号链接；严格尝试（运行它，让内核决定）是唯一可信的拒绝信号。
-- **即使平台仅有一个后端也功能性探测**：否决。探测用于在候选者之间仲裁；只有一个时无需决策，且探测开销对每个会话的首次约束命令征税（对未来重量级后端而言代价过高）。runner 自身执行时的失败关闭拒绝加 `runnerFailureSignatures` 分类承载了安全属性。
+- **即使平台仅有一个后端也功能性探测**：否决。探测用于在候选者之间仲裁；只有一个时无需决策，且探测开销对每个会话的首次约束命令征税（对未来重量级后端而言代价过高）。runner 自身执行时的失败关闭拒绝加结构化 `runnerFailureRules` 分类承载了安全属性。
 - **提交构建好的 launcher 二进制**：否决。diff 中的二进制不可审查且膨胀历史；经审查的源码 + 原生 CI 构建 + launcher 仓库的字节固定发布演练使二进制远离所有代码树。
 - **安装时编译 launcher**：否决。将 C 工具链强加给每个消费方；仅在碰巧有编译器时才存在的备选不是备选。
 - **从一个构建器交叉编译两种架构**：否决。仅为重建两个约 70 KB 的二进制就需要携带一个固定的交叉工具链（rustup targets、zig 或容器镜像）；每架构的原生 runner 已存在，各自构建自己的平台包（`node-addon-require-builtin` 模式，launcher 仓库自己的流水线）。
@@ -172,19 +172,20 @@ fs/web/todo 在进程内执行，因此它们的沙箱语义是各自 seam 层
 - **单一包装的幻觉被有意放弃。**`tools/pre-execute` 包装加提示词约定无法解决沙箱批准——正确的设计需要结构化拒绝、原生 runner 探测、按调用策略承载和一致的跨工具族强制，本设计为此付出了代价。
 - **`read-only` 通过后续设计成为跨工具族边界。** 本 Agent Note 最初只交付 bash 强制；[跨工具族 fs 沙箱 Agent Note](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md) 通过沙箱化的 `ctx.fs` 提供方把同一模式词汇扩展到文件系统工具，并将 mode/root 配置和 `sandbox/mode` 覆盖迁移到 `ctx.sandboxPolicy`（§ 进程内工具）。
 - **Windows 没有后端。** 其链槽保留为空——失败关闭，绝不穿透；填充它是延迟阶段。
-- **Seatbelt 层级依赖 Apple 已弃用但仍交付的 `sandbox-exec` CLI。** 作为 darwin 的唯一候选，它无需探测即被选中，因此未来移除会在执行时作为 runner 失败分类浮现——重新抛出 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`，命令从未运行；失败关闭，绝不开放。
+- **Seatbelt 层级依赖 Apple 已弃用但仍交付的 `sandbox-exec` CLI。** 作为 darwin 的唯一候选，它无需探测即被选中，因此在 workdir 可用时，未来移除会表现为可归因于 runner 的 spawn 失败，可执行文件拒绝则通过其致命签名体现——两者都会变为 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`，且命令绝不会运行；失败关闭，绝不开放。
 - **Landlock 约束的完整度取决于运行内核的 ABI。** 报告为 `enforcement: 'partial'` 而非拒绝——这是有意的权衡，使备选在旧内核主机上仍可用。
+- **Runner 归因使用带内协议。** 退出状态与 stderr 无法以密码学方式识别写入者，因此受限子进程可以模仿 runner 的致命诊断行和状态，造成可用性或诊断误归因。多项证据的合取与精确通知排除减少了意外匹配；这不是沙箱绕过，因为子进程已经受到限制。
 - **launcher 作为注册表依赖到达。** 通过其自身仓库的发布流水线（经审查的 C 源码、原生 CI 构建器、字节固定的发布演练）加上本仓库的版本固定获得信任——真实内核 e2e 测试环节会验证安装产物的实际行为。
 - **模型可能过度请求。** 在没有拒绝依据的情况下升级，或在 `workspace-write` 足够时选择 `danger-full-access`：描述引导且枚举强制阶梯，但人的提示词是实际门控；`approval/asked` 原因使过度请求可审计，且 `prepend` 策略应答器可以自动拒绝部署永远不想要的模式。
 - **公布的目标集是静态的，而有效模式是按会话的**（schema 是注册表全局的）——已处于最宽模式的会话仍被提供这些字段。构造上无害：执行时的严格放宽检查（而非枚举）是安全边界——非放宽请求以自身文本失败且不提示任何人。
-- **授权的升级不等于可工作的沙箱。** 不可用的后端即使对授权升级到约束模式也仍然失败关闭——在平台没有链或所有探测失败时于 `confine()` 阶段，在未探测的唯一 runner 拒绝时于执行阶段（归类为沙箱失败而非命令失败）——而授权的 `danger-full-access` 运行根本不触及提供方：此时授权（而非探测）是权威。
+- **授权的升级不等于可工作的沙箱。** 不可用的后端即使对授权升级到约束模式也仍然失败关闭——平台没有链或所有探测失败时在 `confine()` 阶段失败，所选可执行文件无法启动时通过 spawn 通道失败，已启动的 runner 拒绝时则通过结构化规则失败——而授权的 `danger-full-access` 运行根本不触及提供方：此时授权（而非探测）是权威。
 - **运行时上下文历史仅追加。** 策略切换会在保留的历史之后追加一份用于取代先前快照的完整快照，从而保留稳定的系统与对话前缀；状态不变时不添加消息。
 - **旧策略快照仍保留在历史中。** 每份完整快照都会明确取代更早的运行时上下文快照，因此回放与压缩（compaction）只需保留最新具体化的消息。
 
 ## FAQ
 
 - **一个命令返回了 `[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]`——它失败了吗？** 它运行了，内核拒绝了一个文件操作：拒绝是与退出码正交的结果事实。相关指令禁止通过绕过限制来重试；唯一被认可的动作是以升级请求重试同一命令一次。
-- **如何区分损坏的沙箱与失败的命令？** Runner 失败在分类中优先于拒绝：匹配包装的 `runnerFailureSignatures` 的失败运行意味着命令从未运行——前台重新抛出结构化的 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` 并附带 runner 的 stderr 行，后台任务盖章 `sandbox.runnerFailed` 并渲染自己的标记。损坏的沙箱永远不会被误判为命令执行失败，且命令永远不会无约束运行。
+- **如何区分损坏的沙箱与失败的命令？** 提供方 argv 的任何 spawn 拒绝都能证明受限启动从未开始，但只有在调用方拥有的 workdir 可用，且 Node 为该 argv[0] 报告可归因的 `ENOENT` 或 `EACCES` 时，才能据此判定 runner 损坏。没有精确错误路径的裸 `syscall: 'spawn'` 和其他所有拒绝仍是普通的命令启动错误。进程启动后，只有当 `runnerFailureRules` 中某一条目同时匹配其可选退出码门控，以及排除整行精确信息性行后的一行致命 stderr 诊断时，runner 失败才会优先于拒绝。前台失败会抛出结构化的 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`，并附带 spawn 错误或匹配行作为详细信息；遭异步拒绝或已结算的后台任务则盖章 `sandbox.runnerFailed` 并渲染自己的标记。如果 `SubprocessService` 同步抛出同样带有来源信息的 `ENOENT`／`EACCES` 形态，后台启动会抛出该结构化错误；其他同步错误原样传播。Landlock 部分强制执行通知加上普通子进程失败时，仍返回命令结果。
 - **在没有后端的平台上会发生什么——今天的 Windows？** `confine()` 抛出失败关闭的 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`，命令永不 spawn；`win32` 是保留的空链，由测试固定为同样失败关闭，直到 Windows runner 填充它（§ 延迟阶段）。
 - **`bwrap` 已安装在我的主机上但不可用（禁用了非特权 userns、LSM 拒绝 `mount`）——会发生什么？** 链探测是功能性的——它构建并强制一个真实 profile 而非检查 `--version`——因此存在但不可用的 `bwrap` 探测失败，选择落到注册表安装的 Landlock launcher，结论在提供方生命周期内缓存。
 - **沙箱限制网络或进程可见性吗？** 不——`SandboxMode` 仅声称文件操作；bwrap profile 刻意不 unshare pid，没有后端声称网络。网络限制是否成为自己的旋钮留在 § seam 中开放。

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-24-web-session-model-selector.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-24-web-session-model-selector.md
-2026-07-24-web-session-model-selector.md: 003c0b5ac1c6963701e1d93e4c3ff8615fc45dd5
-2026-07-24-web-session-model-selector.zh.md: a8e74fb1539348535f89f49d7c6d56b2bab79278
+2026-07-24-web-session-model-selector.md: 05e923fb3b5df72485ffb8d6ff5aa0104b19a8a0
+2026-07-24-web-session-model-selector.zh.md: bdfa2f856a799cc86600650829a2df62a7dfdc18

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-24-web-session-model-selector.md

@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ The Web conversation displayed and sent through the Host's fixed provider/model
 
 The Web Host reuses `installAgentLlmTarget` for every created or resumed agent. The provider/model/reasoning target starts from the latest `request/header` when the session has used a model, otherwise from the Host default route. `session.selectModel` changes the session-local mutable target, and prompt assembly captures it with request routing; a switch during a running step therefore applies to the next assembled step. The next consumed target persists through the existing full `request/header` snapshot, while a choice that has not reached a request remains process-local.
 
-The session RPC domain exposes a `session.models` directory and `session.selectModel`. The directory is built dynamically from the LLM registry and grouped by provider; each listed model's exact metadata adds adapter-owned reasoning effort ids, names, descriptions, and optional default. Provider catalogs and exact metadata load concurrently by provider and fail independently, so successful groups remain usable alongside retryable failure records. Catalog membership stays advisory: the current model is inserted as an unlisted row when its registered provider omits it, while exact resolution decides whether a route and explicit effort are available. Selection uses `resolveCallConfig` to reject unsupported effort ids and materialize an adapter-configured default before updating the target.
+The session RPC domain exposes a `session.models` directory and `session.selectModel`. The directory is built dynamically from the LLM registry and grouped by provider; each listed model's exact metadata adds adapter-owned reasoning effort ids, names, descriptions, and optional default. Provider catalogs and exact metadata load concurrently by provider and fail independently, so successful groups remain usable alongside retryable failure records. Catalog membership stays advisory: `session.models.current` is returned independently and can remain routable when absent from every group, but the Host does not synthesize an unlisted row after its provider stops advertising it. The two surfaces answer that state differently on purpose: the TUI still renders the unlisted current model as its own row and marks it current, while Web shows the unset trigger label and asks for a replacement. Web is the surface where a catalog is edited, so a target the user just deleted should read as a decision to make rather than a selection to keep; the TUI, which only picks from what exists, has no such edit to reconcile. The cost is real and accepted — a Web composer showing the unset label can still send to the routed target — and the divergence is deliberate, not a missed migration. Exact resolution decides whether a route and explicit effort are available. Selection uses `resolveCallConfig` to reject unsupported effort ids and materialize an adapter-configured default before updating the target.
 
 The browser `ModelService` owns one `ModelDirectory` per live session. Its snapshot contains the current complete target, grouped catalog, provider failures, operation error, and `idle`/`loading`/`ready`/`selecting`/`error` state. Mounting primes the trigger label and each menu open refreshes the directory. Directory and selection calls share an operation generation so older responses cannot replace a newer result; connection reset discards the process-local projection before restoring the Host target. Failures retain the previous current target and usable groups.
 
-`@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-ui-conversation` declares the session-scoped single slot `conversation.input.model` as a child of its composer-bar entry. InputBar renders the seat in its trailing controls immediately before the pending indicator and primary button; the seat receives the bar's `locked` owner prop and session scope. `@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-ui-model` occupies that seat and also contributes `/model` over the same directory. Its compact trigger displays the catalog model name and effective reasoning label, falling back to ids when metadata is absent. The upward menu first offers Model and, when the current exact model supports it, Effort; Model drills into provider groups, while Effort drills into the adapter-ordered levels. The provider-default row appears only when the adapter does not configure a model default.
+`@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-ui-conversation` declares the session-scoped single slot `conversation.input.model` as a child of its composer-bar entry. InputBar renders the seat in its trailing controls immediately before the pending indicator and primary button; the seat receives the bar's `locked` owner prop and session scope. `@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-ui-model` occupies that seat and also contributes `/model` over the same directory. Its compact trigger displays the exact catalog model name and effective reasoning label. When the current target is absent from the groups, the trigger instead displays `Select model`, the model list marks no row active, and the Effort row stays absent; choosing a listed model replaces the complete target through the existing selection path. The upward menu otherwise first offers Model and Effort; Model drills into provider groups, while Effort drills into the adapter-ordered levels. The provider-default row appears only when the adapter does not configure a model default.
 
 The production browser roster is assembled from `apps/cli/config/base.cordis.yml` plus `apps/cli/config/web.cordis.yml`; the model feature is one `dshClient` row rather than a package hardcoded in Web boot code. Its package manifest orders it after the runtime and command feature, while Cordis service injection waits for the conversation slot before registering the composer occupant.
 
@@ -40,4 +40,4 @@ Any Host-backed Web conversation, including a blank session, can switch among dy
 
 ## Testing
 
-Host tests pin grouped discovery, catalog and exact-metadata failure isolation, logged effort restoration, unlisted current targets, unsupported effort rejection, default materialization, and next-assembly switching. Client tests pin the shared directory, reconnect restoration, and complete-target submission. Component tests pin dynamic effort labels, descriptions, provider-default exposure, and effort submission. The keyless built-app fixture loads the production model plugin, selects OpenAI's GPT-5 and its Max effort, sends a turn, and verifies that the next generated response reports both ids.
+Host tests pin grouped discovery, catalog and exact-metadata failure isolation, logged effort restoration without stale-row injection, advisory unlisted selection, unsupported effort rejection, default materialization, and next-assembly switching. Client tests pin the shared directory, reconnect restoration, and complete-target submission. Component tests pin dynamic effort labels, descriptions, provider-default exposure, effort submission, and the `Select model` fallback for a removed row. The keyless built-app fixture loads the production model plugin, selects OpenAI's GPT-5 and its Max effort, sends a turn, and verifies that the next generated response reports both ids; the DeepSeek configuration fixture removes the active catalog row and pins the fallback before choosing a replacement.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-24-web-session-model-selector.zh.md

@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ Web 对话原本通过 Host 固定的提供方与模型路由显示并发送消
 
 Web Host 为每个新建或恢复的 agent（智能体）复用 `installAgentLlmTarget`。如果会话已经使用过模型，提供方／模型／推理（reasoning）目标从最新的 `request/header` 开始；否则采用 Host 默认路由。`session.selectModel` 会更改会话级可变目标，提示词组装则将该目标与请求路由一并捕获，因此运行中步骤发生的切换会应用于下一个组装步骤。下一个实际采用的目标通过现有的完整 `request/header` 快照持久化；尚未进入请求的选择则仅保存在当前进程中。
 
-会话 RPC 领域公开 `session.models` 模型目录与 `session.selectModel`。该目录从 LLM（大语言模型）注册表动态构建，并按提供方分组；每个已列出模型的精确元数据还会加入由适配器持有的推理强度 ID、名称、说明和可选默认值。各提供方的目录与精确元数据会按提供方并发加载，且彼此独立失败，因此成功加载的分组仍可与可重试的失败记录一同使用。模型是否位于目录仅供参考：如果当前模型的已注册提供方没有列出该模型，系统会将其作为未列出行插入；精确解析则决定路由与显式推理强度是否可用。选择操作通过 `resolveCallConfig` 拒绝不支持的推理强度 ID，并在更新目标前具体化适配器配置的默认值。
+会话 RPC 领域公开 `session.models` 模型目录与 `session.selectModel`。该目录从 LLM（大语言模型）注册表动态构建，并按提供方分组；每个已列出模型的精确元数据还会加入由适配器持有的推理强度 ID、名称、说明和可选默认值。各提供方的目录与精确元数据会按提供方并发加载，且彼此独立失败，因此成功加载的分组仍可与可重试的失败记录一同使用。模型是否位于目录仅供参考：`session.models.current` 独立返回，即使不在任何分组中也仍然可以路由，但提供方停止公布该模型后，Host 不会合成未列出行。两个前门有意对这一状态给出不同回答：TUI 仍把未列出的当前模型渲染为独立一行并标记为当前，Web 则显示未设置状态的触发器标签并要求选择替代模型。Web 正是编辑目录所在的前门，因此用户刚刚删除的目标应当读作一个有待作出的决定，而不是一项可以保留的选择；TUI 只在已存在的模型中挑选，没有这类编辑需要调和。这一代价真实存在且已被接受——显示未设置标签的 Web composer 仍会发送到实际路由的目标——这一分歧是有意为之，而不是一处遗漏的迁移。精确解析决定路由与显式推理强度是否可用。选择操作通过 `resolveCallConfig` 拒绝不支持的推理强度 ID，并在更新目标前具体化适配器配置的默认值。
 
 浏览器中的 `ModelService` 为每个实时会话持有一个 `ModelDirectory`。其快照包含当前完整目标、分组目录、提供方失败记录、操作错误，以及 `idle`、`loading`、`ready`、`selecting`、`error` 状态。挂载时会预先填充触发器标签，此后每次打开菜单都会刷新目录。目录与选择调用共用操作代次，防止较早响应覆盖较新结果；连接重置会先丢弃当前进程中的投影，再恢复 Host 目标。失败时保留先前的当前目标和可用分组。
 
-`@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-ui-conversation` 将会话作用域的单实例 slot `conversation.input.model` 声明为其输入栏 entry 的子 slot。InputBar 在尾部控件区将该 seat 渲染于 pending 指示器与主按钮之前；该 seat 接收输入栏的 `locked` owner prop 与会话作用域。`@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-ui-model` 占用该 seat，并在同一目录上提供 `/model`。其紧凑型触发器显示目录中的模型名称与生效的推理强度标签；元数据缺失时则回退到相应 ID。向上展开的菜单首先提供 Model，并在当前精确模型支持时提供 Effort；Model 可深入提供方分组，Effort 可深入适配器排序的级别。仅当适配器没有配置模型默认值时，才显示提供方默认值行。
+`@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-ui-conversation` 将会话作用域的单实例 slot `conversation.input.model` 声明为其输入栏 entry 的子 slot。InputBar 在尾部控件区将该 seat 渲染于 pending 指示器与主按钮之前；该 seat 接收输入栏的 `locked` owner prop 与会话作用域。`@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-ui-model` 占用该 seat，并在同一目录上提供 `/model`。其紧凑型触发器显示目录中精确模型的名称与生效的推理强度标签。当前目标不在分组中时，触发器改为显示 `Select model`，模型列表不标记任何活动行，Effort 行也保持隐藏；选择一个已列出的模型，会通过现有选择路径替换完整目标。除此情形外，向上展开的菜单会首先提供 Model 与 Effort；Model 可深入提供方分组，Effort 可深入适配器排序的级别。仅当适配器没有配置模型默认值时，才显示提供方默认值行。
 
 生产环境的浏览器名册由 `apps/cli/config/base.cordis.yml` 与 `apps/cli/config/web.cordis.yml` 共同组装；模型功能对应其中一行 `dshClient` 配置项，而不是 Web boot 代码中硬编码的包。其包 manifest（元数据清单）将加载顺序置于运行时与命令功能之后；Cordis 服务注入则等待 conversation slot 可用，再注册 composer 占用方。
 
@@ -40,4 +40,4 @@ Web Host 为每个新建或恢复的 agent（智能体）复用 `installAgentLlm
 
 ## 测试
 
-Host 测试固定分组发现、目录与精确元数据失败隔离、已记录推理强度恢复、当前未列出目标、不支持的推理强度拒绝、默认值具体化，以及切换仅影响下一次组装。客户端测试固定共享目录、重连恢复与完整目标提交。组件测试固定动态推理强度标签、说明、提供方默认值展示与推理强度提交。无密钥 built-app fixture（测试前置数据）加载生产模型插件，选择 OpenAI 的 GPT-5 及其 Max 推理强度，发起一个轮次，并验证下一条生成的响应会报告两个 ID。
+Host 测试固定分组发现、目录与精确元数据失败隔离、已记录推理强度恢复且不注入陈旧行、建议性的未列出模型选择、不支持的推理强度拒绝、默认值具体化，以及切换仅影响下一次组装。客户端测试固定共享目录、重连恢复与完整目标提交。组件测试固定动态推理强度标签、说明、提供方默认值展示、推理强度提交，以及已删除模型行的 `Select model` 回退。无密钥 built-app fixture（测试前置数据）加载生产模型插件，选择 OpenAI 的 GPT-5 及其 Max 推理强度，发起一个轮次，并验证下一条生成的响应会报告两个 ID；DeepSeek 配置 fixture 会删除活动目录行，在选择替代模型之前固定该回退。

.agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-04-doc-tiers-and-budgets.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-04-doc-tiers-and-budgets.md
-2026-07-04-doc-tiers-and-budgets.md: a52c40a9a147fd39fdec4c61079822f1b1115227
-2026-07-04-doc-tiers-and-budgets.zh.md: c26efe0e06d73ff0bd5608c7f44d54ebbe373bed
+2026-07-04-doc-tiers-and-budgets.md: e7b3421d09a1ae5ab9a9373e8040832c1b0d4b97
+2026-07-04-doc-tiers-and-budgets.zh.md: 18bf98777c87512e6161a4529db66030ced47bfd

.agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-04-doc-tiers-and-budgets.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Agent Note: Documentation tiers, budgets, and the ceiling gate
+# Agent Note: Documentation structure, tiers, and budgets
 
 Status: implemented
 
@@ -6,13 +6,14 @@ English | [中文](2026-07-04-doc-tiers-and-budgets.zh.md)
 
 ## Problem
 
-Standing docs accumulated repeated rules, retold incidents, duplicated package maps, and stale Agent Note summaries despite existing writing guidance. Because review alone did not prevent that growth, the repository needed a mechanical budget alongside its documentation taxonomy.
+Standing docs accumulated repeated rules, retold incidents, duplicated package maps, and stale Agent Note summaries despite existing writing guidance. That guidance also did not define how a document's place in the hierarchy limits its scope or how ordered teaching differs from lookup-oriented material. Because review alone did not prevent that growth, the repository needed a mechanical budget alongside its documentation taxonomy.
 
 ## Decision
 
-- **A tier taxonomy with one home per fact.** [docs/AGENTS.md](../../../../docs/AGENTS.md) is the documentation standard: it assigns every Markdown tier a single job (standing orders, system map, type catalog, decision records, incident stories, how-tos, per-package contracts, generated catalogs, workflows), forbids restating a fact outside its home tier (link instead), and carries the slop checklist used when writing or reviewing any doc.
+- **Structure follows the documentation tree.** [docs/AGENTS.md](../../../../docs/AGENTS.md) is the documentation standard: a document owns detail about its subject, summarizes only the purpose, responsibility, and high-level behavior of direct children, and links to deeper owners. [Agent Notes](../../README.md) remain outside this structural contract. Every human-facing document is a tutorial with an ordered outcome or a reference with an explicit lookup scope; a [postmortem](../../../../docs/postmortem/README.md) is an incident-scoped reference whose chronology records evidence. Tutorials introduce concepts in prerequisite order for the reader's starting knowledge.
+- **A tier taxonomy with one home per fact.** The standard assigns every Markdown tier one job, forbids restating a fact outside its home tier, and carries the slop checklist used when writing or reviewing any doc.
 - **A narrow, hard budget gate.** [scripts/verify-doc-budgets.ts](../../../../scripts/verify-doc-budgets.ts) joins `doc-sync`: every doc listed in [scripts/doc-budgets.manifest.json](../../../../scripts/doc-budgets.manifest.json) must stay under its word ceiling (`wc -w` semantics, whole file), and a budgeted file that is missing fails the gate so a rename cannot silently orphan its budget. Scope is deliberately only the accretion-prone standing docs — the root and subtree `AGENTS.md` files, `architecture.md`, `packages/README.md`, and the standing policy docs they evict content into (`docs/testing.md`, `docs/defensive-patterns.md`). Reference docs, Agent Notes, and package READMEs are unbudgeted: length is legitimate there when every row is a fact, and review plus the slop checklist govern them.
-- **Ceilings are an enforcement frontier that ratchets.** A ceiling sits at least 5% above the doc's current size — working headroom, so routine wording edits pass while real growth still trips the gate — and ratchets down, keeping that margin, as the doc is brought to its target budget (root `AGENTS.md` ≤ 1,500 words; `architecture.md` ≤ 1,800; subtree `AGENTS.md` ≤ 600; `packages/README.md` ≤ 600). When the gate goes red the fix is to relocate or condense per the taxonomy; raising a ceiling is permitted only with explicit justification in the PR description, the manifest diff being the reviewable act.
+- **Ceilings are an enforcement frontier that ratchets.** A doc at or below its target keeps at least 5% headroom as its ceiling ratchets down; a doc above target keeps a frozen ceiling that prevents growth until it reaches the target (root `AGENTS.md` ≤ 1,600 words; `architecture.md` ≤ 1,800; subtree `AGENTS.md` ≤ 600 except `packages/AGENTS.md` ≤ 650 and `docs/AGENTS.md` ≤ 1,250; `packages/README.md` ≤ 600). When the gate goes red, relocate or condense; raise a ceiling only with explicit PR justification.
 - **A thin workflow skill, contracts in docs.** [.agents/skills/dsh-doc-standards](../../../skills/dsh-doc-standards/SKILL.md) carries the placement/audit/red-gate workflow and defers to the standard as its source of truth, the same split as [dsh-translate-docs](../../../skills/dsh-translate-docs/SKILL.md) over the i18n contract.
 
 ## Alternatives considered
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ Standing docs accumulated repeated rules, retold incidents, duplicated package m
 
 ## Consequences
 
-- Adding to a budgeted doc now requires displacement: relocate the addition to its taxonomy home with a pointer, or condense existing prose to pay for it. Growth without pruning fails CI.
-- The bring-under-target rewrites land as stacked follow-ups that ratchet the manifest down as they merge; until each lands, its doc's frozen ceiling only prevents further growth.
+- Adding to a budgeted doc requires displacement: relocate the addition to its taxonomy home with a pointer, or condense existing prose to pay for it. Growth without pruning fails CI.
+- Structural review starts with ownership and document form before sentence-level editing, so lower-level detail moves to its owner instead of being polished in the wrong place.
+- Budgeted docs that remain above target cannot grow; reaching the target restores the 5% working headroom.
 - Word count is a crude proxy accepted deliberately: it cannot judge quality, but it forces the relocation decision at exactly the moment content is being added, which is when the author has the context to place it correctly.

.agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-04-doc-tiers-and-budgets.zh.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Agent Note: 文档分层、预算与上限门禁
+# Agent Note: 文档结构、层级与预算
 
 Status: implemented
 
@@ -6,14 +6,15 @@ Status: implemented
 
 ## 问题
 
-尽管已有写作指导，常设文档仍不断累积重复规则、反复讲述的事故、重复的包映射，以及陈旧的 Agent Note 摘要。仅靠评审无法阻止这种增长，因此仓库需要在文档分类体系之外再配一套可自动执行的预算。
+尽管已有写作指导，常设文档仍不断累积重复规则、反复讲述的事件、重复的包（package）映射，以及陈旧的 Agent Note（agent 决策记录）摘要。该指导也未明确文档在层级中的位置如何限定其内容范围，以及按顺序引导读者学习的内容与面向查阅的材料有何不同。仅靠评审无法阻止这种增长，因此仓库需要在文档分类之外再配一套机械预算。
 
 ## 决策
 
-- **每项事实只归属一处的层级分类体系。**[docs/AGENTS.md](../../../../docs/AGENTS.md) 是文档标准：它为每种 Markdown 层级分配单一职责（常设指令、系统图、类型目录、决策记录、事故叙事、操作指南、各包契约、生成的目录、工作流），禁止在事实归属层级之外重复陈述（应改为链接），并包含编写或评审任何文档时使用的赘余检查清单。
-- **范围窄且严格的预算门禁。**[scripts/verify-doc-budgets.ts](../../../../scripts/verify-doc-budgets.ts) 接入 `doc-sync`：[scripts/doc-budgets.manifest.json](../../../../scripts/doc-budgets.manifest.json) 列出的每份文档都不得超过其词数上限（采用 `wc -w` 语义，统计整个文件）；预算内文件缺失也会使门禁失败，使文件重命名无法悄然摆脱预算约束。范围刻意只涵盖容易膨胀的常设文档——根目录和子树中的 `AGENTS.md` 文件、`architecture.md`、`packages/README.md`，以及它们将内容移入的常设策略文档（`docs/testing.md`、`docs/defensive-patterns.md`）。参考文档、Agent Note 和包 README 不设预算：只要每一行都是事实，长度在这些位置就是合理的；评审和赘余检查清单负责约束它们。
-- **上限是会逐步收紧的执行红线。** 上限设定为文档当前词数的至少 105%（留出工作余量，使日常措辞调整能通过，而真正的膨胀仍会触发门禁），并随着文档被精简到目标预算而同步下调、保持该余量（根 `AGENTS.md` ≤ 1,500 词；`architecture.md` ≤ 1,800；子树 `AGENTS.md` ≤ 600；`packages/README.md` ≤ 600）。门禁变红时，修复方式是按分类体系迁移或压缩内容；只有在 PR（Pull Request）描述中给出明确理由时才允许提高上限，manifest（元数据清单）的 diff 本身就是可供评审的变更。
-- **精简的工作流 skill（技能），契约归文档。**[.agents/skills/dsh-doc-standards](../../../skills/dsh-doc-standards/SKILL.md) 承载文档放置、审计和门禁失败处理工作流，并以文档标准为真源，与 [dsh-translate-docs](../../../skills/dsh-translate-docs/SKILL.md) 和 i18n 契约之间的分工相同。
+- **结构遵循文档树。**[docs/AGENTS.md](../../../../docs/AGENTS.md) 是文档标准：文档负责承载其主题的详细内容，仅概述直接子项的目的、职责和高层行为，并链接到更深层内容的归属文档。[Agent Note](../../README.md) 仍不受这一结构契约约束。每份面向人的文档要么是按顺序引导读者达成结果的教程（tutorial），要么是查阅范围明确的参考文档（reference）；[事故复盘（postmortem）](../../../../docs/postmortem/README.md) 是范围限定于单个事件的参考文档，其时间线记录证据。教程结合读者的起始知识，按前置依赖顺序介绍概念。
+- **每项事实只归属一处的层级分类。**文档标准为每种 Markdown 层级分配单一职责，禁止在事实归属层级之外重复陈述，并包含编写或评审任何文档时使用的赘余检查清单。
+- **范围窄且严格的预算门禁。**[scripts/verify-doc-budgets.ts](../../../../scripts/verify-doc-budgets.ts) 接入 `doc-sync`：[scripts/doc-budgets.manifest.json](../../../../scripts/doc-budgets.manifest.json) 列出的每份文档都必须低于其字数上限（采用 `wc -w` 语义，统计整个文件）；预算内文件缺失也会使门禁失败，使重命名无法悄然遗落其预算。范围刻意只涵盖容易膨胀的常设文档——根目录和子树中的 `AGENTS.md` 文件、`architecture.md`、`packages/README.md`，以及它们将内容移入的常设策略文档（`docs/testing.md`、`docs/defensive-patterns.md`）。参考文档、Agent Note 和包 README 不设预算：只要每一行都是事实，长度在这些位置就是合理的；评审和赘余检查清单负责约束它们。
+- **上限是只进不退的执行红线。** 达到或低于目标的文档在上限逐步下调时保留至少 5% 的余量；高于目标的文档则维持冻结的上限，在达到目标之前不得增长（根 `AGENTS.md` ≤ 1,600 词；`architecture.md` ≤ 1,800；子树 `AGENTS.md` ≤ 600，但 `packages/AGENTS.md` ≤ 650、`docs/AGENTS.md` ≤ 1,250；`packages/README.md` ≤ 600）。门禁变红时，迁移或压缩内容；只有在 PR（Pull Request）描述中给出明确理由时才提高上限。
+- **精简的工作流 skill（技能），契约归文档。**[.agents/skills/dsh-doc-standards](../../../skills/dsh-doc-standards/SKILL.md) 承载放置/审计/红灯门禁工作流，并以文档标准为真源，与 [dsh-translate-docs](../../../skills/dsh-translate-docs/SKILL.md) 和 i18n 契约之间的分工相同。
 
 ## 曾考虑的替代方案
 
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ Status: implemented
 
 ## 后果
 
-- 向受预算约束的文档添加内容现在需要腾挪空间：将新增内容迁移到其分类体系归属地并留下链接，或压缩现有行文来腾出空间。只增不减会导致 CI 失败。
-- 精简到目标预算的重写以堆叠的后续 PR 落地，每次合并时同步下调 manifest 中的上限；在各自落地之前，文档冻结的上限仅阻止进一步膨胀。
-- 词数是一个粗糙的代理指标，这是有意接受的：它无法判断质量，但它在内容被添加的那一刻强制触发迁移决策，而那正是作者拥有足够上下文来正确放置内容的时刻。
+- 向受预算约束的文档添加内容需要置换：将新增内容迁移到其分类体系归属地并留下指针，或压缩现有行文来腾出空间。只增不减会导致 CI 失败。
+- 结构评审先检查归属关系和文档形式，再进行句子层面的编辑，使较低层级的细节迁移到其归属文档，而不是在错误的位置加以润色。
+- 仍高于目标的受预算约束文档不得增长；达到目标后，将恢复 5% 的工作余量。
+- 字数是一个粗糙的代理指标，这是有意接受的：它无法判断质量，但它在内容被添加的那一刻强制触发迁移决策，而那正是作者拥有足够上下文来正确放置内容的时刻。