Review found five real defects in the configuration-source work, all confirmed
against the code rather than argued:
1. The note claimed --config outranks settings.yaml. It does not: the settings
seam registers a plugin's cordis entry config as the `base` layer and the
user section layers over it, and the seam cannot tell a shipped value from a
--config one. The note now states shipped reality and names --config-replace
as the lever for a deployment that must win. Separately, a literal `apiKey`
in settings outranked both the environment and .credentials.yaml — the field
is removed, so configuration carries a reference and nothing else.
2. DEEPSEEK_SEARCH_BASE_URL was functionally deleted: the shipped inline went
away without the provider learning to read it. It now resolves from the
environment snapshot, as the README always claimed.
3. The bootstrap deny list missed the interpreter start-up hooks. BASH_ENV is
the sharpest: `bash -c` sources it on every bash tool call, so a project
.env could run a file of its choosing before every command. The list now
covers BASH_ENV and its per-language siblings, the Git hook commands, and
the remaining preload and CA variables, organised by what a variable does
rather than which runtime owns it.
4. YAML parse errors quoted the offending source line — which in a credentials
document is the secret — into boot stderr and the watcher's logger. Only the
error code and position are reported now, in credentials-local and
settings-local alike, pinned by a test that asserts the secret is absent.
5. 0600 governed only files the harness wrote. A hand-created 0644 document was
read normally. POSIX now checks the mode before reading contents, at boot
and on every reload; Windows has no mode to inspect and is skipped rather
than faked.
The project a session is launched in is trusted by default, with no prompt and
no stored trust record: it may supply its own endpoint, ordinary variables, and
a key ranked below the managed store. Trust stops at the harness itself — a
discovered file still cannot set DSH_PERMISSION_MODE, PATH, BASH_ENV, or the
rest, because those take effect with no user action, before any turn, outside
the permission policy and the sandbox.
$DSH_HOME/.env had just become an ordinary environment layer, which left the
harness resolving user-facing values from a flattened process.env that could
no longer say where a value came from. A key stored through the web page
stayed shadowed by an older key in the user's own .env. An endpoint could be
redirected by the project: the invoking directory's .env is materialized like
every other layer, and a base URL decides where a resolved API key is sent, so
a DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL written into a model-editable workspace would send the
user's credential — and the prompts carrying their code — to whatever host
that file named.
Give every user-facing value one ordering, with four kinds of source:
explicit for this run per-operation override, CLI argument
> authored by deployment --config / --config-replace
> this launch's shell inherited process environment
> product-managed store settings.yaml, .credentials.yaml
> discovered file $DSH_HOME/.env
> defaults schema default, shipped base, public default
The domains differ only in which tiers exist. The earlier split — credentials
ranking the environment over the managed file while settings ranked over the
environment — was inconsistent: the distinguishing fact is who authored the
source, not the domain.
packages/util/environment owns an immutable snapshot with per-layer
provenance. getFrom(name, sources) searches only the layers a caller names,
and omitting one is a refusal rather than a demotion: the adapters ask for
['process', 'user-env'], so no reordering can let a project file back into a
decision it was excluded from.
isBootstrapOnly rejects, before anything is materialized, any .env setting a
variable that governs how a process launches (PATH, SHELL, NODE_OPTIONS,
LD_PRELOAD), where code or model-visible instructions load from (the whole
DSH_* namespace, HOME, XDG_*), or how the network is reached (proxy and CA
variables). The namespace is denied wholesale so a switch added later cannot
become settable by being forgotten, and there is no opt-out.
verify-config-source-ownership keeps both rules: no unregistered process.env
read under packages/*/*/src (26 allowlisted with reasons), and no apiKey,
baseURL, or headers inlined from the environment in shipped Cordis config —
removing those inlines is what makes the deployment tier meaningful.
New doc-sync gate verify-export-jsdoc walks every module-level exported
name under packages/*/*/src and requires description prose everywhere,
plus @param per parameter and @returns on non-void annotated returns for
function-like exports, public class methods, properties, and accessors.
The parsing + check helpers move out of gen-cordis-catalog.ts into a
shared scripts/jsdoc.ts so 'documented' means one thing on both gated
surfaces.
Deliberate exemptions (documented in the RFC): heritage-declared class
members (the seam declaration is the doc's one home — the one checker
query in an otherwise pure-AST walk), cordis plugin-protocol slots
(name/inject/reusable/Config/apply, top-level and static), constructors,
overload implementations, declare-module augmentation bodies, and
re-export statements (checked at the defining module).
The 203 under-documented exports the gate found at adoption are filled
in this change, so the gate lands green; generated catalogs/graphs are
regenerated for the shifted line pointers.
RFC: docs/rfc/implemented/process/2026-07-06-export-surface-jsdoc-gate.md
The Exa and Perplexity providers hard-coded request parameters that
deployments should control while defaults are still unsettled. Exa gains
searchType, numResults, and highlightsPerResult; Perplexity gains
maxTokens (it previously sent none) and an optional searchRecency. Each
follows the deepseek provider's shape: a defaulted Config field, a
DEFAULT_* constant, and a positive-integer status() check for numeric
limits. The call-level maxResults still flows through WebSearchRequest
and wins over the configured default, keeping the seam layering intact.
Addresses tianyicui's "make everything configurable" review comment.
The `if (error instanceof WebError) throw error` guard is dead code in the
exa and perplexity providers: their mappers (mapExaResponse /
mapPerplexityResponse) never throw a WebError — a wrong-shape body throws a
TypeError, which the catch correctly translates to WEB_PROVIDER_ERROR. The
guard was added for symmetry with the deepseek provider, whose mapper DOES
throw a WebError in strict mode (no web_search_tool_result block), so it
keeps the rethrow. The unreachable lines tripped the per-file 100% coverage
gate.
- search providers (exa/perplexity/deepseek): map the parsed response
INSIDE the parse try, so a well-formed body of the wrong shape surfaces
as WEB_PROVIDER_ERROR instead of escaping as a raw TypeError; a WebError
the mapper throws on purpose is re-thrown untouched
- web-fetch-local: validate numeric limits at plugin construction (positive
finite caps; non-negative integer maxRedirects) rather than constructing a
provider with nonsensical values
- web-fetch-local: enforce the redirect budget BEFORE resolving each hop, so
maxRedirects:N follows exactly N redirects and an over-limit hop reports
"exceeded the maximum" rather than misdiagnosing a cross-origin block
- drop the stale dsh-tool-web/search and /fetch path aliases (the package no
longer declares those subpath exports)
- strip trailing EOF blank lines flagged by git diff --check
Each fix carries a regression test.
- Preserve abort errors while parsing search responses: when the caller's
AbortSignal fires after headers but during response.json() (both the success
and HTTP-error body parses), surface WEB_ABORTED instead of wrapping it as
WEB_PROVIDER_ERROR, so agent cancel/dispose is not misreported as a provider
failure. Applied to both the Exa and Perplexity providers.
- Report a malformed baseURL as misconfigured in status() (URL.canParse), so
selection diagnostics and execution agree (configured-unavailable up front
rather than a late WEB_PROVIDER_ERROR). WebProviderStatus already had the
reason.
Introduce web access as a first-class capability seam so the model-facing
web tools stay stable while backends change. dsh-web owns ctx.web as a
provider registry with registration-order-independent selection and the
WebError taxonomy; dsh-web-search-exa, dsh-web-search-perplexity, and
dsh-web-fetch-local register capabilities into it; dsh-tool-web is the sole
owner of the model-facing web_search/web_fetch schemas, prompt sections, and
HTML-to-markdown presentation. Search and fetch are deliberately one seam.
Providers ship as namespace plugins that register into ctx.web (like an
LlmAdapter into ctx.llm), not key-owning services, since multiple search
providers cannot each own the key. Tool registration follows product
enablement, not backend availability, so load order/credentials never enter
the model contract; the seam resolves the provider at execution time and
surfaces a structured WebError otherwise.
Moves the RFC to implemented/ amended to match what shipped. Example/app
configs are intentionally not wired yet (RFC migration step 6).
Tianyi Cui
Yichen Jiang
imccyu
Dudu-0223