Files
deepseek-harness/packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/README.md
T
Tianyi Cui aa2a7f9a8a fix: validate and re-cap all inbound worker-port traffic (Codex round 1)
The host's message listener trusted the compile-time WorkerToHost shape on
traffic from a peer that runs model code: postMessage(null) threw in the
listener and crashed the host process; forged log/done messages bypassed
maxLogBytes/maxValueBytes (the worker-side LogBuffer and prepareValue cap
only honest flows); and the error-reply renegotiation re-echoed a forged
non-cloneable call id, throwing outside any catch.

Every inbound message now passes a runtime shape gate that validates and
REBUILDS it field by field (junk drops without a throw; call ids must be
numbers, so replies are always clone-plain; forged extra fields never ride
along). One host-side ledger bounds everything landing in logs — honest
port entries, forged ones, and stray pipe bytes — at the single documented
maxLogBytes, with the shared in-band truncation marker emitted host-side
when the ledger trips first; the completion value is re-capped host-side
through the same prepareValue (with exactly the truncation suffix as slack
so honest worker-capped values pass unchanged), and done error text is
bounded. Also folds the stray-capture budget into that shared ledger
(round-1 finding B: it was a second maxLogBytes on top of the documented
shared cap).
2026-07-08 11:42:59 +08:00

4.1 KiB

@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker

Worker-thread implementation of the @deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime seam: WorkerCodeRuntime runs each program in ONE fresh Node worker_threads.Worker — TypeScript in, type-stripped host-side, bindings bridged over the message port, { value, logs, error? } out. Containment, not a security boundary: trust posture is bash-equivalent by design (the Code Mode RFC § Trust posture), with containment bash does not have — separate isolate, empty environment, heap cap, hard termination.

Config

- id: code-runtime
  name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker'
  config:
    computeMs: 60000              # busy-time budget (measured event-loop active time)
    maxWallMs: 600000             # wall-clock ceiling; never pauses for anything
    maxLogBytes: 65536            # shared byte budget for captured log text
    maxValueBytes: 32768          # rendered-completion-value cap
    maxOldGenerationSizeMb: 512   # worker heap cap (resourceLimits)

Every field is validated (positive numbers) and defaulted; there are no other tunables.

Design

  • One fresh worker per run, no pooling — a program's world dies with its worker: no cross-run state to log, state bleed unrepresentable, runs reconstructable from the session log alone.
  • Type-strip host-side, in execution context — the program is wrapped in an async-function shell, stripped with node:module's stripTypeScriptTypes (erasable syntax only — enum/namespaces are rejected as a program exception and no worker spawns), and sliced back out byte-positioned; it then executes as the body of an AsyncFunction, so top-level await/return work.
  • The port assumes a hostile peer — model code can reach parentPort and forge traffic, so every inbound message is shape-validated and REBUILT before anything reads it (null, primitives, junk types, and malformed payloads drop without a throw; forged extra fields never ride along), the host answers each call id at most once, resolves binding names as OWN properties only (a forged constructor cannot walk a prototype chain), drops post-settlement replies, and converts a non-cloneable binding resolution into an error reply. Forged log/done messages cannot bypass the caps: one host-side ledger bounds everything that lands in logs, and the completion value is re-capped host-side. Worker-side namespaces are null-prototype with defineProperty, so __proto__-shaped binding names are ordinary keys.
  • Two independent budgets, because the peer is hostilecomputeMs meters the worker's MEASURED busy time (worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization() polling): a hot loop cannot hide behind a pending decoy dispatch, and a program awaiting a slow tool accrues nothing. maxWallMs backstops what busy time cannot see (awaiting a promise nobody resolves). Both funnel into worker.terminate(), which ends hot synchronous loops too; heap overflow surfaces as the worker's OOM exit (kind: 'worker-exit').
  • Logs stream eagerly — console/stdout/stderr entries cross the port as they happen, so a timed-out or killed program still shows what it printed. ONE shared maxLogBytes ledger bounds everything: streamed entries, forged port traffic, and pipe bytes that bypass the patched streams (appended after), with the overflow marked in-band once.
  • Empty environment — the worker gets env: {} and execArgv: []: no ambient credentials (stronger than the scrubbed-env rule for spawned commands) and no inherited loader flags.
  • Dispose to quiescence — teardown fails in-flight runs as abort and AWAITS each worker's exit before resolving.

The worker entry, unbuilt and built

worker.ts is deliberately erasable-only TypeScript with type-only cross-package imports: unbuilt (vitest/tsx), the host spawns src/worker.ts directly and Node's native type stripping loads it; built, the entry ships as the sibling bundle lib/worker.js (its own tsdown entry). The built path is pinned by tests/built-lib.e2e.ts, the real-load-path guard from docs/testing.md.