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deepseek-harness/docs/core-data-structures/bash.md
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Tianyi Cui bb9ae2ba99 docs(bash): reframe stdin/env — the scrub is the security control, not a trust boundary
Address review: the "trusted-plugin surface" framing overstated the security
story. A model driving the `bash` tool already has equivalent power to set env
vars and feed stdin through ordinary shell syntax (`FOO=bar cmd`, heredocs), so
the `env`/`stdin` seam fields grant it no new capability — and they cannot
exfiltrate the harness's ambient credentials, because the credential SCRUB in
dsh-bash-local (which strips *KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN* from process.env before the
child sees it) is the actual control, and it works regardless of these fields
(tool-call args are static JSON, never shell-evaluated).

So drop the "dangerous / trusted-plugin boundary" language across the RFC, the
three bash-package READMEs, the bash/src/types.ts JSDoc, and docs/bash.md (both
the type-equiv blocks — kept 1:1 with source — and the prose). The reality that
remains: the `bash` tool doesn't EXPOSE env/stdin as parameters because they'd
be redundant with shell syntax; the fields exist for in-process plugins (the
hooks bridges) to pass a JSON payload + CLAUDE_* vars cleanly. The guard test is
kept but reframed: it catches a future `...args` spread that would silently
forward model input into the post-scrub env merge, NOT a trust wall. No code or
behavior change.
2026-07-02 04:08:24 +08:00

10 KiB

Bash Executor

The bash execution seam — the canonical capability seam example, split across three packages: interface (dsh-bash, ctx.bash), implementation (dsh-bash-local, local subprocesses), and consumer (dsh-tool-bash, the bash/bash_output/bash_kill tool schemas). Bash is one optional capability, not part of the agent-loop spine — so its vocabulary lives here, not in core.md. A sandboxed, containerized, or remote backend is a sibling package implementing the same interface.

Source: packages/bash/bash/src/types.ts

Request vs. spec: the resolve() split

The seam separates the model-/plugin-facing request (optional workdir/timeoutMs, filled from config) from the fully-resolved spec the executor acts on (those fields required). The tool layer calls ctx.bash.resolve(request) between them — this is the repo's "explicit > implicit at package seams" rule made concrete: the reader of a BashExecSpec never wonders where the working directory came from.

interface BashExecRequest {
  command: string
  /** Working directory override (default: implementation-configured). */
  workdir?: string | undefined
  /** Timeout override in milliseconds (implementations cap it). */
  timeoutMs?: number | undefined
  /** Abort signal — implementations kill the command when it fires. */
  signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
  /**
   * Bytes to write to the command's stdin, then close it. Absent leaves stdin
   * closed/empty (the default for model-driven tool calls). Set by in-process
   * plugins (e.g. the hooks bridges, which write a hook command's JSON payload
   * to its stdin); the model-facing bash tool does not expose it as a parameter
   * (a model that needs stdin uses shell syntax like a heredoc or a pipe).
   */
  stdin?: string | undefined
  /**
   * Extra environment entries for the command, merged AFTER the
   * implementation's credential scrub (so an explicit entry here is honored even
   * when its name matches the scrub pattern — the caller named a value it holds,
   * not the harness's ambient secret). Set by in-process plugins (the hooks
   * bridges set `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`, `CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT`, …); the model-facing
   * bash tool does not expose it as a parameter (a model that needs an env var
   * uses shell syntax like `FOO=bar cmd`).
   */
  env?: Record<string, string> | undefined
  /**
   * Opaque OWNER token for a background task — the consumer's isolation key
   * (the tool layer passes the owning agent's `session.header.id`). The
   * executor stores it on the task and exposes it via {@link BashExecutor.ownerOf};
   * the executor itself NEVER interprets it (no access policy lives in the
   * seam — that is the consumer's job). Absent for foreground runs and for an
   * ownerless background start (a non-agent caller).
   */
  owner?: OwnerToken | undefined
}
interface BashExecSpec {
  command: string
  workdir: string
  timeoutMs: number
  /** Abort signal — implementations kill the command when it fires. */
  signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
  /**
   * Bytes to write to the command's stdin (then close it), carried through
   * verbatim from {@link BashExecRequest.stdin}. OPTIONAL on the resolved spec
   * (unlike `owner`): it has no config default, so a missing one means "no
   * stdin" — the safe, ordinary case — not a silent footgun, so it stays a
   * plain optional rather than required-but-nullable (see the request field).
   */
  stdin?: string | undefined
  /**
   * Extra environment entries, carried through verbatim from
   * {@link BashExecRequest.env} and merged by the implementation AFTER its
   * credential scrub (an explicit entry wins even when its name matches the
   * scrub pattern). OPTIONAL on the spec for the same reason as `stdin` — no
   * config default, absent means "no extra env".
   */
  env?: Record<string, string> | undefined
  /**
   * Opaque owner token, REQUIRED-but-nullable (mirrors `workdir`/`timeoutMs`
   * being required on the resolved spec): {@link BashExecutor.resolve} carries
   * the request's `owner` through, defaulting a missing one to `undefined`. A
   * required field makes a forgotten owner a VISIBLE `undefined` rather than a
   * silently-absent property that yields an unowned (cross-session-readable)
   * task. `start()` stores it; `run()` (foreground) ignores it.
   */
  owner: OwnerToken | undefined
}

The owner token is the isolation key: the executor stores it but never interprets it (access policy is the consumer's job), so a background task started by one agent isn't readable cross-session. A required-but-nullable field makes a forgotten owner a visible undefined rather than a silently-unowned task.

stdin and env are set by in-process plugins (the hooks bridges, native plugins) to feed a hook command its JSON payload on stdin and its CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env. The model-facing dsh-tool-bash tool does not expose them as parameters — its request is built from command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only — because a model already has equivalent power through shell syntax (FOO=bar cmd, a heredoc), so duplicating them as tool params would be redundant. This is NOT a security boundary: the credential scrub in dsh-bash-local is what stops the harness's ambient secrets reaching a spawned command, and it works regardless of these fields (a model cannot read a value the scrub removed, and tool-call args are static JSON, never shell-evaluated). A guard test asserts the tool doesn't forward model env/stdin — to catch a future ...args spread, not to defend a trust wall. env is merged AFTER the scrub so an explicit caller entry (a value it already holds) wins even on a credential-shaped name. See the bash-stdin-env RFC.

Both ids the seam handles are branded (zero-cost string brands, the same machinery as SessionId/AgentId): BashTaskId (a tracked background task, generated bash-N by the local executor) and OwnerToken (the opaque isolation key). OwnerToken is deliberately a DISTINCT brand from SessionId, not an alias: the bash seam is a capability seam that must not know what an owner token means, so it never imports dsh-session's vocabulary — the dsh-tool-bash consumer is the single boundary that casts the owning agent's SessionId into an OwnerToken. Branding both stops a raw string (or a BashTaskId where an OwnerToken is expected, or vice versa) from slipping through the type checker on the model-facing task_id path.

Foreground runs: BashRunResult

The outcome of one completed (or killed) foreground run. Orthogonal outcomes are reported independently — a process can both time out AND exit 0 because it trapped the signal — so timedOut, aborted, signal, and exitCode are each their own field; a caller never reads a cut-short run as a clean success.

interface BashRunResult {
  /** Exit code; null when the process died from a signal. */
  exitCode: number | null
  /** Terminating signal (e.g. 'SIGTERM'); null on normal exit. */
  signal: NodeJS.Signals | null
  /** True when the executor's own timeout killed the command. */
  timedOut: boolean
  /** True when the caller's AbortSignal killed the command. */
  aborted: boolean
  /** The effective timeout applied to this run (after defaulting/capping). */
  timeoutMs: number
  stdout: CollectedOutput
  stderr: CollectedOutput
}

Each stream is a CollectedOutput — the (possibly truncated) text plus recovery info. When truncated, text is the tail and the complete stream spills to a private file:

interface CollectedOutput {
  /** Collected text — the TAIL of the stream when truncated. */
  text: string
  /** True when bytes were dropped from `text`. */
  truncated: boolean
  /** Path to a file holding the COMPLETE stream, when truncated and available. */
  spillPath?: string
}

Background tasks: BashTask

A long-running command started with start() is tracked as a BashTask. BashTaskStatus is 'running' | 'completed' | 'killed'; done resolves when the underlying process closes and never rejects.

interface BashTask {
  readonly id: BashTaskId
  readonly command: string
  status: BashTaskStatus
  /** Exit code once finished (null = killed by signal / still running). */
  exitCode: number | null
  /** Terminating signal name, when signal-killed. */
  signal: NodeJS.Signals | null
  /** Resolves when the underlying process closes (never rejects). */
  readonly done: Promise<void>
}

readOutput() returns an incremental BashTaskRead — the output produced since the previous read, with a lossy flag when truncation dropped unread bytes:

interface BashTaskRead {
  task: BashTask
  /** Output produced since the previous read (stderr in a marked section). */
  delta: string
  /** True when truncation dropped unread bytes the delta cannot include. */
  lossy: boolean
  /** Full stdout spill file, when stdout truncation occurred and a safe path is available. */
  stdoutSpillPath?: string
  /** Full stderr spill file, when stderr truncation occurred and a safe path is available. */
  stderrSpillPath?: string
}

The service

BashExecutor (ctx.bash, abstract — defined in packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts) mirrors the LlmService/LlmAdapter split: resolve (request → spec), run (foreground), start (background), get/ownerOf/list/readOutput/kill, and onTaskDone (a BashTaskListener completion callback). Spawned commands get a scrubbed env (dropping *KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN*) and spill files use a private 0700 dir with random names and owner-only opens — model output never gets the ambient environment or a predictable path. The implementation that provides all this is dsh-bash-local; the model-facing bash/bash_output/bash_kill schemas that call it are in dsh-tool-bash (and present as terminals via the tool-presentation vocabulary).