imccyu
7ad54e7791
A test file under packages/client now says which face it covers:
`*.client.spec.{ts,tsx}` and its `*.client.{ts,tsx}` helpers belong to the
Client aggregate, `*.host.spec.ts` to the host aggregate. The carrier's four
node-half specs take the Host suffix.
The two suffixes are mutually exclusive, so each aggregate excludes the
other's and both keep one broad test glob: `exclude` wins over `include`, and
`packages/client/**` no longer has to be excluded wholesale from the host
program with per-file `files` entries carved back out of it. A Host-face spec
that reaches only Host source therefore needs no cross-face project
reference, which the split-project rule rejects.
vitest still discovers every file through `**/*.spec.{ts,tsx}`.
109 lines
6.7 KiB
TypeScript
109 lines
6.7 KiB
TypeScript
/** Behavior of the /api browser-trust fence (rebinding + cross-site defense). */
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import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import { assertTrustedAuthority, isTrustedApiRequest } from '../src/api-request-trust.ts'
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function request(headers: Record<string, string | undefined>): { headers: Record<string, string | undefined> } {
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return { headers }
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}
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describe('isTrustedApiRequest', () => {
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it('holds markerless requests to the same Host fence — a plain-HTTP browser read carries no markers', () => {
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// Over plain HTTP a browser attaches neither Origin nor Fetch-Metadata to
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// reads (EventSource, images, navigations), so a rebound-origin GET is
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// markerless and its response readable: no marker shortcut may exist.
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080' }), [])).toBe(true)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '192.168.1.5:3080' }), ['192.168.1.5'])).toBe(true)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '192.168.1.5:3080' }), [])).toBe(false)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.example' }), [])).toBe(false)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({}), [])).toBe(false)
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})
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it('accepts loopback Hosts in every spelling, with and without ports, for browser requests', () => {
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for (const host of ['localhost', 'localhost:3080', '127.0.0.1', '127.0.0.1:3080', '127.8.9.10:80', '[::1]', '[::1]:3080', 'LOCALHOST:3080']) {
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host, origin: `http://${host}` }), [])).toBe(true)
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}
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})
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it('refuses a rebound Host: the attacker domain names the socket it did not expect', () => {
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({
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host: 'evil.example:3080',
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origin: 'http://evil.example:3080',
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'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
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}), [])).toBe(false)
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})
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it('accepts a declared public authority: exact on host:port entries, any port on port-less entries', () => {
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const headers = { host: 'harness.internal:3080', origin: 'http://harness.internal:3080' }
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request(headers), ['harness.internal:3080'])).toBe(true)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request(headers), ['harness.internal'])).toBe(true)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request(headers), ['harness.internal:9999'])).toBe(false)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request(headers), [])).toBe(false)
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})
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it('matches Host, Origin, and trusted entries through WHATWG normalization (case, default port)', () => {
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'Harness.INTERNAL:3080', origin: 'http://harness.internal:3080' }), ['harness.internal:3080'])).toBe(true)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.internal', origin: 'http://harness.internal' }), ['HARNESS.internal:80'])).toBe(true)
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// An unparsable entry never matches; it must not poison the rest of the list.
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.internal', origin: 'http://harness.internal' }), ['bad entry', 'harness.internal'])).toBe(true)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.internal', origin: 'http://harness.internal' }), ['bad entry'])).toBe(false)
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})
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it('refuses cross-origin browser markers even on a loopback Host', () => {
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// Origin present and different → cross-site request that survived preflight rules.
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'http://evil.example' }), [])).toBe(false)
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// Explicit cross-site label → refused regardless of Origin.
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' }), [])).toBe(false)
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// Opaque origin (sandboxed iframe, file: page) parses to no authority.
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'null' }), [])).toBe(false)
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})
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it('accepts a same-origin browser request, with or without an Origin header', () => {
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({
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host: 'localhost:3080',
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origin: 'http://localhost:3080',
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'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
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}), [])).toBe(true)
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// Origin-less browser shapes (same-origin GETs) still carry sec-fetch-site.
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'localhost:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' }), [])).toBe(true)
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})
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it('assertTrustedAuthority accepts bare authorities and throws on anything more', () => {
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for (const entry of ['harness.internal', 'harness.internal:3080', 'HARNESS.internal:80', '10.0.0.9', '[::1]:3080']) {
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expect(() => { assertTrustedAuthority(entry) }).not.toThrow()
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}
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// WHATWG parsing would quietly read a hostname out of each of these; the
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// config boundary must refuse them instead of authorizing the prefix.
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for (const entry of ['harness.internal/path', 'harness.internal/', 'user@harness.internal', 'harness.internal?x', 'harness.internal#f', 'harness.internal\\path', 'bad entry', '']) {
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expect(() => { assertTrustedAuthority(entry) }).toThrow(/not a bare host\[:port\] authority/)
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}
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// WHATWG trimming would silently strip these; the entry must fail instead.
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for (const entry of ['harness.internal:3080 ', ' harness.internal', 'harness.internal:30\t80']) {
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expect(() => { assertTrustedAuthority(entry) }).toThrow(/not a bare host\[:port\] authority/)
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}
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// WHATWG parsing would silently rewrite these — a dangling colon or
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// zero-padded port would broaden an intended exact-port grant to every
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// port, and non-canonical host spellings would not read back as written.
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for (const entry of ['harness.internal:', '[::1]:', 'harness.internal:0080', '0x7f.0.0.1', '[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]']) {
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expect(() => { assertTrustedAuthority(entry) }).toThrow(/not a bare host\[:port\] authority/)
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}
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})
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it('never lets stray whitespace broaden an exact-port entry to every port', () => {
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// Defense in depth below the load-time assert: the explicit-port judgment
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// reads the parsed URL, so a trimmed `host:port ` entry stays exact.
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const trusted = ['harness.internal:3080 ']
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.internal:9999', origin: 'http://harness.internal:9999' }), trusted)).toBe(false)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.internal:3080', origin: 'http://harness.internal:3080' }), trusted)).toBe(true)
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})
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it('refuses malformed or untrusted authorities on browser requests', () => {
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const markers = { 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' }
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ ...markers }), [])).toBe(false)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ ...markers, host: '' }), [])).toBe(false)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ ...markers, host: 'bad host' }), [])).toBe(false)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ ...markers, host: '127.0.0.999' }), [])).toBe(false)
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expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ ...markers, host: '128.0.0.1' }), [])).toBe(false)
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})
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})
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