The web GUI's folder picking was hardwired to one interaction: a native
OS chooser compiled into the gateway, unusable for remote deployments
and swappable only by editing apiproxy source.
Directory picking becomes a three-package capability seam in
packages/host: ctx.directoryPicker returns a discriminated capability —
dialog (the extracted native chooser; host-display only) or browse
(new: one-level listing + child creation over Node stdlib, hidden flags
host-stamped, symlinks followed, ancestry crumbs; remote-capable). The
gateway injects the seam, advertises the kind via
host.describe.directoryPicker, serves host.listDirectory /
host.createDirectory under browse, and answers
directory-picker-unavailable across kinds. cordis.yml is the swap
point; apps/cli keeps dialog mounted, so behavior is unchanged until
the in-app browser PR flips the default. The connection fixture serves
a deterministic browse tree; WorkspacesService gains the browse calls
the browser UI will drive. Decision record:
.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-directory-picker-capability-seam.md
Markerless requests pass on any Host (a non-browser sender is the principal
and forges headers anyway); browser Host matching gains port-less entries and
WHATWG normalization; dsh derives LAN IP-literal authorities for an
all-interfaces bind and web grows --trusted-host for named ones.
Both web-GUI groups shipped without the group README that the packages
table names as each group's canonical package/ctx-key map, and without
rows in that table. Adds both bilingual pairs, the two table rows
(ceiling 835→870: two genuinely new product groups joined the canonical
table at minimal row width), and fixes webserver README drift
(WebServerService/ctx.webServer → HttpServerService/ctx.httpServer,
matching src/index.ts).
A non-`auto` `scrollbar-width` or `scrollbar-color` makes Chromium and Safari
discard every `::-webkit-scrollbar*` rule for that element, including
`::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover`. Declaring both unconditionally left the
hover tokens rendering nowhere: the engines implementing the hover
pseudo-element are exactly the ones the standard properties silence, and
Firefox has no hover pseudo-element to fall back on. Both hover tokens and all
four elevated surfaces' hover rebinds were therefore dead code.
Measured in chromium on probe elements with `scrollbar-gutter: stable`: an 8px
`::-webkit-scrollbar` alone reserved a 30px band, and adding
`scrollbar-width: thin` dropped it to the 10px `thin` reserves.
The standard properties now sit inside `@supports not
selector(::-webkit-scrollbar)`, so Firefox takes them and WebKit-based engines
take the pseudo-elements. The WebKit rules stay ungated: an engine without
those pseudo-elements drops them as unknown selectors, and gating them would
hide them from an engine that implements them without `selector()` — the
pre-16.4 Safari the ungated form serves correctly.
Three unit assertions pin the split by source offset, which the existing
at-rule-flattening parser cannot see. The web e2e now reads the path chromium
actually takes: the `auto` standard properties as the gate's signature, the
pseudo-element sizing and track, the indirection variables resolved per
throwaway probe, and the hover declaration as cascade rule text — chromium
folds the `:hover` rule into `getComputedStyle(el,
'::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb')`, so no computed query separates the states.
The only browser-trust guard covered host.pickDirectory, while the
consequential methods (session.prompt drives bash) accepted any Host —
open to DNS rebinding, where a rebound page reads and writes the API as
if same-origin and only the Host header betrays the attacker's domain.
The pickDirectory-specific loopback guard becomes a prefix-wide fence:
Host must be loopback or an exact host[:port] from the new trustedHosts
config, an attached Origin must equal that authority, and explicit
cross-site markers are refused; requests without browser markers (curl,
tests, native clients) pass, because without a browser there is no
confused deputy. The loopback-socket check is dropped — binding policy
expresses reachability, and the fence is not an auth layer. The Agent
Note records the full threat model and the alternatives.
Browsers send "simple" POSTs (text/plain, form encodings) without a CORS
preflight, so a malicious page could execute side-effectful RPCs blind —
the response stays unreadable cross-origin, but session.prompt would
still run. The carrier now answers 415 unless the declared media type is
application/json, forcing every cross-site attempt into a preflight this
server never answers. Raw-fetch specs gain the header; a new handler case
proves the fence rejects before the impl runs.
Review follow-ups: the three new notify loops (currentProvideInfo
subscribers, ui-skill lexicon listeners, late-registration controller
setup) now contain per-callback failures so one faulty consumer cannot
starve the rest, abort the list projection pass, or poison the source
roster with no disposer; controller lexicon polling drops a throwing
source with a console record like the candidate path. The ui-slash
README (both languages) now states the late-registration warm and the
subscribeLexicon contract, and the scenario suite drives a typed /name
token gaining its decoration when the roll settles with no further
input.
Tianyi Cui
_Kerman
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