deepseek-harness/examples/acp-agent

acp-agent example

The DeepSeek Harness SDK agent demo exposed as an Agent Client Protocol (ACP) server over JSON-RPC stdio — drive it from Zed or any other ACP client.

pnpm run demo:acp          # needs DEEPSEEK_API_KEY (repo-root .env or env)
pnpm run demo:code-mode acp   # the same server in Code Mode: one wire tool, run_code

The leaf config loads the ACP app, DeepSeek adapter, sandboxed bash, the sandboxed filesystem stack, approval and permission services, model-facing tools, and repeat guard. The app bundles the agent spine, JSONL persistence, and bridge, creates agents on session/new, and keeps stdout logger-free. fs.cordis.yml adds local tool-result spill storage for its dedicated scenarios; code-mode.cordis.yml adds run_code and its generated TypeScript SDK. See Code Mode.

stdout is the protocol

This example loads no stdout logger — stdout carries the JSON-RPC frames, and any other write corrupts them. @deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-demo includes no logger entry, so this leaf has none to get wrong by default; do not add one (use a stderr exporter if you need logs).

Zed configuration

Add to your Zed settings.json under agent_servers:

{
  "agent_servers": {
    "DeepSeek Harness": {
      "command": "pnpm",
      "args": ["--dir", "/path/to/deepseek-harness", "run", "demo:acp"],
      "env": { "DEEPSEEK_API_KEY": "sk-…" }
    }
  }
}

The editor sets each session's cwd to the project it opens, and bash uses that directory as its workdir. The current sandbox write boundary is nevertheless fixed when the server starts (workspaceRoot: process.cwd()), so launch the server from the workspace it should be allowed to modify; making that root session-scoped is deferred in the sandbox Agent Note. The filesystem tools now ride the same sandbox policy through @deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox, so read/write/edit are available under every mode and confined to the same workspaceRoot.

Snapshot tests (record-once / replay-deterministic)

This example hosts the ACP snapshot suite. It replays through dsh-llm-replay, which reconstructs model streams from assistant/chunk events in each scenario's session JSONL. Recording runs the real ACP agent and harvests its logs; refresh keeps the committed transcript as mock input and rewrites current replay outputs. replay.override.json covers throw and hang cases that chunks cannot express, and an optional workspace/ seeds files. The snapshot Agent Note owns the ACP harness design.

Permissions and sandboxing

The default tree composes @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local, @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy, @deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox, @deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox, @deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval, and @deepseek-ai/dsh-permission. Bash and the read/write/edit tools start in workspace-write; a denied operation returns a structured marker, and a retry with sandbox_permissions plus justification becomes a one-shot session/request_permission prompt in the editor. "Allow once" runs exactly that retry under the wider mode (sandbox Agent Note § Escalation).

• One session config option is live: a capable client shows one Permissions select. workspace-write means workspace-confined bash plus ask; danger-full-access means unconfined bash plus never. Switching writes one permission/preset event through to the sandbox-mode and approval-policy events, and session/load reports the resumed value.
• Every approval is one-shot: the choices are Allow once and Reject; a dismissal, rejection, missing editor, or unavailable runner fails closed.
• The boundary spans bash and the filesystem tools, and is config-fixed today: bash confines through the OS runner and the read/write/edit tools through an in-process path fence (dsh-fs-sandbox), both keyed to the same workspaceRoot — which remains the server's launch directory (a per-session root is deferred).

tests/escalation.e2e.ts boots this default tree keyless, drives the permission select, and—with a key and usable runner—proves both approval outcomes against the filesystem. Most snapshots use that tree and start at danger-full-access so bash fixtures remain runner-independent; scenarios that call read, write, or edit use the fixed full-access fs overlay and a separate request-header pin. The permission-switching and escalation inputs select workspace-write before exercising the bash policy path. No fixture pins a real denial because kernel error text is backend-specific; real confinement remains covered by the sandbox packages' kernel e2e suites.

MVP limitations

The bridge supports N concurrent sessions per connection, each with its own cwd (RFC 011). Prompts support ACP's baseline text and resource_link blocks only; additionalDirectories and mcpServers are rejected. See packages/ui/acp/README.md for the full contract.