Tianyi Cui
083af62785
Two findings on the ACP backend: Blocking: cancel() only sent session/cancel, so a child that ignores the notify or wedges the prompt left result hung forever — the model-facing tool awaits result before its finally disposes, so the parent cancellation hung and the child stayed alive, violating the SubagentRun.cancel() contract (result settles aborted). The result path now races the ACP drive against a cancelSettled promise that requestCancel resolves, so result settles aborted the instant a cancel is requested, regardless of the child. dispose() still kills+reaps the process. New MOCK_IGNORE_CANCEL mock mode (receives cancel, never resolves the prompt, never exits) drives a regression proven to hang without the race. Nit: the drive-path catch was an empty broad catch that discarded the error (AGENTS.md forbids). Because cancellation is now handled by the race arm, a rejection reaching the catch is always a genuine child-level error — bind it, flatten to error, and surface the original via a new AcpRunSpec.onError sink that the provider wires to ctx.logger.warn, so a real fault is preserved.
96 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
96 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* The out-of-process ACP subagent backend: registers a {@link SubagentProvider}
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* on `ctx.subagents` that runs each child agent in a SPAWNED SUBPROCESS, driven
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* over the Agent Client Protocol (ACP) as the client. The parent process is the
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* ACP client; the child is any ACP agent (point the configured command at the
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* `acp-agent` example to "talk to our own process").
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*
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* Unlike the in-process backends (`-spawn`/`-fork`), the child does NOT share
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* this cordis context — it is a separate process with its own session, model
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* client, and tools. So this backend injects only `subagents` (no `agents`),
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* advertises NO start-time capabilities (an out-of-process child cannot enforce
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* the parent's depth/tool-filter), and ignores `request.parent`.
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*
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* Plugin export shape: named `name`/`inject`/`Config`/`apply`, NO default
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* export (the cordis Loader's `unwrapExports` does `exports.default ?? exports`,
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* so a stray default would drop the namespace — see docs/postmortem/0001).
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*
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* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-acp
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*/
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import type { Context } from 'cordis'
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import z from 'schemastery'
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import type { SubagentCapabilities, SubagentProvider, SubagentStartRequest } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent'
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import { type AcpRunSpec, type PermissionPolicy, startAcpRun } from './run.ts'
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export const name = 'subagent-acp'
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export const inject = ['subagents']
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/** Config: how to spawn and drive the child ACP agent process. */
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export interface Config {
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/** Provider name on `ctx.subagents` (default `acp`). */
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providerName: string
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/** The executable to spawn for each run (the child ACP agent). */
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command: string
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/** Arguments passed to {@link command}. */
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args: string[]
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/**
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* Working directory for the child process and its ACP session. Defaults to
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* the parent process's cwd when omitted.
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*/
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cwd?: string
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/**
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* How to auto-answer the child's `session/request_permission` prompts:
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* `reject` (default — decline every prompt) or `allow` (approve via the first
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* allow-shaped option). The first cut surfaces no prompt to a human.
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*/
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permission: PermissionPolicy
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/**
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* Extra environment variables for the child process — e.g. the child
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* harness's own `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY`. Forwarded on top of a credential-scrubbed
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* copy of the parent env, so an explicit key here reaches the child while
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* ambient secrets do not leak implicitly.
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*/
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env: Record<string, string>
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}
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export const Config: z<Config> = z.object({
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providerName: z.string().default('acp'),
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command: z.string().required(),
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args: z.array(z.string()).default([]),
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cwd: z.string(),
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permission: z.union(['allow', 'reject'] as const).default('reject'),
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env: z.dict(z.string()).default({}),
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})
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/**
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* The ACP provider. Advertises NO start-time capabilities: an out-of-process
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* child cannot honor `outputSchema`/`maxDepth`/`toolFilter` (the service rejects
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* a request needing any of them before `start` runs).
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*/
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class AcpProvider implements SubagentProvider {
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readonly capabilities: SubagentCapabilities = { outputSchema: false, depthLimit: false, toolFilter: false }
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constructor(readonly name: string, private readonly ctx: Context, private readonly config: Config) {}
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start(request: SubagentStartRequest) {
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const spec: AcpRunSpec = {
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command: this.config.command,
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args: this.config.args,
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cwd: this.config.cwd ?? process.cwd(),
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permission: this.config.permission,
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env: this.config.env,
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onError: (error, stopReason) => {
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// The seam forbids `result` rejecting, so a child-level failure is
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// flattened to a stop reason — preserve it here rather than losing it.
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this.ctx.logger.warn(`subagent-acp "${this.name}": child run failed (${stopReason}): ${error.message}`)
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},
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}
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return startAcpRun(request, spec)
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}
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}
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export function apply(ctx: Context, config: Config): void {
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ctx.subagents.registerProvider(new AcpProvider(config.providerName, ctx, config))
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}
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