@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker
Worker-thread implementation of the @deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime seam: WorkerCodeRuntime runs each program in ONE fresh Node worker_threads.Worker — TypeScript in, type-stripped host-side, bindings bridged over the message port, { value, logs, error? } out. Containment, not a security boundary: trust posture is bash-equivalent by design (the Code Mode Agent Note § Trust posture), with containment bash does not have — separate isolate, empty environment, heap cap, hard termination.
Config
- id: code-runtime
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker'
config:
computeMs: 60000 # busy-time budget (measured event-loop active time)
maxWallMs: 600000 # wall-clock ceiling; never pauses for anything
maxOutputBytes: 67108864 # combined serialized outer-output cap (64 MiB)
maxOldGenerationSizeMb: 512 # worker heap cap (resourceLimits)
Every field is validated and defaulted; maxOutputBytes is a safe integer of at least four bytes, the remaining fields are positive finite numbers, and there are no other tunables.
Design
- One fresh worker per run, no pooling — a program's world dies with its worker: no cross-run state to log, state bleed unrepresentable, runs reconstructable from the session log alone.
- Type-strip host-side, in execution context — the program is wrapped in an async-function shell, stripped with
node:module'sstripTypeScriptTypes(erasable syntax only —enum/namespaces are rejected as a programexceptionand no worker spawns), and sliced back out byte-positioned; it then executes as the body of anAsyncFunction, so top-levelawait/returnwork. - The port assumes a hostile peer — model code can reach
parentPortand forge traffic, so every inbound message is shape-validated and REBUILT before anything reads it (null, primitives, junk types, and malformed payloads drop without a throw; forged extra fields never ride along), the host answers each call id at most once, resolves binding names as OWN properties only (a forgedconstructorcannot walk a prototype chain), drops post-settlement replies, and validates every binding resolution and completion as lossless JSON. Forgedlog/donemessages cannot bypass the outer cap: the host repeats validation and accounts every admitted log plus the completion or diagnostic. Worker-side namespaces are null-prototype withdefineProperty, so__proto__-shaped binding names are ordinary keys. - Two independent budgets, because the peer is hostile —
computeMsmeters the worker's MEASURED busy time (worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()polling): a hot loop cannot hide behind a pending decoy dispatch, and a program awaiting a slow tool accrues nothing.maxWallMsbackstops what busy time cannot see (awaiting a promise nobody resolves). Both funnel intoworker.terminate(), which ends hot synchronous loops too; heap overflow surfaces as the worker's OOM exit (kind: 'worker-exit'). - Intermediate binding values are complete JSON — binding arguments and resolutions undergo iterative lossless-JSON validation, flatten into a bounded-depth pre-order wire value for structured clone, and rebuild iteratively on the other side. They have no byte, JavaScript call-stack, or nested structured-clone depth cap. They never enter the outer-output ledger or model context; provider/executor acquisition bounds and process/worker memory remain the limits.
- Logs stream eagerly into one outer ledger — console/stdout/stderr text crosses the port in emission order, so a timed-out or killed program still shows what it printed. Native writes that bypass the patched stream slots arrive on pipes independent of the completion port; settlement therefore continues bounded pipe capture until worker termination completes before materializing the result.
maxOutputBytesaccounts the JSON serialization of the outerlogsarray plus the completion value or failure diagnostic. At or below the cap the exact value returns; a lossy completion isinvalid-output, and a combined overflow isoutput-limitrather than a substituted inspected string. The failure retains the fitting captured prefix and later follows the normal outerrun_codespill policy. - Empty environment — the worker gets
env: {}andexecArgv: []: no ambient credentials (stronger than the scrubbed-env rule for spawned commands) and no inherited loader flags. - Dispose to quiescence — teardown fails in-flight runs as
abortand AWAITS each worker's exit before resolving.
The worker entry, unbuilt and built
Source mode loads erasable-only src/worker.ts through Node's native type stripping. Its transitive runtime closure contains only Node built-ins and relative source modules, so a fresh checkout never requires a sibling workspace package's unbuilt lib/ export. The worker-local JSON snapshotter is parity-tested against the session-owned canonical boundary; both sides flatten and rebuild validated values around the message port so application nesting never reaches structured clone. Built mode passes the sibling lib/worker.cjs as a filesystem path because pkg's VFS Worker hook expects CommonJS; the same path works under ordinary Node. tests/built-lib.e2e.ts pins the real load path required by docs/testing.md.
The SDK surface is the default/named WorkerCodeRuntime class plus Config. The operational ./worker subpath exists only as the packaged spawn entry; the wire protocol and bootstrap helpers are source-private implementation details.
Model Experience
Indirectly, through Code Mode in dsh-tools, which renders the exact outer value when it fits or an explicit invalid-output / output-limit failure. Only the outer run_code result enters model context and its ordinary spill policy; binding traffic and intermediate values remain execution-local.
KV Cache effect
No direct invalidation; the named consumer owns any request-prefix changes.
Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- OS processes a program spawns survive termination —
worker.terminate()ends the thread only, weaker than bash-local's process-group kill; orphan cleanup is a deployment concern until a container backend exists. - Type-strip rides Node's experimental
stripTypeScriptTypesAPI — the relied-on behavior is pinned by unit tests, with amaro/sucrase as named drop-in replacements if it shifts. computeMsexpiry can overshoot by up to one poll interval — busy time is sampled every 25 ms (an internal constant, deliberately not config).- Programs get a five-method
consoleshim (log/info/warn/error/debug) — deliberately not Node's full console surface. - Intermediate binding values have no byte cap — a program can exhaust process or worker memory with a value that never becomes outer output.
- The 64 MiB default is a rejection boundary, not recoverable storage — outer spill can save only the bounded logs and diagnostic returned after
output-limit; bytes rejected beyond the runtime cap never reach the spill layer.