deepseek-harness/packages/client/connection

@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-connection

English | 中文

Wire consumer layer: the client plugin's apply mounts ctx.connection (shared api client + single-consumer stream-loop starter); the export face carries the wire contract types, the AbstractApiClient seam, and the loop's sink/config types. The platform subclasses (WebApiClient/FixtureApiClient), the ConnectionController loop, and the fixture data source are package-internal — apply selects and drives them; tests reach them via src. Contract: api-contracts v3 §3.

/api browser-trust fence

The node half guards every request under /api before bridging (src/api-request-trust.ts). Every request — browser-marked or not — must present a Host that is a loopback authority or matches a trustedHosts entry: exact on host:port entries, any port on port-less entries, both sides compared through WHATWG normalization (DNS-rebinding defense). There is deliberately no shortcut for requests without browser markers: over plain HTTP a browser attaches neither Origin nor Fetch-Metadata to reads (EventSource, images, navigations — those headers go only to trustworthy destinations), so an unmarked request may still be a rebound browser read with a readable response, and Host is the one header rebinding cannot forge; non-browser clients pass the same fence via loopback, the CLI-derived LAN IP literals, or a declared authority. When markers are present, an attached Origin must equal the Host authority, and an explicit sec-fetch-site: cross-site marker is refused. A trustedHosts entry that is not a bare, canonical host[:port] authority — one WHATWG parsing reads back exactly as written — fails the plugin load loudly: parsing would otherwise quietly authorize the hostname inside harness.internal/path, or broaden a dangling-colon or zero-padded port to an any-port grant. Failures answer plain 403 before any RPC dispatch. A non-loopback (--host 0.0.0.0) deployment therefore needs its serving authorities trusted: the dsh CLI derives the machine's LAN IP literals itself and its --trusted-host flag declares named ones, so trustedHosts in cordis.yml is for compositions the CLI does not boot. The fence is deliberately not an authentication layer — reachability policy stays with the webserver binding, and auth remains deferred work. Decision record: the api browser-trust boundary Agent Note.

Keyless fixture

Any fixture query parameter selects the in-memory carrier. fixture=empty starts with no Workspace or Session; fixturePrompt=reject rejects prompts before acceptance; fixtureAttach=fail publishes a Session but rejects its Workspace attachment; fixtureSessionCreate=drop-response publishes and frames a Session before dropping the create response; and fixtureFrames=workspace-first reverses the default session-first create-frame order. Workspace creation by name/path and caller-preallocated SessionIds remain deterministic enough for assembled Web tests to reconcile list and frame arrival.

Model Experience

None, as the wire consumer layer moves already-composed messages between browser and host; nothing here reaches a model request.

KV Cache effect

None; this package neither assembles nor sends a provider request.

Known Limitations and Deferred Work

• history's implicit resume is arguable — opening history on an unattached session pulls an agent up host-side; the pure-persistence-read alternative is recorded in the rt-core reconciliation ledger, unchanged in P-I. This package's consumers see it as latency on first open.
• ToolEventView/ToolCallView/ToolResultView re-exports are scheduled for removal — they fall when the toolview migration deletes the host viewFor line (presentation belongs to the client); the fixture keeps a local viewFor mirror until then.