287 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
287 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* The model-facing bash tools: `bash`, `bash_output`, `bash_kill`. Pure
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* schema + text shaping — every process concern lives behind the `ctx.bash`
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* executor seam (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash`), so sandbox/permission/remote
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* executor implementations swap in without touching what the model sees.
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*
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* Background notifications: when a background task completes, a short notice
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* is injected into the owning agent's session (`agent.inject()` — the
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* documented context seam). Injection is durable context for the NEXT model
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* request, not a wake-up: an idle agent stays idle until something sends a
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* message, which is why the tool descriptions tell the model to poll with
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* `bash_output`.
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*
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* Task ownership: the owning agent is recorded per task id at spawn and kept
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* for the lifetime of THIS plugin instance (it is NOT cleared on task
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* completion — a finished task must stay un-readable / un-killable by a
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* different agent). `bash_output`/`bash_kill` reject a task owned by a DIFFERENT
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* agent (a task with no recorded owner is open to anyone). Task ids are global
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* and predictable (`bash-1`, …); under multi-session ACP (RFC 011) this
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* ownership check is the fence that stops one session's agent from reading or
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* killing another session's background task.
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*
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* TODO(tool-bash-owner-hmr): the ownership map is per-plugin-instance, so an
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* independent HMR reload of `tool-bash` (without reloading `dsh-bash`) starts a
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* fresh map and a task spawned before the reload becomes un-owned (open to any
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* caller). This is acceptable today — HMR is dev-only, the ACP session boundary
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* is one user's cooperative editor (not an adversarial trust boundary), and the
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* executor's own disposal kills its tasks — but a durable fix would attach
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* ownership to the executor/task lifetime via a `dsh-bash` seam.
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*
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* TODO(permissions): commands run with the executor's full authority. The
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* permission/sandbox seam is the `tools/execute` waterfall (veto/ask) plus
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* sandboxing `BashExecutor` implementations — see docs/architecture.md
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* § plugin checklist.
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*
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* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash
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*/
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import type { Context } from 'cordis'
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import { isAbsolute, resolve as resolvePath } from 'node:path'
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import { defineTool } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
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import type { Agent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
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import type { BashRunResult, BashTask, CollectedOutput } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
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export const name = 'tool-bash'
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export const inject = ['tools', 'bash']
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/**
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* Validate the constraints the SchemaSpec can't express. `defineTool` now
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* validates parsed args against the SchemaSpec before `execute` runs (RFC 005
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* → ADR 0011), so type/required/enum checks are already done and `args` is
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* the validated `InferArgs` shape here. What remains are value constraints the
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* DSL has no vocabulary for: non-empty strings and a positive, finite timeout.
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*/
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function validateBashArgs(args: {
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command: string
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description: string
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timeoutMs?: number
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workdir?: string
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run_in_background?: boolean
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}): void {
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if (args.command.trim().length === 0) {
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throw new Error('invalid command: expected a non-empty string')
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}
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if (args.description.trim().length === 0) {
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throw new Error('invalid description: expected a non-empty string')
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}
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if (args.timeoutMs !== undefined && (!Number.isFinite(args.timeoutMs) || args.timeoutMs <= 0)) {
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throw new Error(`invalid timeoutMs: expected a positive number, got ${JSON.stringify(args.timeoutMs)}`)
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}
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}
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/**
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* Reject an empty `task_id`. Type and presence are guaranteed by the
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* SchemaSpec validation (ADR 0011); only the non-empty constraint, which the
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* DSL can't express, is left to check here.
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*/
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function validateTaskId(value: string): string {
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if (value.length === 0) {
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throw new Error(`invalid task_id: expected a string, got ${JSON.stringify(value)}`)
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}
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return value
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}
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/** Append the truncation notice (with the full-output spill path) to a stream's text. */
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function streamText(output: CollectedOutput): string {
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if (!output.truncated) return output.text
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return `${output.text}\n[output truncated; full output: ${output.spillPath ?? '(unavailable)'}]`
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}
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/**
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* Shape one finished run into the text the model sees: stdout, then a marked
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* stderr section, then exit-status markers. Non-zero exits are REPORTED, not
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* errored — the model decides how to react; only infrastructure failures
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* (spawn errors, aborts) surface as isError results.
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*/
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export function renderResult(result: BashRunResult): string {
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const out = streamText(result.stdout)
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const err = streamText(result.stderr)
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let body = out
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if (err.length > 0) {
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// Single newline between sections (stdout usually ends with one already).
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if (body.length > 0 && !body.endsWith('\n')) body += '\n'
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body += `[stderr]\n${err}`
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}
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if (body.length === 0) body = '(no output)'
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const markers: string[] = []
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// Timeout is reported independently of how the process actually ended: a
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// command can trap SIGTERM and exit 0 after our timer fired (e.g.
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// `trap "exit 0" TERM; sleep 60`), giving timedOut:true / exitCode:0 /
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// signal:null — the model must still see that the command was cut short.
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if (result.timedOut) markers.push(`[timed out after ${result.timeoutMs}ms]`)
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if (result.signal !== null) {
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markers.push(`[killed by signal: ${result.signal}]`)
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} else if (result.exitCode !== 0) {
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markers.push(`[exit code: ${result.exitCode}]`)
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}
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if (markers.length === 0) return body
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if (!body.endsWith('\n')) body += '\n'
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return body + markers.join('\n')
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}
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/**
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* Resolve the working directory for a bash call. Precedence: an explicit model
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* `workdir` wins; otherwise default to the calling agent's session cwd
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* (`session.header.cwd`) so each ACP session's commands run in ITS workspace,
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* not the server's launch dir. A RELATIVE model `workdir` is resolved against
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* the session cwd (the tool tells the model to pass `workdir` instead of `cd`,
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* so a relative one should be relative to the session's root, not `process.cwd()`).
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* Returns `undefined` when neither is available (no agent / headerless session /
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* no session cwd) — the executor then applies its own config/`process.cwd()`
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* default, preserving today's non-ACP behavior.
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*/
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function resolveWorkdir(modelWorkdir: string | undefined, exec: { agent?: Agent }): string | undefined {
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const sessionCwd = exec.agent?.session.header.cwd
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if (modelWorkdir === undefined) return sessionCwd
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if (sessionCwd !== undefined && !isAbsolute(modelWorkdir)) {
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return resolvePath(sessionCwd, modelWorkdir)
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}
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return modelWorkdir
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}
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/** Status line for background task reads. */
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function statusLine(task: BashTask): string {
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switch (task.status) {
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case 'running': return '[status: running]'
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case 'killed': return `[status: killed${task.signal !== null ? ` by ${task.signal}` : ''}]`
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case 'completed': return `[status: completed, exit code: ${task.exitCode ?? 0}]`
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}
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}
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export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
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// Owning agent per background task id, recorded at spawn. Kept for the
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// lifetime of THIS plugin instance (NOT cleared on completion): a completed
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// task must stay un-readable / un-killable by a DIFFERENT agent, so the
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// ownership record outlives the task. Under multi-session ACP (RFC 011) this
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// is the isolation fence — one session's agent must never read or kill
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// another session's background task. A task with no recorded owner (started by
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// a non-loop caller, `exec.agent` absent) is unowned and accessible to anyone.
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// An independent `tool-bash` HMR reload resets this map — see the
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// TODO(tool-bash-owner-hmr) note in the module doc.
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const taskOwner = new Map<string, Agent>()
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/**
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* Authorize a `bash_output`/`bash_kill` call against a task's owner. Rejects
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* when the task has a recorded owner and the caller is not that exact agent —
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* including the conservative no-agent case (`exec.agent` absent cannot prove
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* ownership of an owned task). An unowned task (no record) is allowed.
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*/
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const assertTaskAccess = (taskId: string, exec: { agent?: Agent }): void => {
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const owner = taskOwner.get(taskId)
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if (owner !== undefined && owner !== exec.agent) {
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throw new Error(`task ${taskId} belongs to another session`)
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}
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}
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// Background completion → inject a notice into the owning agent's session.
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ctx.bash.onTaskDone((task) => {
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const agent = taskOwner.get(task.id)
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if (!agent) return
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try {
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agent.inject(
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[{ type: 'text', text: `background bash task ${task.id} finished ${statusLine(task)}. Read its output with bash_output.` }],
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{ source: { kind: 'plugin', plugin: 'tool-bash' } },
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)
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} catch (error: unknown) {
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// The ONE expected failure: the agent was disposed between task
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// completion and this injection (LoopAgent.inject throws
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// `agent "<id>" is disposed`). That race is benign — drop the notice.
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// Anything else is a real bug and must surface, not be swallowed.
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if (error instanceof Error && error.message.includes('is disposed')) return
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throw error
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}
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})
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ctx.tools.register(defineTool({
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name: 'bash',
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description: 'Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. '
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+ 'Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — '
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+ 'pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. '
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+ 'Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported. '
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+ 'Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; '
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+ 'poll it with `bash_output` and stop it with `bash_kill`.',
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parameters: {
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command: { type: 'string', required: true, description: 'The bash command to execute.' },
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description: {
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type: 'string',
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required: true,
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description: 'Clear, concise description of what this command does in active voice, '
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+ '5-10 words (shown in the UI). Examples: "ls" → "List files in current directory"; '
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+ '"git status" → "Show working tree status"; "npm install" → "Install package dependencies".',
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},
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timeoutMs: { type: 'number', description: 'Timeout in milliseconds. The executor applies its configured default and cap, and kills the command on expiry.' },
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workdir: { type: 'string', description: 'Working directory for this command. Defaults to the session workspace; a relative path is resolved against it.' },
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run_in_background: { type: 'boolean', description: 'Run in the background and return a task id immediately. No timeout applies.' },
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},
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async execute(args, exec) {
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validateBashArgs(args)
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// `description` is display/logging metadata only (surfaced to UIs via
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// the tool/call session event); it is intentionally NOT forwarded to
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// ctx.bash and has no effect on execution.
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// Default the workdir to the calling agent's session cwd so each ACP
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// session runs in its own workspace (see resolveWorkdir); an explicit
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// model workdir still wins.
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const workdir = resolveWorkdir(args.workdir, exec)
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const request = {
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command: args.command,
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...workdir !== undefined ? { workdir } : {},
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...args.timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs: args.timeoutMs } : {},
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...exec.signal ? { signal: exec.signal } : {},
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}
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if (args.run_in_background === true) {
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const task = ctx.bash.start(ctx.bash.resolve(request))
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if (exec.agent) taskOwner.set(task.id, exec.agent)
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return [{ type: 'text', text: `started background task ${task.id}` }]
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}
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const result = await ctx.bash.run(ctx.bash.resolve(request))
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if (result.aborted) throw new Error('command aborted')
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return [{ type: 'text', text: renderResult(result) }]
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},
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}))
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ctx.tools.register(defineTool({
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name: 'bash_output',
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description: 'Read new output from a background bash task started with `bash` + `run_in_background`. '
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+ 'Returns only output produced since the previous bash_output call, plus the task status. '
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+ 'Tasks keep running while you do other work; poll again later for more output.',
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parameters: {
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task_id: { type: 'string', required: true, description: 'Task id returned by the bash tool.' },
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},
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// execute is synchronous (registry reads + string shaping) but the
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// ToolDefinition contract wants a Promise — hence resolve(), not async.
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execute(args, exec) {
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const id = validateTaskId(args.task_id)
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assertTaskAccess(id, exec)
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const read = ctx.bash.readOutput(id)
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let text = read.delta.length > 0 ? read.delta : '(no new output)'
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if (read.lossy) {
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const paths = [read.stdoutSpillPath, read.stderrSpillPath].filter((p): p is string => p !== undefined)
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text += `\n[some output was dropped from memory; full output: ${paths.join(', ')}]`
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}
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text += `\n${statusLine(read.task)}`
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return Promise.resolve([{ type: 'text', text }])
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},
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}))
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ctx.tools.register(defineTool({
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name: 'bash_kill',
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description: 'Ask the executor to kill a running background bash task by task id.',
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parameters: {
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task_id: { type: 'string', required: true, description: 'Task id returned by the bash tool.' },
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},
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execute(args, exec) {
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const id = validateTaskId(args.task_id)
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assertTaskAccess(id, exec)
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const killed = ctx.bash.kill(id)
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return Promise.resolve([{
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type: 'text',
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text: killed ? `killed background task ${id}` : `task ${id} had already finished`,
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}])
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},
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}))
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}
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