More fuzz tests and small fixes for the findings (#10864)
* first pass tests * more tests * Fix two crafted-admin-packet crashes found by the E5 fuzzer Both are reachable from an authorized admin (local from==0, admin channel, or PKC) - remote DoS: 1. SIGFPE in LoRa config validation. A set_config LoRaConfig with use_preset=false and bandwidth=0 makes freqSlotWidth 0, so numFreqSlots is 0 and `hash(name) % numFreqSlots` (RadioInterface.cpp) divides by zero. Guard the modulo; the existing channel_num check then rejects/ clamps the config. 2. Stack overflow in Channels::getKey. A SECONDARY channel at the primary slot with an empty PSK recursed into getKey(primaryIndex) forever. Skip the primary-key borrow when chIndex == primaryIndex. Re-enable the E5 admin fuzzer to hit both triggers again (use_preset both ways incl. bandwidth 0, plus the set_channel tag) as regression guards. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Correct fuzz-test invariants after the crash fixes - E5 admin fuzz: node eviction under a filling NodeDB is legitimate, so assert only the bounded-count invariant, not that a specific seed node survives 6000 mutating ops. - TMM blitz: scope off the nodeinfo direct-response send path (it needs a fully-wired MeshService/phone queue the fixture doesn't provide; the deterministic directResponse tests cover it). The crafted-nodenum rate/unknown/position cache stress is unchanged. clod helped too * realistic tests * test: dedup fuzz RNG into shared test/support/DeterministicRng.h The four in-tree fuzz suites (test_fuzz_decode, test_fuzz_packets, test_hop_scaling, test_traffic_management) each carried a byte-identical copy of the seeded 64-bit LCG (rngSeed/rngNext/rngByte/rngRange). Hoist it into one shared header so there is a single generator to reason about and no risk of the copies drifting. static inline keeps per-suite state per translation unit and avoids -Wunused-function for suites that don't use every helper. Also corrects a stale comment in test_traffic_management (the blitz's nodeinfo direct-response path is intentionally left off). No behavioral change: same constants, same per-suite seeds. clod helped too * test: fuzz uncovered ProtobufModule handlers and the MQTT downlink ingress Extend the in-tree fuzz coverage to packet sources that previously had none: - test_fuzz_packets E8/E9/E10: drive PositionModule, DeviceTelemetryModule and NeighborInfoModule at handleReceivedProtobuf directly (via using-shims, bypassing the ProtobufModule reply/send path so no router is needed). The fixture already stands up nodeDB/service/channels, and nodeStatus/powerStatus are auto-initialized in main.cpp, so no new globals are required. Adds a shared fuzzRxHeader() helper for crafting adversarial RX packet headers. - test_fuzz_decode: add meshtastic_KeyVerification to the decode table. The KeyVerification and StoreForward handler paths are documented as decode-level only, with the concrete reason each is intrinsic (private-state gating / PSRAM + self-pointer wiring), not a fixture gap. - test_mqtt: test_receiveFuzzServiceEnvelope blitzes the non-RF broker-push ingress (onReceiveProto) two ways - raw garbage bytes that must fail envelope decode cleanly, and a well-formed ServiceEnvelope wrapping a crafted inner MeshPacket over crafted channel_id/gateway_id - exercising the channel match, isFromUs, XEdDSA receive policy and perhapsDecode chain. Adds a deliverRaw() passthrough to MQTTUnitTest. All under the coverage env (ASan/LSan). No firmware/src changes. Full sweep GREEN 27/27, 544 cases. clod helped too * Harden LoRa/channel config against crafted admin messages; consolidate test helpers Production (review findings on the hot-fuzz crash fixes): - Clamp bandwidth at the source (clampBandwidthKHz) in checkOrClampConfigLora and applyModemConfig so numFreqSlots can never be 0 for any consumer; a bandwidth-0 set_config previously passed validation and re-armed the SIGFPE on the next applyModemConfig. - Guard applyModemConfig's hash % numFreqSlots (the validator's sibling modulo was fixed earlier but this one was still unguarded). - Enforce the primary-channel invariant in Channels::onConfigChanged: a config demoting every slot now re-promotes the stale SECONDARY slot (keeping its key) or restores the default channel if the slot is DISABLED, instead of leaving every getPrimaryIndex() reader on a non-primary slot. The getKey recursion guard stays as defense-in-depth. Tests: - New test/support/MockMeshService.h and AdminModuleTestShim.h replace four byte-identical mocks and three divergent admin shims (test_mqtt's capturing mock is genuinely different and stays). - DeterministicRng.h: add rngFill() (replaces 14 hand-rolled fill loops) and rngEdgeNodeNum() (unifies the three NodeNum boundary pools). - Extract fuzzChannelSettings() shared by the set_channel case and fuzzBeacon. - fuzzBeacon: the un-terminated branch now fills the whole buffer with non-NUL bytes so the strnlen bound is actually stressed (~50% of iterations, not ~4%). - E6 beacon fuzz: replace the TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(true) tautology with real invariants (handler never consumes; offers land in lastReceivedOffer keyed to the sender). - Trim the seven over-long comment blocks flagged against the 1-2 line rule; the FINDINGS trailer moves to this commit message (see production notes). Full native suite GREEN 27/27 under the coverage (ASan/LSan) env. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Clamp UTF-8 char length in the emote walkers; add test_fuzz_emotes A TEXT_MESSAGE payload is opaque protobuf bytes, so PB_VALIDATE_UTF8 never screens it - invalid UTF-8 and truncated multi-byte lead bytes reach the emote/width render path verbatim. EmoteRenderer's walkers advanced by utf8CharLen(lead) without clamping to the bytes actually remaining, so a truncated lead (e.g. a lone 0xF0, which claims 4 bytes) near the end of the buffer made getUtf8ChunkWidth's memcpy read past the string. ASan confirms a heap-buffer-overflow READ from measureStringWithEmotes. Add utf8CharLenClamped() and use it at every walk site (width measure, truncation cut-loop, and the draw-path text-run/chunk builders); the one already-guarded site (matchAtIgnoringModifiers) is unchanged. New test/test_fuzz_emotes drives measureStringWithEmotes and truncateToWidth over adversarial byte strings (biased to embed/end in truncated multi-byte leads) in exact-sized heap buffers so any over-read is a hard ASan fault. Its headless display uses a synthetic font (firstChar 0, fontData centered in a large buffer) so the stock OLEDDisplay::getStringWidth - which indexes the font jump table with a signed char and over-reads for any byte >= 0x80 - does not mask the finding. native-suite-count bumped 27 -> 28. Full native suite GREEN 28/28 under the coverage (ASan/LSan) env. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Keep emote width measurement in-bounds for non-ASCII bytes OLEDDisplay::getStringWidth (the utf8=false path EmoteRenderer uses on default builds) indexes the font jump table by (c - firstChar) with a signed char and no bounds check, so any byte outside printable ASCII - high bytes from UTF-8 text, but also a stray control byte like 0x0A - reads outside the font array. On-device this reads adjacent flash and returns a garbage width; under ASan the test_fuzz_emotes fuzzer flags it as a global-buffer-overflow, and it made the non-ASCII width measurement meaningless either way. The OLED driver is a pinned upstream dependency, so guard it firmware-side in EmoteRenderer's getStringWidth helper: measure a sanitized copy where any byte outside [0x20, 0x7E] counts as a '?' placeholder. Printable ASCII is unchanged and the UA/RU lookup path is untouched. test_fuzz_emotes now drives a real ArialMT font instead of the synthetic in-bounds font it needed before this fix, so the suite exercises the true production width path (utf8CharLen clamp + this sanitizer) end to end. The same fuzzer tripped the global-buffer-overflow before this change. Full native suite GREEN 28/28 under the coverage (ASan/LSan) env. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -22,7 +22,12 @@
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#include "mesh-pb-constants.h"
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#include "mesh/generated/meshtastic/admin.pb.h"
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#include "mesh/generated/meshtastic/channel.pb.h"
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#include "mesh/generated/meshtastic/config.pb.h"
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#include "mesh/generated/meshtastic/mesh.pb.h"
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#include "mesh/generated/meshtastic/mesh_beacon.pb.h"
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#include "mesh/generated/meshtastic/module_config.pb.h"
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#include "mesh/generated/meshtastic/mqtt.pb.h"
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#include "mesh/generated/meshtastic/storeforward.pb.h"
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#include "mesh/generated/meshtastic/telemetry.pb.h"
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#include "meshUtils.h"
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@@ -30,28 +35,8 @@
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#include <cstring>
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#include <pb_decode.h>
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Deterministic RNG - seeded 64-bit LCG (Knuth MMIX constants). No rand()/time so a failing
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// iteration reproduces exactly from the printed base seed.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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static uint64_t g_rng = 0;
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static void rngSeed(uint64_t s)
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{
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g_rng = s ? s : 0x9E3779B97F4A7C15ULL;
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}
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static uint32_t rngNext()
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{
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g_rng = g_rng * 6364136223846793005ULL + 1442695040888963407ULL;
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return (uint32_t)(g_rng >> 32);
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}
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static uint8_t rngByte()
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{
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return (uint8_t)(rngNext() & 0xFF);
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}
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static uint32_t rngRange(uint32_t n) // uniform-ish in [0, n)
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{
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return n ? (rngNext() % n) : 0;
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}
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// Deterministic RNG (rngSeed/rngNext/rngByte/rngRange) - shared seeded LCG.
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#include "support/DeterministicRng.h"
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static constexpr uint64_t BASE_SEED = 0x00C0FFEEULL;
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static constexpr unsigned DECODE_ITERS = 3000; // per type, per pass (ASan-instrumented, keep bounded)
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@@ -75,6 +60,13 @@ union AnyMsg {
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meshtastic_Routing routing;
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meshtastic_AdminMessage adminMessage;
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meshtastic_StoreAndForward storeAndForward;
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meshtastic_MeshBeacon meshBeacon;
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meshtastic_ServiceEnvelope serviceEnvelope;
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meshtastic_ModuleConfig moduleConfig;
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meshtastic_Config config;
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meshtastic_Channel channel;
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meshtastic_ChannelSettings channelSettings;
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meshtastic_KeyVerification keyVerification;
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};
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struct FuzzType {
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@@ -94,6 +86,13 @@ static const FuzzType FUZZ_TYPES[] = {
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{"Routing", &meshtastic_Routing_msg},
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{"AdminMessage", &meshtastic_AdminMessage_msg},
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{"StoreAndForward", &meshtastic_StoreAndForward_msg},
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{"MeshBeacon", &meshtastic_MeshBeacon_msg}, // beacon offer: char[101] message + PSK-bearing ChannelSettings
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{"ServiceEnvelope", &meshtastic_ServiceEnvelope_msg}, // MQTT downlink wrapper - unusual (non-RF) ingress
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{"ModuleConfig", &meshtastic_ModuleConfig_msg}, // admin set_module_config payload union
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{"Config", &meshtastic_Config_msg}, // admin set_config payload union
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{"Channel", &meshtastic_Channel_msg}, // admin set_channel payload
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{"ChannelSettings", &meshtastic_ChannelSettings_msg},
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{"KeyVerification", &meshtastic_KeyVerification_msg}, // PKI key-verification handshake payload
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};
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static const size_t NUM_FUZZ_TYPES = sizeof(FUZZ_TYPES) / sizeof(FUZZ_TYPES[0]);
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@@ -164,8 +163,7 @@ static void decodeFuzzPass(bool protoish, uint64_t seed)
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len = genProtoish(buf, sizeof(buf));
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} else {
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len = rngRange(sizeof(buf) + 1);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++)
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buf[i] = rngByte();
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rngFill(buf, len);
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}
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memset(&out, 0, sizeof(out));
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// Return value intentionally ignored: true or false are both acceptable. What must never
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@@ -328,8 +326,7 @@ void test_D2f_pb_string_length(void)
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for (unsigned k = 0; k < 20000; k++) {
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uint8_t buf[64];
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size_t maxLen = 1 + rngRange(sizeof(buf));
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for (size_t i = 0; i < maxLen; i++)
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buf[i] = rngByte();
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rngFill(buf, maxLen);
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size_t len = pb_string_length((const char *)buf, maxLen);
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TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(len <= maxLen, "pb_string_length returned > max_len");
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if (len > 0)
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