Hypatia May
501c3a8ab6
A delegated in-process child now acts only within the sandbox scope fixed at delegation: captureDelegatedPolicyOverrides still snapshots the parent's explicit sandbox override but pins the child approval policy to 'never' (instead of inheriting the parent's), so every child ask — sandbox_permissions escalations included — is rejected deterministically by ApprovalService before any answerer, with the audit pair still logged. Every in-process child additionally receives the scoped subagent:delegation runtime-context statement telling it to report a scope limitation instead of retrying. Supersedes the approval half of the policy-inheritance decision (new Agent Note cross-linked from both prior notes and the approval-seam Q&A); refreshed child snapshot fixtures carry the pinned event, and subagent-published-run-failure now persists a one-event child log.
acp-agent example
English | 中文
Automation-oriented Agent Client Protocol server over JSON-RPC stdio. It is intended for parent agents, subagent providers, and other programmatic clients, not as the product UI.
pnpm run demo:acp # needs DEEPSEEK_API_KEY (repo-root .env or env)
pnpm run demo:code-mode # same protocol with the Code Mode tool transport
The leaf loads the ACP app, DeepSeek adapter, sandboxed bash and filesystem stacks, one-shot approval policy, compaction, subagents, workflows, hooks, a derived session-query index, and repeat guard. The app creates one fresh agent per session/new, persists sessions to JSONL, and keeps stdout protocol-pure. Optional overlays add session queries, filesystem spill storage, Code Mode, or web fetching.
Protocol channel
Stdout carries only newline-delimited ACP JSON-RPC. @deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-demo installs no stdout logger; leaf additions must use stderr for diagnostics.
The automation contract — supported methods, baseline prompt content, committed-text output, and the intentionally absent UI surfaces — lives in @deepseek-ai/dsh-acp.
Session workspaces and permissions
Each session/new supplies an absolute cwd. Sandboxed bash and filesystem mutations resolve workspace-write against that session cwd, so concurrent sessions can use separate project roots; platform temporary roots remain shared writable scratch space (sandbox contract). DSH_PERMISSION_MODE selects workspace-write or danger-full-access for the deployment.
Under workspace-write, a model retry requesting wider sandbox access triggers session/request_permission with allow_once and reject_once. The client decides programmatically; dismissal or an unavailable answer fails closed. The selected outcome applies only to that retry and is recorded through the normal tool-result/audit path. The server never exposes a permission picker or persists client policy.