Packet Signing via XEdDSA (#10478)
* Test commit for XEdDSA support * Update to Crypto lib in Meshtatic org * Generate a new node identity on key generation (#7628) * Generate a new node identity on key generation * Fixes * Fixes * Fixes * Messed up * Fixes * Update src/modules/AdminModule.cpp Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Update src/mesh/NodeDB.cpp Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Figured it out! * Cleanup * Update src/mesh/NodeDB.h Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Update src/mesh/NodeDB.cpp Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Update src/modules/AdminModule.cpp Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Update crypto commit hash * Some fixes for xeddsa pr (#9610) * fix: add null check for getMeshNode() in NodeInfoModule getMeshNode() can return nullptr for unknown nodes. Dereferencing without a check crashes the firmware when receiving NodeInfo from a node not yet in the database. * fix: enforce XEdDSA signature verification and prevent stripping Previously, failed signature verification still allowed the packet through, making signatures purely cosmetic. Now: - Failed verification drops the packet (DECODE_FAILURE) - Successfully verified nodes get HAS_XEDDSA_SIGNED bitfield set - Unsigned packets from previously-signing nodes are rejected - Log levels reduced from WARN/ERROR to DEBUG/WARN as appropriate * fix: include packet metadata in XEdDSA signature The signature now covers [fromNode | packetId | portnum | payload] instead of just the payload bytes. This prevents: - Replay attacks (different packetId fails verification) - Reattribution (different fromNode fails verification) - Portnum redirection (different portnum fails verification) Also adds a key initialization check to xeddsa_sign (returns false if XEdDSA keys are all zeros) and checks the return value in the encode path. * fix: handle existing key pair in AdminModule security config When a user provides both a valid private key and public key via admin config, the crypto engine's DH private key and owner public key were never loaded. DMs and XEdDSA signing would silently break. Add an else branch to load both keys into the crypto engine. * perf: cache Ed25519 public key conversion in xeddsa_verify curve_to_ed_pub() performs field element parsing, inversion, and multiplication on every call. Since packets from the same node tend to arrive in bursts, a single-entry cache avoids repeating this expensive conversion for consecutive packets from one sender. * fix: skip identity cleanup when node number is unchanged createNewIdentity() was called on every generateCryptoKeyPair(), including normal boots where the same key is regenerated. This caused unnecessary NodeDB writes and old-node cleanup logic to run when the node number hadn't actually changed. Also fixes only zeroing byte[0] of the old node's public key instead of clearing the entire array. * fix: replace hardcoded 120 with derived XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE constant The payload size check for XEdDSA signing used a magic number (120). Replace with a derivation from DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN and XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE so the limit adjusts automatically if constants change. This also increases the max signable payload from 120 to 169 bytes, which is still safe since the actual encoded size is checked after pb_encode. * fix: add const qualifiers to XEdDSA verify and curve_to_ed_pub inputs pubKey, payload, and signature parameters in xeddsa_verify are input-only and should not be modified. Same for curve_pubkey in curve_to_ed_pub. * chore: remove commented-out old Crypto dependency in portduino.ini * Leave out the admin module change for now --------- Co-authored-by: Jonathan Bennett <jbennett@incomsystems.biz> * trunk * protobuf re-update * Protobufs * Merge resolution fix * Put XEDDSA on the right bit * NodeDB update to new nodeInfoLite accessors, etc * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Refine unsigned packet rejection logic in Router (#10534) * use hardware random to fill the first 32 signature bytes with entropy prior to signing. * Add XEdDSA packet-signing policy tests and update dependencies for macos * Minor fixes * integrate XEdDSA support and update dependencies across multiple modules --------- Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Wessel <github@weebl.me> Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: thebentern <9000580+thebentern@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jonathan Bennett
co-authored by
GitHub
Ben Meadors
Copilot
Wessel
copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
thebentern
GitHub
Ben Meadors
Copilot
Wessel
copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
thebentern
parent
07a87a8254
commit
8267bb22bd
+99
-21
@@ -448,8 +448,6 @@ NodeDB::NodeDB()
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// likewise - we always want the app requirements to come from the running appload
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myNodeInfo.min_app_version = 30200; // format is Mmmss (where M is 1+the numeric major number. i.e. 30200 means 2.2.00
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// Note! We do this after loading saved settings, so that if somehow an invalid nodenum was stored in preferences we won't
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// keep using that nodenum forever. Crummy guess at our nodenum (but we will check against the nodedb to avoid conflicts)
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pickNewNodeNum();
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// Set our board type so we can share it with others
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@@ -469,31 +467,18 @@ NodeDB::NodeDB()
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}
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#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN || MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
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if (!owner.is_licensed && config.lora.region != meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_UNSET) {
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bool keygenSuccess = false;
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keyIsLowEntropy = checkLowEntropyPublicKey(config.security.public_key);
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if (config.security.private_key.size == 32 && !keyIsLowEntropy) {
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if (crypto->regeneratePublicKey(config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.private_key.bytes)) {
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keygenSuccess = true;
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}
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} else {
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crypto->generateKeyPair(config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.private_key.bytes);
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keygenSuccess = true;
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}
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if (keygenSuccess) {
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config.security.public_key.size = 32;
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config.security.private_key.size = 32;
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owner.public_key.size = 32;
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memcpy(owner.public_key.bytes, config.security.public_key.bytes, 32);
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}
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}
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// Generate crypto keys if needed using consolidated function
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// Set my node num uint32 value to bytes from the public key (if we have one)
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// Generate identity and crypto keys if needed; this will create a new identity if one does not exist
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generateCryptoKeyPair(nullptr);
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#elif !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
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// Calculate Curve25519 public and private keys
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if (config.security.private_key.size == 32 && config.security.public_key.size == 32) {
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owner.public_key.size = config.security.public_key.size;
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memcpy(owner.public_key.bytes, config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.public_key.size);
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crypto->setDHPrivateKey(config.security.private_key.bytes);
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// Set my node num uint32 value to bytes from the new public key
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myNodeInfo.my_node_num = crc32Buffer(config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.public_key.size);
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}
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#endif
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// Include our owner in the node db under our nodenum
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@@ -3059,6 +3044,99 @@ bool NodeDB::checkLowEntropyPublicKey(const meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_pub
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}
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#endif
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bool NodeDB::generateCryptoKeyPair(const uint8_t *privateKey)
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{
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#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN || MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
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// Only generate keys for non-licensed users and if LoRa region is set
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if (owner.is_licensed || config.lora.region == meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_UNSET) {
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return false;
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}
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bool keygenSuccess = false;
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// Record whether the stored key is a known compromised/low-entropy key so main.cpp can warn the
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// user. A detected low-entropy key is regenerated below, but the flag stays set so the
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// "Compromised keys were detected and regenerated" notification still fires.
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keyIsLowEntropy = checkLowEntropyPublicKey(config.security.public_key);
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// If a specific private key was provided, use it
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if (privateKey != nullptr) {
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LOG_INFO("Using provided private key for PKI");
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memcpy(config.security.private_key.bytes, privateKey, 32);
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config.security.private_key.size = 32;
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config.security.public_key.size = 32;
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// Generate public key from the provided private key
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if (crypto->regeneratePublicKey(config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.private_key.bytes)) {
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keygenSuccess = true;
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} else {
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LOG_ERROR("Failed to generate public key from provided private key");
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return false;
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}
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}
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// Try to regenerate public key from existing private key if it's valid and not low entropy
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else if (config.security.private_key.size == 32 && !keyIsLowEntropy) {
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config.security.public_key.size = 32;
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LOG_DEBUG("Regenerate PKI public key from existing private key");
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if (crypto->regeneratePublicKey(config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.private_key.bytes)) {
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keygenSuccess = true;
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}
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} else {
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// Generate a new key pair
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LOG_INFO("Generate new PKI keys");
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config.security.public_key.size = 32;
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config.security.private_key.size = 32;
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crypto->generateKeyPair(config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.private_key.bytes);
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keygenSuccess = true;
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}
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// Update sizes and copy to owner if successful
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if (keygenSuccess) {
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owner.public_key.size = 32;
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memcpy(owner.public_key.bytes, config.security.public_key.bytes, 32);
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// Set the DH private key for crypto operations
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LOG_DEBUG("Set DH private key for crypto operations");
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crypto->setDHPrivateKey(config.security.private_key.bytes);
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// Conditionally create new identity based on parameter
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createNewIdentity();
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}
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return keygenSuccess;
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#else
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return false;
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#endif
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}
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bool NodeDB::createNewIdentity()
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{
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uint32_t oldNodeNum = getNodeNum();
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uint32_t newNodeNum = crc32Buffer(config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.public_key.size);
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// If the key hasn't changed, nothing to do
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if (newNodeNum == oldNodeNum)
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return false;
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// Retire the old node entry
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meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = getMeshNode(oldNodeNum);
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if (node != NULL) {
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LOG_DEBUG("Old node num %u is now %u", oldNodeNum, newNodeNum);
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nodeInfoLiteSetBit(node, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_IGNORED_MASK, true);
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node->public_key.size = 0;
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memset(node->public_key.bytes, 0, sizeof(node->public_key.bytes));
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}
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// Drop satellite-store entries (position/telemetry/environment/status) keyed by the retired
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// node number so stale data isn't left attached to the old identity.
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eraseNodeSatellites(oldNodeNum);
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myNodeInfo.my_node_num = newNodeNum;
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meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *info = getOrCreateMeshNode(getNodeNum());
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TypeConversions::CopyUserToNodeInfoLite(info, owner);
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return true;
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}
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bool NodeDB::backupPreferences(meshtastic_AdminMessage_BackupLocation location)
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{
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bool success = false;
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