Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into feat/todo-multi-in-progress

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2026-07-28 01:28:29 +08:00
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
README.md: acc0e37e73d3887c70a77d16311305e52f5a4030
README.zh.md: 15983dba00eff6fbc6e6d32a4d22df3a4249af76
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/README.md
README.md: 83c9a398970831e88cb3ef5d71d3f175da97d1f1
README.zh.md: 8e6c15eccdd83d3b918249920596dcbeee94f2b2
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Worker-thread implementation of the [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime`](../code-ru
maxOldGenerationSizeMb: 512 # worker heap cap (resourceLimits)
```
Every field is validated and defaulted; `maxOutputBytes` is a safe integer of at least four bytes, the remaining fields are positive finite numbers, and there are no other tunables.
Every field is validated and defaulted; `maxOutputBytes` is a safe integer of at least four bytes, the remaining fields are positive finite numbers, `maxWallMs` is additionally at most `2147483647` (Node's maximum `setTimeout` delay), and there are no other tunables.
## Design
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Every field is validated and defaulted; `maxOutputBytes` is a safe integer of at
- **Type-strip host-side, in execution context** — the program is wrapped in an async-function shell, stripped with `node:module`'s `stripTypeScriptTypes` (erasable syntax only — `enum`/namespaces are rejected as a program `exception` and no worker spawns), and sliced back out byte-positioned; it then executes as the body of an `AsyncFunction`, so top-level `await`/`return` work.
- **The port assumes a hostile peer** — model code can reach `parentPort` and forge traffic, so every inbound message is shape-validated and REBUILT before anything reads it (`null`, primitives, junk types, and malformed payloads drop without a throw; forged extra fields never ride along), the host answers each call id at most once, resolves binding names as OWN properties only (a forged `constructor` cannot walk a prototype chain), drops post-settlement replies, and validates every binding resolution and completion as lossless JSON. Forged `log`/`done` messages cannot bypass the outer cap: the host repeats validation and accounts every admitted log plus the completion or diagnostic. Worker-side namespaces are null-prototype with `defineProperty`, so `__proto__`-shaped binding names are ordinary keys.
- **Binding rejection classes are request data** — an optional namespace descriptor names the constructor global and the own property that receives the failed member name. The worker materializes and injects that real class, so `instanceof` works without hardcoding `tools` or `ToolCallError`; declarations with invalid or colliding globals fail before a worker spawns. Failures use module-captured error and property-definition intrinsics plus null-prototype descriptors, so later model mutations cannot turn a rejected binding into a worker crash.
- **Two independent budgets, because the peer is hostile** — `computeMs` meters the worker's MEASURED busy time (`worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()` polling): a hot loop cannot hide behind a pending decoy dispatch, and a program awaiting a slow tool accrues nothing. `maxWallMs` backstops what busy time cannot see (awaiting a promise nobody resolves). Both funnel into `worker.terminate()`, which ends hot synchronous loops too; heap overflow surfaces as the worker's OOM exit (`kind: 'worker-exit'`).
- **Two independent budgets, because the peer is hostile** — `computeMs` meters the worker's MEASURED busy time (`worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()` polling): a hot loop cannot hide behind a pending decoy dispatch, and a program awaiting a slow tool accrues nothing. `maxWallMs` backstops what busy time cannot see (awaiting a promise nobody resolves). Both funnel into `worker.terminate()`, which ends hot synchronous loops too; heap overflow surfaces as the worker's OOM exit (`kind: 'worker-exit'`). `maxWallMs` is range-checked at load against `MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS`: `setTimeout` clamps a longer delay to 1 ms, so a positivity check alone would accept a ceiling that expires on the first tick. `computeMs` needs no such bound, being compared against measured utilization rather than fed to a timer.
- **Intermediate binding values are complete JSON** — binding arguments and resolutions undergo iterative lossless-JSON validation. Before program execution, the worker captures its own realm's plain-container prototype identities plus the native function-source check used only for foreign realms, so constructor-slot mutation and user-authored impostors cannot change container classification. It also captures every structural and metering intrinsic used by this JSON boundary, creates property descriptors without a prototype, and bypasses mutable collection prototypes for private traversal state; model mutations of globals, prototype methods, or descriptor-shaped `Object.prototype` fields therefore cannot alter validation, wire transport, or byte accounting. Values flatten into a bounded-depth pre-order wire value for structured clone and rebuild iteratively on the other side. They have no byte, JavaScript call-stack, or nested structured-clone depth cap. They never enter the outer-output ledger or model context; provider/executor acquisition bounds and process/worker memory remain the limits.
- **Logs stream eagerly into one outer ledger** — console/stdout/stderr text crosses the port in emission order, so a timed-out or killed program still shows what it printed. The worker charges exact JSON-string bytes and preflights completion values and exception diagnostics against the remaining combined budget before posting them; a thrown million-byte stack therefore becomes the fixed `output-limit` diagnostic at the worker boundary. Native writes that bypass the patched stream slots arrive on pipes independent of the completion port, so the host repeats the ledger for those bytes and hostile forged traffic; settlement continues bounded pipe capture until worker termination completes before materializing the result. `maxOutputBytes` accounts the JSON serialization of the outer `logs` array plus the completion value or failure-message payload; fixed `CodeRunResult` field names, braces, the bounded error-kind tag, and later presentation whitespace are outside that variable-payload ledger. At or below the cap the exact value returns; a lossy completion is `invalid-output`, and a combined overflow is `output-limit` rather than a substituted inspected string. The failure retains the fitting captured prefix and later follows the normal outer `run_code` spill policy.
- **Empty environment** — the worker gets `env: {}` and `execArgv: []`: no ambient credentials (stronger than the scrubbed-env rule for spawned commands) and no inherited loader flags.
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
maxOldGenerationSizeMb: 512 # worker heap cap (resourceLimits)
```
每个字段都会验证并提供默认值;`maxOutputBytes` 必须是至少 4 字节的安全整数,其余字段必须是有限正数,此外没有其他可调项。
每个字段都会验证并提供默认值;`maxOutputBytes` 必须是至少 4 字节的安全整数,其余字段必须是有限正数,`maxWallMs` 还必须不超过 `2147483647`Node 的 `setTimeout` 最大延迟),此外没有其他可调项。
## 设计
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
- **在执行上下文中,由宿主侧剥离类型**:程序会包裹在异步函数外壳中,通过 `node:module``stripTypeScriptTypes` 剥离类型(只支持可擦除语法;`enum`namespace 会作为程序 `exception` 被拒绝,且不会启动 worker),再按字节位置切回原内容。之后程序作为 `AsyncFunction` 的函数体执行,因此顶层 `await``return` 可用。
- **端口把对端视为不可信**:模型代码能够访问 `parentPort` 并伪造通信,因此任何代码读取入站消息前,系统都会验证其形状并重新构建(`null`、原始值、无效类型和格式错误的载荷会被静默丢弃;伪造的额外字段绝不会被带入);宿主对每个调用 id 最多响应一次,只将绑定名称解析为自有属性(伪造的 `constructor` 无法沿原型链访问),丢弃结算后的回复,并验证每个绑定 resolve 值与完成值是否为无损 JSON。伪造的 `log``done` 消息无法绕过外层上限:宿主会再次验证,并统计每条获准日志以及完成值或诊断。worker 侧命名空间使用 null-prototype 和 `defineProperty`,因此形似 `__proto__` 的绑定名称只是普通键。
- **绑定 reject 类属于请求数据**:可选命名空间描述符会指定构造器全局变量,以及用于接收失败成员名称的自有属性。worker 会创建并注入该真实类,使 `instanceof` 生效,同时无需硬编码 `tools``ToolCallError`;全局变量无效或冲突的声明会在启动 worker 前失败。失败路径使用模块捕获的错误与属性定义 intrinsic,以及 null-prototype 描述符,因此模型之后的修改无法把被拒绝的绑定变成 worker 崩溃。
- **两个独立预算,因为对端不可信**:`computeMs` 统计 worker 实际测得的忙碌时间(轮询 `worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()`);热循环无法借助待完成的诱饵 dispatch 隐藏,程序等待慢工具时则不累计。`maxWallMs` 为忙碌时间无法观测的情况兜底(例如等待永远不会 resolve 的 promise)。二者最终都会调用 `worker.terminate()`,连同步热循环也能终止;堆溢出会表现为 worker 的 OOM 退出(`kind: 'worker-exit'`)。
- **两个独立预算,因为对端不可信**:`computeMs` 统计 worker 实际测得的忙碌时间(轮询 `worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()`);热循环无法借助待完成的诱饵 dispatch 隐藏,程序等待慢工具时则不累计。`maxWallMs` 为忙碌时间无法观测的情况兜底(例如等待永远不会 resolve 的 promise)。二者最终都会调用 `worker.terminate()`,连同步热循环也能终止;堆溢出会表现为 worker 的 OOM 退出(`kind: 'worker-exit'`)。`maxWallMs` 在加载时会对照 `MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS` 做范围校验:`setTimeout` 会把更长的延迟夹到 1 ms,仅有正数校验会放行一个在第一个 tick 就到期的上限。`computeMs` 不需要这道上界,因为它对照的是实测占用率,而不是喂给定时器。
- **中间绑定值是完整 JSON**:绑定参数与 resolve 值会接受迭代式无损 JSON 验证。程序执行前,worker 会捕获自己 realm 中的普通容器原型身份,以及只用于外部 realm 的原生函数源码检查,因此构造器槽修改和用户编写的仿冒对象都无法改变容器分类。它还会捕获该 JSON 边界使用的每一个结构与计量 intrinsic,以无原型对象创建属性描述符,并绕过可变集合原型管理私有遍历状态;因此,模型对全局对象、原型方法或 `Object.prototype` 上形似描述符字段的修改,都无法改变验证、wire 传输或字节计量。值会展平为有深度上限的前序 wire 值,供 structured clone 使用,并在另一侧迭代式重建。它们没有字节、JavaScript 调用栈或嵌套 structured-clone 深度上限,绝不会进入外层输出账本或模型上下文;上限仍来自提供方/执行器获取限制与进程/worker 内存。
- **日志主动流入一个外层账本**consolestdoutstderr 文本按发送顺序穿过端口,因此超时或被终止的程序仍会显示已经打印的内容。worker 会按 JSON 字符串精确计费,并在发送完成值和异常诊断前,根据组合预算的剩余量预检;因此,抛出的百万字节 stack 会在 worker 边界变成固定的 `output-limit` 诊断。绕过补丁 stream 槽的原生写入会到达独立于完成端口的 pipe,因此宿主会针对这些字节和不可信伪造通信再次执行账本统计;在物化结果前,结算过程会持续进行有界 pipe 捕获,直到 worker 完成终止。`maxOutputBytes` 统计外层 `logs` 数组加完成值或失败消息载荷的 JSON 序列化;固定的 `CodeRunResult` 字段名、花括号、有界错误 kind 标签,以及后续呈现空白不计入这份可变载荷账本。未超过上限时会返回精确值;有损完成值属于 `invalid-output`,组合溢出属于 `output-limit`,不会用 inspected string 代替。失败会保留能容纳的已捕获前缀,之后按普通外层 `run_code` 落盘策略处理。
- **空环境**worker 使用 `env: {}``execArgv: []`,既没有环境凭据(比 spawn 命令的清理环境规则更严格),也不会继承 loader 标志。
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime": "^0.0.1",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-invariants": "^0.0.1",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-session": "^0.0.1",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout": "^0.0.1",
"cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.7"
},
"dependencies": {
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime": "workspace:^",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-invariants": "workspace:^",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-session": "workspace:^",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout": "workspace:^",
"cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.7"
}
}
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import type { Readable } from 'node:stream'
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
import { Context } from 'cordis'
import z from 'schemastery'
import { MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout'
import { CodeRuntime } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime'
import type { CodeBindingNamespace, CodeJsonValue, CodeRunFailure, CodeRunRequest, CodeRunResult } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime'
import { snapshotJsonValue } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
@@ -35,7 +36,9 @@ export interface Config {
/**
* Wall-clock ceiling in milliseconds; never pauses for anything. The
* backstop for what busy-time cannot see (a program awaiting a promise
* nobody will resolve).
* nobody will resolve). At most `2_147_483_647` (Node's maximum
* `setTimeout` delay, about 24.9 days): a longer value is rejected at load
* because `setTimeout` would clamp it to 1 ms.
*/
maxWallMs?: number
/**
@@ -266,6 +269,12 @@ export class WorkerCodeRuntime extends CodeRuntime {
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(this.config.maxOutputBytes) || this.config.maxOutputBytes < MIN_OUTPUT_BYTES) {
throw new Error(`dsh-code-runtime-worker: config.maxOutputBytes must be a safe integer of at least ${MIN_OUTPUT_BYTES}, got ${String(this.config.maxOutputBytes)}`)
}
// maxWallMs reaches setTimeout, which clamps any delay above
// MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS to 1 ms; the positivity check above accepts such a
// value, so a 25-day ceiling would time the run out immediately.
if (this.config.maxWallMs > MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS) {
throw new Error(`dsh-code-runtime-worker: config.maxWallMs must be at most ${MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS} (Node clamps a longer setTimeout delay to 1ms), got ${String(this.config.maxWallMs)}`)
}
ctx.effect(() => () => this.teardown(), 'worker code-runtime teardown')
}
@@ -829,6 +829,16 @@ describe('WorkerCodeRuntime — seam misuse and lifecycle', () => {
await expect(ctx.plugin(WorkerCodeRuntime, { computeMs: -1 })).rejects.toThrow(/positive number/)
})
it('rejects a maxWallMs above Node\'s maximum timer delay', async () => {
// setTimeout clamps a delay past 2^31-1 ms to 1 ms, so the positivity check
// alone would accept a 25-day ceiling that expires on the first tick.
const ctx = new Context()
await expect(ctx.plugin(WorkerCodeRuntime, { maxWallMs: 2_147_483_648 }))
.rejects.toThrow(/maxWallMs must be at most 2147483647/)
// The boundary itself is usable.
await expect(ctx.plugin(WorkerCodeRuntime, { maxWallMs: 2_147_483_647 })).resolves.toBeTruthy()
})
it('requires maxOutputBytes to fit the smallest counted outer payloads', async () => {
const ctx = new Context()
await expect(ctx.plugin(WorkerCodeRuntime, { maxOutputBytes: 3 })).rejects.toThrow(/safe integer of at least 4/)
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
},
{
"path": "../../support/invariants"
},
{
"path": "../../util/timeout"
}
]
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
README.md: b9d6337d2145d279758f5494c2ad51ed5e00154f
README.zh.md: 99190c262b015bf28627debd68e67f6c64618a09
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard/README.md
README.md: 226dba10239031e8e79bd5698e77c213688ce579
README.zh.md: 8e22a5e67d3700024934437c5c9c1a5e969b740d
+1 -1
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
English | [中文](README.zh.md)
An advisory loop-breaker, not a model-facing tool: it never appears in the tool list, never vetoes or rewrites a call, and adds exactly one behavior — it watches each agent's stream of tool calls, counts runs of consecutive calls to the same tool with identical canonicalized arguments, and at configured run lengths injects an escalating advisory reminder telling the model to stop repeating itself, re-read the last result, and either change approach or conclude. The decision (retry differently, gather more evidence, or finish) stays entirely with the model: a legitimately repeated call is delayed by nothing and blocked by nothing. Decision record: [the repeat-tool-guard Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-08-repeat-tool-guard.md).
An advisory loop-breaker, not a model-facing tool: it never appears in the tool list, never vetoes or rewrites a call, and adds exactly one behavior — it watches each agent's stream of tool calls, counts runs of consecutive calls to the same tool with identical canonicalized arguments, and at configured run lengths injects an escalating advisory reminder telling the model to stop repeating itself, re-read the last result, and either change approach or conclude. The decision (retry differently, gather more evidence, or finish) stays entirely with the model: a legitimately repeated call is delayed by nothing and blocked by nothing. Decision record: [the repeat-tool-guard Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/archived/feature/2026-07-08-repeat-tool-guard.md).
## Config
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
[English](README.md) | 中文
这是一个仅提供建议的循环中断器,而非面向模型的工具:它不会出现在工具列表中,不会否决或改写调用,只增加一种行为。它监视每个 agent(智能体)的工具调用流,统计以完全相同的规范化参数连续调用同一工具的次数;达到所配置的连续次数时,它会注入逐级增强的提示,要求模型停止重复、重新阅读上一次结果,并改用其他方案或结束任务。究竟是换一种方式重试、收集更多证据还是完成任务,仍完全由模型决定:合理的重复调用既不会延迟,也不会受阻。决策记录见 [repeat-tool-guard Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-08-repeat-tool-guard.md)。
这是一个仅提供建议的循环中断器,而非面向模型的工具:它不会出现在工具列表中,不会否决或改写调用,只增加一种行为。它监视每个 agent(智能体)的工具调用流,统计以完全相同的规范化参数连续调用同一工具的次数;达到所配置的连续次数时,它会注入逐级增强的提示,要求模型停止重复、重新阅读上一次结果,并改用其他方案或结束任务。究竟是换一种方式重试、收集更多证据还是完成任务,仍完全由模型决定:合理的重复调用既不会延迟,也不会受阻。决策记录见 [repeat-tool-guard Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/archived/feature/2026-07-08-repeat-tool-guard.md)。
## 配置
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@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
README.md: 0ac80db3571a1c9a8c472e12a675eba17031cf5e
README.zh.md: d6f7c3639bcff570dd9d7be8615bfeadc222f2b3
README.md: abc7d9bc81b6ec43bed6277de7f42ddf5728c7a8
README.zh.md: 7a99a303ac3b6c83e2acd0f8154e9b313ef673d1
+1 -1
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Local Linux/macOS `node-pty` backend for `ctx.pty`; loading it on another platfo
The plugin injects `pty`, `sandbox`, and `sandboxPolicy`, then registers the configured backend type (`shell`). `danger-full-access` starts the shell directly; confined modes wrap the exact shell argv through `ctx.sandbox`. The effective session mode is resolved at spawn. A change to a different effective mode is rejected before its `sandbox/mode` event commits while that owner has an open PTY or a spawn in progress; the fence is attached to the exact owner and therefore outlives a local-provider reload that retains existing sessions. Wait for creation to settle and close the sessions before changing modes, so a terminal opened with wider access cannot survive a downgrade.
Linux readiness combines a foreground-verified private bash prompt marker, foreground-process-group syscall inspection, silence fallback, and absolute timeout. macOS uses the verified prompt marker plus silence/timeout because it has no `/proc` syscall surface. A marker is not ready until printable prompt text arrives, including when the OSC marker and `PS1` are split across data callbacks; when bash prints the marker before the kernel publishes its return to the foreground process group, polling retains the candidate through one final poll after the ordinary silence bound so a coincident handoff can win. An interactive child that inherits `PROMPT_COMMAND` therefore cannot suppress inferred-idle readiness until the absolute timeout. Unrecognized or unreadable process state is never a positive exact-idle signal. During unpublished startup, a fallback requires observed output; zero-output silence cannot publish an empty session, and timeout rejects the spawn. Cancellation closes the unpublished shell and rejects with the caller's exact abort reason even when its foreground process group is not observable yet; if that close fails, `PtyBackendCleanupError` separately preserves the cleanup failure for registry disposal. Incomplete terminal-control sequences are bounded by `maxReadBytes` and discarded through their terminator after crossing that limit; a trailing carriage return is carried across callbacks so split CRLF becomes one newline.
Linux readiness combines a foreground-verified private bash prompt marker, foreground-process-group syscall inspection, silence fallback, and absolute timeout. macOS uses the verified prompt marker plus silence/timeout because it has no `/proc` syscall surface. A marker is not ready until printable prompt text arrives, including when the OSC marker and `PS1` are split across data callbacks; when bash prints the marker before the kernel publishes its return to the foreground process group, polling retains the candidate for `handoffGraceMs` past the ordinary silence bound so a coincident handoff can win; that grace must cover at least one `pollIntervalMs` and is rejected at load otherwise. An interactive child that inherits `PROMPT_COMMAND` therefore cannot suppress inferred-idle readiness until the absolute timeout. Unrecognized or unreadable process state is never a positive exact-idle signal. During unpublished startup, a fallback requires observed output; zero-output silence cannot publish an empty session, and timeout rejects the spawn. Cancellation closes the unpublished shell and rejects with the caller's exact abort reason even when its foreground process group is not observable yet; if that close fails, `PtyBackendCleanupError` separately preserves the cleanup failure for registry disposal. Incomplete terminal-control sequences are bounded by `maxReadBytes` and discarded through their terminator after crossing that limit; a trailing carriage return is carried across callbacks so split CRLF becomes one newline.
Send cancellation resolves the current foreground process group and delivers a real `SIGINT`; it never emulates interruption by writing `\x03`, so raw-mode programs remain cancellable. Close sends `SIGTERM` to descendants, waits, then sends `SIGKILL` to the union of captured survivors and newly scanned descendants so reparenting cannot hide a process from teardown. It verifies that every retained identity is gone or, on Linux, a non-executing zombie before stopping the shell; zombie entries are quiescent and are reaped as the shell exits. A survivor failure does not cache a permanently rejected close; a later close retries the teardown.
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
该插件注入 `pty``sandbox``sandboxPolicy`,然后注册所配置的后端类型(`shell`)。`danger-full-access` 会直接启动 shell;受限模式则通过 `ctx.sandbox` 包装确切的 shell argv。系统在 spawn 时解析会话的实际模式。当某个所有者存在开放的 PTY 或正在进行 spawn 时,如果配置变更会得到不同的实际模式,系统会在对应 `sandbox/mode` 事件提交前拒绝该变更。该限制绑定到确切所有者,因此即使本地提供方重新加载并保留现有会话,它仍然有效。更改模式前,请等待创建结算并关闭会话,避免以更宽权限打开的终端在权限降级后继续存在。
Linux 的就绪检测结合以下机制:由前台状态验证的私有 bash 提示符标记、前台进程组 syscall 检查、静默回退和绝对超时。macOS 没有 `/proc` syscall 接口,因此使用经过验证的提示符标记以及静默/超时。当可打印的提示符文本尚未到达时,即使 OSC 标记和 `PS1` 被拆到多个数据回调中,系统也不会把标记视为就绪。如果 bash 在内核发布其重新取得前台进程组的状态前打印标记,轮询会将该候选状态保留到普通静默上限之后的最后一次轮询,使恰好同时发生的前台交接有机会胜出。因此,继承 `PROMPT_COMMAND` 的交互式子进程无法持续压制推断空闲就绪,最多只能延续到绝对超时。无法识别或读取的进程状态绝不会作为精确空闲的正向信号。尚未发布的启动过程中,回退路径要求已经观察到输出;零输出静默不能发布空会话,超时则拒绝 spawn。取消操作会关闭尚未发布的 shell,并以调用方提供的确切中止原因拒绝,即使当时还无法观察其前台进程组。如果关闭失败,`PtyBackendCleanupError` 会单独保留清理失败,供注册表释放资源时处理。未完成的终端控制序列受 `maxReadBytes` 限制;超过上限后,系统会丢弃内容直到其终止符。末尾的回车会跨回调保留,使拆分的 CRLF 合并为一个换行。
Linux 的就绪检测结合以下机制:由前台状态验证的私有 bash 提示符标记、前台进程组 syscall 检查、静默回退和绝对超时。macOS 没有 `/proc` syscall 接口,因此使用经过验证的提示符标记以及静默/超时。当可打印的提示符文本尚未到达时,即使 OSC 标记和 `PS1` 被拆到多个数据回调中,系统也不会把标记视为就绪。如果 bash 在内核发布其重新取得前台进程组的状态前打印标记,轮询会在普通静默上限之后再保留该候选状态 `handoffGraceMs`,使恰好同时发生的前台交接有机会胜出;该宽限至少要覆盖一个 `pollIntervalMs`,否则加载时即被拒绝。因此,继承 `PROMPT_COMMAND` 的交互式子进程无法持续压制推断空闲就绪,最多只能延续到绝对超时。无法识别或读取的进程状态绝不会作为精确空闲的正向信号。尚未发布的启动过程中,回退路径要求已经观察到输出;零输出静默不能发布空会话,超时则拒绝 spawn。取消操作会关闭尚未发布的 shell,并以调用方提供的确切中止原因拒绝,即使当时还无法观察其前台进程组。如果关闭失败,`PtyBackendCleanupError` 会单独保留清理失败,供注册表释放资源时处理。未完成的终端控制序列受 `maxReadBytes` 限制;超过上限后,系统会丢弃内容直到其终止符。末尾的回车会跨回调保留,使拆分的 CRLF 合并为一个换行。
取消发送时,系统会解析当前前台进程组并发送真正的 `SIGINT`;它绝不会通过写入 `\x03` 模拟中断,因此原始模式程序仍可取消。关闭操作先向后代发送 `SIGTERM` 并等待,再向已捕获的存活进程与新扫描到的后代之并集发送 `SIGKILL`,防止进程通过重新设定父进程而逃避清理。系统确认每个保留的进程身份都已消失;在 Linux 上,非执行中的僵尸进程也视为完全停稳,并会随 shell 退出而回收。如果仍有进程存活,失败结果不会缓存成永久拒绝的关闭操作;后续关闭仍会重试清理。
+9
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@@ -26,6 +26,11 @@ export interface Config {
exactProbeAfterMs?: number
/** Silence duration that yields `inferred_idle`. */
idleSilenceMs?: number
/**
* Extra wait beyond `idleSilenceMs`, once a prompt marker was seen, for the shell to
* regain the foreground before `inferred_idle` settles; at least one `pollIntervalMs`.
*/
handoffGraceMs?: number
/** Absolute send wait bound. */
timeoutMs?: number
/** Grace before teardown escalates to `SIGKILL`. */
@@ -48,6 +53,7 @@ export const Config: z<Config> = z.object({
pollIntervalMs: z.number().default(50),
exactProbeAfterMs: z.number().default(150),
idleSilenceMs: z.number().default(3_000),
handoffGraceMs: z.number().default(500),
timeoutMs: z.number().default(30_000),
disposeGraceMs: z.number().default(3_000),
})
@@ -69,4 +75,7 @@ export function validateConfig(config: Config): asserts config is ResolvedConfig
if (resolved.maxReadBytes > resolved.scrollbackMaxBytes) {
throw new Error('pty-local: maxReadBytes must not exceed scrollbackMaxBytes')
}
if (resolved.handoffGraceMs < resolved.pollIntervalMs) {
throw new Error('pty-local: handoffGraceMs must be at least pollIntervalMs so one readiness poll runs inside the grace window')
}
}
+5 -4
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@@ -331,11 +331,12 @@ export class LocalPtySession implements PtyBackendSession {
// A prompt candidate can race bash's foreground handoff, but an interactive
// child also inherits PROMPT_COMMAND. Silence therefore remains the bound
// on waiting for shell ownership instead of letting a child marker suppress
// readiness until the absolute timeout. One final poll lets a foreground
// handoff coincident with that boundary win before the fallback settles.
// readiness until the absolute timeout. When a prompt marker was seen, the
// configured grace holds the fallback past the silence bound so polls in
// that window can observe the foreground handoff and settle as stdin_read.
const idleFor = Date.now() - this.lastOutputAt
const handoffGrace = this.promptSeen ? this.config.pollIntervalMs : 0
if (startupHasOutput && idleFor >= this.config.idleSilenceMs && idleFor - this.config.idleSilenceMs >= handoffGrace) {
const handoffGrace = this.promptSeen ? this.config.handoffGraceMs : 0
if (startupHasOutput && idleFor >= this.config.idleSilenceMs + handoffGrace) {
this.settleActive('inferred_idle')
return
}
+6 -1
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ function config(overrides: Partial<Config> = {}): Config {
return {
backendType: 'shell', shellPath: '/bin/bash', shellArgs: [], rows: 40, cols: 160,
scrollbackLines: 100, scrollbackMaxBytes: 1024, maxReadBytes: 512,
pollIntervalMs: 10, exactProbeAfterMs: 20, idleSilenceMs: 100, timeoutMs: 1000,
pollIntervalMs: 10, exactProbeAfterMs: 20, idleSilenceMs: 100, handoffGraceMs: 50, timeoutMs: 1000,
disposeGraceMs: 100,
...overrides,
}
@@ -24,4 +24,9 @@ describe('pty-local config', () => {
expect(() => { validateConfig(config({ rows: 1.5 })) }).toThrow('rows')
expect(() => { validateConfig(config({ maxReadBytes: 2048 })) }).toThrow('must not exceed')
})
it('rejects a handoff grace shorter than one readiness poll', () => {
expect(() => { validateConfig(config({ handoffGraceMs: 9, pollIntervalMs: 10 })) }).toThrow('handoffGraceMs must be at least pollIntervalMs')
expect(() => { validateConfig(config({ handoffGraceMs: 10, pollIntervalMs: 10 })) }).not.toThrow()
})
})
+1 -1
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ function config(): ResolvedConfig {
return {
backendType: 'shell', shellPath: '/bin/bash', shellArgs: [], rows: 24, cols: 80,
scrollbackLines: 10, scrollbackMaxBytes: 100, maxReadBytes: 50,
pollIntervalMs: 10, exactProbeAfterMs: 20, idleSilenceMs: 50, timeoutMs: 100,
pollIntervalMs: 10, exactProbeAfterMs: 20, idleSilenceMs: 50, handoffGraceMs: 10, timeoutMs: 100,
disposeGraceMs: 10,
}
}
+14 -4
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@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ function stubAgent(ctx: Context, rawId: string): Agent {
async function harness(
mode: 'danger-full-access' | 'workspace-write',
timing: { idleSilenceMs?: number; timeoutMs?: number } = {},
timing: { idleSilenceMs?: number; handoffGraceMs?: number; timeoutMs?: number } = {},
) {
const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-pty-local-'))
roots.push(root)
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ async function harness(
pollIntervalMs: 10,
exactProbeAfterMs: 20,
idleSilenceMs: timing.idleSilenceMs ?? 250,
handoffGraceMs: timing.handoffGraceMs ?? 250,
timeoutMs: timing.timeoutMs ?? 2_000,
disposeGraceMs: 500,
scrollbackLines: 100,
@@ -80,6 +81,15 @@ async function waitForOutput(operation: PtySendOperation, expected: string, time
expect(output).toContain(expected)
}
// A send the test interrupts settles when bash returns to its prompt, so the
// kernel may publish the foreground handoff on either side of the silence
// bound. `handoffGraceMs` widens the window that wins the exact attribution but
// cannot remove the race on a loaded host, so these settles assert that the
// session became usable again, not which readiness tier observed it.
function expectReadyForNextSend(waitReason: string): void {
expect(['stdin_read', 'inferred_idle']).toContain(waitReason)
}
describe('pty-local real shell', () => {
it('persists cwd and environment across sends, scrubs secrets, and closes', async () => {
const previous = process.env.DSH_TEST_SECRET
@@ -123,7 +133,7 @@ describe('pty-local real shell', () => {
const foreground = ctx.pty.startSend(agent, created.sessionId, { text: 'sleep 60', submit: true })
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 50))
expect((await ctx.pty.signal(agent, created.sessionId, 'SIGINT')).delivered).toBe(true)
expect((await foreground.done).waitReason).toBe('stdin_read')
expectReadyForNextSend((await foreground.done).waitReason)
const background = ctx.pty.startSend(agent, created.sessionId, {
text: 'sh -c \'trap "" TERM; sleep 60\' & echo CHILD=$!',
@@ -159,13 +169,13 @@ describe('pty-local real shell', () => {
await waitForOutput(foreground, ready, 15_000)
controller.abort()
const result = await foreground.done
expect(result.waitReason).toBe('stdin_read')
expectReadyForNextSend(result.waitReason)
const after = await ctx.pty.startSend(agent, created.sessionId, {
text: 'echo AFTER_SIGINT',
submit: true,
}).done
expect(after.viewport).toContain('AFTER_SIGINT')
expect(after.waitReason).toBe('stdin_read')
expectReadyForNextSend(after.waitReason)
await ctx.pty.kill(agent, created.sessionId)
}, 20_000)
})
+22 -1
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@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ function config(overrides: Partial<ResolvedConfig> = {}): ResolvedConfig {
return {
backendType: 'shell', shellPath: '/bin/bash', shellArgs: [], rows: 24, cols: 80,
scrollbackLines: 10, scrollbackMaxBytes: 128, maxReadBytes: 64,
pollIntervalMs: 10, exactProbeAfterMs: 20, idleSilenceMs: 50, timeoutMs: 100,
pollIntervalMs: 10, exactProbeAfterMs: 20, idleSilenceMs: 50, handoffGraceMs: 10, timeoutMs: 100,
disposeGraceMs: 20,
...overrides,
}
@@ -307,6 +307,27 @@ describe('LocalPtySession readiness and output', () => {
expect((await operation.done).waitReason).toBe('stdin_read')
})
it('holds the idle fallback for the configured handoff grace, not one poll', async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers()
const terminal = new FakeTerminal()
const inspector = new FakeInspector()
const session = new LocalPtySession(terminal.asPty(), inspector, config({ handoffGraceMs: 40 }))
await initialize(session, terminal)
const operation = session.startSend({ text: 'run', submit: true })
let settled = false
void operation.done.then(() => { settled = true })
inspector.pgid = 789
terminal.emitData('\x1b]133;D;0\x07dsh> ')
// One poll past the silence bound would already have settled inferred_idle.
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(70)
expect(settled).toBe(false)
inspector.pgid = 456
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(10)
expect((await operation.done).waitReason).toBe('stdin_read')
})
it('falls back to inferred idle when a foreground child emits an inherited prompt marker', async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers()
const terminal = new FakeTerminal()
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ suite('terminal real Loader composition through cordis.yml', () => {
' pollIntervalMs: 10',
' exactProbeAfterMs: 20',
' idleSilenceMs: 250',
' handoffGraceMs: 250',
' timeoutMs: 2000',
' disposeGraceMs: 500',
"- name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pty'",