Yichen Jiang
0512b12714
$DSH_HOME/.env had just become an ordinary environment layer, which left the harness resolving user-facing values from a flattened process.env that could no longer say where a value came from. A key stored through the web page stayed shadowed by an older key in the user's own .env. An endpoint could be redirected by the project: the invoking directory's .env is materialized like every other layer, and a base URL decides where a resolved API key is sent, so a DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL written into a model-editable workspace would send the user's credential — and the prompts carrying their code — to whatever host that file named. Give every user-facing value one ordering, with four kinds of source: explicit for this run per-operation override, CLI argument > authored by deployment --config / --config-replace > this launch's shell inherited process environment > product-managed store settings.yaml, .credentials.yaml > discovered file $DSH_HOME/.env > defaults schema default, shipped base, public default The domains differ only in which tiers exist. The earlier split — credentials ranking the environment over the managed file while settings ranked over the environment — was inconsistent: the distinguishing fact is who authored the source, not the domain. packages/util/environment owns an immutable snapshot with per-layer provenance. getFrom(name, sources) searches only the layers a caller names, and omitting one is a refusal rather than a demotion: the adapters ask for ['process', 'user-env'], so no reordering can let a project file back into a decision it was excluded from. isBootstrapOnly rejects, before anything is materialized, any .env setting a variable that governs how a process launches (PATH, SHELL, NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD), where code or model-visible instructions load from (the whole DSH_* namespace, HOME, XDG_*), or how the network is reached (proxy and CA variables). The namespace is denied wholesale so a switch added later cannot become settable by being forgotten, and there is no opt-out. verify-config-source-ownership keeps both rules: no unregistered process.env read under packages/*/*/src (26 allowlisted with reasons), and no apiKey, baseURL, or headers inlined from the environment in shipped Cordis config — removing those inlines is what makes the deployment tier meaningful.
web/ - web capability family
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The web access capability seam: an abstract web interface, search/fetch provider implementations, and the model-facing web tools. All product packages.
| Package | Role | ctx key |
|---|---|---|
web/ |
Abstract web seam (search/fetch provider registries + selection + vocabulary + WebError) |
ctx.web |
web-search-exa/ |
Exa-backed WebSearchProvider |
(registers on ctx.web) |
web-search-perplexity/ |
Perplexity-backed WebSearchProvider |
(registers on ctx.web) |
web-search-deepseek/ |
DeepSeek-backed WebSearchProvider using native web_search through the Anthropic-compatible API |
(registers on ctx.web) |
web-fetch-local/ |
Anonymous public HTTP(S) WebFetchProvider |
(registers on ctx.web) |
tool-web/ |
Model-facing web_search/web_fetch tool schemas |
(registers on ctx.tools) |
The interface lives at web/web/. Unlike bash/fs, the seam spans two capabilities (search and fetch) with potentially multiple providers each: ctx.web is one web-access middle layer with one provider-selection policy, one abort/error vocabulary, and one product-facing "how this harness reaches the web" config surface. Providers register capabilities, not tools; tool-web is the only owner of model-facing names, schemas, prompt guidance, and presentation. A search provider swap does not change how the model asks for a query, and a fetch implementation swap does not change how the model asks for a URL.
See the web capability seam Agent Note for the design rationale, including why search and fetch are deliberately one seam and why web_fetch's SSRF protection is deferred.