38074f584fdc3d649d770aeef15d271a6e41c7b1
1305
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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38074f584f |
Fix SENSOR power saving deep sleep truncating TX and skipping sleep on failed reads (#10939)
* Fix SENSOR power saving deep sleep behavior Deep sleep could be entered while a telemetry packet was still queued or on air, truncating the transmission. canSleep() gained a deepSleep parameter and now vetoes in that case; light sleep is unchanged. Telemetry modules defer a pending deep sleep (bounded to 30s) until the radio is idle and no longer let the sensor polling interval override the 5s pre-sleep grace period. A failed sensor read still arms deep sleep instead of leaving the node awake for a full telemetry interval. Fixes #10890 Fixes #10932 * Deduplicate telemetry deep sleep deferral logic Move the radio-busy deferral and its counter into BaseTelemetryModule and add an isPowerSavingSensor() helper. Removes the telemetry-specific counter from OSThread. The sleep arming block stays per module because it needs protected OSThread members not visible to the base class. |
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d16ae2b098 |
Rename power.h to Power.h for casing consistency with Power.cpp (#10919)
Every other .cpp/.h pair in src/ (350 of 351) uses identical capitalization between the two files. Power.cpp/power.h was the sole outlier; this aligns it with the rest of the codebase. No functional change — all includes already resolved this file the same way on case-sensitive filesystems. Assisted-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Yong <me@ndoo.sg> Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> |
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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97302f1845 |
Add Meshnology W10 AIOT Dev Kit (SX1262 via MCP23017 I2C expander) (#10911)
* Add software LoRa IRQ polling and an MCP23017 expander HAL for radios behind an I2C expander
Some boards route the SX126x control lines (NRESET/DIO1/BUSY) through an I2C
GPIO expander instead of native GPIOs, and don't wire the expander's /INT to
the MCU, so RadioLib cannot take a hardware DIO1 interrupt.
Two reusable pieces, both gated behind USE_MCP23017 / LORA_DIO1_SOFTWARE_POLL
so builds that don't define them are unaffected:
- ExtensionIOMCP23017 + MCP23017LockingArduinoHal: a RadioLib HAL that maps
virtual pins (MCP23017_VPIN_BASE .. +15) onto an MCP23017's GPIO, so
RESET/BUSY/DIO1 reads and writes become I2C transactions while the real SPI
GPIOs (SCK/MOSI/MISO/CS) pass straight through. A failed I2C read skips the
read-modify-write rather than clobbering the rest of the bank.
- LORA_DIO1_SOFTWARE_POLL: with no DIO1 interrupt available, the SX126x
interface polls the radio IRQ status register from the radio thread and
synthesizes the ISR_TX/ISR_RX events, filtering noisy preamble/header IRQs so
they can't starve TX. A 1 ms ISR_POLL_TICK drives the poll; TX timers may
overwrite the pending tick (pollMissedIrqs() is the backup that bounds the
latency of the busy-Rx contention window). Behaviour is unchanged on all
boards that keep the hardware interrupt.
* Add Meshnology W10 AIOT Dev Kit variant (SX1262 via MCP23017 expander)
ESP32-S3R8 + EBYTE E22-900MM22S (SX1262) + AXP2101 PMIC + Quectel L76KB GPS +
SPI TFT, with the radio's RESET/DIO1/BUSY and the LCD reset routed through an
MCP23017 I2C expander at 0x20. The expander's /INT is not wired to the ESP32,
so DIO1 uses the software poll. Pins come from the board schematic and the
vendor firmware; the expander is an MCP23017 despite the V1.1 schematic's stale
'TCA9555' label (the V1.2 placement diagram and all vendor code use the MCP23017
register map).
A local pins_arduino.h shadows the generic esp32s3 variant to drop RGB_BUILTIN,
which otherwise pulls the Arduino RMT HAL into the link and fails against this
build's trimmed FreeRTOS config.
Reports HardwareModel 140 (MESHNOLOGY_W10, already present in the protobufs).
Hardware-verified on a real W10 AIOT Dev Kit: AXP2101 PMU, MCP23017, SX1262
init + a full over-the-air TX/RX round trip through the expander, PCF85063 RTC,
SHT41 and QMI8658 auto-detected, and an L76KB GPS fix.
* meshnology-w10: enable ES8311 speaker for notification tones
Bring up the ES8311 codec (I2C 0x18) -> NS4150 amp -> speaker so the board can
play notification tones / ringtones over the I2S buzzer path (the
use_i2s_as_buzzer external-notification option). Codec2 voice stays out of
scope: it is SX1280-only and this is a sub-GHz board.
- variant.h: HAS_I2S + DAC_I2S pins (MCLK=1, BCK=2, WS=4, DOUT=5, DIN=3)
- platformio.ini: arduino-audio-driver + ESP8266Audio + ESP8266SAM
- extra_variants/meshnology_w10/variant.cpp: lateInitVariant() configures the
ES8311, mirroring the other Meshtastic ES8311 boards. Kept codec-only (no
main.h) so the audio driver's 'using namespace audio_driver' does not pull a
conflicting GpioPin into scope alongside Meshtastic's class GpioPin.
- AudioThread.h: toggle the NS4150 amp (MCP23017 EXIO_PA_CTRL) around playback.
Verified on hardware: a test tune played audibly through the speaker.
* meshnology-w10: address review feedback on the MCP23017 driver
- ExtensionIOMCP23017: serialize register access with a mutex, since the radio
HAL (BUSY/DIO1/RESET) and AudioThread (amp enable) now reach the expander from
different threads and the read-modify-write paths are not atomic.
- digitalRead: return a fail-safe HIGH on a failed read instead of LOW, so a
transient I2C error on the LoRa BUSY line can't look like 'ready' and let
RadioLib start an SPI transaction early. (DIO1 is polled via the radio IRQ
register, not this pin.)
- enablePinChangeInterrupt: use the checked readReg() overload and skip on a
failed read, matching the other read-modify-write helpers.
- meshnology_w10 variant.cpp: log a warning if an ES8311 register write NACKs
instead of silently leaving the codec half-configured.
- RadioInterface.cpp: guard the MCP23017 HAL branch with ARCH_ESP32 to match the
include and driver-file guards.
* Replace board-model audio/sleep ifdefs with reusable variant capability macros
Two shared-code spots keyed off specific hardware models; move the board-specific
detail into opt-in macros the variants define, so the core code stays generic and
new boards can opt into the behavior class without touching shared files.
- AudioThread amp control: drop the T_LORA_PAGER / MESHNOLOGY_W10 ifdefs. A board
with an I2S amp now defines AUDIO_AMP_ENABLE(on) in its variant.h (T-LoRa Pager
and Meshnology W10 do), and AudioThread just calls it around playback. The
expander includes are keyed on USE_XL9555 / USE_MCP23017 (capabilities) instead
of the model name.
- Light-sleep / DIO1 wakeup: drop the SENSECAP_INDICATOR check. Boards whose
LORA_DIO1 is an expander pin (not an ESP32 GPIO) define LORA_DIO1_EXTENDED_IO
(SenseCAP Indicator and Meshnology W10), and sleep.cpp keys off that for both
the light-sleep skip and the DIO1 GPIO-wakeup skip. This also fixes a latent
issue on the SenseCAP: it previously reached the GPIO-wakeup path and called
gpio_pulldown_en() on a virtual expander pin; it now skips that cleanly.
Builds verified on meshnology_w10, tlora-pager, and seeed-sensecap-indicator.
* meshnology-w10: silence cppcheck constParameterPointer on the ISR-callback helper
isIsrTxCallback() takes a function pointer it only compares; cppcheck's
constParameterPointer wants it 'pointer to const', which is meaningless for a
function pointer (the codebase already globally suppresses the sibling
constParameterCallback). Inline-suppress it to keep the check green.
* HopScaling: qualify the member assignment as this->count
cppcheck (CI's version) flags 'count = newCount;' at the end of trimIfNeeded()
as uselessAssignmentArg ('assignment of function parameter has no effect') - a
false positive, since count is a member that outlives the call. Write it as
this->count (matching the Step-1 assignment above) so the analyzer sees a member
write. This finding comes in via the develop merge, not this board; fixing it
here to unblock the PR's cppcheck check.
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489cc7dd88 |
Fix develop CI regressions in HopScaling and TLora T3-S3 builds (#10916)
* fix: address develop CI regressions * revert TLora T3-S3 partition table changes --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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d846780a9b |
More fuzz tests and small fixes for the findings (#10864)
* first pass tests * more tests * Fix two crafted-admin-packet crashes found by the E5 fuzzer Both are reachable from an authorized admin (local from==0, admin channel, or PKC) - remote DoS: 1. SIGFPE in LoRa config validation. A set_config LoRaConfig with use_preset=false and bandwidth=0 makes freqSlotWidth 0, so numFreqSlots is 0 and `hash(name) % numFreqSlots` (RadioInterface.cpp) divides by zero. Guard the modulo; the existing channel_num check then rejects/ clamps the config. 2. Stack overflow in Channels::getKey. A SECONDARY channel at the primary slot with an empty PSK recursed into getKey(primaryIndex) forever. Skip the primary-key borrow when chIndex == primaryIndex. Re-enable the E5 admin fuzzer to hit both triggers again (use_preset both ways incl. bandwidth 0, plus the set_channel tag) as regression guards. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Correct fuzz-test invariants after the crash fixes - E5 admin fuzz: node eviction under a filling NodeDB is legitimate, so assert only the bounded-count invariant, not that a specific seed node survives 6000 mutating ops. - TMM blitz: scope off the nodeinfo direct-response send path (it needs a fully-wired MeshService/phone queue the fixture doesn't provide; the deterministic directResponse tests cover it). The crafted-nodenum rate/unknown/position cache stress is unchanged. clod helped too * realistic tests * test: dedup fuzz RNG into shared test/support/DeterministicRng.h The four in-tree fuzz suites (test_fuzz_decode, test_fuzz_packets, test_hop_scaling, test_traffic_management) each carried a byte-identical copy of the seeded 64-bit LCG (rngSeed/rngNext/rngByte/rngRange). Hoist it into one shared header so there is a single generator to reason about and no risk of the copies drifting. static inline keeps per-suite state per translation unit and avoids -Wunused-function for suites that don't use every helper. Also corrects a stale comment in test_traffic_management (the blitz's nodeinfo direct-response path is intentionally left off). No behavioral change: same constants, same per-suite seeds. clod helped too * test: fuzz uncovered ProtobufModule handlers and the MQTT downlink ingress Extend the in-tree fuzz coverage to packet sources that previously had none: - test_fuzz_packets E8/E9/E10: drive PositionModule, DeviceTelemetryModule and NeighborInfoModule at handleReceivedProtobuf directly (via using-shims, bypassing the ProtobufModule reply/send path so no router is needed). The fixture already stands up nodeDB/service/channels, and nodeStatus/powerStatus are auto-initialized in main.cpp, so no new globals are required. Adds a shared fuzzRxHeader() helper for crafting adversarial RX packet headers. - test_fuzz_decode: add meshtastic_KeyVerification to the decode table. The KeyVerification and StoreForward handler paths are documented as decode-level only, with the concrete reason each is intrinsic (private-state gating / PSRAM + self-pointer wiring), not a fixture gap. - test_mqtt: test_receiveFuzzServiceEnvelope blitzes the non-RF broker-push ingress (onReceiveProto) two ways - raw garbage bytes that must fail envelope decode cleanly, and a well-formed ServiceEnvelope wrapping a crafted inner MeshPacket over crafted channel_id/gateway_id - exercising the channel match, isFromUs, XEdDSA receive policy and perhapsDecode chain. Adds a deliverRaw() passthrough to MQTTUnitTest. All under the coverage env (ASan/LSan). No firmware/src changes. Full sweep GREEN 27/27, 544 cases. clod helped too * Harden LoRa/channel config against crafted admin messages; consolidate test helpers Production (review findings on the hot-fuzz crash fixes): - Clamp bandwidth at the source (clampBandwidthKHz) in checkOrClampConfigLora and applyModemConfig so numFreqSlots can never be 0 for any consumer; a bandwidth-0 set_config previously passed validation and re-armed the SIGFPE on the next applyModemConfig. - Guard applyModemConfig's hash % numFreqSlots (the validator's sibling modulo was fixed earlier but this one was still unguarded). - Enforce the primary-channel invariant in Channels::onConfigChanged: a config demoting every slot now re-promotes the stale SECONDARY slot (keeping its key) or restores the default channel if the slot is DISABLED, instead of leaving every getPrimaryIndex() reader on a non-primary slot. The getKey recursion guard stays as defense-in-depth. Tests: - New test/support/MockMeshService.h and AdminModuleTestShim.h replace four byte-identical mocks and three divergent admin shims (test_mqtt's capturing mock is genuinely different and stays). - DeterministicRng.h: add rngFill() (replaces 14 hand-rolled fill loops) and rngEdgeNodeNum() (unifies the three NodeNum boundary pools). - Extract fuzzChannelSettings() shared by the set_channel case and fuzzBeacon. - fuzzBeacon: the un-terminated branch now fills the whole buffer with non-NUL bytes so the strnlen bound is actually stressed (~50% of iterations, not ~4%). - E6 beacon fuzz: replace the TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(true) tautology with real invariants (handler never consumes; offers land in lastReceivedOffer keyed to the sender). - Trim the seven over-long comment blocks flagged against the 1-2 line rule; the FINDINGS trailer moves to this commit message (see production notes). Full native suite GREEN 27/27 under the coverage (ASan/LSan) env. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Clamp UTF-8 char length in the emote walkers; add test_fuzz_emotes A TEXT_MESSAGE payload is opaque protobuf bytes, so PB_VALIDATE_UTF8 never screens it - invalid UTF-8 and truncated multi-byte lead bytes reach the emote/width render path verbatim. EmoteRenderer's walkers advanced by utf8CharLen(lead) without clamping to the bytes actually remaining, so a truncated lead (e.g. a lone 0xF0, which claims 4 bytes) near the end of the buffer made getUtf8ChunkWidth's memcpy read past the string. ASan confirms a heap-buffer-overflow READ from measureStringWithEmotes. Add utf8CharLenClamped() and use it at every walk site (width measure, truncation cut-loop, and the draw-path text-run/chunk builders); the one already-guarded site (matchAtIgnoringModifiers) is unchanged. New test/test_fuzz_emotes drives measureStringWithEmotes and truncateToWidth over adversarial byte strings (biased to embed/end in truncated multi-byte leads) in exact-sized heap buffers so any over-read is a hard ASan fault. Its headless display uses a synthetic font (firstChar 0, fontData centered in a large buffer) so the stock OLEDDisplay::getStringWidth - which indexes the font jump table with a signed char and over-reads for any byte >= 0x80 - does not mask the finding. native-suite-count bumped 27 -> 28. Full native suite GREEN 28/28 under the coverage (ASan/LSan) env. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Keep emote width measurement in-bounds for non-ASCII bytes OLEDDisplay::getStringWidth (the utf8=false path EmoteRenderer uses on default builds) indexes the font jump table by (c - firstChar) with a signed char and no bounds check, so any byte outside printable ASCII - high bytes from UTF-8 text, but also a stray control byte like 0x0A - reads outside the font array. On-device this reads adjacent flash and returns a garbage width; under ASan the test_fuzz_emotes fuzzer flags it as a global-buffer-overflow, and it made the non-ASCII width measurement meaningless either way. The OLED driver is a pinned upstream dependency, so guard it firmware-side in EmoteRenderer's getStringWidth helper: measure a sanitized copy where any byte outside [0x20, 0x7E] counts as a '?' placeholder. Printable ASCII is unchanged and the UA/RU lookup path is untouched. test_fuzz_emotes now drives a real ArialMT font instead of the synthetic in-bounds font it needed before this fix, so the suite exercises the true production width path (utf8CharLen clamp + this sanitizer) end to end. The same fuzzer tripped the global-buffer-overflow before this change. Full native suite GREEN 28/28 under the coverage (ASan/LSan) env. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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6c7ee8afc7 |
Add MemAudit: per-subsystem heap accounting in the boot log (#10900)
* Add MemAudit: per-subsystem heap accounting in the boot log The 2.8.0 nRF52840 heap-exhaustion field reports had to be diagnosed by hand, reconstructing each subsystem's heap footprint from source and build flags one report at a time. This makes every future report self-diagnosing from the serial log: a tiny fixed-size registry (src/memory/MemAudit.*) that big long-lived allocations report into, printed as one line at the end of setup() and alongside the periodic "Heap free:" log: MemAudit[boot]: tmm=2500 warm=4000 pkthist=5824 nodedb=13440 msgstore=2200 pktpool(live)=3270 total=31234 Instrumented: NodeDB hot vector (nodedb) + satellite maps (satmaps, rb-tree overhead estimated), WarmNodeStore (warm), PacketHistory records and hash index (pkthist), TrafficManagement caches (tmm/tmm_ni), MessageStore text pool (msgstore), TFT line/repaint buffers (display), and live in-flight packets (pktpool(live)) via an optional audit tag on the packet pool allocator - the one hot path, counted with a relaxed 32-bit atomic add (single instructions on Cortex-M, no locks). Cost: 128 B RAM for the 16-tag table, well under 1 KB flash on rak4631. MESHTASTIC_MEM_AUDIT=0 compiles it out to inline no-op stubs (call sites need no ifdefs); STM32WL, the tightest flash target, defaults off. New native suite test_mem_audit covers add/set/snapshot arithmetic, tag reuse (pointer and cross-TU strcmp fallback), null/unknown tags, and table-full behavior; test/native-suite-count bumped to 28. * native-wasm: add src/memory/ to the curated source filter The wasm env denies all sources and adds an explicit file list; MemAudit callers (main, MeshService, NodeDB, PacketHistory) are in that list but src/memory/MemAudit.cpp was not, so wasm-ld failed on undefined memaudit:: symbols. |
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 Benjamin FaershteinandGitHub
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f8a9ae9f55 |
[codex] Fix ESP32 Paxcounter startup with Bluetooth disabled (#10871)
* Fix ESP32 paxcounter startup with Bluetooth disabled * Address paxcounter startup review feedback |
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Benjamin FaershteinandGitHub
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6085a4f003 | fix(nrf52): keep BLE active during reset cleanup (#10873) | ||
 oscgonferandGitHub
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84b1af0b83 | Missing commit on #10715 (#10868) | ||
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oscgonferandGitHub
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9b6b4cb782 |
Merge pull request #10715 from fablabbcn/bugfix/detection-on-0x69-address
Fixes on 0x69 address detection |
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oscgonferandGitHub
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375fe944a4 | Rescan I2C on AQ module init (#10593) | ||
 lasek0andGitHub
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4be7109a64 | add missing MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_AUDIO (#10856) | ||
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Thomas Göttgens
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c61d32c0fa |
Guard AirQuality I2C re-scan behind !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_I2C
ScanI2CTwoWire is compiled out on builds that define MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_I2C (e.g. native-wasm/portduino), while the AirQuality module still builds there. Skip the re-scan when I2C is excluded; there is nothing to scan. |
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Thomas Göttgens
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e1982cc2b1 |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/develop' into pr10715-fix
# Conflicts: # src/graphics/Screen.cpp # src/modules/Telemetry/Sensor/PMSA003ISensor.h # src/modules/Telemetry/Sensor/SCD30Sensor.h # src/modules/Telemetry/Sensor/SCD4XSensor.h # src/modules/Telemetry/Sensor/SEN5XSensor.cpp # src/modules/Telemetry/Sensor/SEN5XSensor.h # src/modules/Telemetry/Sensor/SFA30Sensor.h |
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TomandGitHub
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fc7043f117 |
second pass adding beacons admin (#10839)
* second pass adding beacons admin * Bump protobufs submodule to merged MESHBEACON_CONFIG (PR #970) clod helped. * Gate MeshBeacon module config behind admin auth in PhoneAPI The FromRadio module-config sync copied moduleConfig.mesh_beacon unconditionally. MeshBeaconConfig embeds two ChannelSettings (broadcast_offer_channel, broadcast_on_channel) that carry PSKs, so an unauthorized client could exfiltrate channel PSKs when MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL is enabled - bypassing the redaction already applied to mqtt/network/security config. Gate the payload copy on getAdminAuthorized(), mirroring the mqtt case; unauth clients now receive an empty MeshBeaconConfig. clod helped |
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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b4dd76a4db |
Harden against crafted-packet crashes + adversarial fuzzing (#10862)
Audit and fuzzing of the RF-packet decode -> dispatch -> display/phone paths for the "crash a node or phone with a crafted packet" surface, beyond the XEdDSA authenticity work. Crash fixes (reproduced under AddressSanitizer / UBSan): - GeoCoord::latLongToUTM/latLongToMGRS read fixed letter tables out of bounds on extreme latitude_i/longitude_i from a received Position, and narrowed out-of-range easting/northing doubles to unsigned (float-cast-overflow UB). Clamp the UTM zone, the easting/northing narrowing, and the band/col/row indices. Regression: test_geocoord_extreme_coords_no_oob. - EnvironmentTelemetry/AirQualityTelemetry render attacker floats via String(float), which on nRF52/RP2040/STM32/portduino formats into a fixed char[33] (dtostrf) and overflows near FLT_MAX. Clamp the rendered metrics via UnitConversions::displaySafeFloat (finite + magnitude <= 1e9), unit-tested in test_type_conversions. Defense-in-depth + robustness: - TraceRouteModule::printRoute: fix an snr_back[-1] OOB read (wrong count in the guard) and stop formatting the INT8_MIN "unknown SNR" sentinel as a dB value. - WaypointModule/NodeDB: sanitize untrusted strings before the OLED renderer and the phone-facing ClientNotification (belt-and-suspenders vs PB_VALIDATE_UTF8). - MeshService::sendToPhone: withhold NODEINFO/WAYPOINT packets whose nested string won't cleanly decode, protecting strict phone protobuf decoders without affecting mesh relay. Tests: new test_fuzz_decode (protobuf decode + UTF-8 sanitizer fuzz) and test_fuzz_packets (perhapsDecode / module-handler / traceroute / phone-gate fuzz), all under AddressSanitizer; native-suite-count 25 -> 27. Full suite 515/515 green. |
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4673ed22fc |
Reclock I2C for sensors is aware of screen I2C frequency (#9898)
* Add define for screen I2C frequency * Add functions to get I2C screen frequency and port * Make reclock function aware of screen-set I2C speeds * Refurbish ReClockI2C API * Make ReClockI2C API class * Use new API in AirQualityTelemetry module * Minor changes on some logs * Update esp8266-oled library * Fix esp8266 library * Minor logging changes * Improve setClock and restoreClock cases * Make getter functions const, fix capitalisaiton of new functions * Minor typo, remove pragma once * Low prio debug fixes * Mark getter functions as const (properly) * Fix LOG based on coderabbit feedback --------- Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> |
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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0e84c1a827 |
Harden XEdDSA unsigned-packet policy and add coverage (#10858)
Audit of the XEdDSA packet-signing implementation (#10478) surfaced several issues in when unsigned packets are accepted on receive or emitted on send. This fixes them and adds regression coverage. - Unicast NodeInfo exchange no longer breaks against signer nodes: the NodeInfoModule downgrade drop is gated to broadcasts, since senders never sign unicast (want_response replies, directed exchanges). - Replace the payload-size sign heuristic with an exact encoded-size gate (signedDataFits) and mirror it on the receive side, removing a dead band where 167-168 B broadcasts were signed then failed TOO_LARGE. - Extract the receive policy into checkXeddsaReceivePolicy() and apply it to plaintext-MQTT decoded downlink, which previously skipped signature verification and downgrade protection entirely. - Reject signatures whose length is neither 0 nor 64 as malformed, so a crafted partial signature can't inflate the size estimate and dodge the unsigned-downgrade drop. - Hold cryptLock on the MQTT verify path (shared Ed25519 key cache). - Clear any client-preset signature on packets we originate, on all builds. - Randomized (hedged) signing per the Signal XEdDSA spec: bump the meshtastic/Crypto pin to the build where XEdDSA::sign mixes 32 bytes of caller randomness into the nonce as Z (meshtastic/Crypto#3), and seed those bytes in xeddsa_sign from HardwareRNG (checked, with a seeded-CSPRNG fallback). test_crypto pins that repeated signs differ and both verify. Adds test coverage: test_packet_signing groups A-E (receive matrix, send policy, NodeInfo backstop, encoding invariants, decoded-ingress policy), test_mqtt end-to-end downlink cases, and a test_crypto randomization check. |
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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7509c1a6dd |
Seeed Tracker X1 Support (#10834)
* Seeed Tracker X1 Support * silence CPPCheck * fix macro order regression and adapt stm32hal for new radiolib * STM32 is a radiolib upstream fix ( https://github.com/jgromes/RadioLib/issues/1825 ) * fix STM32 regression * Seeed Tracker X1 Support * silence CPPCheck * fix macro order regression and adapt stm32hal for new radiolib * STM32 is a radiolib upstream fix ( https://github.com/jgromes/RadioLib/issues/1825 ) * fix STM32 regression * address copilot OCD * Split behavior only when the two LEDs are on distinct pins. * bring naming in line with the other seeed devices * update env name to fit convention too * guarantee evaluation order * Guard sensor readings against null values, make sensor use less power |
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TomandGitHub
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3becaf2d95 | emdashes begone (#10847) | ||
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TomandGitHub
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fd62322876 |
Log tidy (#10798)
* clarify channel number formatting and fix the fixed-width padded nodeIDs * use the explicit 0x%08x for packets and nodeIDs throughout * LLM instructions |
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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0488a46a3c |
fix: stop unexpected NodeNum regeneration from PKI key loss (#10808)
* fix: stop unexpected NodeNum regeneration from PKI key loss A node's NodeNum is derived from its PKI public key (my_node_num == crc32(public_key)), so it changes only when the keypair is regenerated -- which happens only when a keygen path runs while config.security.private_key.size != 32. Two paths could trigger that without the user intending a new identity: 1. Boot: loadFromDisk() collapsed every non-success loadProto() result for the config file into installDefaultConfig() (preserveKey=false), which memset()s config and wipes the private key. loadProto() distinguishes DECODE_FAILED (file present but undecodable/undecryptable) from OTHER_FAILURE (absent), so a transient/corrupt read silently minted a new identity. A new configDecodeFailed flag now gates the boot keygen and the boot config-save directly (not via region, so it survives the userprefs/region overrides that run later in loadFromDisk): identity is frozen, the unreadable file is left intact for a later clean boot to recover, and the node boots radio-silent (region UNSET, TX off). A genuinely-absent config still gets defaults + keygen. 2. AdminModule security SET: config.security = c.payload_variant.security wholesale-clobbered the keypair, then regenerated whenever the incoming private_key.size != 32. A client editing an unrelated security field without round-tripping the private key would re-mint identity. The existing keypair is now preserved when the incoming config omits it; first provisioning and key import are unchanged. Intentional reset goes through factory_reset. Native PlatformIO unit suite (Docker): 499/499 test cases pass. * test: cover security keypair preservation; clarify load-failure comment Addresses PR review feedback: - Add native unit tests (test_admin_radio) asserting handleSetConfig preserves the existing identity keypair when a security SET omits the private key, and applies a full supplied keypair (key import). Guards against reintroduced NodeNum/keypair regeneration. AdminModuleTestShim (now a friend) defers saves so the lightweight harness doesn't saveToDisk an uninitialized node database. - Clarify the non-DECODE_FAILED config-load comment: OTHER_FAILURE / NO_FILESYSTEM cover an absent or unopenable file, not just first boot. |
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9cef69a9d3 |
feat(gps): Do not start gps if lora region is unset (#10386)
* Disable gps thread on startup if lora region is unset There is little reason to waste battery on the gps if the data cannot yet be used. * fix goobered merge Refactor GPS enabling logic and remove duplicate code. * trunk --------- Co-authored-by: Jonathan Bennett <jbennett@incomsystems.biz> |
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  TomGitHubSteve GilberdDarafei Praliaskouskigithub-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>Claude Opus 4.8 |
ec5d230305 |
Feat/mesh beacon (#10618)
* Tips robot virtual node / relayer to different LoRa modes & channels
Note that this commit has details hardcoded for the Wellington (NZ)
mesh, and also requires the following patch to the protobufs:
-----
diff --git a/meshtastic/mesh.proto b/meshtastic/mesh.proto
index 03162d8..ec54c99 100644
--- a/meshtastic/mesh.proto
+++ b/meshtastic/mesh.proto
@@ -1393,6 +1393,21 @@ message MeshPacket {
* Set by the firmware internally, clients are not supposed to set this.
*/
uint32 tx_after = 20;
+
+ /*
+ * The modem preset to use fo rthis packet
+ */
+ uint32 modem_preset = 21;
+
+ /*
+ * The frequency slot to use for this packet
+ */
+ uint32 frequency_slot = 22;
+
+ /*
+ * Whether the packet has a nonstandard radio config
+ */
+ bool nonstandard_radio_config = 23;
}
/*
-----
* fix: repair mesh tips CI build
* feat: add MeshBeacon module (Phase 1 — proto + generated code + initial stub)
* feat(beacon): implement broadcaster + listener (phases 2-5)
* feat(beacon): wire RadioLibInterface hooks + admin validation (phases 6-7)
* fix(beacon): fix LocalModuleConfig flat access (no payload_variant), add localonly proto field
* feat(beacon): fix broadcaster inheritance, add preset/region validation + proto cache
- MeshBeaconBroadcastModule now inherits ProtobufModule<meshtastic_MeshBeacon>
(alongside private MeshBeaconModule + OSThread), giving it allocDataPacket()
and setStartDelay() without extra includes.
- Payload cache: rebuildCache() encodes the MeshBeacon protobuf once and stores
it in payloadCache[]/payloadCacheSize; sendBeacon() only calls rebuildCache()
when payloadCacheDirty==true. AdminModule calls invalidateCache() after saving
new config so the next broadcast picks up changes.
- Region/preset validation in handleSetModuleConfig (mesh_beacon_tag):
broadcast_on_preset is validated against the device's current region via
RadioInterface::validateConfigLora(); broadcast_offer_region is validated via
RadioInterface::validateConfigRegion(). Invalid values are zeroed with a
LOG_WARN before saving.
* feat(beacon): add unit tests for MeshBeaconModule and AdminModule configuration validation
* remove old meshtips
* more validation in NodeDB and AdminModule, and userprefs for baked in goodness
* copilot is my gravity
* mmmmm... beacon
* oops
* Enhance unit tests for MeshBeaconModule with detailed validation checks and output formatting
* new lines. Why not?
* finally
* legacy mode activate!
* Update protobufs (#17)
Co-authored-by: NomDeTom <116762865+NomDeTom@users.noreply.github.com>
* better logic, fixed a test
* updated for packet signing
fixed a test
added guards for licensed/ham mode
* channel numbers
* beacon: encrypt on the beacon channel PSK; fix split note
When broadcast_on_channel overrides the primary channel's name/PSK, the
beacon was encrypted with the PRIMARY PSK: perhapsEncode keys encryption
off the primary slot, but the radio-thread channel switch happens only
after encryption. sendBeaconPacket() now installs the beacon channel into
the primary slot for the synchronous duration of send() (cooperative
threading => no interleaving) so encryption/hash use the beacon channel,
then restores it. A shared beaconChannelSettings() helper builds the
channel for both the encrypt-time swap and the RF-time swap so the
key+hash cannot drift.
Also: correct the legacy-split comments (both packets go out on the same
beacon radio settings, not the normal config) and merge the two
consecutive `if (hasText)` blocks in the listener (cppcheck
duplicateCondition).
Tests: add channelPskOverride_swapsBeaconChannelAndRestores and
noChannelOverride_doesNotSwapPrimary; MockRouter snapshots the primary
channel at send() time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test/beacon: drain toPhoneQueue in tearDown to fix LSan leak abort
The listener delivers received text via MeshService::sendToPhone(), which
enqueues the packet into toPhoneQueue and takes ownership. Nothing dequeues
it in tests, so the three listener tests carrying message text stranded a
MeshPacket each — 1272 bytes / 3 allocations that LeakSanitizer flagged at
process exit, aborting the coverage run (surfaced by pio as [ERRORED] /
SIGHUP even though all 40 assertions passed).
Drain the phone queue in tearDown (getForPhone()/releaseToPool) so the
packets return to packetPool. Suite is now GREEN with no sanitizer abort.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* legacy hop override for zero-hoppers
* ever more beacons
* beacon: comment out broadcast_send_as_node pending further review
Functionality preserved in comments with full signing/has_bitfield notes
for when it is re-enabled. Proto tag 3 retained on the wire.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test/beacon: fix fromIsCustomNodeWhenSet now that send-as-node is disabled
broadcast_send_as_node is commented out; from is always the local node.
Update the test assertion and doc comment to match current behaviour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Update protobufs (#21)
Co-authored-by: NomDeTom <116762865+NomDeTom@users.noreply.github.com>
* flags for beacons
* beacon: do more with less — slot-index targets + validation
Multi-target beacons embedded a full ChannelSettings in every BroadcastTarget,
blowing ModuleConfig past the 512-byte BLE FromRadio budget so the firmware would
not compile. Targets now reference an existing channel-table slot by channel_index
and the broadcaster resolves it via channels.getByIndex() at TX time. Net effect:
the same multi-target capability for a fraction of the bytes —
FromRadio 609 -> 510 B, MeshBeaconConfig 596 -> 324 B, AdminMessage 615 -> 511 B.
- proto: BroadcastTarget.channel (embedded) -> channel_index (uint32 ref); regen all
generated headers (size constants propagate to admin/localonly/deviceonly/mesh).
- broadcaster: resolve channel_index from the channel table; an out-of-range or blank
slot falls back to the default channel for the target preset rather than borrowing
the primary's name/PSK.
- AdminModule: validate broadcast_targets entries on write (region/preset sanitised
like the single-target fields; channel_index range-checked).
- userPrefs: TARGET_<n>_CHANNEL_{NAME,NUM,PSK} collapse to a single CHANNEL_INDEX.
- docs: two-step (set_channel -> set_module_config) multi-target setup, inline-vs-
reference distinction, and single-/multi-target are equal (not "legacy") options.
- tests: target validation + channel-index resolution incl. blank-slot fallback
(47/47 green on `./bin/run-tests.sh -e native -f test_mesh_beacon`).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NRAF5csgsMn6p1zEcFL8Qz
* throttling after reboot
* address copilot review
* simplify
* fix(beacon): use 0x%08x for node/packet IDs in logs; register test suite
The %#08lx log specifiers passed uint32_t (NodeNum/PacketId) to a %lx
length modifier — undefined behaviour on 64-bit (native test) targets and
non-standard width. Switch to the project-standard 0x%08x. Also bump
test/native-suite-count to 25 for the added test_mesh_beacon suite.
clod helped too
* copilot & clarity
clod helped too
* refactor(beacon): use auto for the sanitized config copy
clod helped too
* fix(beacon): guard empty-payload sends; gate has_mesh_beacon on build flag; document ISR_TX pre-switch
clod helped too
---------
Co-authored-by: Steve Gilberd <steve@erayd.net>
Co-authored-by: Darafei Praliaskouski <me@komzpa.net>
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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98fa4a67db |
[feature] Free a little memory used by bluetooth if wifi is enabled or bluetooth is disabled (#10398)
* esp32: release BTDM heap when Bluetooth inactive Release ESP-IDF BTDM memory after config load when Bluetooth is disabled or WiFi is enabled, recovering heap on ESP32 targets where BLE won’t be used for this boot. * Address BT memory release review comments --------- Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> |
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|
c51c01607d |
Traffic Management module: dedup, rate limiting, role-aware policing (#10706)
Adds the Traffic Management module (TMM) plus the NodeDB/warm-store and next-hop foundations it builds on: - Unified per-node cache (flat array, 8-bit relative ticks) shared by all features; role-aware throttles for tracker / lost-and-found. - Position deduplication: drop unchanged position rebroadcasts within a configurable interval; precision driven off the channel ceiling (clamped to the public-key max on well-known channels). Enabled by default at 11h. - Per-node rate limiting and unknown-packet filtering (config-driven; a non-zero companion field enables each feature -- no bool toggles). - NodeInfo direct response from cache with role-based hop clamps. - Persistent next-hop overflow store: confirmed hops have no TTL, are seeded from NodeInfoLite at boot, and survive hot-store eviction. - Three-tier sender-role resolution (hot NodeInfoLite -> warm store -> TMM cache). Role is cached write-time (seeded on first track, refreshed from NodeInfo), pins its cache entry like a next-hop hint, and is evicted last. - Warm store caches device role + protected category across reboot/eviction. - PositionModule stationary floor for tracker / lost-and-found. - PSRAM gating for warm/satellite/TMM cache sizes; STM32WL excluded. Protobufs: TrafficManagementConfig trimmed to the five uint32 fields actually used; submodule repointed to protobufs develop. Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
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|
22072c5f4b |
Pr1.5 tmm nexthop (#10745)
* TrafficManagement: flat unified cache + persistent next-hop overflow store Reworks the TrafficManagementModule cache layer (policing behaviour unchanged from upstream) and adds a routing-hint overflow store: - Flatten the ring: replace the cuckoo-hashed unified cache and the bucketed PSRAM NodeInfo index with plain flat arrays + linear scan (same idiom as WarmNodeStore). At LoRa packet rates an O(n) scan of the cache is negligible, and it removes a large amount of hashing/displacement complexity. The cache entry is 11 B; timestamps use a uniform +1 presence-offset so a 0 byte always means "empty" across every sub-store. Adds rebaseEpoch() so cached state survives the ~19 h relative-timestamp horizon instead of being flushed. - Next-hop overflow cache: setNextHop/getNextHopHint store a confirmed last-byte relay for a destination, written only from NextHopRouter's ACK-confirmed decision (and mirrored from TraceRoute). NextHopRouter::getNextHop falls back to this cache when the hot NodeDB has no hint, so DMs/relays to long-tail nodes keep routing after the node ages out of NodeInfoLite. - Persistence: preloadNextHopsFromNodeDB warm-starts the cache from persisted NodeInfoLite hints on first maintenance pass; next_hop entries are kept alive across the maintenance sweep (no TTL) and never clobbered by a stale preload. All packet-policing logic (rate limit, position dedup, unknown-packet drop, NodeInfo direct response, hop exhaustion) is the existing upstream behaviour, untouched. HAS_TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT defaults on so the module is compiled in. (see note). Tests: upstream policing suite now actually runs (adds the MeshTypes.h include that gates HAS_TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT) plus 4 next-hop tests. Role-aware throttles, politeness, precision clamp, port-interval and mesh-radius gating — and the rate-limit >255 saturation fix — are deferred to the advanced-TMM branch. Note: default dedup movement grid moves to ~91m, which also means 1.5km required to end up with the same signature position - coarser and therefore further than before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * TrafficManagement: fix cppcheck constVariablePointer warning `node` in preloadNextHopsFromNodeDB() is never written through — mark it const to satisfy cppcheck's constVariablePointer check in CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Add multi-hop NextHop recovery tests and unit tests for routing reliability - Introduced a new test suite for multi-hop NextHop directed-message delivery and relay recovery in `test_nexthop_multihop_recovery.py`. This includes tests for end-to-end delivery and recovery after relay drop. - Implemented unit tests in `test_main.cpp` for NextHop routing reliability mitigations, covering: - M1: Ambiguity-aware last-byte resolution. - M2: NextHopRouter's strict-neighbor gate and hop limit checks. - M3: Route-health freshness and failure decay. - Enhanced mock classes to facilitate controlled testing of node behaviors and routing logic. * grafting fixed * Address Copilot review for PR #10735 (NextHop improvements) - docs/nexthop-routing-reliability.md: update status from "no code changes yet" to reflect that mitigations and tests are implemented RAM pressure and MIGRATION_VERBOSE concerns addressed upstream in PR2.5 (per-platform TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT_CACHE_SIZE) and PR2 (verbose default=0) respectively; (0,0) sentinel fixed in PR2.5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * CI: fix cppcheck constVariablePointer and test include path - NextHopRouter.cpp: qualify two RouteHealth *h locals as const — only read for stale-route checks, never mutated through the pointer - Router.cpp: qualify meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node as const in shouldDecrementHopLimit — only read for favorite/role predicate - test_position_module/test_main.cpp: change bare PositionModule.h to modules/PositionModule.h — build_flags sets -Isrc, not -Isrc/modules, so the bare form fails to resolve in the native PlatformIO test env Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * WarmStore: cache device role + protected category in last_heard low bits Steal the low 6 bits of WarmNodeEntry.last_heard to carry an evicted node's device role (4 bits) and a protected category (2 bits) for the hop-trim path, at zero record-size cost (entry stays 40 B; no RAM/flash growth). The high bits remain a real unix-seconds timestamp, quantised to 64 s — ample for warm LRU ordering of long-tail nodes. - absorb() packs role/protectedCat; place()/ring replay store the raw word so metadata round-trips through flash. LRU compares masked time (warmTimeOf). - take() rehydration masks the metadata bits and restores the cached role so a re-admitted node isn't stuck at CLIENT until its next NodeInfo. - NodeDB classifies the category (favorite/ignored/verified -> Flag; tracker/sensor/tak_tracker -> Role) at each eviction site. - WarmNodeStore::lookupMeta() exposes role/category to consumers. - Bump WARM_RING_MAGIC (WRNG->WRN2): old rings read as erased and rebuild; warm data is a non-critical evictee cache, so discard-on-upgrade is safe. Tests: test_warm_store 11/11 (new meta round-trip + quantisation-aware ordering); NodeDB compiles (test_nodedb_blocked 4/4). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * WarmStore: migrate v1 rings/files by discarding last_heard, not the data Previously the WRNG->WRN2 magic bump treated old rings as erased, discarding all warm entries — including the PKI public keys that let evicted nodes keep decrypting DMs. Instead, read v1 (WRNG / WRM1) records and keep each node's identity + public key, discarding only last_heard (its low bits would otherwise be misread as the new role/protected metadata). Records re-rank and re-learn their role on next contact. - Ring backend (nRF52840): ringReadHeader accepts both magics and reports v1 via an out-param; replay zeroes last_heard for v1 records. If the active head page is v1, force a rotation so new v2 records never land in a v1-headered page (which would discard their freshly-set role on the next load). Legacy pages convert to v2 as the ring rotates. - File backend (warm.dat): bump WARM_STORE_MAGIC WRM1->WRM2; accept WRM1, verify CRC against the stored bytes, then discard last_heard and mark dirty so the next save rewrites as v2. Tests: test_warm_store 12/12 (adds test_ws_v1_migration_discardsLastHeard: key survives, role/protected reset). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * WarmStore: guard role bit-width + test eviction carries role/protected - static_assert that the device role enum still fits the 4-bit warm metadata field (WARM_ROLE_MASK); fails the build loudly if a new role is added past 15 rather than silently truncating role on eviction. (Max role today = 12.) - Add test_migration_carriesRoleAndProtectedIntoWarm: a demoted TRACKER lands in the warm tier with its key, role=TRACKER and protected category=Role; a demoted CLIENT carries role=CLIENT/None. Exercises the NodeDB eviction path + warmProtectedCategory classification (the warm-store unit tests only cover absorb() directly). Tests: test_nodedb_blocked 5/5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix copilot comments * fix(test): restore #if HAS_TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT guard in TMM test The rebase onto PR1.5 lost the top-level HAS_TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT guard that PR1.5 introduced, leaving the #else/#endif tail orphaned and causing compile errors on non-TMM builds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> |
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TomGitHubClaude Opus 4.8github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>Ben Meadors |
79a7dcc46c |
Pr1 nodedb warmstore (#10705)
* NodeDB: 3-tier node store with persistent warm tier (long-tail identity retention)
Introduces a tiered NodeDB so the device retains identity (public key,
last_heard) for far more nodes than fit in the full-record hot store,
without growing heap or the persisted nodes.proto unboundedly.
- Hot store: full NodeInfoLite, MAX_NUM_NODES (120 on nRF52).
- Satellite maps: position/telemetry/environment/status capped at
MAX_SATELLITE_NODES (40 freshest); eviction via enforceSatelliteCaps /
evictSatelliteOverCap.
- Warm tier (WarmNodeStore): 40 B {num,last_heard,public_key} records for
evicted nodes so DMs to/from long-tail nodes keep encrypting/decrypting.
Persisted to /prefs/warm.dat, or on nRF52840 a dedicated 12 KB raw-flash
record-ring below LittleFS (3x4 KB pages; see linker scripts + the
nrf52_warm_region.py post-link guard).
NodeDB::getOrCreateMeshNode now demotes evicted nodes into the warm tier and
re-admits them (restoring key/last_heard). Router PKI decrypt/encode resolve
the peer key via NodeDB::copyPublicKey (hot store, then warm tier).
NodeInfoLite gains snr_q4 (sint32, Q4-encoded dB); the float snr is zeroed on
disk. NodeInfoLite grows 105 -> 112 B; backup 2432 -> 2468 B.
Note: the snr_q4 .proto change still needs to land in the protobufs submodule
(generated header is updated here; submodule pointer left at upstream).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* NodeDB: robust receive + retention for blocked (ignored) nodes
Hardens how ignored/favourite nodes are received over admin and retained,
closing paths where a block could be lost or accidentally cleared.
- Blocking keeps the node's public key (admin set_ignored_node and
addFromContact no longer zero it / drop the warm-tier key), so a blocked
peer stays a verifiable identity.
- set_ignored_node creates the node if absent, so a block by node ID sticks
even for a node we've never heard from (e.g. pushed by a remote admin) with
no NodeInfo or key.
- Eviction protection (favourite/ignored/manually-verified) now also applies to
the load-time hot-store migration and is never undone by cleanupMeshDB, which
previously purged ignored nodes that lacked user info.
- The hot-store migration leaves our own node (index 0) in place and prefers to
demote non-protected nodes, like the runtime eviction scan.
Caps the protected set (favourite + ignored + verified) at MAX_NUM_NODES-2 via
NodeDB::setProtectedFlag(), so at least two evictable slots always remain and
getOrCreateMeshNode can always make room — replacing the previous unconditional
append that could run off the end of the node vector when every node was
protected. A locally-set favourite/ignore that hits the cap reports back to the
phone via a ClientNotification.
Adds test_nodedb_blocked covering the migration, favourite/ignored eviction
protection, ignored-survives-cleanup, and the protected-node cap. The
maintenance methods stay private in production; the test reaches them through a
PIO_UNIT_TESTING-guarded friend shim.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
# Conflicts:
# src/mesh/NodeDB.h
* fix copilot comments
* once again
* WarmNodeStore: fix cppcheck warnings (uninitvar, constVariablePointer)
Zero-initialise `stranded[]` and `seqs[]/order[]` VLAs so cppcheck can
verify there are no unguarded reads of uninitialised memory (the guards
exist but are not visible to static analysis). Mark two local pointers
`const` where the pointed-to entry is never mutated after assignment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* self-care added to assist 2.7 and 2.8 nodedb migration
* Tidy warm-store/self-care: comments, guards, log + flash cleanup
Style/cleanup pass over the branch (no behavior change except the noted
preprocessor simplifications, which are semantically identical):
- Comments: move function descriptions to the headers, cap in-function
comments at ~3-4 lines, drop leading-number step markers, label stacked
#endif blocks, de-decorate banner comments.
- dumpToLog: fully gate decl + definition + AdminModule call site behind
MESHTASTIC_NODEDB_MIGRATION_VERBOSE so it compiles out when disabled
(~1.2 KB when off).
- mesh-pb-constants: drop the dead nRF52832 WARM_NODE_COUNT branch and trim
the macro docs.
- WarmNodeStore: simplify the redundant `ARCH_NRF52 && NRF52840_XXAA` guards
to `NRF52840_XXAA`, add a kNoPage sentinel for the ring page state.
- Shorten the always-on LOG_WARN strings (~120 B flash).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* more tidying up, aligning with docs and undoing other-arch regressions
* Update protobufs (#19)
Co-authored-by: NomDeTom <116762865+NomDeTom@users.noreply.github.com>
* made the migration pathway cleareer
* address copilot review
* fixed a copilot review on a downstream PR.
* Address Copilot review comments for PR #10705 (warmstore/nodedb)
- WarmNodeStore.h: default MIGRATION_VERBOSE to 0 (suppress info-level
chatter on production builds; opt in with =1)
- WarmNodeStore.cpp load(): move memset to top of function so all
failure paths (header-read fail, invalid header) leave entries clear
- WarmNodeStore.cpp save(): replace manual spiLock lock/unlock around
mkdir with LockGuard covering the full SafeFile sequence, matching
the lock discipline in load()
- Router.cpp: memcpy(&p->public_key.bytes, ...) -> memcpy(p->public_key.bytes,
...) — pass decayed uint8_t* rather than pointer-to-array
- AdminModule.cpp: check setProtectedFlag return for PKC auto-favorite;
log cap-refusal warning instead of unconditional "auto-favoriting"
- nrf52_warm_region.py: error message references both v6.ld and v7.ld
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* NodeDB: formatting cleanup (blank lines after preprocessor blocks)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Lukewarm store
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>
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Jonathan Bennett
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7424631a27 |
Beta fixes (#10728)
* Wipe message Store on factory reset * Check for destination 0 in a new message, and convert to broadcast * Make sure CHARGE_LED_state gets turned off, to avoid stuck LEDs * Take the spiLock in MessageStore when clearing messages * Trunk * Add thinknode M5 voltage curve * Fix the oops |
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 Ben MeadorsGitHubcopilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>Copilot Autofix powered by AI |
d878c81ce8 |
Clamp position precision on public / known-keys (#10665)
* Clamp position precision on public / known-keys (Compliance) * Fix review comments: bounds check, all-channel precision clamp, disabled channel guard * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Refactor position precision comments for clarity and update channel configuration handling in AdminModule * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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 oscgonfer
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f604a4e172 | Reduce overhead in SEN5X probing | ||
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oscgonfer
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2ef8d9cd3a | Style fix | ||
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oscgonfer
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301c5e014a |
Allow re-scan of AirQualityModule for late-coming sensors
* Define map for sensors to re-scan * Add re-scan on runOnce |
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oscgonfer
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6c61f12b10 | Move address, bus and port to TelemetrySensor | ||
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oscgonfer
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81c0f14217 | Low prio debug fixes | ||
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oscgonfer
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70588f01e5 | Minor logging changes | ||
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oscgonfer
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b7ec5cd35a |
Refurbish ReClockI2C API
* Make ReClockI2C API class * Use new API in AirQualityTelemetry module * Minor changes on some logs |
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oscgonfer
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0200d45241 | Make reclock function aware of screen-set I2C speeds | ||
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oscgonferandGitHub
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658197ccfd | Merge branch 'develop' into bugfix/detection-on-0x69-address | ||
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oscgonfer
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7c17e489c2 |
Fixes on 0x69 address detection
* Change SEN5X detection method, using class itself * MPU6050 register check * BMX160 default removed |
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oscgonferandGitHub
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8a0c7592cc | Remove duplicate code from AQ telemetry, probably from merge conflict (#10708) | ||
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b938b63e8a |
fix a long-running CI bug that overran a lot (#10707)
* fix the fix * Address Copilot review: add EXIT trap and clarify PKC comment Add `trap` to kill meshtasticd on any early exit (python harness failure, socket timeout) so CI never leaks a background process. Reword the ARCH_PORTDUINO comment to make explicit that pki_encrypted=true causes the from==0 plain-admin branch to be skipped, routing into the PKC key-check — the underlying logic was correct all along. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update PORTDUINO comment to reflect from==0 auth fix The from==0 branch no longer requires !pki_encrypted (fixed upstream in this branch), so update the simulator comment to reflect the actual remaining reason for the early intercept: is_managed could still block exit_simulator even for local packets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bbcc35e209 |
Stm32 general (#10700)
* Attempt to generalize ARCH_STM32 * Trunk * One More ARCH_STM32 * Whoops, one snuck in there * Fix comment to reflect define change Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Jonathan BennettandBen Meadors
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bede05356d |
Lora led rx (#10674)
* add optional LED_LORA to indicate LoRa TX * Briefly flash LED_LORA on packet RX --------- Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> |
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  Jonathan BennettGitHubBen MeadorsCopilotWesselcopilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>thebentern |
8267bb22bd |
Packet Signing via XEdDSA (#10478)
* Test commit for XEdDSA support * Update to Crypto lib in Meshtatic org * Generate a new node identity on key generation (#7628) * Generate a new node identity on key generation * Fixes * Fixes * Fixes * Messed up * Fixes * Update src/modules/AdminModule.cpp Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Update src/mesh/NodeDB.cpp Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Figured it out! * Cleanup * Update src/mesh/NodeDB.h Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Update src/mesh/NodeDB.cpp Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Update src/modules/AdminModule.cpp Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Update crypto commit hash * Some fixes for xeddsa pr (#9610) * fix: add null check for getMeshNode() in NodeInfoModule getMeshNode() can return nullptr for unknown nodes. Dereferencing without a check crashes the firmware when receiving NodeInfo from a node not yet in the database. * fix: enforce XEdDSA signature verification and prevent stripping Previously, failed signature verification still allowed the packet through, making signatures purely cosmetic. Now: - Failed verification drops the packet (DECODE_FAILURE) - Successfully verified nodes get HAS_XEDDSA_SIGNED bitfield set - Unsigned packets from previously-signing nodes are rejected - Log levels reduced from WARN/ERROR to DEBUG/WARN as appropriate * fix: include packet metadata in XEdDSA signature The signature now covers [fromNode | packetId | portnum | payload] instead of just the payload bytes. This prevents: - Replay attacks (different packetId fails verification) - Reattribution (different fromNode fails verification) - Portnum redirection (different portnum fails verification) Also adds a key initialization check to xeddsa_sign (returns false if XEdDSA keys are all zeros) and checks the return value in the encode path. * fix: handle existing key pair in AdminModule security config When a user provides both a valid private key and public key via admin config, the crypto engine's DH private key and owner public key were never loaded. DMs and XEdDSA signing would silently break. Add an else branch to load both keys into the crypto engine. * perf: cache Ed25519 public key conversion in xeddsa_verify curve_to_ed_pub() performs field element parsing, inversion, and multiplication on every call. Since packets from the same node tend to arrive in bursts, a single-entry cache avoids repeating this expensive conversion for consecutive packets from one sender. * fix: skip identity cleanup when node number is unchanged createNewIdentity() was called on every generateCryptoKeyPair(), including normal boots where the same key is regenerated. This caused unnecessary NodeDB writes and old-node cleanup logic to run when the node number hadn't actually changed. Also fixes only zeroing byte[0] of the old node's public key instead of clearing the entire array. * fix: replace hardcoded 120 with derived XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE constant The payload size check for XEdDSA signing used a magic number (120). Replace with a derivation from DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN and XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE so the limit adjusts automatically if constants change. This also increases the max signable payload from 120 to 169 bytes, which is still safe since the actual encoded size is checked after pb_encode. * fix: add const qualifiers to XEdDSA verify and curve_to_ed_pub inputs pubKey, payload, and signature parameters in xeddsa_verify are input-only and should not be modified. Same for curve_pubkey in curve_to_ed_pub. * chore: remove commented-out old Crypto dependency in portduino.ini * Leave out the admin module change for now --------- Co-authored-by: Jonathan Bennett <jbennett@incomsystems.biz> * trunk * protobuf re-update * Protobufs * Merge resolution fix * Put XEDDSA on the right bit * NodeDB update to new nodeInfoLite accessors, etc * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Refine unsigned packet rejection logic in Router (#10534) * use hardware random to fill the first 32 signature bytes with entropy prior to signing. * Add XEdDSA packet-signing policy tests and update dependencies for macos * Minor fixes * integrate XEdDSA support and update dependencies across multiple modules --------- Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Wessel <github@weebl.me> Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: thebentern <9000580+thebentern@users.noreply.github.com> |
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07a87a8254 |
security: runtime-toggleable MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN hardening for nRF52 (#10349)
* security: add MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN hardened build option
Meshtastic nodes ship with secrets on flash (channel PSKs, the device
private key, admin keys, wifi PSK) and over-the-wire access to admin
APIs that can re-key the mesh. Lose the device, at a border crossing,
in a raid, off a backpack, and an attacker reads everything in 30s
with a USB cable. There's no at-rest encryption, no client auth, the
screen leaks contents, and SWD is wide open. This adds an opt-in
hardened build for users who care.
-DMESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN=1 on nRF52 (CC310) turns on:
DEBUG_MUTE silence USB/serial logs
MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE AES-128-CTR + HMAC-SHA256 on
LocalConfig / channels / NodeDB.
Passphrase-gated DEK, TTL/boot
unlock token, failed-attempt
backoff (within-boot, wall-clock,
persisted bootsSinceFail).
MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL per-connection auth gate. Secrets
emitted as empty proto structs
to unauthenticated clients.
MESHTASTIC_ENABLE_APPROTECT one-way UICR APPROTECT, reset
applied same boot. Recoverable
only via \`nrfjprog --recover\`,
which also wipes the DEK.
LockdownDisplay screen shows "LOCKED" when locked
or idle 30s. OLED only; InkHUD /
niche / device-ui not yet wired.
Wire format is the LockdownAuth / LockdownStatus pair from
meshtastic/protobufs#911 (AdminMessage tag 104, FromRadio tag 18).
Access-control state is a file-scope 6-slot table in PhoneAPI.cpp
keyed by \`this\`, not class members. Adding *any* per-instance field
to PhoneAPI breaks USB-CDC enumeration on the current nRF52 Adafruit
framework, one volatile bool was enough. Out-of-line side-steps it.
lockdown_auth is handled synchronously in PhoneAPI::handleToRadioPacket
rather than routed through the mesh Router into AdminModule. Two
reasons: the passphrase never travels through a routed MeshPacket
queue, and per-connection authorization runs while \`this\` is still on
the call stack. The previous async-via-router design lost connection
identity (g_currentContext was null by the time AdminModule processed
the auth), so per-connection unlock never actually took effect on the
originating client.
Non-nRF52: #warning, only DEBUG_MUTE activates. tools/lockdown_provision.py
drives provision / unlock / lock-now / watch over USB.
Display privacy is a screen-lock latch separate from storage-lock
state: shouldRedactDisplay() is true when storage is locked OR the
latch is set. Screen::setOn(false) sets the latch when the stock idle
timeout powers the display off (reusing config.display.screen_on_secs,
no second timer); it is cleared only when a client authenticates with
the passphrase. A device idling on the mesh keeps routing but hides
its screen until re-auth; button input wakes the backlight to the
LOCKED frame, not content. The earlier lockdown-specific 30s idle
timer is removed — it duplicated PowerFSM idle detection and showed a
misleading LOCKED screen on a merely-idle device.
Unlock-token TTL fix: a token carrying both a boot-count and a
wall-clock TTL is no longer destroyed when the RTC is invalid at cold
boot. The boot count is independently verifiable without a clock, so
the token falls back to boot-count enforcement instead of being
deleted. A token is only hard-rejected when its wall-clock TTL can be
evaluated and is found expired.
NodeDB::reloadFromDisk() after unlock is deferred to the main loop via
lockdownReloadPending rather than run inline on the transport callback
stack — the reload is too heavy for the BLE/serial task stack and was
resetting the device immediately after a successful unlock.
The screen-lock latch also swallows local input events in
InputBroker::handleInputEvent while it (or storage-locked) is set.
Without that, a blind operator could drive on-device menus, fire
canned messages, or change settings through the joystick/buttons even
though the screen content was hidden. PowerFSM is still triggered
first so the backlight wakes to the LOCKED frame; the event is dropped
before reaching the UI observers.
The screen-lock latch is initialised to true at boot, so even a
token-auto-unlocked cold boot comes up redacted. Otherwise an attacker
holding a screen-locked device could power-cycle it (the RAM latch
resets) and recover a content screen. After any boot, the operator
must authenticate from a client to reveal screen content.
MyNodeInfo.device_id is also redacted for unauthenticated clients —
it is a stable hardware identifier useful to an attacker for
fingerprinting / correlating the device across observations. The
public mesh fields (my_node_num, owner short/long name, public key,
hw model) are left as-is because they are already broadcast on-mesh.
ModuleConfig.mqtt is also redacted for unauthenticated clients —
MQTTConfig carries broker username, password, server address, and
root_topic. The empty MQTTConfig is emitted via the same zero-init
pattern as the other gated sections.
Uptime-based session limit (MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN_SESSION_DEFAULT_SECONDS)
caps how long a single auto-unlocked session can hold storage open,
measured in firmware millis() since unlock. 0 = unlimited (existing
token-only behavior, suitable for tower/infra nodes); non-zero arms a
timer on every passphrase unlock and on every token-auto-unlock that
inherits the value, since the cap is persisted in the token (token
format bumped to v2: adds sessionMaxSeconds, body 56→60 bytes).
On expiry the device revokes per-connection auth, re-engages the
screen-lock latch, and reboots WITHOUT deleting the token. Next boot
auto-unlocks via the boot count (decrementing it) and arms a fresh
session window. Hard exposure ceiling: bootsRemaining * sessionMaxSeconds.
Explicit user Lock Now still deletes the token (passphrase required to
recover); only session expiry preserves it.
Why uptime, not wall-clock: getValidTime() is fed by GPS/RTC/client
time pushes — all manipulable by an attacker with the device (GPS
spoof to roll the clock back, pull the RTC backup cell, Faraday-cage
the whole thing). millis() comes off the Cortex-M's internal cycle
counter, sealed inside the chip; the only way to reset it is a reboot,
which costs a boot from the on-flash token counter. APPROTECT remains
the load-bearing defense against forging higher boot counts via SWD.
A future LockdownAuth.max_session_seconds proto field will let the
client set this per-token; until that lands the build-time
MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN_SESSION_DEFAULT_SECONDS macro is the only source.
Session expiry now decrements the on-flash boot count in place and
re-arms the uptime timer WITHOUT rebooting, while budget remains.
Mesh routing keeps running across session boundaries; the device only
reboots when bootsRemaining reaches zero (rollback budget exhausted),
at which point it hard-locks and forces passphrase re-entry.
Each session boundary still: revokes per-connection admin auth so
clients must re-authenticate to see content, re-engages the screen
lock latch, and emits LockdownStatus{LOCKED, needs_auth, boots=N}
so connected clients see the decremented count and know to re-auth.
Storage stays unlocked (DEK in RAM) for continuity.
The boot count's role as the rollback ledger is unchanged — it
decrements monotonically once per session boundary, whether the
session ends in a reboot or an in-place roll. Attacker who power-
cycles to dodge the session timer still pays a boot via the existing
readAndConsumeToken decrement-at-load path. APPROTECT remains the
only defense against forging higher counts.
Net effect for an unattended/tower node with bootsRemaining=50,
sessionSeconds=3600: 50 hours of continuous mesh service, one
reboot at the end, vs. the previous design's 50 reboots over the
same period. Same exposure ceiling, far better uptime.
LockdownAuth.max_session_seconds (proto tag 5) is now consumed: when
non-zero the client value wins; 0 falls back to the firmware-side
MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN_SESSION_DEFAULT_SECONDS, matching the boots_remaining
sentinel convention. Protobufs submodule pin bumped to develop tip
which contains meshtastic/protobufs#916 (merged).
* security: drop dead is_managed allowlist for set_config(security).private_key
The 'isLockdownSecurityCmd' allowlist in handleReceivedProtobuf dates
from the pre-LockdownAuth design when the passphrase was smuggled
through SecurityConfig.private_key. With lockdown_auth handled
synchronously in PhoneAPI::handleToRadioPacket before any admin message
reaches the Router, this allowlist now serves no legitimate purpose
and lets an unauthenticated local client mutate security settings on
a managed device by setting private_key.size>=1 — including
potentially disabling is_managed itself.
Remove the allowlist. Managed-mode local admin now requires a
PhoneAPI connection that has already authenticated via lockdown_auth
(or, on the pki_encrypted branch below, a valid PKC admin key).
Resolves Copilot review feedback on src/modules/AdminModule.cpp:105.
* security: protect lockdown-status drain slot from concurrent writers
g_pendingLockdownStatus / g_hasPendingLockdownStatus are written from
multiple call sites (PhoneAPI::handleLockdownAuthInline on the BLE/USB
transport callback, AdminModule on the Router thread, main loop session
expiry) and read in getFromRadio() on whichever transport is draining
FromRadio. The struct read/write was unprotected, so a writer could
corrupt the slot mid-encode. Same pattern as nodeInfoMutex — wrap
both the queue path and the drain in a small lock. Drain re-checks
the bool under the lock to handle the case where another reader
grabbed the slot first.
Resolves Copilot review feedback on src/mesh/PhoneAPI.cpp:1560.
* security: derive readAndDecrypt size cap from caller buffer, not a hardcoded 64 KB
The MAX_PROTO_FILE_SIZE = 65536 + OVERHEAD ceiling was an absolute
constant chosen against a since-outdated assumption that 'meshtastic
proto files are well under 64 KB'. On variants where MAX_NUM_NODES
pushes the serialised NodeDatabase past 64 KB the legitimate file gets
rejected at load and the device treats its own real config as corrupt.
The caller already knows the maximum plaintext it expects (outBufSize).
Cap the ciphertext at outBufSize + OVERHEAD instead — this is the tightest
sound bound (anything larger could not possibly decode into the caller's
buffer), still defends against OOM / integer overflow, and scales with
the platform's actual NodeDB size rather than an arbitrary constant.
Resolves Copilot review feedback on src/security/EncryptedStorage.cpp:1327.
* docs: fix stale 'passphrase delivery via AdminModule' references in configuration.h
The lockdown overview comment block was written when passphrase delivery
ran through AdminModule's handleReceivedProtobuf. With the synchronous
refactor that path now lives in PhoneAPI::handleLockdownAuthInline,
called before the admin message reaches the Router. Update both the
nRF52 feature list and the non-nRF52 degraded-mode rationale to point
at the current code path.
Resolves Copilot review feedback on src/configuration.h:578 (and :604).
* docs: refresh unlock-token format doc to match v2 layout
The header comment for the UTOK file still described v1 (version 0x01,
no session_max_seconds, 71 bytes) even after the in-flight bump to
TOKEN_VERSION=0x02 and TOKEN_TOTAL_SIZE=75. The inline body-size
breakdown comment was also wrong (claimed 39 bytes and mismatched the
real NONCE_SIZE/AES_KEY_SIZE constants). Rewrite both to match the
actual on-flash layout and note how v1 tokens are handled on upgrade
(rejected via the version byte; passphrase re-entry mints a v2).
Resolves Copilot review feedback on src/security/EncryptedStorage.h:50.
* docs: correct session-limit comment re: token-auto-unlock behavior
The s_sessionMaxMs comment block claimed 'token-auto-unlocked
sessions have no session timer (the session feature is a
passphrase-unlock-only knob)'. Stale: readAndConsumeToken() now
persists sessionMaxSeconds in the token file and re-calls
setSession() from the token-load path, so token-auto-unlocked
sessions DO inherit the same cap (and consumeSessionBoot() re-arms
in place between sessions on a single boot). Update the comment to
match.
Resolves Copilot review feedback on src/security/EncryptedStorage.cpp:72.
* docs: clarify input-swallow gate re: screen-lock latch vs storage state
The previous comment said input is swallowed 'until a client authenticates
and unlockScreen() clears the latch (or storage is unlocked)'. The
parenthetical was misleading: storage being unlocked is not in itself
enough to clear the latch — the latch persists across the
storage-unlocked-but-screen-locked steady state, and only an explicit
unlockScreen() (called from a successful passphrase auth path) clears
it. Reword so the only-passphrase-clears-the-latch invariant is
explicit and local input is named as something that does NOT clear it.
Resolves Copilot review feedback on src/input/InputBroker.cpp:134.
* docs: fix reloadFromDisk() trigger comment in NodeDB.h
The header still claimed reloadFromDisk() is called by AdminModule
after a successful passphrase op. With the synchronous PhoneAPI
refactor the actual trigger is PhoneAPI::handleLockdownAuthInline
setting lockdownReloadPending, with main.cpp's loop() dispatching
the heavy reload on the main thread (the transport callback stack
isn't large enough). Update the comment to point at the real path
and explain why the deferral exists.
Resolves Copilot review feedback on src/mesh/NodeDB.h:393.
* style: clang-format lockdown sources
Apply trunk clang-format (16.0.3) to satisfy the format check.
* style: black-format lockdown_provision.py
Satisfy the trunk black formatter check.
* security: drop unused v1 EncryptedStorage formats and migration
This storage layer has never shipped, so there are no v1 DEK files,
v1 unlock tokens, or v1 backoff records anywhere to stay compatible
with. Remove the dead compatibility machinery:
- legacy init() (FICR-only KEK, no passphrase) — had no callers
- deriveKEKv1() / loadDEKv1() and the v1->v2 DEK migration paths in
provisionPassphrase() and unlockWithPassphrase()
- the 5-byte v1 backoff file format
Also drop the now-pointless version byte from the on-disk MENC, MDEK,
and UTOK formats. Each is identified by its 4-byte magic (and, for the
keyed formats, its HMAC); with only one version that will ever exist,
the version field added nothing. Sizes shrink by one byte each
(overhead 54->53, DEK 66->65, token 75->74).
Rename the surviving helpers to drop the _v2 suffix (deriveKEK,
loadDEK, saveDEK, KEK_DOMAIN). No behavioral change for provisioning,
unlock, token consumption, or session handling.
Verified with an nRF52 lockdown build (rak4631).
* fix(lockdown): harden auth-table and lockdown_auth handler (audit)
Audit findings addressed:
C3 — `~PhoneAPI()` now clears its auth slot unconditionally. The previous
slot-clear in `close()` was gated on `state != STATE_SEND_NOTHING`, so a
PhoneAPI that never reached config (or that already closed) left
`slot.who` pointing at freed memory; a future PhoneAPI heap-allocated at
the same address would inherit the prior session's authorization through
`findOrAllocSlot`.
C4 — All access to `g_authSlots`, `g_authEpoch`, and `g_currentContext` is
now serialised through `g_authSlotsMutex`. Previously these were touched
without locking from BLE/USB/TCP/Router tasks, so two parallel slot scans
could hand out the same slot and mid-update reads could observe
authorized=true alongside a stale epoch. Granularity is fine — every
critical section is a short linear scan over six entries, and getFromRadio
(which calls `getAdminAuthorized()` per redaction check) tolerates the
brief blocking.
A4 / H1 — `lock_now` now requires the originating connection to be
already authorized. Previously any unauthenticated client (BLE/USB/TCP)
could submit `lockdown_auth { lock_now=true }` and force a reboot,
which was a trivial local-presence DoS — an attacker near the radio
could brick-loop it indefinitely. The original "panic button without
auth" property is dropped; panic now requires the operator to have
passphrase-unlocked the connection.
H2 — Empty-passphrase `lockdown_auth` (with `lock_now=false`) used to
silently return success. The client received no feedback distinguishing
that case from a real success, and an attacker could probe lockdown
state for free. Now emits UNLOCK_FAILED with no backoff increment
(empty-passphrase is more likely a client bug than an attack, but the
honest signal still lets the client correct itself).
H14 — `la.boots_remaining > 255` previously truncated silently
(256 → 0 → mapped to TOKEN_DEFAULT_BOOTS=50; 257 → 1). Honest clients
could not detect the misbehavior. Now rejected explicitly with
UNLOCK_FAILED.
L1 — The `to == nodeDB->getNodeNum()` allowance in the unauth ToRadio
gate now also requires `getNodeNum() != 0`. During the locked-default
boot path `getNodeNum()` returns 0, so a packet with `to=0` could
otherwise satisfy the equality and bypass the gate.
L2 — Comment added on `g_authEpoch` wrap. Practically unreachable
(2^32 lockNow events on one boot), but worth recording the behavior.
M17 — `findOrAllocSlot_LH` now evicts the first unauthorized stale slot
when the table is full of non-nullptr entries, rather than failing
closed. Authorized slots are never evicted — they represent live
operator sessions. Fail-closed (with LOG_WARN) only when every slot
holds a different live authorized PhoneAPI, which would require seven
simultaneous authed connections.
M18 — `s_screenLocked` is now `std::atomic<bool>` with relaxed ordering.
Plain bool happened to work on single-core Cortex-M4 today but breaks
silently if lockdown ports to ESP32 / RP2040, or under LTO whole-
program elision.
Verified with an nRF52 lockdown build (rak4631).
* fix(lockdown): gate every admin op on per-connection auth + storage unlock
Audit findings addressed:
H6 — Unauthenticated local clients could previously set_config / set_module_config /
set_channel etc. on a lockdown device whenever is_managed was unset.
The previous gate inside AdminModule's is_managed branch consulted
PhoneAPI::isLocalAdminAuthorized(), which reads a global g_currentContext
set during synchronous PhoneAPI dispatch — but AdminModule runs on the
Router task, by which time the dispatch task has exited and the global is
unrelated to the originating connection. The check was both broken (always
false on Router, so even authed clients were rejected) and unsafe (when it
did fire, the wrong connection could be authorized).
The fix relocates the gate to PhoneAPI::handleToRadioPacket, where dispatch
is synchronous and getAdminAuthorized() can be trusted. The admin payload
is already decoded there to extract lockdown_auth; extend the same branch
so that any non-lockdown_auth admin variant from an unauthorized connection
is dropped before ever reaching the Router queue.
H7 — Same root cause: get_config_request / get_module_config_request /
get_channel_request handlers returned full security/network/mqtt content
to unauthorized local clients. With the H6 gate in PhoneAPI, these
requests never reach AdminModule, so handleGetConfig / handleGetModuleConfig
/ handleGetChannel are only callable from authorized connections.
H9 — Remote admin (PKC-authorized peers, mesh-relayed admin) bypassed
lockdown entirely. If admin_keys were baked in via USERPREFS or set on a
prior unlocked boot, a remote attacker could drive factory_reset /
set_config against a locked device before the operator ever unlocked it.
Added an EncryptedStorage::isUnlocked() early-return at the top of
AdminModule::handleReceivedProtobuf. The local lockdown_auth path is
unaffected because PhoneAPI handles it synchronously before AdminModule
runs.
H10 — Removed g_currentContext, the ContextGuard, authorizeLocalAdmin(),
and isLocalAdminAuthorized() entirely. The audit's race (Router-thread
reads a pointer set by an unrelated parallel dispatch and authorizes the
wrong PhoneAPI) and the always-false-on-Router behavior both disappear
with the code that produced them. The PKC-admin auto-authorize path is
gone — PKC admin and the per-connection lockdown auth are now
independent: clients using PKC admin from a local app must also send
lockdown_auth to unlock the redacted FromRadio stream.
Cleaned up AdminModule's is_managed branch: under lockdown the
PhoneAPI-layer gate has already done its job, so no additional check
is needed; without lockdown the legacy is_managed-blocks-plain-admin
semantics are preserved.
Verified with an nRF52 lockdown build (rak4631).
* fix(lockdown): hold radio silent until storage is unlocked
Audit finding H8: while locked, the device beaconed nodeinfo and
telemetry on the public LongFast default PSK and routed incoming default-
channel packets through the locked router. The locked-default boot path
in NodeDB::loadFromDisk installs config via installDefaultConfig, which
honours USERPREFS_CONFIG_LORA_REGION (the common shape for managed
deployments) and synthesises the default LongFast channel. So a locked
device on managed firmware came up TX-enabled on a well-known PSK
before any operator interaction.
Force config.lora.region = UNSET in the locked-boot block.
RadioLibInterface gates both TX (startSend) and RX (readData) on
region != UNSET — locked devices no longer initialise the SX12xx for
either direction. Also set tx_enabled = false for any code path that
checks the flag directly without consulting region.
reloadFromDisk() restores the persisted lora config once the operator
unlocks. Note: until the audit's M8 (radio re-init after reload, the
upcoming commit 5 in this remediation series) lands, an unlocked
device may need to reboot before its radio fully comes up under the
real config; this is no worse than the pre-fix state, where the radio
was already running on the wrong (default) config and any real config
change required an explicit reconfigure or reboot anyway.
Verified with an nRF52 lockdown build (rak4631).
* fix(lockdown): per-connection status queue, redaction expansion, log/banner mute (audit)
M14 — Replaces the single file-scope LockdownStatus slot with a per-
PhoneAPI table keyed by PhoneAPI*, parallel to the auth-slot table and
sharing g_authSlotsMutex. Previously a status produced for connection
A (UNLOCKED with the active TTL, or UNLOCK_FAILED with a backoff)
could be drained by connection B before A read it, leaking A's auth
state to B. queueLockdownStatus is now a per-instance method writing
to this->slot. A new static broadcastLockdownStatus exists for the
main-loop session-expiry callers that have no PhoneAPI* in hand —
those want every connected client to learn about the session roll,
which is the only legitimate broadcast use case. hasPendingLockdownStatus
is a const helper for the FromRadio available()/drain check.
M13 — buildStatus_LH (the single point where lock_reason crosses into
the on-wire LockdownStatus) collapses any token_* reason to a generic
"locked" before emission. The specific reasons (token_hmac_fail,
token_wrong_size, token_bad_magic, token_boots_zero, token_expired,
token_dek_fail, token_missing) still go to local logs, but no longer
tell an unauthenticated client that the firmware noticed their
tampering / rollback / corrupt-file attempt.
M15 — Extended the STATE_SEND_MY_INFO redaction (previously device_id
only) to also wipe pio_env and min_app_version for unauth clients —
both are pure build-fingerprint vectors that tell an attacker which
known issues to probe. Kept my_node_num (broadcast on the mesh anyway)
and nodedb_count (clients need it post-unlock to decide whether to
pull the node DB). Added equivalent redaction for STATE_SEND_METADATA:
the whole DeviceMetadata struct is wiped for unauth clients
(firmware_version, device_state_version, hw_model, hw_model_string,
has_bluetooth/has_wifi/has_ethernet, role, position_flags,
excluded_modules). Clients re-fetch after authenticating.
M16 — LoRa config is now whitelisted for unauth clients to the set
that is intrinsically observable on the air anyway: region,
modem_preset, use_preset, channel_num, hop_limit. Operator-private
knobs (ignore_incoming, override_duty_cycle, override_frequency,
sx126x_rx_boosted_gain, tx_power, ignore_mqtt, fem_lna_mode,
config_ok_to_mqtt) are zeroed. The whitelist is built as a fresh
LoRaConfig stack copy rather than masked in place to avoid touching
the persisted struct.
M12 — Skip the DEBUG_MUTE "we are muted, FYI" banner under
MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN. The banner spilled APP_VERSION / APP_ENV /
APP_REPO over USB CDC even with all other logging suppressed, which
defeats the muting in lockdown builds and gives a USB-attached
attacker a free firmware-fingerprint primitive.
L9 — Removed the numeric backoff value from the LOG_WARN unlock-
failed message. The client receives backoff_seconds via the
UNLOCK_FAILED status; printing it again to USB serial under
non-DEBUG_MUTE builds (i.e. MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN_DEBUG dev builds)
was the only place it appeared in logs.
Verified with an nRF52 lockdown build (rak4631).
* fix(lockdown): atomic post-unlock reload with corruption surface (audit)
Closes M6, M7, M8, M9 from the lockdown security audit.
M6 — handleLockdownAuthInline no longer flips the connection to
authorized or emits UNLOCKED on the cold-unlock path (the first
successful passphrase verify after a locked boot). The client keeps
seeing LOCKED until reloadFromDisk has actually populated config /
channelFile / nodeDatabase with the operator's real values. Without
this, the window between the auth call and the main-loop reload
exposed two race-friendly bugs: (a) the client could read the
locked-default placeholders as if they were the real config, and (b)
a set_config in the window would silently overwrite a corrupted
baseline once the reload swapped values in.
A new per-status-slot bool pendingUnlockAfterReload records that the
connection is mid-unlock. The re-verify path (storage already
unlocked) is unchanged and authorizes immediately — there is nothing
to reload.
M7 — reloadFromDisk now holds a new file-scope mutex
(g_reloadFromDiskMutex) against itself, parks the radio in sleep
mode before swapping config / channelFile, and reconfigures the
radio with the now-real settings after. Other readers of config.lora
/ channelFile / nodeDatabase do not take this lock today; closing
those races is a wider locking-discipline change outside the audit's
M7 scope. The radio standby+reconfigure prevents the SX12xx from
sitting in a half-old/half-new register set across the swap, which
otherwise required a reboot to recover from.
M8 — RadioInterface::reconfigure() is now called at the end of a
successful reload, so the SX12xx register set actually reflects
the unlocked operator settings (region, modem preset, channels)
rather than staying on the locked-default placeholder. Routed through
a new Router::getRadioIface() accessor — the radio interface is
owned by Router as a unique_ptr and was not exposed.
M9 — NodeDB::loadProto now sets a NodeDB::storageCorruptThisLoad
flag whenever an encrypted file fails to decrypt or proto-decode.
reloadFromDisk consumes the flag and returns false on any failure
instead of silently falling back to defaults. main.cpp's reload
service then calls EncryptedStorage::lockNow() and
PhoneAPI::revokeAllAuth(), and the new
PhoneAPI::completePendingUnlocks(false) emits LOCKED(storage_corrupt)
to every pending connection — they stay unauthorized so any
set_config they send is dropped at the existing unauth gates.
The lock_reason string passes through buildStatus_LH's M13
redaction unchanged because it does not start with token_.
The success path goes through PhoneAPI::completePendingUnlocks(true)
which authorizes each pending connection, emits UNLOCKED with the
current TTL, and clears the screen-lock latch once. Snapshots the
target PhoneAPI* list outside the auth-table lock to avoid re-entry
when setAdminAuthorized takes the same lock.
Verified with an nRF52 lockdown build (rak4631).
* fix(lockdown): UI/pairing fixes for first-pair + content-flash + e-ink (audit)
Closes H13, M19, M20, L4 from the lockdown audit. (L3 dropped per
explicit decision — battery level is not a meaningful security side
channel.)
H13 — BLE pairing PIN was suppressed by the lockdown lock screen on
locked devices. Screen.cpp updateUiFrame's lockdown short-circuit
intercepts before ui->update() runs, so the pairing-PIN overlay
banner that NRF52Bluetooth::onPairingPasskey queued never painted.
Net effect: a freshly-locked device on first BLE pair could not be
unlocked over BLE because the operator could never see the PIN —
chicken and egg.
Adds a new notificationTypeEnum::pairing_pin value and special-cases
it in the short-circuit: paint the LOCKED frame first (so the
underlying background remains the redacted view, never dashboard
content) then let ui->update() composite the PIN banner overlay on
top. The PIN itself is an ephemeral pair-handshake artifact
(regenerated per attempt, dies on banner timeout) and is not
operator content, so this does not regress the redaction guarantee.
NRF52Bluetooth::onPairingPasskey switches from showSimpleBanner to
showOverlayBanner with notificationType = pairing_pin so the
short-circuit's lookup matches.
M19 — Brief content-visible window on Screen::handleSetOn(true)
wake. OLED GDDRAM physically retains the last-rendered frame while
the panel is powered off; the next ui->update() after displayOn() is
async, so an observer (or shoulder-surfer) could see the previous
frame's content for 16-50 ms on every wake. Under MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
we now paint the LOCKED frame into GDDRAM in handleSetOn(false)
before calling displayOff(). On wake the only thing the panel can
flash is the redacted view. Gated on lockdown only — non-lockdown
builds keep the previous frame as a UX cue.
M20 — E-ink panels physically retain the last-rendered image
without power. A power-cycled lockdown handheld kept showing
operator-identifying content (position, messages, nodeinfo) until
the firmware's first natural refresh — which on e-ink can be
seconds into boot. Now, under MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN && USE_EINK, the
panel init path in Screen::setup() paints the LOCKED frame and
forces a full refresh (forceDisplay) immediately after ui->init()
and before any other rendering. Persistent pixels are wiped to the
redacted view before an observer can see them. Build-tested on
seeed_wio_tracker_L1_eink; hardware-verified visual confirmation
is pending a T-Echo session.
L4 — Screen::blink() bypasses the normal ui->update() path that
the lockdown short-circuit gates. It draws arbitrary geometry, not
node data, so it does not actually leak today; but any future
change that puts content into blink would silently leak past
redaction. Added an early-return on shouldRedactDisplay() to make
the function honor the redaction contract.
Verified with nRF52 lockdown builds on both rak4631 (OLED) and
seeed_wio_tracker_L1_eink (e-ink).
* fix(lockdown): refuse APPROTECT on vulnerable silicon, gate on provision (audit)
Closes M22 and M23 from the lockdown audit.
M22 — APPROTECT lockout on nRF52840 is publicly known to be bypassable
on every silicon revision shipping in current Meshtastic hardware
(AAB0..AAF0) via SWD glitching, per LimitedResults' published research
on the nRF52 series. Engaging APPROTECT on these revisions has two
bad properties: (1) the lockout is irreversible without a destructive
nrfjprog --recover, and (2) it gives the operator a false sense of
security because the lockout itself can be defeated by anyone with
ten minutes and a glitcher.
enableAPProtect() now reads FICR.INFO.VARIANT (encoded as a 4-byte
ASCII word) and refuses to engage on any known-vulnerable revision,
logging the variant so the operator knows their device's specific
build code. To override (e.g. for end-to-end testing of the engage
path on hardware that's known affected), rebuild with
-DMESHTASTIC_APPROTECT_OVERRIDE_VULNERABLE_SILICON=1.
The vulnerable list is explicit and easy to update: any future
revision shown to be fixed can be removed from the list and APPROTECT
will engage on it as before.
M23 — APPROTECT engagement moved from very early in setup() to
after fsInit() + EncryptedStorage::initLocked(), and gated on
EncryptedStorage::isProvisioned(). A misconfigured CI build of a
lockdown variant flashed to a dev board would otherwise burn SWD on
first boot before the operator had set any passphrase, taking the
board out of the development/recovery workflow with zero real
security benefit (there is no DEK to protect on an unprovisioned
device). Engagement now follows operator intent: SWD locks only
once they've committed to lockdown via passphrase provisioning.
The SWD-attachable window between boot and APPROTECT engagement
widens slightly from this reorder (now ~hundreds of ms while fsInit
runs) but APPROTECT remains effective on the only payload it could
protect (the in-RAM DEK loaded by initLocked which now runs *after*
APPROTECT for already-provisioned devices).
Verified with an nRF52 lockdown build (rak4631).
* tools: harden lockdown_provision.py (audit)
Closes M26-M30 and addresses L7.
M26 — passphrase input. --passphrase on argv now requires
--insecure-passphrase-on-cmdline as an explicit acknowledgement;
without it the tool refuses and points at --passphrase-file or the
interactive prompt. --passphrase-file refuses to read anything that
isn't mode 0600 (so a passphrase another user can read off the
filesystem doesn't silently succeed). With neither, the tool reads
the passphrase via getpass.getpass — and on 'provision' double-prompts
with a confirm.
M27 — provision now requires an explicit 'yes' confirmation unless
--yes is passed, after printing the warning that the passphrase
cannot be recovered. The double-passphrase prompt is built into
gather_passphrase(confirm=True). Reduces the chance of a typo
binding a device to an unrecoverable passphrase.
M28 — 'lock' subcommand gains a 'lock-now' alias, matching how the
audit and wire docs refer to it everywhere. Both forms now require
'yes' confirmation unless --yes is set, so an accidental command
doesn't immediately reboot the device into a locked state.
M29 — the 4-second sleep is gone. Replaced with a StatusFuture
single-shot that the FromRadio interceptor signals when the next
LockdownStatus arrives. provision/unlock/lock wait up to --wait
seconds (default 8) for the actual reply and exit non-zero with the
device's reason on UNLOCK_FAILED, surfacing backoff_seconds in the
error line. Exit codes are now meaningful:
0 = UNLOCKED
1 = no status / unexpected
2 = NEEDS_PROVISION (or a precondition fault: missing pkg, bad args)
3 = LOCKED (ambiguous: device reported locked rather than the
expected unlocked result)
4 = UNLOCK_FAILED
This lets ops scripts decide what to do without parsing stdout.
M30 — top-of-file docstring gained an explicit SECURITY MODEL block
that names the threat model (USB-only, passphrase cleartext on the
cable) and forbids extension to TCP/BLE/UDP without a redesign. A
runtime banner reprints the headline on every invocation. --port
values starting with tcp:/tcp://, ble:/ble://, udp:/udp://, ws:/wss:
are rejected at argument parse before any connection attempt; a
copy-paste of an example into a context with a different --port
cannot silently leak credentials to the wire.
L7 — private meshtastic APIs (_handleFromRadio, _sendToRadio,
_generatePacketId) are still in use because the lib does not yet
dispatch LockdownStatus on a public pubsub topic and there is no
public seam for raw ToRadio. Their use is now wrapped in
getattr-with-clear-error so a future lib version that removes them
produces an actionable error instead of an obscure traceback. The
top-of-file note explains why we're on the private surface.
Verified end-to-end on hardware (R1-Neo + Seeed Wio Tracker L1)
during the audit-remediation hardware test pass:
- provision (interactive, with confirm and double-prompt)
- unlock (success returns UNLOCKED + boots TTL)
- watch (passive listener emits LockdownStatus events)
- lock-now (with --yes)
* fix(lockdown): H13 — render pairing PIN steady over LOCKED frame
Two bugs in the H13 fix from commit 614b7f001:
1. NotificationRenderer::drawBannercallback's switch had no case for
the new notificationTypeEnum::pairing_pin. The function fell through
to no-op so the banner never rendered. Added pairing_pin alongside
text_banner so it dispatches to drawAlertBannerOverlay (same
rendering, distinct type so the lockdown short-circuit in Screen.cpp
can recognise it).
2. updateUiFrame's lockdown short-circuit called ui->update() to
composite the banner. That redraws the current carousel frame
(the dashboard) into the host framebuffer BEFORE the overlay
paints, so the panel flashed dashboard content under the banner
on every cycle. Replaced with a direct call to drawBannercallback
so only the banner box is painted on top of the LOCKED pixels.
Also: drawLockdownLockScreen used to commit to the panel
(display->display()) at its end. With the banner overlay then
painting and committing a second time, the panel visibly flickered
between 'just LOCKED' and 'LOCKED + banner' on every render cycle.
Split into drawLockdownLockScreenIntoBuffer (no commit) for the
lockdown short-circuit, and a thin drawLockdownLockScreen wrapper
that calls Buffer + display() for the other call sites that don't
composite anything on top. The short-circuit now commits exactly
once per frame after both LOCKED + any overlay are in the buffer.
Verified end-to-end on hardware (Seeed Wio Tracker L1, OLED):
fresh BLE pair against a locked device now shows the pairing PIN
steadily on top of the LOCKED frame, no flicker, no dashboard
leak, and pair completes normally.
* fix(lockdown): backoff MAC + atomic writes + fault wipe + size cap (audit)
Closes H3, H4, H12, M10, M11, M25 from the lockdown audit. Non-format-
breaking: existing devices keep their .dek and .unlock_token but their
old plaintext .backoff file (6 bytes, no MAC) is silently rejected as
tampered on first read and reseeded with the MAC'd 38-byte format on
the next failed-attempt OR successful unlock.
H3 — Pre-increment the failed-attempt counter BEFORE running the HMAC
verify in unlockWithPassphrase. The previous order wrote the counter
only after a failed verify, so an attacker glitching the chip between
verify and write could skip the increment and bypass backoff. The
slot is now reserved atomically up front; the success path writes
attempts=0 to clear the reservation. Worst case for a legitimate user
who power-cycles mid-success is one phantom attempt — backoff
recovers next try.
H4 — .backoff file is now MAC'd with HMAC-SHA256(ephemeralKEK,
"backoff-auth" || body) (32-byte tag), and written atomically via
SafeFile (tmp + readback verify + rename). readBackoff treats
missing / wrong-size / MAC-fail uniformly as max-attempts (255) so an
attacker who deletes or rewrites the file can only INCREASE the wait,
never decrease it. clearBackoff() now writes an attempts=0 sentinel
instead of removing the file, so 'missing == tamper' is unambiguous
post-provision. bumpBootsSinceFailOnBoot() skips on un-provisioned
devices to avoid false 'tamper' detection during the legitimate fresh
window between fsInit and provisionPassphrase.
H12 — saveDEK and writeUnlockToken now write via SafeFile in
fullAtomic mode (tmp file + readback verify + atomic rename) instead
of remove-then-open-then-write. Power loss during a DEK or token
write previously left the device unable to unlock — the encrypted
prefs files are unreadable without a valid DEK. The atomic path
rolls back to the previous file on partial write.
M10 — readAndConsumeToken's 74-byte stack buffer (entire wrapped
DEK + HMAC, explicitly called out by the audit as never wiped before
return) is now a meshtastic_security::ZeroizingBuffer that the
destructor scrubs on every return path. Same treatment for the
computedHmac stack array next to it, and for the new backoff state
buffers in readBackoff / writeBackoff / computeBackoffHmac. Removes
the manual secure_zero calls those buffers had on success paths and
fixes the missing wipes on the failure-return paths.
M11 — Added EncryptedStorage::secureWipeKeys() public API that
zeros dek/kek/ephemeralKek in BSS without touching flash, no
logging, no locks (safe from interrupt context). HardFault_Impl now
calls it as the very first thing on entry, before the diagnostic
print / coredump path runs, so a hard-fault crash dump won't capture
the DEK / KEK material that the rest of the module leaves in RAM.
M25 — migrateFile now refuses to allocate a buffer for any file
larger than 64 KiB. The legitimate ceiling is well under that on
every supported variant; anything larger is either corrupt or a
DFU-injected OOM attempt.
Verified with an nRF52 lockdown build (rak4631).
* fix(lockdown): MENC header MAC + token rollback counter (audit)
Closes M2 and M4 from the lockdown audit. **FORMAT-BREAKING** — devices
provisioned with prior lockdown firmware must factory-erase /prefs and
reprovision; the previous tokens and encrypted prefs files will not
decrypt under the new HMAC/body layouts.
M2 — The HMAC on MENC encrypted proto files now covers the full on-disk
header (4-byte magic + 13-byte nonce + 4-byte plaintext_len + ciphertext)
instead of just (nonce + ciphertext). Without this, magic and
plaintext_len were integrity-protected only by the equality check
`plaintextLen == ciphertextLen` — which holds today (no padding /
compression / AAD) but would silently produce length-oracle and
downgrade vulnerabilities the instant any of those got added. Putting
the header inside the MAC closes that pre-condition cleanly. The
verify side in readAndDecrypt and the compose side in encryptAndWrite
update in lockstep.
M4 — UTOK gains a 4-byte monotonic counter field inside its MAC'd
body. The highest counter ever issued is persisted to a new
/prefs/.tokmono file MAC'd with HMAC-SHA256(ephemeralKEK,
"tokmono-auth" || counter). On every readAndConsumeToken, any
token whose counter is less than the persisted value is rejected as
a rollback attempt and deleted. Defeats the audit's threat: an
attacker who once captured a token (e.g. bootsRemaining=255 from
before the operator lowered the policy) tries to write it back to
disk later. Counter is incremented monotonically across the device's
lifetime so any captured snapshot loses to the persisted max-seen.
Self-heal: a token whose counter exceeds the persisted value (e.g.
the .tokmono write itself failed after the token committed, or the
.tokmono got wiped via factory-erase) is accepted AND the counter
file is promoted to match. This avoids spuriously rejecting valid
tokens after partial-update recovery.
Threat model caveat (consistent with C2 acceptance): an attacker who
has both flash extraction AND FICR can recompute the .tokmono MAC
and restore a matching pair (.unlock_token + .tokmono) from an
earlier capture. M4 raises the bar to that combined capability;
the flash-write-only attacker is now blocked.
Verified with an nRF52 lockdown build (rak4631).
MIGRATION: devices already provisioned with the prior lockdown
firmware will fail to auto-unlock at boot (token format mismatch),
fall back to LOCKED(needs_auth), and every passphrase attempt will
fail because the encrypted /prefs files are HMAC'd against the old
input. Recovery is: factory-erase via the bootloader UF2 then
re-provision via lockdown_provision.py or the Android app.
* feat(lockdown): make lockdown a runtime client-toggleable setting
Converts MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN from a per-variant compile-time flag that
forced lockdown ON into an internal capability that is ALWAYS compiled
in for nRF52 and gated purely at runtime by whether a passphrase has
been provisioned. A device that has never been provisioned (or that the
operator disabled) behaves exactly like stock firmware.
Build/config:
- configuration.h auto-defines MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN (+ ACCESS_CONTROL,
ENCRYPTED_STORAGE, APPROTECT-capable) for ARCH_NRF52 unconditionally.
No variant sets -DMESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN anymore. Flash-constrained
variants can opt out with -DMESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_LOCKDOWN=1. DEBUG_MUTE
is no longer coupled to lockdown (a capable-but-off device must log
normally). rak4631 lands at 96.2% flash with lockdown always-in.
Runtime predicate:
- EncryptedStorage::isLockdownActive() == isProvisioned() (.dek exists)
is the single source of truth for active/inactive.
- PhoneAPI::getAdminAuthorized() returns true when lockdown is inactive,
so every existing redaction gate no-ops on a capable-but-off device
with no per-site changes. The locked-boot defaults path (NodeDB), the
AdminModule storage-locked gate, the screen-redaction predicate, and
the plaintext->encrypted migrate block are all additionally gated on
isLockdownActive() so an un-provisioned device loads/serves plaintext
normally.
- sendConfigComplete emits LockdownStatus{DISABLED} when capable-but-off
so the client renders its toggle OFF.
Enable (off->on): client provisions a passphrase. provisionPassphrase
generates the DEK; the existing reload path encrypts the plaintext
config in place (migration runs live with the DEK in RAM) and authorizes
the connection -> UNLOCKED. No reboot.
Disable (on->off): LockdownAuth{passphrase, disable=true}. PhoneAPI
verifies the passphrase (loads DEK), sets lockdownDisablePending; the
main loop runs NodeDB::disableLockdownToPlaintext() which decrypts every
pref via EncryptedStorage::migrateFileToPlaintext() then
removeLockdownArtifacts() deletes the DEK/token/counter/backoff (the
.dek delete is the atomic commit), then reboots into normal mode.
Power-loss safe and re-runnable without a persistent marker — and the
crypto runs live with the operator's passphrase in RAM rather than via
a boot-time marker an attacker could plant to trigger an unprompted
decrypt. APPROTECT is NOT reversed (sticky; permanent on silicon where
it engaged).
Generated bindings (admin.pb.h / mesh.pb.h) regenerated against
protobufs#927 (LockdownAuth.disable, LockdownStatus.State.DISABLED).
Submodule pointer stays at the pinned develop commit; the bindings are
ahead until #927 merges and the submodule is bumped, same flow as the
max_session_seconds work.
Builds clean: rak4631 with no flags now auto-includes lockdown.
NOTE: this changes the LockdownStatus the firmware emits and adds the
disable path; pairs with protobufs#927 and the upcoming Android client
toggle work.
* fix(lockdown): re-lock per-connection auth on BLE reconnect
A provisioned device reused a single BLE PhoneAPI instance, and the
per-connection auth slot (keyed by that instance) was only cleared on the
!isConnected() disconnect transition. A fast disconnect/reconnect could
begin a new config burst while state was still STATE_SEND_PACKETS, so the
reconnected client inherited the prior session's authorization: it received
SecurityConfig in the clear and no LockdownStatus, and never re-authenticated.
Reset the auth slot in NRF52Bluetooth onConnect(), which fires once per
physical link, so every new connection starts locked regardless of whether
the previous link's close() raced the new handshake. handleStartConfig keeps
its !isConnected() reset (do NOT reset on a same-connection want_config: the
post-unlock re-fetch is the client pulling now-unredacted config and must keep
the auth it just earned, otherwise config comes back redacted and set_config
writes get dropped).
* fix(lockdown): persist config on a lockdown-capable but disabled device
saveProto always called encryptAndWrite when encrypted storage was compiled,
and saveToDiskNoRetry skipped every save when !isUnlocked(). On a disabled
(never provisioned) device there is no DEK and isUnlocked() is always false,
so both paths fired and NO config ever persisted: a LoRa region set before
enabling lockdown lived only in RAM, then provisioning migrated the UNSET
default from disk and the region was lost.
Gate both on isLockdownActive(): when lockdown is inactive the device writes
plaintext exactly like stock firmware; the reloadFromDisk migrate pass then
re-saves those plaintext files encrypted once the device is provisioned.
Verified on hardware: region set while disabled now survives enable, reboot,
and unlock.
* fix(lockdown): suppress LoRa region picker under the lock screen
A locked-boot lockdown device installs region=UNSET as a deliberate RAM
placeholder (the real region is in encrypted storage, restored on unlock).
Screen.cpp popped the region picker / onboard message whenever region==UNSET,
so it rendered over the lock screen and trapped input with no way out. Skip it
while the display is being redacted for lockdown.
* fix(lockdown): silence cppcheck void* false positive + ruff docstring lints
The nRF52 `check` (cppcheck --fail-on-defect=low) flagged
arithOperationsOnVoidPointer on EncryptedStorage.cpp buffers. These are
false positives: make_zeroizing_array() returns unique_ptr<uint8_t[], ...>
so .get() is uint8_t*, not void* — cppcheck just can't resolve the
custom-deleter alias. File-scoped suppression, matching the existing
crypto-code convention in suppressions.txt.
Trunk flagged 5 ruff docstring issues in lockdown_provision.py: D301
(backslashes need a raw docstring) and D405/D407/D411/D413 (the EXAMPLES
heading was being parsed as a numpydoc section). Made the docstring raw
and renamed the heading to USAGE to dodge section detection while keeping
the ASCII-box formatting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(lockdown): resolve cppcheck const/null-deref defects
The nRF52 `check` job (pio check --fail-on-defect=low) flagged seven
real cppcheck defects in the lockdown code:
- EncryptedStorage.cpp: nonce/encDek are read-only views into the
token buffer -> const uint8_t *.
- NodeDB.cpp: segments[] lookup table is never mutated -> const.
- PhoneAPI.cpp: clearStatusSlot_LH's p is only compared; the auth-check
slot and the hasPendingLockdownStatus loop var are read-only -> const.
- Screen.cpp: the MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN drawLockdownLockScreen() guard
introduced a redundant null check (nullPointerRedundantCheck) since
dispdev->displayOff() right below derefs it unguarded, as does the
rest of the file. Dropped the guard.
Verified with cppcheck 2.21 locally against the project suppressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(lockdown): const-qualify clearAuthSlot_LH param (cppcheck cascade)
Making clearStatusSlot_LH take const PhoneAPI* let cppcheck propagate the
same to clearAuthSlot_LH, whose p is only compared and forwarded. The
remaining PhoneAPI* params (findOrAlloc*Slot_LH) store p into the slot
table, so they correctly stay non-const.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(lockdown): wire runtime-toggle disable flow into provision tool
Addresses Copilot review on tools/lockdown_provision.py — the reference
tool advertised the runtime-toggle disable lifecycle but couldn't exercise
it:
- _STATE_NAMES: map LockdownStatus.DISABLED so a capable-but-off boot
prints DISABLED instead of an opaque state=<num>.
- build_lockdown_auth(): add a disable param that actually sets
la.disable, failing loudly on pre-runtime-toggle bindings instead of
silently sending a plain unlock.
- cmd_disable() + 'disable' subcommand: send LockdownAuth{disable=true,
passphrase=...} and wait for the resulting LockdownStatus. Mirrors the
firmware: non-empty passphrase required, DISABLED broadcast precedes
the reboot, TTL/session fields ignored.
- _exit_code_for_status(): treat DISABLED as a success (exit 0) like
UNLOCKED.
All DISABLED/disable references are hasattr-guarded so the tool still
imports and runs the lock/unlock/provision paths against the currently
released meshtastic package (verified: it has LockdownAuth but not yet
disable/DISABLED). Verified with ruff 0.15.13 and black.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ben Meadors
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ed52e3019d | Change handleSetOwner parameter to const reference and improve long name handling | ||
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Ben Meadors
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c2bcec93d0 | Fix long name clamping and adjust related structures for compatibility | ||
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TomandGitHub
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ab882c5619 |
EU regions merge (#10675)
* stronger together * validate 2.4ghz regions * less noise * you're right, and that shapens the analysis significantly * sassy rejoinder |
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Ben Meadors
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309d51a3e8 | fix(NodeInfoModule): update user handling in allocReply to prevent global state clobbering |