@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local
Local-subprocess implementation of the @deepseek-ai/dsh-bash executor seam: LocalBashExecutor spawns bash -c <command> per call in its own process group, collects bounded output with full-stream spill files, and escalates kills SIGTERM→SIGKILL across the whole group.
The package root exports the default and named LocalBashExecutor plugin plus its Config; subprocess plumbing stays internal to the implementation package.
Config
- id: bash
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local'
config:
cwd: /path/to/workspace # default: process.cwd()
timeoutMs: 120000 # default foreground timeout
maxTimeoutMs: 600000 # cap for per-call overrides
maxOutputBytes: 64000 # per-stream in-memory cap; overflow spills to disk
graceMs: 3000 # SIGTERM→SIGKILL escalation grace on kills
Behavior (and where it came from)
Design surveyed against the bash tools of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, and pi; the notable choices:
- Spawn per call, no shell state — every call is a fresh non-login
bash -c(deterministic; no rc files). All four surveyed tools spawn per call.XXX(stateful-shell)insrc/run.tsrecords the two proven stateful designs (Claude Code's cwd-only persistence; Codex's PTY exec sessions) for when real workflows demand them. - Process-group kills with escalation — children are spawned
detached(own process group); kills send SIGTERM to the group, then SIGKILL after thegraceMsgrace (default 3s — OpenCode's escalation; pipelines and subshells die with the parent). ESRCH is tolerated; daemons that re-parent away from the group can still survive — same caveat as the surveyed tools. - Tail-keep truncation + spill files — output beyond
maxOutputByteskeeps the in-memory TAIL (errors/results cluster at the end — pi/OpenCode rationale) while the FULL stream is appended to a temp file whose path is reported when available. If the final spill close reports a delayed writeback failure, the executor still returns the tail but withholds the path rather than advertising a possibly incomplete file. - Model-friendly env + credential scrub —
process.envminus credential-shaped vars (*KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN*), thenNO_COLOR=1 TERM=dumb PAGER=cat GIT_PAGER=cat(Codex's hardcoded set) so pagers and ANSI color don't garble results. This scrub is the security control that keeps the harness's ambient credentials out of a spawned command. A spec'senvis merged LAST (after the scrub), so a caller's explicit entry — a value it already holds — wins even on a credential-shaped name. The spec'sstdin, when supplied, is written to the child and closed; with none supplied, fd 0 is/dev/null— the exact pre-seam default, so a command that probes stdin's file type is unaffected. Bothenv/stdinare set by in-process plugins (the hooks bridges); the model-facing tool doesn't expose them. See the bash-stdin-env RFC. - Background tasks —
start()returns immediately, no timeout applies (Claude Code detaches timeouts when backgrounding),readOutput()is incremental with whole-stream byte offsets, and disposal kills everything. The spec's opaqueownertoken is stored on the tracked task and returned byownerOf(id)— the executor never interprets it (the consumer's access policy does), and because it lives with the task here it survives atool-bashHMR reload.
Model Experience
Indirectly, through dsh-tool-bash, which renders this executor's bounded stdout/stderr tails, background-task deltas and state, spill-file path, exact Error: unknown bash task "<taskId>" and Error: aborted before spawn: <reason> failures, and retains each resulting tool message until compaction.
Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- Unconfined by itself — this executor always runs commands with the harness process's authority; deployments needing confinement compose
dsh-bash-sandbox, while per-call allow/deny/ask policy belongs ontools/pre-execute. - No persistent shell or PTY — every call starts a fresh non-login
bash -c; cwd-only persistence and interactive terminal sessions remain deferred until a real workflow requires them. - POSIX-only — the
bashbinary, detached process groups, group kills, and SIGTERM→SIGKILL escalation are hardcoded; Windows is unsupported. - The credential scrub is a name heuristic —
*KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN*only; differently-named secrets (e.g.*PASSWORD*) pass through, and a whitelist for over-scrubbed vars is noted future work. - Spill files are never deleted — full-output recovery files (and the private per-process spill dir) accumulate under the OS tmpdir until something external cleans them.
- Finished background tasks are never evicted — they stay in the task map, retaining their in-memory output tails, until executor disposal.
OutputCollector.snapshot()/totalBytesare test-shaped residuals — the live poll path usesreadFrom()and a marked cleanup can inline the final snapshot and remove the unused public getter.
The raw process handling lives in src/run.ts; src/index.ts is the service wiring.