deepseek-harness/packages/workflow/workflow-vm

@deepseek-ai/dsh-workflow-vm

The first WorkflowService implementation: an in-process node:vm engine. It parses the Claude Code-format script (export const meta = {...} + plain-JS body), runs the body in a fresh vm context with the workflow hooks injected, and fans agent() calls out to ctx.subagents.

The script contract it executes

• Meta extraction (extractMeta): a string/comment-aware brace scanner finds the leading export const meta literal (template interpolation rejected — the literal must be pure), evaluates it ALONE in an empty timed vm context, materializes the result to plain JSON data, validates the shape (name/description required; unknown fields rejected loud), and blanks the statement line-preservingly so error stacks keep the script's own line numbers.
• Hooks: agent(prompt, {label, phase, schema, model}) (schema = the structured-output subset, forwarded as outputSchema; result = validated object, or final text without a schema; a failed child resolves null), parallel(thunks), pipeline(items, ...stages) with NO cross-stage barrier and (prev, item, index) stage callbacks, phase(title), log(message), and the args global. Anything else — effort/isolation/agentType, unknown options, malformed arguments, schemas outside the subset — throws a FATAL WorkflowError that parallel/pipeline re-throw rather than nulling (see the seam README's failure discipline).
• Determinism bans: Date.now(), Math.random(), and argless new Date() throw (kept even though resume is deferred, so scripts stay resume-compatible); no timers, filesystem, or Node APIs exist in the context.

Realm discipline

Values ENTERING the host (the meta literal, hook options/schemas, the script's return) are materialized by materializeFromRealm: a descriptor walk that never invokes accessors and rejects loud everything JSON cannot carry (accessors, exotic prototypes, functions, symbols, cycles, sparse arrays, non-finite numbers, nested undefined, and proxies — rejected via the trap-free util.types.isProxy BEFORE any inspection could run a realm-side trap on the host stack), copying into host containers via defineProperty so a "__proto__" key becomes a data property, never a prototype mutation. Values ENTERING the realm are realm-built throughout, so the script never holds an object whose prototype chain reaches host intrinsics: args and agent() results are rebuilt through the context's own JSON.parse, combinator result arrays through its Array.from, hook promises through its Promise.resolve, and a hook failure (rejection or synchronous phase/log throw) crosses as a realm-built clone carrying name/code/message/fatal — the combinators recognize fatal clones structurally, so the fatal-vs-null discipline survives the boundary.

Limits, cancellation, disposal

Per-run: a concurrency semaphore (maxConcurrentAgents), a total-agent() cap (maxTotalAgents), and a per-call item cap (maxItemsPerCall), all config. cancel() aborts every child (a shared AbortSignal), rejects waiting agent() slots, and makes every future hook call throw CANCELLED — the script dies at its next await and the run settles cancelled; a cancellation that lands before the body runs (or before it settles) reports cancelled even if the script itself needed no hooks. Once a run settles, stray children a script fired without awaiting are aborted too, and dispose() waits for those children to finish disposing (bounded by the grace) before returning. Every hook-returned promise carries a no-op rejection consumer, so a dropped promise cannot surface an unhandled rejection (the app boot layer exits the process on those). Thrown script values are pre-rendered to a string INSIDE the realm's execution window (the body is compiled into a realm-side catch), so a hostile stack getter is subject to the vm sync-slice timeout like any other script code; the host catch only descriptor-reads that string, falling back to describeThrown (fixed labels, own-data reads, an identity-verified host-native stack getter) — result cannot reject.

Documented limitations (the accepted cost of the in-process mechanism; the seam exists so a worker-thread/isolated-vm engine can swap in): vm is NOT a security boundary — scripts are model-written, the same trust level as the model's bash access — and the vm timeout covers only the initial synchronous slice, so a pathological synchronous spin in realm code past that slice (an await continuation, or a thenable's then invoked by promise resolution) cannot be killed; dispose() waits disposeGraceMs then ABANDONS such a script (its settlement stays contained, but an abandoned spin would still occupy the event loop). A returned promise or thenable resolves per JavaScript semantics BEFORE materialization — that is what makes an un-awaited return agent('x') work — and the realm-boundary guard applies to the resolution.

Config

Key	Default	Meaning
provider	spawn	The ctx.subagents provider children run on.
maxConcurrentAgents	0 (auto)	Concurrent agent() ceiling; 0 resolves to min(16, max(1, cores - 2)).
maxTotalAgents	1000	Total agent() calls one run may start (runaway-loop backstop).
maxItemsPerCall	4096	Items accepted by one parallel()/pipeline() call.
syncTimeoutMs	5000	vm timeout for the initial synchronous slice and the meta evaluation.
disposeGraceMs	5000	How long dispose() waits for a cancelled script and its children before abandoning them.