fix(code-runtime): reject a maxWallMs above Node's maximum timer delay

`config.maxWallMs` is only checked for positivity, and it is handed to
`setTimeout`, which clamps any delay above 2^31-1 ms to 1 ms. A deployment
configuring a 25-day wall ceiling therefore gets the opposite of what it asked
for: every run times out on the first tick. The runtime now range-checks the
field at load against MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS from dsh-timeout and throws, so the
misconfiguration fails loud where it is self-contained instead of silently
inverting the budget.

`computeMs` needs no matching bound: it is compared against measured event-loop
utilization rather than fed to a timer.

The test asserts both the rejection and that the boundary value itself loads.

packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
-#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
-README.md: acc0e37e73d3887c70a77d16311305e52f5a4030
-README.zh.md: 15983dba00eff6fbc6e6d32a4d22df3a4249af76
+#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/README.md
+README.md: 90f6f1bce07c2a0e83b411b6d85e9cd1cd4a5f31
+README.zh.md: 56aa99a1160a19025c7cb09314ddb7b9aec56890

packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/README.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Every field is validated and defaulted; `maxOutputBytes` is a safe integer of at
 - **Type-strip host-side, in execution context** — the program is wrapped in an async-function shell, stripped with `node:module`'s `stripTypeScriptTypes` (erasable syntax only — `enum`/namespaces are rejected as a program `exception` and no worker spawns), and sliced back out byte-positioned; it then executes as the body of an `AsyncFunction`, so top-level `await`/`return` work.
 - **The port assumes a hostile peer** — model code can reach `parentPort` and forge traffic, so every inbound message is shape-validated and REBUILT before anything reads it (`null`, primitives, junk types, and malformed payloads drop without a throw; forged extra fields never ride along), the host answers each call id at most once, resolves binding names as OWN properties only (a forged `constructor` cannot walk a prototype chain), drops post-settlement replies, and validates every binding resolution and completion as lossless JSON. Forged `log`/`done` messages cannot bypass the outer cap: the host repeats validation and accounts every admitted log plus the completion or diagnostic. Worker-side namespaces are null-prototype with `defineProperty`, so `__proto__`-shaped binding names are ordinary keys.
 - **Binding rejection classes are request data** — an optional namespace descriptor names the constructor global and the own property that receives the failed member name. The worker materializes and injects that real class, so `instanceof` works without hardcoding `tools` or `ToolCallError`; declarations with invalid or colliding globals fail before a worker spawns. Failures use module-captured error and property-definition intrinsics plus null-prototype descriptors, so later model mutations cannot turn a rejected binding into a worker crash.
-- **Two independent budgets, because the peer is hostile** — `computeMs` meters the worker's MEASURED busy time (`worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()` polling): a hot loop cannot hide behind a pending decoy dispatch, and a program awaiting a slow tool accrues nothing. `maxWallMs` backstops what busy time cannot see (awaiting a promise nobody resolves). Both funnel into `worker.terminate()`, which ends hot synchronous loops too; heap overflow surfaces as the worker's OOM exit (`kind: 'worker-exit'`).
+- **Two independent budgets, because the peer is hostile** — `computeMs` meters the worker's MEASURED busy time (`worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()` polling): a hot loop cannot hide behind a pending decoy dispatch, and a program awaiting a slow tool accrues nothing. `maxWallMs` backstops what busy time cannot see (awaiting a promise nobody resolves). Both funnel into `worker.terminate()`, which ends hot synchronous loops too; heap overflow surfaces as the worker's OOM exit (`kind: 'worker-exit'`). `maxWallMs` is range-checked at load against `MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS`: `setTimeout` clamps a longer delay to 1 ms, so a positivity check alone would accept a ceiling that expires on the first tick. `computeMs` needs no such bound, being compared against measured utilization rather than fed to a timer.
 - **Intermediate binding values are complete JSON** — binding arguments and resolutions undergo iterative lossless-JSON validation. Before program execution, the worker captures its own realm's plain-container prototype identities plus the native function-source check used only for foreign realms, so constructor-slot mutation and user-authored impostors cannot change container classification. It also captures every structural and metering intrinsic used by this JSON boundary, creates property descriptors without a prototype, and bypasses mutable collection prototypes for private traversal state; model mutations of globals, prototype methods, or descriptor-shaped `Object.prototype` fields therefore cannot alter validation, wire transport, or byte accounting. Values flatten into a bounded-depth pre-order wire value for structured clone and rebuild iteratively on the other side. They have no byte, JavaScript call-stack, or nested structured-clone depth cap. They never enter the outer-output ledger or model context; provider/executor acquisition bounds and process/worker memory remain the limits.
 - **Logs stream eagerly into one outer ledger** — console/stdout/stderr text crosses the port in emission order, so a timed-out or killed program still shows what it printed. The worker charges exact JSON-string bytes and preflights completion values and exception diagnostics against the remaining combined budget before posting them; a thrown million-byte stack therefore becomes the fixed `output-limit` diagnostic at the worker boundary. Native writes that bypass the patched stream slots arrive on pipes independent of the completion port, so the host repeats the ledger for those bytes and hostile forged traffic; settlement continues bounded pipe capture until worker termination completes before materializing the result. `maxOutputBytes` accounts the JSON serialization of the outer `logs` array plus the completion value or failure-message payload; fixed `CodeRunResult` field names, braces, the bounded error-kind tag, and later presentation whitespace are outside that variable-payload ledger. At or below the cap the exact value returns; a lossy completion is `invalid-output`, and a combined overflow is `output-limit` rather than a substituted inspected string. The failure retains the fitting captured prefix and later follows the normal outer `run_code` spill policy.
 - **Empty environment** — the worker gets `env: {}` and `execArgv: []`: no ambient credentials (stronger than the scrubbed-env rule for spawned commands) and no inherited loader flags.

packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/README.zh.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 - **在执行上下文中，由宿主侧剥离类型**：程序会包裹在异步函数外壳中，通过 `node:module` 的 `stripTypeScriptTypes` 剥离类型（只支持可擦除语法；`enum`／namespace 会作为程序 `exception` 被拒绝，且不会启动 worker），再按字节位置切回原内容。之后程序作为 `AsyncFunction` 的函数体执行，因此顶层 `await`／`return` 可用。
 - **端口把对端视为不可信**：模型代码能够访问 `parentPort` 并伪造通信，因此任何代码读取入站消息前，系统都会验证其形状并重新构建（`null`、原始值、无效类型和格式错误的载荷会被静默丢弃；伪造的额外字段绝不会被带入）；宿主对每个调用 id 最多响应一次，只将绑定名称解析为自有属性（伪造的 `constructor` 无法沿原型链访问），丢弃结算后的回复，并验证每个绑定 resolve 值与完成值是否为无损 JSON。伪造的 `log`／`done` 消息无法绕过外层上限：宿主会再次验证，并统计每条获准日志以及完成值或诊断。worker 侧命名空间使用 null-prototype 和 `defineProperty`，因此形似 `__proto__` 的绑定名称只是普通键。
 - **绑定 reject 类属于请求数据**：可选命名空间描述符会指定构造器全局变量，以及用于接收失败成员名称的自有属性。worker 会创建并注入该真实类，使 `instanceof` 生效，同时无需硬编码 `tools` 或 `ToolCallError`；全局变量无效或冲突的声明会在启动 worker 前失败。失败路径使用模块捕获的错误与属性定义 intrinsic，以及 null-prototype 描述符，因此模型之后的修改无法把被拒绝的绑定变成 worker 崩溃。
-- **两个独立预算，因为对端不可信**：`computeMs` 统计 worker 实际测得的忙碌时间（轮询 `worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()`）；热循环无法借助待完成的诱饵 dispatch 隐藏，程序等待慢工具时则不累计。`maxWallMs` 为忙碌时间无法观测的情况兜底（例如等待永远不会 resolve 的 promise）。二者最终都会调用 `worker.terminate()`，连同步热循环也能终止；堆溢出会表现为 worker 的 OOM 退出（`kind: 'worker-exit'`）。
+- **两个独立预算，因为对端不可信**：`computeMs` 统计 worker 实际测得的忙碌时间（轮询 `worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()`）；热循环无法借助待完成的诱饵 dispatch 隐藏，程序等待慢工具时则不累计。`maxWallMs` 为忙碌时间无法观测的情况兜底（例如等待永远不会 resolve 的 promise）。二者最终都会调用 `worker.terminate()`，连同步热循环也能终止；堆溢出会表现为 worker 的 OOM 退出（`kind: 'worker-exit'`）。`maxWallMs` 在加载时会对照 `MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS` 做范围校验：`setTimeout` 会把更长的延迟夹到 1 ms，仅有正数校验会放行一个在第一个 tick 就到期的上限。`computeMs` 不需要这道上界，因为它对照的是实测占用率，而不是喂给定时器。
 - **中间绑定值是完整 JSON**：绑定参数与 resolve 值会接受迭代式无损 JSON 验证。程序执行前，worker 会捕获自己 realm 中的普通容器原型身份，以及只用于外部 realm 的原生函数源码检查，因此构造器槽修改和用户编写的仿冒对象都无法改变容器分类。它还会捕获该 JSON 边界使用的每一个结构与计量 intrinsic，以无原型对象创建属性描述符，并绕过可变集合原型管理私有遍历状态；因此，模型对全局对象、原型方法或 `Object.prototype` 上形似描述符字段的修改，都无法改变验证、wire 传输或字节计量。值会展平为有深度上限的前序 wire 值，供 structured clone 使用，并在另一侧迭代式重建。它们没有字节、JavaScript 调用栈或嵌套 structured-clone 深度上限，绝不会进入外层输出账本或模型上下文；上限仍来自提供方／执行器获取限制与进程／worker 内存。
 - **日志主动流入一个外层账本**：console／stdout／stderr 文本按发送顺序穿过端口，因此超时或被终止的程序仍会显示已经打印的内容。worker 会按 JSON 字符串精确计费，并在发送完成值和异常诊断前，根据组合预算的剩余量预检；因此，抛出的百万字节 stack 会在 worker 边界变成固定的 `output-limit` 诊断。绕过补丁 stream 槽的原生写入会到达独立于完成端口的 pipe，因此宿主会针对这些字节和不可信伪造通信再次执行账本统计；在物化结果前，结算过程会持续进行有界 pipe 捕获，直到 worker 完成终止。`maxOutputBytes` 统计外层 `logs` 数组加完成值或失败消息载荷的 JSON 序列化；固定的 `CodeRunResult` 字段名、花括号、有界错误 kind 标签，以及后续呈现空白不计入这份可变载荷账本。未超过上限时会返回精确值；有损完成值属于 `invalid-output`，组合溢出属于 `output-limit`，不会用 inspected string 代替。失败会保留能容纳的已捕获前缀，之后按普通外层 `run_code` 落盘策略处理。
 - **空环境**：worker 使用 `env: {}` 和 `execArgv: []`，既没有环境凭据（比 spawn 命令的清理环境规则更严格），也不会继承 loader 标志。

packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/package.json

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
     "@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime": "^0.0.1",
     "@deepseek-ai/dsh-invariants": "^0.0.1",
     "@deepseek-ai/dsh-session": "^0.0.1",
+    "@deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout": "^0.0.1",
     "cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.7"
   },
   "dependencies": {
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@
     "@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime": "workspace:^",
     "@deepseek-ai/dsh-invariants": "workspace:^",
     "@deepseek-ai/dsh-session": "workspace:^",
+    "@deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout": "workspace:^",
     "cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.7"
   }
 }

packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/src/index.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import type { Readable } from 'node:stream'
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
 import { Context } from 'cordis'
 import z from 'schemastery'
+import { MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout'
 import { CodeRuntime } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime'
 import type { CodeBindingNamespace, CodeJsonValue, CodeRunFailure, CodeRunRequest, CodeRunResult } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime'
 import { snapshotJsonValue } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
@@ -266,6 +267,12 @@ export class WorkerCodeRuntime extends CodeRuntime {
     if (!Number.isSafeInteger(this.config.maxOutputBytes) || this.config.maxOutputBytes < MIN_OUTPUT_BYTES) {
       throw new Error(`dsh-code-runtime-worker: config.maxOutputBytes must be a safe integer of at least ${MIN_OUTPUT_BYTES}, got ${String(this.config.maxOutputBytes)}`)
     }
+    // maxWallMs reaches setTimeout, which clamps any delay above
+    // MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS to 1 ms; the positivity check above accepts such a
+    // value, so a 25-day ceiling would time the run out immediately.
+    if (this.config.maxWallMs > MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS) {
+      throw new Error(`dsh-code-runtime-worker: config.maxWallMs must be at most ${MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS} (Node clamps a longer setTimeout delay to 1ms), got ${String(this.config.maxWallMs)}`)
+    }
     ctx.effect(() => () => this.teardown(), 'worker code-runtime teardown')
   }
 

packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/tests/runtime.spec.ts

@@ -829,6 +829,16 @@ describe('WorkerCodeRuntime — seam misuse and lifecycle', () => {
     await expect(ctx.plugin(WorkerCodeRuntime, { computeMs: -1 })).rejects.toThrow(/positive number/)
   })
 
+  it('rejects a maxWallMs above Node\'s maximum timer delay', async () => {
+    // setTimeout clamps a delay past 2^31-1 ms to 1 ms, so the positivity check
+    // alone would accept a 25-day ceiling that expires on the first tick.
+    const ctx = new Context()
+    await expect(ctx.plugin(WorkerCodeRuntime, { maxWallMs: 2_147_483_648 }))
+      .rejects.toThrow(/maxWallMs must be at most 2147483647/)
+    // The boundary itself is usable.
+    await expect(ctx.plugin(WorkerCodeRuntime, { maxWallMs: 2_147_483_647 })).resolves.toBeTruthy()
+  })
+
   it('requires maxOutputBytes to fit the smallest counted outer payloads', async () => {
     const ctx = new Context()
     await expect(ctx.plugin(WorkerCodeRuntime, { maxOutputBytes: 3 })).rejects.toThrow(/safe integer of at least 4/)

packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/tsconfig.json

@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
     },
     {
       "path": "../../support/invariants"
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "../../util/timeout"
     }
   ]
 }