# Conflicts: # docs/config-catalog.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/module-graph.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/code-mode-turn/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-rejected/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/hook-cc-pretool-ask/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/skill-load/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/text-turn/tool-schemas.golden.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/system-prompt.golden.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/tool-schemas.golden.json # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/src/index.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/bwrap.e2e.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/sandbox.spec.ts # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/seatbelt.e2e.ts # packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/package.json # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/render.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tsconfig.json # pnpm-lock.yaml # scripts/verify-package-readme-model-experience.ts
98 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
98 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
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import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
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import { homedir } from 'node:os'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import { Context } from 'cordis'
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import { LocalSandboxProvider } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local'
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import { SandboxPolicyService } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy'
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import { bwrapProfileArgs } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local/src/profiles.ts'
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import { SandboxBashExecutor } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox'
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/**
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* Keyless integration of the real provider and executor through public run/start paths. With
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* no rung forced, a passing bwrap probe selects the ladder's first rung. The tests check world
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* effects and stamped facts, including EROFS classification through the wrap-carried dialect;
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* backend-only confinement is covered by `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`.
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*
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* Skips when bwrap or unprivileged user namespaces are unavailable. HOME-based paths are
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* intentional because bwrap replaces `/tmp`, which cannot prove the workspace-root boundary.
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*/
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const probe = spawnSync('bwrap', [...bwrapProfileArgs({ mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: '/' }), '--', 'true'], { timeout: 5_000, stdio: 'ignore' })
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const bwrapUsable = probe.status === 0
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let ctx: Context | undefined
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const tempDirs: string[] = []
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afterEach(async () => {
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await ctx?.fiber.dispose()
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ctx = undefined
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await Promise.all(tempDirs.splice(0).map(dir => rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })))
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})
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async function tempDir(base: string): Promise<string> {
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const dir = await mkdtemp(join(base, 'dsh-bwrap-e2e-'))
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tempDirs.push(dir)
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return dir
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}
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async function sandboxedBash(workspace: string, mode: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write'): Promise<SandboxBashExecutor> {
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ctx = new Context()
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await ctx.plugin(LocalSandboxProvider, {})
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await ctx.plugin(SandboxPolicyService, { mode, workspaceRoot: workspace })
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await ctx.plugin(SandboxBashExecutor, { cwd: workspace, timeoutMs: 30_000 })
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return ctx.bash as SandboxBashExecutor
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}
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describe.skipIf(!bwrapUsable)('bash-sandbox: real bwrap confinement through ctx.bash', () => {
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it('read-only denies a write — the file must NOT exist, and EROFS text classifies as a denial', async () => {
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const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
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const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
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const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${workdir}/denied.txt` }))
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expect(result.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
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expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
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expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
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})
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it('workspace-write lands a write inside the workspace root and still denies one beside it', async () => {
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const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
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const outside = await tempDir(homedir())
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const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'workspace-write')
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const inside = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `printf bwrap-ok > ${workdir}/allowed.txt` }))
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expect(inside.exitCode).toBe(0)
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expect(inside.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
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expect(readFileSync(join(workdir, 'allowed.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('bwrap-ok')
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const denied = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${outside}/denied.txt` }))
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expect(denied.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
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expect(denied.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
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expect(existsSync(join(outside, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
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})
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it('classifies a background denial once the task settles', async () => {
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const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
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const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
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const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${workdir}/bg-denied.txt` }))
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await task.done
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expect(task.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
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expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'bg-denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
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})
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it('an approved escalated retry — the spec-level workspace-write override — lands the exact write read-only denied', async () => {
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const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
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const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
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const command = `printf escalated > ${workdir}/escalated.txt`
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const strict = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command }))
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expect(strict.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
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expect(strict.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
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expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'escalated.txt'))).toBe(false)
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const retried = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command, sandboxMode: 'workspace-write' }))
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expect(retried.exitCode).toBe(0)
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expect(retried.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
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expect(readFileSync(join(workdir, 'escalated.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('escalated')
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})
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})
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