Merge branch 'develop' into codex/packet-auth-policy

src/modules/AdminModule.cpp

@@ -1985,7 +1985,15 @@ void AdminModule::noteOutgoingAdminRequest(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &p)
     if (!responseVariant)
         return; // not a getter whose response we can pair
 
-    const bool keyValid = p.pki_encrypted && p.public_key.size == 32;
+    // Pin the key perhapsEncode will actually encrypt to, resolved the same way it resolves it.
+    // p.public_key is NOT it: nothing populates that field on the outgoing path (only perhapsDecode
+    // sets it, on RX), so reading it here pinned nothing and left `from` as the sole check.
+    bool keyValid = false;
+    meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t destKey = {0, {0}};
+#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
+    const bool haveDestKey = nodeDB->copyPublicKey(p.to, destKey);
+    keyValid = haveDestKey && wouldEncryptWithPKC(&p, p.channel, haveDestKey);
+#endif
 
     // One entry per request (a client sends N indexed get_channel requests, each answered once, so
     // entries must not merge). Free slot, else evict the oldest by rollover-safe elapsed time.
@@ -2004,6 +2012,7 @@ void AdminModule::noteOutgoingAdminRequest(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &p)
     }
 
     slot->to = p.to;
+    slot->requestId = p.id;
     slot->sentAtMs = millis();
     slot->expectedResponse = responseVariant;
     slot->moduleConfigType = admin.which_payload_variant == meshtastic_AdminMessage_get_module_config_request_tag
@@ -2011,7 +2020,7 @@ void AdminModule::noteOutgoingAdminRequest(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &p)
                                  : 0;
     slot->keyValid = keyValid;
     if (keyValid)
-        memcpy(slot->key, p.public_key.bytes, 32);
+        memcpy(slot->key, destKey.bytes, 32);
     else
         memset(slot->key, 0, 32);
     LOG_DEBUG("Admin request sent to 0x%08x, expecting its response", p.to);
@@ -2024,6 +2033,11 @@ bool AdminModule::responseIsSolicited(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &mp, pb_size_t
     for (auto &o : outstandingAdminRequests) {
         if (o.to != mp.from || o.expectedResponse != responseVariant)
             continue;
+        // mp.from is unauthenticated, so also require the response to echo our request's packet id
+        // (setReplyTo puts it in decoded.request_id). A blind injector must now guess it. Id 0 is
+        // no token at all - an omitted request_id decodes to 0 - so such a slot never matches.
+        if (o.requestId == 0 || mp.decoded.request_id != o.requestId)
+            continue;
         if (!Throttle::isWithinTimespanMs(o.sentAtMs, kOutstandingAdminRequestMs)) {
             o.to = 0; // lapsed; free the slot and keep looking for another live match
             continue;