# Conflicts: # docs/cookbook/adding-a-package.md # docs/rfc/INDEX.md # package.json # packages/AGENTS.md # packages/bash/bash-sandbox/README.md # packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md # packages/sandbox/sandbox/README.md # packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-sqlite/README.md # packages/support/acp-snapshot/README.md # packages/ui/app-boot/README.md # packages/ui/user-approval/README.md # packages/workflow/tool-workflow/README.md
5.5 KiB
@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker
Worker-thread implementation of the @deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime seam: WorkerCodeRuntime runs each program in ONE fresh Node worker_threads.Worker — TypeScript in, type-stripped host-side, bindings bridged over the message port, { value, logs, error? } out. Containment, not a security boundary: trust posture is bash-equivalent by design (the Code Mode RFC § Trust posture), with containment bash does not have — separate isolate, empty environment, heap cap, hard termination.
Model Experience
| Context surface | What the model sees | Token effect |
|---|---|---|
run_code result, indirectly |
The conversation model sees only what the model-written program prints or returns, or a shaped failure; binding-call traffic and worker internals stay outside its context. This backend contributes no schema or prompt itself. | Zero tokens until Code Mode executes a program. maxLogBytes and maxValueBytes cap the model-visible result, which then remains in tool history until compaction. |
Config
- id: code-runtime
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker'
config:
computeMs: 60000 # busy-time budget (measured event-loop active time)
maxWallMs: 600000 # wall-clock ceiling; never pauses for anything
maxLogBytes: 65536 # shared byte budget for captured log text
maxValueBytes: 32768 # rendered-completion-value cap
maxOldGenerationSizeMb: 512 # worker heap cap (resourceLimits)
Every field is validated (positive numbers) and defaulted; there are no other tunables.
Design
- One fresh worker per run, no pooling — a program's world dies with its worker: no cross-run state to log, state bleed unrepresentable, runs reconstructable from the session log alone.
- Type-strip host-side, in execution context — the program is wrapped in an async-function shell, stripped with
node:module'sstripTypeScriptTypes(erasable syntax only —enum/namespaces are rejected as a programexceptionand no worker spawns), and sliced back out byte-positioned; it then executes as the body of anAsyncFunction, so top-levelawait/returnwork. - The port assumes a hostile peer — model code can reach
parentPortand forge traffic, so every inbound message is shape-validated and REBUILT before anything reads it (null, primitives, junk types, and malformed payloads drop without a throw; forged extra fields never ride along), the host answers each call id at most once, resolves binding names as OWN properties only (a forgedconstructorcannot walk a prototype chain), drops post-settlement replies, and converts a non-cloneable binding resolution into an error reply. Forgedlog/donemessages cannot bypass the caps: one host-side ledger bounds everything that lands inlogs, and the completion value is re-capped host-side. Worker-side namespaces are null-prototype withdefineProperty, so__proto__-shaped binding names are ordinary keys. - Two independent budgets, because the peer is hostile —
computeMsmeters the worker's MEASURED busy time (worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()polling): a hot loop cannot hide behind a pending decoy dispatch, and a program awaiting a slow tool accrues nothing.maxWallMsbackstops what busy time cannot see (awaiting a promise nobody resolves). Both funnel intoworker.terminate(), which ends hot synchronous loops too; heap overflow surfaces as the worker's OOM exit (kind: 'worker-exit'). - Logs stream eagerly — console/stdout/stderr entries cross the port as they happen, so a timed-out or killed program still shows what it printed. ONE shared
maxLogBytesledger bounds everything: streamed entries, forged port traffic, and pipe bytes that bypass the patched streams (appended after), with the overflow marked in-band once. - Empty environment — the worker gets
env: {}andexecArgv: []: no ambient credentials (stronger than the scrubbed-env rule for spawned commands) and no inherited loader flags. - Dispose to quiescence — teardown fails in-flight runs as
abortand AWAITS each worker's exit before resolving.
The worker entry, unbuilt and built
worker.ts is deliberately erasable-only TypeScript with type-only cross-package imports: unbuilt (vitest/tsx), the host spawns src/worker.ts directly and Node's native type stripping loads it; built, the entry ships as the sibling bundle lib/worker.js (its own tsdown entry). The built path is pinned by tests/built-lib.e2e.ts, the real-load-path guard from docs/testing.md.
Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- OS processes a program spawns survive termination —
worker.terminate()ends the thread only, weaker than bash-local's process-group kill; orphan cleanup is a deployment concern until a container backend exists. - Type-strip rides Node's experimental
stripTypeScriptTypesAPI — the relied-on behavior is pinned by unit tests, with amaro/sucrase as named drop-in replacements if it shifts. computeMsexpiry can overshoot by up to one poll interval — busy time is sampled every 25 ms (an internal constant, deliberately not config).- Programs get a five-method
consoleshim (log/info/warn/error/debug) — deliberately not Node's full console surface. - A non-cloneable or oversize completion value does not cross as a value — it arrives as a bounded, truncation-marked
util.inspectrendering invalue's place.