deepseek-harness/packages/bash/bash-local/README.md

@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local

Local-subprocess implementation of the @deepseek-ai/dsh-bash executor seam: LocalBashExecutor spawns bash -c <command> per call in its own process group, collects bounded output with full-stream spill files, and escalates kills SIGTERM→SIGKILL across the whole group.

The package root exports the default and named LocalBashExecutor plugin plus its Config; subprocess plumbing stays internal to the implementation package.

Config

- id: bash
  name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local'
  config:
    cwd: /path/to/workspace   # default: process.cwd()
    timeoutMs: 120000          # default foreground timeout
    maxTimeoutMs: 600000       # cap for per-call overrides
    maxOutputBytes: 64000      # per-stream in-memory cap; overflow spills to disk
    graceMs: 3000              # SIGTERM→SIGKILL escalation grace on kills

Behavior (and where it came from)

Design surveyed against the bash tools of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, and pi; the notable choices:

• Spawn per call, no shell state — every call is a fresh non-login bash -c (deterministic; no rc files). All four surveyed tools spawn per call. XXX(stateful-shell) in src/run.ts records the two proven stateful designs (Claude Code's cwd-only persistence; Codex's PTY exec sessions) for when real workflows demand them.
• Process-group kills with escalation — children are spawned detached (own process group); kills send SIGTERM to the group, then SIGKILL after the graceMs grace (default 3s — OpenCode's escalation; pipelines and subshells die with the parent). ESRCH is tolerated; daemons that re-parent away from the group can still survive — same caveat as the surveyed tools.
• Tail-keep truncation + spill files — output beyond maxOutputBytes keeps the in-memory TAIL (errors/results cluster at the end — pi/OpenCode rationale) while the FULL stream is appended to a temp file whose path is reported when available. A foreground BashExecRequest.stdoutMaxBytes can raise stdout's capture budget for one trusted caller; stderr and background tasks still use maxOutputBytes. If the final spill close reports a delayed writeback failure, the executor still returns the tail but withholds the path rather than advertising a possibly incomplete file.
• Model-friendly env + credential scrub — process.env minus credential-shaped vars (*KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN*) and all ambient DSH_* names, then NO_COLOR=1 TERM=dumb PAGER=cat GIT_PAGER=cat (Codex's hardcoded set) so pagers and ANSI color don't garble results. A spec's ordinary env is merged after the scrub but rejects DSH_*; managed dshEnv rejects ordinary names and merges last, preventing stale nested-harness identity. Supplied stdin is written and closed; otherwise fd 0 is /dev/null. See the stdin/env RFC and managed environment RFC.
• Background processes — start() returns a live BashProcess handle immediately, no timeout applies (Claude Code detaches timeouts when backgrounding), the handle's readOutput() is incremental with whole-stream byte offsets, and disposal kills every running process and awaits its exit. Everything task-shaped (ids, ownership, polling, notices) lives in the generic ctx.tasks runtime, which the tool layer registers the handle with — this executor never sees a session or a registry.

Model Experience

Indirectly, through dsh-tool-bash, which renders this executor's bounded stdout/stderr tails, background-process deltas, spill-file paths, and infrastructure failures.

Known Limitations and Deferred Work

• Unconfined by itself — this executor always runs commands with the harness process's authority; deployments needing confinement compose dsh-bash-sandbox, while per-call allow/deny/ask policy belongs on tools/pre-execute.
• No persistent shell or PTY — every call starts a fresh non-login bash -c; cwd-only persistence and interactive terminal sessions remain deferred until a real workflow requires them.
• POSIX-only — the bash binary, detached process groups, group kills, and SIGTERM→SIGKILL escalation are hardcoded; Windows is unsupported.
• The credential scrub is a name heuristic — *KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN* only; differently-named secrets (e.g. *PASSWORD*) pass through, and a whitelist for over-scrubbed vars is noted future work.
• Spill files are never deleted — full-output recovery files (and the private per-process spill dir) accumulate under the OS tmpdir until something external cleans them.

The raw process handling lives in src/run.ts; src/index.ts is the service wiring.