Delete design-session citations (decision/audit/plan ordinals, stack
positions), change narration, review choreography, and reviewer-addressed
justification from comments, JSDoc, docs, READMEs, Agent Notes, tests, and
generator templates; restate every affected fact as current-state contract
prose. Fix generated docs at their sources and regenerate the catalogs and
cordis-surface regions; re-paste type-equiv blocks; update every bilingual
counterpart and re-record the pairs. Record the citation rule in the
committed-artifact-citations Agent Note.
Fetch-Metadata and Origin are only attached to trustworthy destinations, so
over plain HTTP a rebound page's same-origin GET (EventSource, images,
navigations) arrives with no browser markers and a readable response. Remove
the marker shortcut; non-browser clients pass the same fence via loopback,
the CLI-derived LAN IP literals, or a declared authority.
WHATWG parsing would quietly read a hostname out of harness.internal/path or
user@harness.internal, authorizing the typo's hostname; other typos would sit
silently ignored until requests 403. Refuse every URL part beyond host[:port]
at plugin load.
Markerless requests pass on any Host (a non-browser sender is the principal
and forges headers anyway); browser Host matching gains port-less entries and
WHATWG normalization; dsh derives LAN IP-literal authorities for an
all-interfaces bind and web grows --trusted-host for named ones.
The only browser-trust guard covered host.pickDirectory, while the
consequential methods (session.prompt drives bash) accepted any Host —
open to DNS rebinding, where a rebound page reads and writes the API as
if same-origin and only the Host header betrays the attacker's domain.
The pickDirectory-specific loopback guard becomes a prefix-wide fence:
Host must be loopback or an exact host[:port] from the new trustedHosts
config, an attached Origin must equal that authority, and explicit
cross-site markers are refused; requests without browser markers (curl,
tests, native clients) pass, because without a browser there is no
confused deputy. The loopback-socket check is dropped — binding policy
expresses reachability, and the fence is not an auth layer. The Agent
Note records the full threat model and the alternatives.