The three-entry cordis.yml (dsh-sandbox-local + dsh-bash-sandbox at a read-only default + dsh-approval) served over ACP: the first live approval composition. Recorded snapshot scenarios pin the wire end to end — config-options advertisement, the mode-switching arc as the suite pinned header (both switches, the prompt-section delta, one changed-by-the-user notice per knob, a confined write landing under the switched mode), and both escalation branches over scripted permissionAnswers (a grant runs confined under workspace-write; a rejection executes nothing and pins the fail-closed text). The with-key escalation e2e drives a real model + real runner + the real bridge answerer, world-verified; ci.yml snapshot lane and e2e.yml install bubblewrap so the confined replays actually execute. Both RFCs move to implemented/ (Decision/Consequences form, deferred phases tracked in their own sections), with every cross-reference flipped.
11 lines
646 B
JSON
11 lines
646 B
JSON
{
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"steps": [
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{ "op": "initialize" },
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{ "op": "newSession" },
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{ "op": "prompt", "text": "The sandbox already denied writing escalated.txt in this workspace earlier. Retry it now exactly once: one single bash call with the command printf 'escalated\\n' > escalated.txt && cat escalated.txt, with sandbox_permissions set to workspace-write and the justification 'the user asked to write escalated.txt in the workspace'. Do not run it without sandbox_permissions first. I will approve the permission prompt. After the result, reply with the single word DONE and stop." }
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],
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"permissionAnswers": [
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{ "kind": "allow_once" }
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]
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}
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