Codex's PR-C review found two (A) blockers: - tools/post-execute could corrupt the protected outcome. postExecute passed the mutable `result` to listeners and then read result.callId / spread result on the return paths, so a listener mutating the reference (flipping isError, rewriting callId, injecting an error) escaped the decision channel. Now the authoritative callId/isError/error are SNAPSHOT before the waterfall and the return value is rebuilt from the snapshot + the typed PostToolDecision — the decision is the only sanctioned way to change the outcome, and callId is always exec.callId. Added a regression test that mutates the result reference and asserts it has no effect; proven to fail red on the unfixed code. - Public docs/JSDoc still advertised the removed `tools/execute` waterfall after the split. Swept every current-state reference to tools/pre-execute + tools/post-execute: the ToolRegistry class JSDoc (and the regenerated catalog), loop.ts's ASCII flow (also added the prompt-submit/session-start steps it was missing), the package-map READMEs (packages, core, agent-core), core-data-structures core.md/tools.md, the bash + acp + invariants src/READMEs (the deferred permission gate is the tools/pre-execute deny/ask seam now), the cookbook, and the implemented RFCs whose factual seam catalog drifted. codec.ts's totality prose now lists `rejected`. Proposed-RFC references are left as-is (frozen proposals, validated when built).
@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local
Local-subprocess implementation of the @deepseek-ai/dsh-bash executor seam: LocalBashExecutor spawns bash -c <command> per call in its own process group, collects bounded output with full-stream spill files, and escalates kills SIGTERM→SIGKILL across the whole group.
Config
- id: bash
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local'
config:
cwd: /path/to/workspace # default: process.cwd()
timeoutMs: 120000 # default foreground timeout
maxTimeoutMs: 600000 # cap for per-call overrides
maxOutputBytes: 64000 # per-stream in-memory cap; overflow spills to disk
Behavior (and where it came from)
Design surveyed against the bash tools of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, and pi; the notable choices:
- Spawn per call, no shell state — every call is a fresh non-login
bash -c(deterministic; no rc files). All four surveyed tools spawn per call.XXX(stateful-shell)insrc/run.tsrecords the two proven stateful designs (Claude Code's cwd-only persistence; Codex's PTY exec sessions) for when real workflows demand them. - Process-group kills with escalation — children are spawned
detached(own process group); kills send SIGTERM to the group, then SIGKILL after a 3s grace (OpenCode's escalation; pipelines and subshells die with the parent). ESRCH is tolerated; daemons that re-parent away from the group can still survive — same caveat as the surveyed tools. - Tail-keep truncation + spill files — output beyond
maxOutputByteskeeps the in-memory TAIL (errors/results cluster at the end — pi/OpenCode rationale) while the FULL stream is appended to a temp file whose path is reported when available. If the final spill close reports a delayed writeback failure, the executor still returns the tail but withholds the path rather than advertising a possibly incomplete file. - Model-friendly env + credential scrub —
process.envminus credential-shaped vars (*KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN*), thenNO_COLOR=1 TERM=dumb PAGER=cat GIT_PAGER=cat(Codex's hardcoded set) so pagers and ANSI color don't garble results. A spec's trusted-pluginenvis merged LAST (after the scrub), so an in-process plugin's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's ambient credentials from model-driven commands, not a trusted caller. The spec'sstdin(also trusted-plugin) is written to the child and closed; with none supplied, stdin is an immediately-closed empty pipe (EOF, as before). See the trusted-plugin RFC. - Background tasks —
start()returns immediately, no timeout applies (Claude Code detaches timeouts when backgrounding),readOutput()is incremental with whole-stream byte offsets, and disposal kills everything. The spec's opaqueownertoken is stored on the tracked task and returned byownerOf(id)— the executor never interprets it (the consumer's access policy does), and because it lives with the task here it survives atool-bashHMR reload.
Sandboxing
TODO(permissions/sandbox): execution policy does NOT belong in this package. Use the tools/pre-execute deny/ask gate or implement a sandboxing BashExecutor — see docs/architecture.md § plugin checklist. Reference points: Claude Code wraps commands in sandbox-exec/bubblewrap; Codex applies seatbelt/landlock plus an execpolicy prefix-rule engine.