Huanqi Cao
441927c526
workspace-write now runs [logon SID, Everyone, orphan]: the two lists differ only by the orphan, and the keep-alive group (logon SID + Everyone) is the single shared invariant. The WMI namespace security check fails in BOTH modes (0x80041003), so CIM/Get-ComputerInfo are unavailable everywhere — the price of closing the C:\\-root tree-creation escape (AU:(AD) + AU:(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)) in workspace-write too. The unused WinLocalSid/WinInteractiveSid/WinAuthenticatedUserSid constants and their ABI-probe prints are removed; the enforcement 'full' claim now stands on a closed NTFS surface. New regression: a C:\\Users\\Public subdirectory write is denied under BOTH modes (the ambient-writable blind spot the review flagged — INTERACTIVE is absent from both lists). FAT-class (non-ACL) targets outside the granted roots remain writable (no security descriptors to intersect) — documented as a legacy residue, warn-only, not engineered around. Docs/design note/PR body updated in both languages (list I/J terminology gone everywhere).
sandbox/ — process-sandbox capability family
English | 中文
This family applies per-session confinement policy to process execution. It covers same-world subprocesses; isolated environments replace complete capability implementations instead of registering here.
| Package | Role | ctx key |
|---|---|---|
sandbox/ |
Defines the process-sandbox service and shared escalation vocabulary | ctx.sandbox |
sandbox-local/ |
Provides local platform confinement backends | registers on ctx.sandbox |
sandbox-policy/ |
Resolves durable per-session sandbox policy | ctx.sandboxPolicy |
See the sandbox decision for the capability boundary and the filesystem integration decision for cross-family policy use.