docs: tighten prose audit after master retarget

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Tianyi Cui
2026-07-13 16:24:32 +08:00
parent 17e04a1c70
commit c45d7927cf
192 files changed
+1047 -4078

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@@ -1,39 +1,7 @@
/**
* Per-run execution state for the engine's THREAD side: the script's vm
* context and its injected hooks (`agent`/`parallel`/`pipeline`/`phase`/
* `log`/`args`), the concurrency semaphore and caps, cancellation, and the
* drive loop that turns a script settlement into a {@link WorkflowResult}.
* Children are started by RPC to the host through a {@link ChildPort}, so
* this module never touches a cordis context — it runs inside the worker
* thread.
*
* Value boundary (the trust premise lives in ./realm.ts): values ENTERING the
* worker-side host code from the script (hook options, schemas, the return
* value) are materialized by `materializeFromRealm` — a plain walk that
* rejects loud everything JSON cannot carry, which also makes every value
* safe for the later postMessage hop. Values ENTERING the realm (`args`,
* `agent()` results, hook promises and their failures, combinator arrays) are
* handed over DIRECTLY as worker-realm values: the script is model-written
* and trusted, so outer prototypes are not a leak. `args` is cloned once at
* start so a script scribbling on it cannot mutate the session's init object
* (a benign-bug guard; the postMessage clone already isolated the caller).
*
* Failure discipline: fatal {@link WorkflowError}s (bad hook arguments,
* unsupported options/schemas, tripped caps, synchronous start refusal,
* provider-start failure, ready-child result rejection, and
* cancellation) ALWAYS propagate through
* `parallel`/`pipeline` — recognized by `instanceof` against this realm's
* class, which a script inside the vm context cannot forge — and the per-item
* `null` is reserved for child-run failures and ordinary in-stage script
* errors. Every hook-returned promise gets a no-op rejection consumer, so a
* dropped promise cannot surface an unhandled rejection (which would kill the
* worker and read as an engine fault).
*
* There is deliberately NO worker-side abandon channel: a script that never
* settles after a cancel simply never posts a result, and the HOST enforces
* the settles-within-grace guarantee by force-settling `cancelled` and
* terminating the worker — the real kill an in-process engine could not have.
*
* Worker-side workflow runtime: vm hooks, child RPC, limits, value
* materialization, cancellation, and result shaping. Host termination enforces
* the cancellation deadline.
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-workflow-workerthread/runtime
*/