Files
deepseek-harness/packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/bwrap.e2e.ts
T
Tianyi Cui fb0d4ba564 fix(process): close review gaps from Codex round 1
- Mount LocalProcessManager in the sandbox e2e compositions (bwrap/landlock/
  seatbelt + the spine multi-project e2e) and add the spine demo's
  dsh-process-local devDependency, so SandboxBashExecutor's new inject
  resolves when those suites are enabled.
- Extend the Windows test/coverage skip to packages/process/* — the POSIX
  process-group suite moved there from packages/bash.
- Update the stale disposal contract: the bash seam JSDoc, BashProcess JSDoc,
  and core bash doc (en+zh) now state that composition teardown (the process
  manager's disposal) owns kill-and-await, and an executor-only reload leaves
  background processes running.
- Record ctx.processes in the architecture capability table and extension map
  (en+zh) and the root AGENTS.md layout tree; reword the timeout-library note
  so it describes where the plumbing and classification live today.
2026-07-26 07:54:42 +08:00

100 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript

import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
import { homedir } from 'node:os'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import { Context } from 'cordis'
import { LocalSandboxProvider } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local'
import { SandboxPolicyService } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy'
import { bwrapProfileArgs } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local/src/profiles.ts'
import { SandboxBashExecutor } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox'
import LocalProcessManager from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-process-local'
/**
* Keyless integration of the real provider and executor through public run/start paths. With
* no rung forced, a passing bwrap probe selects the ladder's first rung. The tests check world
* effects and stamped facts, including EROFS classification through the wrap-carried dialect;
* backend-only confinement is covered by `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`.
*
* Skips when bwrap or unprivileged user namespaces are unavailable. HOME-based paths are
* intentional because bwrap replaces `/tmp`, which cannot prove the workspace-root boundary.
*/
const probe = spawnSync('bwrap', [...bwrapProfileArgs({ mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: '/' }), '--', 'true'], { timeout: 5_000, stdio: 'ignore' })
const bwrapUsable = probe.status === 0
let ctx: Context | undefined
const tempDirs: string[] = []
afterEach(async () => {
await ctx?.fiber.dispose()
ctx = undefined
await Promise.all(tempDirs.splice(0).map(dir => rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })))
})
async function tempDir(base: string): Promise<string> {
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(base, 'dsh-bwrap-e2e-'))
tempDirs.push(dir)
return dir
}
async function sandboxedBash(workspace: string, mode: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write'): Promise<SandboxBashExecutor> {
ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(LocalSandboxProvider, {})
await ctx.plugin(SandboxPolicyService, { mode, workspaceRoot: workspace })
await ctx.plugin(LocalProcessManager)
await ctx.plugin(SandboxBashExecutor, { cwd: workspace, timeoutMs: 30_000 })
return ctx.bash as SandboxBashExecutor
}
describe.skipIf(!bwrapUsable)('bash-sandbox: real bwrap confinement through ctx.bash', () => {
it('read-only denies a write — the file must NOT exist, and EROFS text classifies as a denial', async () => {
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${workdir}/denied.txt` }))
expect(result.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
})
it('workspace-write lands a write inside the workspace root and still denies one beside it', async () => {
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
const outside = await tempDir(homedir())
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'workspace-write')
const inside = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `printf bwrap-ok > ${workdir}/allowed.txt` }))
expect(inside.exitCode).toBe(0)
expect(inside.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
expect(readFileSync(join(workdir, 'allowed.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('bwrap-ok')
const denied = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${outside}/denied.txt` }))
expect(denied.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
expect(denied.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
expect(existsSync(join(outside, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
})
it('classifies a background denial once the task settles', async () => {
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${workdir}/bg-denied.txt` }))
await task.done
expect(task.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'bg-denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
})
it('an approved escalated retry — the spec-level workspace-write override — lands the exact write read-only denied', async () => {
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
const command = `printf escalated > ${workdir}/escalated.txt`
const strict = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command }))
expect(strict.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
expect(strict.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'escalated.txt'))).toBe(false)
const retried = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command, sandboxPolicy: { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: workdir } }))
expect(retried.exitCode).toBe(0)
expect(retried.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
expect(readFileSync(join(workdir, 'escalated.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('escalated')
})
})