The automation-only rewrite edited many implemented Agent Notes; several
edits replaced still-live or historical rationale instead of reframing:
- llm-model-catalog: restore the prompt/request consistency section and
selection-ownership alternatives — installAgentLlmTarget and the TUI
/model selector still ship that design; only the ACP wire is gone.
- plan-specific-collaboration-state, acp-multi-session, todo-write,
ask-user-question: link the superseding automation-only note instead
of silently rewriting the original decision or motivation; drop a
paragraph duplicating the Web-provider facts stated two paragraphs up.
- sandbox: stop claiming unit coverage for turn-enclosed config writes
(that mechanism left with the bridge) and retitle the commit-boundary
paragraph accordingly.
- Fix the missing blank line before '## Consequences' in the
plugin-command-registration pair, the JSON-RPC/Web render-intent
consumer misattribution (the second consumer is the host/client
runtime), stale bash_output/bash_kill names, and 'optional goals' in
architecture.md.
- examples/acp-agent/README.md: point at the package contract instead
of restating it; packages/ui/permission and plan-mode READMEs record
the consumer-less preset service and the exit_plan_mode coverage gap
under Known Limitations.
- 2026-06-19-acp-snapshot-tests: the new note defers the corpus
migration rather than committing to it; say so.
Re-record the touched bilingual pairs.
- fs-sandbox: delegate the mutation with the freshly re-canonicalized target
(not the stale one), so the checked identity is the mutated identity — a
symlink swapped in after resolve() can no longer escape workspace-write.
- tool-fs: map a denial to an FsError carrying FS_SANDBOX_DENIED (not a plain
Error), so ToolRegistry keeps the structured code on result.error for
retry/observers while the message stays the shared marker.
- sandbox-local: derive the Seatbelt writable set from the shared
writableRoots() helper, so the profile and the fs fence cannot drift.
- gen-doc-graphs: ctx.sandboxPolicy is owned by dsh-sandbox-policy and read only
by the sandboxed executor/provider (the tool layers use the pure fold).
- docs: bash-sandbox/bash/permission READMEs and bash.md reflect the relocated
policy home and the sandbox/mode rename; drop the stale stdout.golden.jsonl.
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
A preset names a bundle of the two mechanism knobs — request =
workspace-write + ask, yolo = danger-full-access + never — so the editor
shows ONE 'Permissions' select where the sandbox-mode and approval-policy
tiers stay orthogonal capabilities (the Codex /approvals shape: presets over
two dials). ctx.permission (dsh-permission) owns the config-defined table,
validates the default preset's bundle against the composed knob defaults at
load (fails loud), and writes a switch THROUGH: one log-only
permission/preset event (the audit fact reverse-mapping cannot recover —
the planned 'agent' preset shares request's knob values and differs only in
composed policy) plus each knob event via its own setter, deduped — a
net-zero switch appends nothing. Every knob consumer keeps reading its own
fold, untouched.
The current preset DERIVES from the effective knob values — the fold breaks
bundle ties, a knob state outside the table is the reserved 'custom' value
(a state, not an error: shown while it holds, switchable FROM, never a
target), and defaultPreset disappears (zero-event state reverse-maps from
the composition defaults).
The ACP bridge drops the two per-knob selects for the one preset select
(advertised only when ctx.permission is composed); pending/anchor/no-op
semantics carry over unchanged, with the no-op echo acknowledged before
vocabulary validation so a client re-pushing a derived 'custom' current
never errors. The sandbox variant example composes the
service with a workspace-write default; the permission-switching,
escalation-approved and escalation-rejected scenarios are re-recorded under
it (escalations now target an outside-workspace /tmp path under
danger-full-access, self-cleaning) and config-options is re-authored on the
single-select wire.
Tianyi Cui
kingwl
imccyu