Use hardware RNG for session passkey and PKC extra nonce (#11047)

* Use hardware RNG for session passkey and PKC extra nonce

The admin session passkey and the Curve25519 extra nonce were drawn
from Arduino random(), which is not a CSPRNG. Source them from
HardwareRNG::fill, mirroring the signing path, and fall back to the
seeded CSPRNG (CryptRNG) only when no hardware source is available.

* AdminModule: make session passkey expiry rollover-safe

session_time was compared as millis()/1000 seconds with additive
thresholds, which breaks across the millis() wrap and could keep a stale
admin session key valid. Store session_time in millis() and use
Throttle::isWithinTimespanMs for the 150s refresh and 300s validity
windows.

* AdminModule: track session passkey validity with an explicit flag

session_time == 0 was used as the uninitialized sentinel, but millis()
is legitimately 0 in the first millisecond of uptime, so a passkey
issued then would be treated as no session. Use a dedicated
session_passkey_valid flag instead.

* AdminModule: camelCase the session passkey validity flag

---------

Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>

src/modules/AdminModule.cpp

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #include "AdminModule.h"
 #include "Channels.h"
 #include "DisplayFormatters.h"
+#include "HardwareRNG.h"
 #include "MeshService.h"
 #include "NodeDB.h"
 #include "PositionPrecision.h"
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@
 #include "GPS.h"
 #endif
 
+#include <RNG.h>      // CryptRNG, the seeded CSPRNG used as fallback for the session passkey
+#include <Throttle.h> // rollover-safe elapsed-time checks for the session passkey
+
 #if MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_GPS
 #include "modules/PositionModule.h"
 #endif
@@ -1792,11 +1796,15 @@ AdminModule::AdminModule() : ProtobufModule("Admin", meshtastic_PortNum_ADMIN_AP
 
 void AdminModule::setPassKey(meshtastic_AdminMessage *res)
 {
-    if (session_time == 0 || millis() / 1000 > session_time + 150) {
-        for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-            session_passkey[i] = random();
-        }
-        session_time = millis() / 1000;
+    // Regenerate once there is no session yet or the current key is older than 150s. session_time
+    // holds millis(); the Throttle check is rollover-safe, unlike the previous seconds comparison.
+    if (!sessionPasskeyValid || !Throttle::isWithinTimespanMs(session_time, 150 * 1000UL)) {
+        // Session passkey authenticates admin replies, so it must be unpredictable: prefer the
+        // hardware RNG, falling back to the seeded CSPRNG only when no hardware source exists.
+        if (!HardwareRNG::fill(session_passkey, sizeof(session_passkey)))
+            CryptRNG.rand(session_passkey, sizeof(session_passkey));
+        session_time = millis();
+        sessionPasskeyValid = true;
     }
     memcpy(res->session_passkey.bytes, session_passkey, 8);
     res->session_passkey.size = 8;
@@ -1809,7 +1817,8 @@ bool AdminModule::checkPassKey(meshtastic_AdminMessage *res)
 { // check that the key in the packet is still valid
     printBytes("Incoming session key: ", res->session_passkey.bytes, 8);
     printBytes("Expected session key: ", session_passkey, 8);
-    return (session_time + 300 > millis() / 1000 && res->session_passkey.size == 8 &&
+    // Key is valid for 300s from issue; sessionPasskeyValid guards an unissued session.
+    return (sessionPasskeyValid && Throttle::isWithinTimespanMs(session_time, 300 * 1000UL) && res->session_passkey.size == 8 &&
             memcmp(res->session_passkey.bytes, session_passkey, 8) == 0);
 }
 

src/modules/AdminModule.h

@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ class AdminModule : public ProtobufModule<meshtastic_AdminMessage>, public Obser
     bool hasOpenEditTransaction = false;
 
     uint8_t session_passkey[8] = {0};
-    uint session_time = 0;
+    uint32_t session_time = 0;        // millis() when the current session passkey was issued
+    bool sessionPasskeyValid = false; // separate flag: millis() 0 at boot is a valid issue time
 
     void saveChanges(int saveWhat, bool shouldReboot = true);