Clamp position precision on public / known-keys (#10665)
* Clamp position precision on public / known-keys (Compliance) * Fix review comments: bounds check, all-channel precision clamp, disabled channel guard * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Refactor position precision comments for clarity and update channel configuration handling in AdminModule * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -404,6 +404,42 @@ bool Channels::isDefaultChannel(ChannelIndex chIndex)
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return false;
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}
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bool cryptoKeyIsPublic(const CryptoKey &key)
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{
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if (key.length == 0)
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return true; // encryption disabled
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// Match the defaultpsk family ignoring its last byte (getKey() bumps only that byte per 1-byte index).
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if (key.length == (int)sizeof(defaultpsk) && memcmp(key.bytes, defaultpsk, sizeof(defaultpsk) - 1) == 0)
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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bool Channels::usesPublicKey(ChannelIndex chIndex)
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{
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const meshtastic_Channel &ch = getByIndex(chIndex);
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if (!ch.has_settings || ch.role == meshtastic_Channel_Role_DISABLED)
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return false;
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const auto &psk = ch.settings.psk;
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if (psk.size == 0) {
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// Secondary channels inherit the primary key when unset; primary size==0 means encryption disabled.
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if (ch.role == meshtastic_Channel_Role_SECONDARY) {
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// Guard against malformed configs with no PRIMARY channel (primaryIndex could point back to us).
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if (primaryIndex == chIndex)
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return true; // fail closed: treat as public
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return usesPublicKey(primaryIndex);
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}
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return true;
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}
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if (psk.size == 1) {
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// Short PSK aliases: 0 disables encryption; 1..255 are the public defaultpsk family.
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return true;
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}
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return (psk.size == sizeof(defaultpsk) && memcmp(psk.bytes, defaultpsk, sizeof(defaultpsk) - 1) == 0);
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}
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bool Channels::hasDefaultChannel()
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{
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// If we don't use a preset or the default frequency slot, or we override the frequency, we don't have a default channel
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@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ class Channels
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// Returns true if the channel has the default name and PSK
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bool isDefaultChannel(ChannelIndex chIndex);
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// Returns true if this channel's effective key is publicly decryptable (open or well-known/default PSK).
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bool usesPublicKey(ChannelIndex chIndex);
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// Returns true if we can be reached via a channel with the default settings given a region and modem preset
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bool hasDefaultChannel();
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@@ -144,6 +147,9 @@ extern Channels channels;
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static const uint8_t defaultpsk[] = {0xd4, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x3a, 0x20, 0x29, 0x07, 0x59,
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0xf0, 0xbc, 0xff, 0xab, 0xcf, 0x4e, 0x69, 0x01};
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/// True if a getKey()-resolved key offers no privacy: length 0 (off) or the public defaultpsk family. Pure; for tests.
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bool cryptoKeyIsPublic(const CryptoKey &key);
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static const uint8_t eventpsk[] = {0x38, 0x4b, 0xbc, 0xc0, 0x1d, 0xc0, 0x22, 0xd1, 0x81, 0xbf, 0x36,
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0xb8, 0x61, 0x21, 0xe1, 0xfb, 0x96, 0xb7, 0x2e, 0x55, 0xbf, 0x74,
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0x22, 0x7e, 0x9d, 0x6a, 0xfb, 0x48, 0xd6, 0x4c, 0xb1, 0xa1};
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@@ -16,7 +16,16 @@ uint32_t getPositionPrecisionForChannel(const meshtastic_Channel &channel)
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uint32_t getPositionPrecisionForChannel(uint8_t channelIndex)
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{
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return getPositionPrecisionForChannel(channels.getByIndex(channelIndex));
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const meshtastic_Channel &ch = channels.getByIndex(channelIndex);
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if (ch.role == meshtastic_Channel_Role_DISABLED)
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return 0;
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uint32_t precision = getPositionPrecisionForChannel(ch);
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// Never send a precise position on a publicly-decryptable channel (key check is gated on > ceiling).
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if (precision > MAX_POSITION_PRECISION_PUBLIC_KEY && channels.usesPublicKey(channelIndex)) {
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precision = MAX_POSITION_PRECISION_PUBLIC_KEY;
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}
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return precision;
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}
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static int32_t truncateCoordinate(int32_t coordinate, uint32_t precision)
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@@ -4,7 +4,16 @@
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#include "meshtastic/mesh.pb.h"
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#include <stdint.h>
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// Max precision on a publicly-decryptable channel. CCPA "precise geolocation" = within a ~564m (1,850ft) radius.
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// Precision is bit-truncation of latitude_i/longitude_i: the latitude cell stays ~constant in meters worldwide
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// (~700m at 15 bits), while only the longitude cell varies — widest at the equator, narrowing toward the poles.
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// 15 also matches the MQTT map-report public precision ceiling.
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#define MAX_POSITION_PRECISION_PUBLIC_KEY 15
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// Configured precision as-is; does NOT apply the public-key clamp -- use the channelIndex overload for the on-wire value.
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uint32_t getPositionPrecisionForChannel(const meshtastic_Channel &channel);
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// Configured precision, clamped to MAX_POSITION_PRECISION_PUBLIC_KEY when the channel's effective key is publicly decryptable.
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uint32_t getPositionPrecisionForChannel(uint8_t channelIndex);
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void applyPositionPrecision(meshtastic_Position &position, uint32_t precision);
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bool applyPositionPrecision(meshtastic_MeshPacket &packet, uint32_t precision);
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@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
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#include "Channels.h"
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#include "MeshService.h"
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#include "NodeDB.h"
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#include "PositionPrecision.h"
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#include "PowerFSM.h"
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#include "RTC.h"
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#include "SPILock.h"
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@@ -1157,7 +1158,26 @@ void AdminModule::handleSetChannel(const meshtastic_Channel &cc)
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if (channels.ensureLicensedOperation()) {
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sendWarning(licensedModeMessage);
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}
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// Refresh derived state (primaryIndex in particular) BEFORE the precision clamp below. usesPublicKey()
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// resolves a secondary channel's key against the primary, so it must see the post-update primaryIndex;
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// running the clamp first could evaluate secondaries against the previous primary and skip the clamp/warning.
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channels.onConfigChanged(); // tell the radios about this change
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// Persist the public-key precision clamp for all channels that may be affected (e.g. secondaries
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// that inherit a now-public primary key) and warn the client once if anything was coarsened.
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bool clamped = false;
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for (uint8_t i = 0; i < channels.getNumChannels(); i++) {
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meshtastic_Channel &ch = channels.getByIndex(i);
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if (ch.role == meshtastic_Channel_Role_DISABLED || !ch.settings.has_module_settings)
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continue;
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uint32_t allowed = getPositionPrecisionForChannel(i);
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if (allowed != ch.settings.module_settings.position_precision) {
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ch.settings.module_settings.position_precision = allowed;
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clamped = true;
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}
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}
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if (clamped)
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sendWarning(publicChannelPrecisionMessage);
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saveChanges(SEGMENT_CHANNELS, false);
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}
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@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ class AdminModule : public ProtobufModule<meshtastic_AdminMessage>, public Obser
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static constexpr const char *licensedModeMessage =
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"Licensed mode activated, removing admin channel and encryption from all channels";
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static constexpr const char *publicChannelPrecisionMessage =
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"Precise position is not allowed on a public (open / known-key) channel; reduced to coarse precision";
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extern AdminModule *adminModule;
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void disableBluetooth();
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