Yichen Jiang
a90ccc4453
The `readDenyPaths` policy field shipped in the previous commit broke Linux confinement outright. bwrap has to create the `/dev/null` bind's mount point inside a tree its own profile has already made read-only, so it refused the entire confinement whenever the parent directory was absent — every host that has not stored a credential yet, including a fresh install: bwrap: Can't mkdir parents for /home/runner/.dsh/.env: Read-only file system which the executor correctly classifies as SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, so every confined bash call failed closed. Landlock cannot subtract from its own `/` read grant, so it reported `partial` enforcement on every confined call for a file it never hid, with no way to switch the denial off (schemastery fills an omitted array with `[]`, so empty and omitted were indistinguishable). A protection that breaks confinement where it works and misreports it where it does not is worse than a documented absence. Revert the field, both expressible backends, the enforcement downgrade, and the policy default; state the residue plainly in the credentials-local READMEs — file mode stops other OS users, not the model — and keep the OS-keychain provider recorded as the real answer. The narrower discipline stands: no surface hoists the credential document into `process.env`, and the model is never handed a resolved path to it.
fs/ - filesystem capability family
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The filesystem stack: a provider seam (text IO + atomic mutation with an optional version guard), a local implementation, a policy gate plugin (observed-state + read-before-edit + version-guarded write/edit), the model-facing file tools + executor, and the bash-backed discovery tools. All product packages.
| Package | Role | ctx key |
|---|---|---|
fs/ |
Provider seam: text IO + atomic mutation primitives (optional version guard); owns the fs/* policy events |
ctx.fs |
fs-local/ |
Local-filesystem FileSystem implementation |
(registers ctx.fs) |
fs-sandbox/ |
Sandbox-enforcing FileSystem: extends fs-local and fences write/edit by the per-call mode + workspace root policy (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the session workspace + temp roots), reads pass through |
(registers ctx.fs) |
fs-policy/ |
Policy gate plugin: observed-state + read-before-edit + version-guarded write/edit, via the fs/* event gate |
(no service — fs/* listeners) |
tool-fs/ |
Model-facing read/write/edit tools AND the executor (reads via ctx.fs, owns read windowing, dispatches fs/*); preserves filesystem semantics for session-cwd-relative paths and advertises sandbox escalation fields when the mounted ctx.fs confines |
(registers on ctx.tools) |
tool-fs-search/ |
Model-facing glob/grep discovery tools when rg is available on the bash executor PATH, backed by fixed ripgrep commands through ctx.bash, NOT by ctx.fs provider methods |
(registers on ctx.tools) |
The interface lives at fs/fs/. A sandboxed, remote, or project-scoped filesystem backend can replace fs-local without touching the seam, the policy gate, or the model-facing tool schemas — fs-sandbox is the first such replacement (an in-process path fence over the shared sandbox mode; see the cross-family fs sandbox Agent Note). The policy (fs-policy/) is a plugin that participates only through the fs/* event gate, not a service the tool injects — so dropping it gracefully loses the policy and leaves the unconstrained bare provider rather than breaking the tool. A deployment that loads tool-fs/ is expected to also load it. The mode fence and the read-before-edit gate are orthogonal and compose. Discovery (tool-fs-search/) deliberately does NOT extend the provider seam: search is a process-backed rg workflow on the bash executor, so filesystem backends stay free of a universal search contract; its tools register only when that executor can find rg, and its results are follow-up-readable when the bash workdir and the read root are the same workspace (the co-located deployment its README documents).
No timeouts on file IO
read/write/edit take no timeoutMs, and the provider seam arms no deadline — unlike bash and web (which consume @deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout) and the bash-backed glob/grep (whose declared timeoutMs is enforced by @deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout-policy): those are process-backed, where a deadline can really kill the work. A local syscall is best-effort-abortable at most: a timeout could not force an in-progress fsync/rename to stop, so a deadline here would be a knob that cannot deliver on its promise. Adding one would also be an implicit default in the exact place explicit-over-implicit forbids. Both reference agents (Claude Code, Codex) leave file IO untimed for the same reason; cancellation still propagates through the tool-execution signal for best-effort abort at syscall boundaries.