kingwl
f505bd9258
Review fixes (ds-review-bot warnings on #623): - One chain, every consumer: the override resolution (own post-seed switches ?? header baseline, closed-vocabulary validated) moves into pure exports (sandboxOverrideOf / approvalOverrideOf); the services delegate, and the permission presets consume them — current(session) and set() now see inherited baselines, so a child inheriting danger-full-access gets REAL knob switches when workspace-write is selected instead of a silent no-op, and a seed-carried preset selection is subsumed by the baseline. current(events) becomes current(session) (pre-release; the only callers were tests). - Unconditional durable validation: a malformed header baseline fails loud on every read, no longer shadowed by an own switch. - The two policy peers are declared optional (peerDependenciesMeta), so a thin spawn/fork deployment without policy plugins can consume the driver; verify-runtime-closure honors the flag. Red-first: inherited-preset derive/switch-away and seeded-selection tests in the permission suite; malformed-baseline-with-own-switch tests in both policy suites.
sandbox/ — process-sandbox capability family
English | 中文
The confinement half of the capability-seam split: an abstract provider interface, platform backends, and the shared policy home. Consumers hand ctx.sandbox the exact argv they are about to spawn and spawn the returned (wrapped) argv instead; a complete SandboxExecutionPolicy (mode + workspace root) rides each capability call, and its confined subset becomes the provider's SandboxPolicy. Different sessions and consumers can therefore confine under different policies at the same instant. All product packages.
| Package | Role | ctx key |
|---|---|---|
sandbox/ |
Abstract process-sandbox seam (the SandboxProvider contract + the mode/enforcement/policy vocabulary) plus the shared ESCALATION kit (approveEscalation, the strictly-wider ladder, the denial/hint markers) and the writableRoots derivation every enforcement dialect shares |
ctx.sandbox |
sandbox-local/ |
Local backends by platform chain: Linux bwrap else the landlock-run launcher (the npm-distributed node-addon-landlock-run family, built and released from its own repository), darwin sandbox-exec/Seatbelt — multi-candidate chains functionally probed, sole candidates selected directly, verdict cached, fail-closed |
(registers ctx.sandbox) |
sandbox-policy/ |
The policy resolver: deployment fallbacks plus each session's durable mode and immutable cwd root. Both enforcing families consume its complete per-call result, so bash and fs cannot confine to different roots | ctx.sandboxPolicy |
The seam confines SAME-WORLD subprocesses only (shared filesystem and kernel). Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends here — they replace whole capability implementations (ctx.bash, ctx.fs) as environment-coherent groups; the boundary is recorded in the sandbox Agent Note.
Consumers today: bash/bash-sandbox (wraps ['bash', '-c', command] through ctx.sandbox) and fs/fs-sandbox (an in-process path fence, not an argv wrapper — reads ctx.sandboxPolicy and enforces the shared mode on write/edit). The cross-family boundary is the sandbox Agent Note's cross-family fs sandbox phase; the shared vocabulary lets both families teach the model one denial marker and one escalation flow.