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Pin admin responses to the stored peer key and request id (#11092)

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* Pin admin responses to the stored peer key and request id

noteOutgoingAdminRequest derived its PKC pin from p.public_key, which nothing
populates on the outgoing path, so keyValid was false for every client request
and the pin never engaged. The accepted-response predicate reduced to an
unauthenticated from plus variant and subtype.

Resolve the destination key from NodeDB the way perhapsEncode does, and pin it
only when the request would actually be PKC-encrypted. Extract that condition
from perhapsEncode as wouldEncryptWithPKC so both use one predicate. Also
record the request's packet id and require the response to echo it.

* Treat a zero request id as no pairing token
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Göttgens
2026-07-21 07:16:22 -05:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by GitHub
parent 1872e5b306
commit d587f08481
5 changed files with 190 additions and 44 deletions
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src/mesh/Router.cpp
+29 -22
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@@ -822,6 +822,34 @@ static bool signedDataFits(meshtastic_Data *d)
}
#endif
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
bool wouldEncryptWithPKC(const meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, ChannelIndex chIndex, bool haveDestKey)
{
// First, only PKC encrypt packets we are originating
return isFromUs(p) &&
#if ARCH_PORTDUINO
// Sim radio via the cli flag skips PKC
!portduino_config.force_simradio &&
#endif
// Don't use PKC with Ham mode
!owner.is_licensed &&
// Don't use PKC on 'serial' or 'gpio' channels unless explicitly requested
!(p->pki_encrypted != true && (strcasecmp(channels.getName(chIndex), Channels::serialChannel) == 0 ||
strcasecmp(channels.getName(chIndex), Channels::gpioChannel) == 0)) &&
// Check for valid keys and single node destination
config.security.private_key.size == 32 && !isBroadcast(p->to) &&
// Some portnums either make no sense to send with PKC
p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_TRACEROUTE_APP && p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP &&
p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP && p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP &&
// We allow Key Verification messages to be sent without a known destination key, since the point of those messages is
// to exchange keys. The first exchange (no usable key yet) falls through to channel encryption; the follow-on packet
// uses the pending key resolved into haveDestKey/destKey above.
// Though possible the first packet each direction should go non-pkc
// to handle the case where the remote node has our key, but we don't have theirs.
!(p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_KEY_VERIFICATION_APP && !haveDestKey);
}
#endif
/** Return 0 for success or a Routing_Error code for failure
*/
meshtastic_Routing_Error perhapsEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
@@ -915,28 +943,7 @@ meshtastic_Routing_Error perhapsEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
}
// We may want to retool things so we can send a PKC packet when the client specifies a key and nodenum, even if the node
// is not in the local nodedb
// First, only PKC encrypt packets we are originating
if (isFromUs(p) &&
#if ARCH_PORTDUINO
// Sim radio via the cli flag skips PKC
!portduino_config.force_simradio &&
#endif
// Don't use PKC with Ham mode
!owner.is_licensed &&
// Don't use PKC on 'serial' or 'gpio' channels unless explicitly requested
!(p->pki_encrypted != true && (strcasecmp(channels.getName(chIndex), Channels::serialChannel) == 0 ||
strcasecmp(channels.getName(chIndex), Channels::gpioChannel) == 0)) &&
// Check for valid keys and single node destination
config.security.private_key.size == 32 && !isBroadcast(p->to) &&
// Some portnums either make no sense to send with PKC
p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_TRACEROUTE_APP && p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP &&
p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP && p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP &&
// We allow Key Verification messages to be sent without a known destination key, since the point of those messages is
// to exchange keys. The first exchange (no usable key yet) falls through to channel encryption; the follow-on packet
// uses the pending key resolved into haveDestKey/destKey above.
// Though possible the first packet each direction should go non-pkc
// to handle the case where the remote node has our key, but we don't have theirs.
!(p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_KEY_VERIFICATION_APP && !haveDestKey)) {
if (wouldEncryptWithPKC(p, chIndex, haveDestKey)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Use PKI!");
if (numbytes + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH + MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD > MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN)
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_TOO_LARGE;