Move the agent-spine bundle and the stdio/ACP/JSON-RPC app packages out of
core/ and ui/ into a new packages/examples/ group, renamed with a -demo
suffix so the npm name marks them as non-product surface:
core/agent-core -> examples/agent-spine-demo (dsh-agent-spine-demo)
ui/stdio-agent -> examples/stdio-demo (dsh-stdio-demo)
ui/acp-agent -> examples/acp-demo (dsh-acp-demo)
ui/jsonrpc-agent -> examples/jsonrpc-demo (dsh-jsonrpc-demo)
Update every code/config/test reference and reference-only doc mentions, and
regenerate module-graph, config-catalog, and doc-graphs. The jsonrpc bin
(dsh-jsonrpc-agent) and single-file exe (dsh-jsonrpc-agent-pkg) keep their
names; the SDK runtime-startup surface is reconciled separately.
The executable golden proves the packaged VFS and Python SDK boundary, but it does not pin the editor-facing ACP updates, and the existing ACP scenarios exercised Code Mode, subagents, and workflows only as separate stories.
Add a dedicated both-mode replay composition that mounts a Cordis marker, inspects it through a real Code Mode worker dispatch, runs a direct spawn child and a workflow-owned spawn child, then unmounts the marker. Commit normalized ACP frames, parent and child logs, and the composition-specific request-header pin.
Use cordis_inspect as the Code Mode sub-dispatch instead of registering another dynamic tool: the executable snapshot already owns tool-set mutation and header-delta coverage, while this keeps the ACP header contract stable and focuses the new golden on transport presentation and cross-feature composition.
A preset names a bundle of the two mechanism knobs — request =
workspace-write + ask, yolo = danger-full-access + never — so the editor
shows ONE 'Permissions' select where the sandbox-mode and approval-policy
tiers stay orthogonal capabilities (the Codex /approvals shape: presets over
two dials). ctx.permission (dsh-permission) owns the config-defined table,
validates the default preset's bundle against the composed knob defaults at
load (fails loud), and writes a switch THROUGH: one log-only
permission/preset event (the audit fact reverse-mapping cannot recover —
the planned 'agent' preset shares request's knob values and differs only in
composed policy) plus each knob event via its own setter, deduped — a
net-zero switch appends nothing. Every knob consumer keeps reading its own
fold, untouched.
The current preset DERIVES from the effective knob values — the fold breaks
bundle ties, a knob state outside the table is the reserved 'custom' value
(a state, not an error: shown while it holds, switchable FROM, never a
target), and defaultPreset disappears (zero-event state reverse-maps from
the composition defaults).
The ACP bridge drops the two per-knob selects for the one preset select
(advertised only when ctx.permission is composed); pending/anchor/no-op
semantics carry over unchanged, with the no-op echo acknowledged before
vocabulary validation so a client re-pushing a derived 'custom' current
never errors. The sandbox variant example composes the
service with a workspace-write default; the permission-switching,
escalation-approved and escalation-rejected scenarios are re-recorded under
it (escalations now target an outside-workspace /tmp path under
danger-full-access, self-cleaning) and config-options is re-authored on the
single-select wire.
sandbox-acp-agent's whole surface moves into examples/acp-agent following
the example's existing multi-variant shape (the code-mode/both-mode
overlays): sandbox.cordis.yml + its replay overlay, the four snapshot
scenarios (config-options / mode-switching / escalation-approved /
escalation-rejected) as a 'sandbox' header class over per-scenario
configPath — goldens byte-identical, zero re-recording — and
escalation.e2e.ts unchanged apart from the config path. One ACP example
remains; demo:sandbox-acp keeps its name and boots the variant. References
(both RFCs, group/package READMEs, the examples table and test map, the
e2e workflow comment) now point at the variant.
The keyless Loader-path smokes killed the child 10s after spawn, but a
loaded CI e2e runner routinely needs longer just to boot the unbuilt tsx
tree: on this branch's run the coding-agent smoke burned both retries and
failed at 30s wall-clock, and the sibling smokes passed only on retry x2
(master's latest run shows the same near-misses). The budget guards
against a HANG, not slowness — raise kill to 30s and the vitest test
timeout to 45s so a slow boot no longer masquerades as one.
The three-entry cordis.yml (dsh-sandbox-local + dsh-bash-sandbox at a
read-only default + dsh-approval) served over ACP: the first live approval
composition. Recorded snapshot scenarios pin the wire end to end —
config-options advertisement, the mode-switching arc as the suite pinned
header (both switches, the prompt-section delta, one changed-by-the-user
notice per knob, a confined write landing under the switched mode), and
both escalation branches over scripted permissionAnswers (a grant runs
confined under workspace-write; a rejection executes nothing and pins the
fail-closed text). The with-key escalation e2e drives a real model +
real runner + the real bridge answerer, world-verified; ci.yml snapshot
lane and e2e.yml install bubblewrap so the confined replays actually
execute.
Both RFCs move to implemented/ (Decision/Consequences form, deferred
phases tracked in their own sections), with every cross-reference flipped.
dsh-bash grows the per-call policy carrier: BashExecRequest.sandboxMode
(request-optional, spec required-but-nullable — the owner pattern; resolve()
is the one explicit defaulting step) and the BashExecutor.sandboxMode
capability fact (undefined in the base class — composition truth the tool
layer can read). dsh-bash-local carries the field verbatim and confines
nothing.
dsh-bash-sandbox extends LocalBashExecutor and hands ctx.sandbox the exact
argv it is about to spawn. A denial is a RESULT FACT (the command RAN;
result.sandbox.denied is orthogonal to exitCode/signal), classified
conservatively against the wrap own dialect; a RUNNER failure outranks
denial — foreground re-throws the structured SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, a settled
background task stamps sandbox.runnerFailed — so a broken sandbox never
reads as a failing command and the command never runs unconfined.
dsh-tool-bash renders the markers and teaches the model not to retry around
a policy denial; escalation and per-session switching are staged follow-ups.
The ACP bridge registers the first real approval answerer: an ask for an
agent it owns becomes session/request_permission attached to the already-
streamed tool call (one-shot allow_once/reject_once only), outcomes map
conservatively (unknown optionId never grants, client cancel → cancelled),
and foreign or call-less requests delegate down the waterfall. The snapshot
harness accepts scripted permissionAnswers (FIFO; an unscripted prompt
answers cancelled, fail closed) so recorded scenarios can drive the wire
keylessly.