Files
deepseek-harness/packages/workflow
imccyu a53be53d64 workflow: forward TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH through the worker env scrub
The empty-env hardening wiped the one variable the UNBUILT worker's
loader depends on: tsx finds a tsconfig by searching up from the
worker's cwd, and a parent running outside the repo (the ACP snapshot
harness pins the repo tsconfig through TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH exactly
because its child cwd is a temp dir) lost the dsh-* paths map - the
worker then resolved workspace imports to unbuilt lib/ bundles and died
on CI with ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND (green locally only because stale built
lib/ masked the wrong resolution).

Forward exactly that variable when the parent carries it - loader
plumbing, not a secret; the built shape stays fully empty - and pin the
whole contract with an escape-based test: the worker env is exactly
{TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH}, the credential canary still never crosses.
2026-07-10 00:23:11 +08:00
..

workflow/ — dynamic-workflow capability family

The workflow seam: a model-written JavaScript orchestration script that fans out subagents at scale (phases, structured per-agent results, concurrency caps), modeled on Claude Code's dynamic workflows. A capability seam (see capability seams) in the bash shape: ONE engine implementation per context registers as ctx.workflows; the model-facing tool consumes it.

Package Role ctx key
workflow/ Abstract workflow seam: service base class + run vocabulary + workflow/* events ctx.workflows
workflow-workerthread/ node:worker_threads engine: one worker per run; the script's vm context lives inside the worker, agent() bridges to ctx.subagents over the message port (provides ctx.workflows)
tool-workflow/ Model-facing workflow tool over ctx.workflows (registers on ctx.tools)

The interface lives at workflow/workflow/. The engine's agent() hook rides the subagent seam (any registered provider; the shipped examples use spawn), and agent({ schema }) rides the structured-output support the in-process backends implement. The worker thread isolates the SCRIPT — the host never blocks on it, and a cancelled run's post-grace termination is real — but it is NOT a security boundary; an isolated-vm/separate-process engine (actual sandboxing) swaps in behind the same interface if that ever matters.

The proposal, decisions, and deferred work: docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-05-dynamic-workflows.md.