Review round: the no-caption rule the Agent Note states applied only to the
success texts, leaving `permission · unknown permission preset "bogus" (…)`.
The error text now reads `unknown preset "bogus" (…)` and its exact wording
is pinned; the fixture mirror drops `JSON.stringify` for the host's own
quoting so the two cannot drift on a quoted argument.
The Note now states the line it draws: the rule bans a caption for the
command's own value, not the vocabulary, so `/plan`'s `Plan mode off.` and
`/goal`'s `Goal cleared.` conform as written — recorded with the broader
name-ban as a rejected alternative. The web row assertions are scoped to the
row so unrelated page text reading `permission` cannot satisfy them.
The web command row renders `title · summary` from one logged command
lifecycle pair, and the two halves were written without knowing about each
other: the title was the dispatched line rebuilt from `command/run` and the
summary was `command/done`'s verbatim text, so every Access-chip pick read
`/permission workspace-write · Permission preset: workspace-write.` — the
command name twice and its argument twice.
The title is now the bare command name (no `/`, no arguments — the summary
already says what the command did), and a command handler's settlement text
never repeats the command's own name, so `/permission` returns `preset
workspace-write`. The row reads `permission · preset workspace-write`, and
the TUI notice still names the preset that now applies. The log is
unchanged: `command/run` keeps its structured name/args split for a richer
registered row.
Two real branches gain assertions (effectivePermissionPreset's backward
scan over non-preset events; the popup options() throw when the projection
vanished between availability and open — a sync throw, not a rejection).
The empty ui-permission node half joins the ui-model entry on the
client-lane coverage debt list (same pure-UI plugin shape, same TODO).
The read side becomes the 'permissions' session projection: src/types.ts is
the key declaration's one home (PermissionSelect = whole select: table
options in declaration order plus a current-only 'custom'), served through
./types and the ./client re-export. The unit folds the three whole-value
knob events (permission/preset, sandbox/mode, approval/policy) into a plain
KnobState and views the select over the composition defaults the service
already owns; current() shares the same derive step, so the fold exists
once. The write side becomes the /permission command (the /plan
registration shape): bare invocation reports the current preset and the
table, a preset argument switches through set() immediately — no turn
anchoring (knob events need no enclosure), no dedicated RPC. Both children
activate only when their registry is composed.
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
A preset names a bundle of the two mechanism knobs — request =
workspace-write + ask, yolo = danger-full-access + never — so the editor
shows ONE 'Permissions' select where the sandbox-mode and approval-policy
tiers stay orthogonal capabilities (the Codex /approvals shape: presets over
two dials). ctx.permission (dsh-permission) owns the config-defined table,
validates the default preset's bundle against the composed knob defaults at
load (fails loud), and writes a switch THROUGH: one log-only
permission/preset event (the audit fact reverse-mapping cannot recover —
the planned 'agent' preset shares request's knob values and differs only in
composed policy) plus each knob event via its own setter, deduped — a
net-zero switch appends nothing. Every knob consumer keeps reading its own
fold, untouched.
The current preset DERIVES from the effective knob values — the fold breaks
bundle ties, a knob state outside the table is the reserved 'custom' value
(a state, not an error: shown while it holds, switchable FROM, never a
target), and defaultPreset disappears (zero-event state reverse-maps from
the composition defaults).
The ACP bridge drops the two per-knob selects for the one preset select
(advertised only when ctx.permission is composed); pending/anchor/no-op
semantics carry over unchanged, with the no-op echo acknowledged before
vocabulary validation so a client re-pushing a derived 'custom' current
never errors. The sandbox variant example composes the
service with a workspace-write default; the permission-switching,
escalation-approved and escalation-rejected scenarios are re-recorded under
it (escalations now target an outside-workspace /tmp path under
danger-full-access, self-cleaning) and config-options is re-authored on the
single-select wire.
Yichen Jiang
creatixchu
imccyu
Tianyi Cui
kingwl