ef1aedd5699110d3bd911ca25bbdd22693caca43
138
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Benjamin Faershtein
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8acb7fec73 | test: cover coerced packet signature policy | ||
  Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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5e3d1ea606 |
Merge pull request #11129 from RCGV1/agent/include-statusmessage-config
phoneapi: send status message config |
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Benjamin Faershtein
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d195ec6748 | fix(security): round-trip packet policy defaults | ||
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Benjamin Faershtein
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566d95f7d2 | test: terminate status message fixture | ||
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Benjamin Faershtein
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91915a0539 | Merge commit '5548bd3195c18ec9274b2ff8171504acfc2647b3' into agent/include-statusmessage-config | ||
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Benjamin Faershtein
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9cce99400b | phoneapi: send status message config | ||
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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5548bd3195 | Merge pull request #10967 from RCGV1/codex/packet-auth-policy | ||
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Ben Meadors
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6fc7c1b1db |
test: unset force_simradio so admin request pinning is exercised
The native test harness boots Portduino in simulated mode, and
wouldEncryptWithPKC() short-circuits to false whenever
portduino_config.force_simradio is set. noteOutgoingAdminRequest() derives its
pin from that predicate:
keyValid = haveDestKey && wouldEncryptWithPKC(&p, p.channel, haveDestKey);
so under the harness no outgoing admin request is ever key-pinned, and
responseIsSolicited() admits a plaintext response to a PKC-pinned request.
test_pinned_request_keeps_its_key_after_an_unpinned_request and
test_request_to_keyed_node_pins_the_stored_key have therefore failed since
#11092 added them, on develop and on every branch that merges it.
Instrumenting the predicate shows every other term already satisfied
(haveDestKey=1, isFromUs=1, private_key=32, unicast, ADMIN_APP, channel
LongFast) with wouldEncryptWithPKC=0, leaving only the simradio guard.
Clear the flag in setUp so the fixture models a real device. Skipping PKC under
force_simradio is correct for a simulated radio - there is no PKC to pin - so
the predicate is left alone rather than relaxed to make a test pass. The only
sim-mode path in this suite is AdminModule's exit_simulator intercept, which no
test here exercises.
Native suite: 38 suites, 723/723 cases, no sanitizer findings.
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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e11635baa2 | Merge branch 'develop' into codex/packet-auth-policy | ||
 Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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d587f08481 |
Pin admin responses to the stored peer key and request id (#11092)
* Pin admin responses to the stored peer key and request id noteOutgoingAdminRequest derived its PKC pin from p.public_key, which nothing populates on the outgoing path, so keyValid was false for every client request and the pin never engaged. The accepted-response predicate reduced to an unauthenticated from plus variant and subtype. Resolve the destination key from NodeDB the way perhapsEncode does, and pin it only when the request would actually be PKC-encrypted. Extract that condition from perhapsEncode as wouldEncryptWithPKC so both use one predicate. Also record the request's packet id and require the response to echo it. * Treat a zero request id as no pairing token |
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Ben Meadors
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7d954e668d |
Merge branch 'develop' into codex/packet-auth-policy
Resolve conflicts against the NodeDB signer/key primitives (#11050) and the admin-key PKI decrypt budget (#11100). - NodeDB: drop this branch's hasSeenXeddsaSigner in favour of develop's isKnownXeddsaSigner. They answer the same question, but develop's reads the dedicated warm signer bit (warmSignerOf) rather than the WarmProtected category, and TrafficManagementModule already depends on it. Keep develop's copyPublicKey/copyPublicKeyAuthoritative, isVerifiedSignerForKey and commitRemoteKey/KeyCommitTrust. - checkXeddsaReceivePolicy: keep this branch's Strict/Balanced/Compatible policy, which is a superset of develop's balanced-only downgrade gate, and call isKnownXeddsaSigner from it. develop's !pki_encrypted term is dropped because the policy returns early for PKI packets before that check. - perhapsDecode: keep develop's key resolution (NodeDB then pending-key, only for real PKI candidates) plus its admin-key token bucket, and re-apply this branch's pkiAttempted flag feeding the DECODE_OPAQUE verdict. Keep both passesRoutingAuthGate and adminKeyFallbackAllowed/Refund. - test_A17: model eviction the way NodeDB actually does it, passing the warm signer bit as well as the XeddsaSigner category, since isKnownXeddsaSigner reads the former. Native suite: 38 suites, 743/743 cases, no sanitizer findings. |
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Ben Meadors
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e247f70c6d |
test: drain toPhoneQueue in MQTT test to fix ASan leak
sendLocal() now dispatches local packets through handleReceived() directly instead of the mock-overridden enqueueReceivedMessage(). The MQTT implicit ACK-to-self therefore runs the full receive pipeline (RoutingModule -> MeshService::handleFromRadio -> sendToPhone), enqueuing pooled MeshPacket copies into toPhoneQueue. Production drains that queue via PhoneAPI, but the test has no phone reader, so the copies leaked at teardown (LeakSanitizer: 42824 bytes / 101 objects across test_receiveFuzzServiceEnvelope and test_receiveAcksOwnSentMessages). Give MockMeshService a destructor that drains toPhoneQueue like the phone would. Test-only; the real firmware does not leak here. |
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1872e5b306 |
TMM extend to ephemeral 3rd tier store (#11050)
* Harden TMM NodeInfo direct-response: staleness, key hygiene, throttle The NodeInfo direct-response path answered queries on behalf of other nodes from an unauthenticated, never-expiring cache while suppressing the genuine request (STOP). That let a long-gone or forged identity be served as a fresh-looking, authoritative reply indefinitely. Three fixes: - Staleness gate: refuse to spoof a reply for a node not actually heard within ~6h (PSRAM cache via lastObservedMs; NodeDB fallback via sinceLastSeen, which tolerates last_heard==0 when the clock is unset). A stale entry now falls through so the real request propagates instead of being answered for a dead node. - Key hygiene: mirror NodeDB::updateUser() PKI checks when caching overheard NodeInfo - reject a packet advertising our own public key, and pin keys (drop a NodeInfo whose key mismatches an already-known key from NodeDB or from our own cache). Prevents cache poisoning / key substitution via the spoofed-reply path. - Response throttle: at most one spoofed reply per target node per 30s. Direct responses bypass the per-sender rate limiter (they STOP the request first) and the reply target is attacker-controlled, so this bounds airtime exhaustion and reflected floods. Recorded in a new NodeInfoPayloadEntry.lastResponseMs (PSRAM; self-expiring timestamp compare, no sweep needed). Tests: native NodeDB-fallback staleness (stale drops, fresh serves) plus PSRAM-guarded staleness, throttle, and key-mismatch cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Add TODO(T1-T9) markers for code-review findings on NodeInfo hardening Comment-only. Tags each site flagged in the review of the direct-response throttle/staleness/key-hygiene change so the follow-ups are visible in-context: T1 throttle black-holes distinct requestors; T2 per-target key doesn't bound aggregate TX; T3 non-PSRAM fallback unthrottled; T4 millis-wrap defeats the staleness gate; T5 redundant second O(n) scan for the throttle stamp; T6 duplicated 32-byte key compares; T7 sinceLastSeen() called twice; T8 two 6h constants can desync; T9 clockMs()==0 collides with the 0 sentinel. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Address code-review cleanups T6, T7, T8 in NodeInfo direct-response T8: derive kNodeInfoMaxServeAgeSecs from kNodeInfoMaxServeAgeMs so the PSRAM and NodeDB-fallback staleness windows cannot desync. T6: collapse the three duplicated 32-byte key compares in cacheNodeInfoPacket (owner-impersonation + NodeDB pin + cache TOFU pin) into one pubKeysEqual() helper, so the compare lives in one place. T7: compute sinceLastSeen(node) once on the fallback staleness path so the tested age and the logged age cannot diverge (it calls getTime() each time). Remaining review items still marked in-code: T1/T2/T3 (throttle design), T4/T9 (millis-wrap + 0-sentinel), T5 (redundant throttle-stamp scan). Native test_traffic_management suite: 48/48 passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Throttle the NodeDB fallback direct-response path (T3) The per-target NodeInfo response throttle lived only in the PSRAM NodeInfoPayloadEntry, so non-PSRAM boards - which answer from the NodeDB fallback path - emitted spoofed direct replies with no rate limit at all, leaving the airtime/reflection surface the throttle exists to close. Add a single module-global fallback stamp (nodeInfoFallbackLastResponseMs, 4 bytes, guarded by cacheLock) that throttles the fallback path to one spoofed reply per window across all targets. Coarser than the PSRAM per-target throttle, but the fallback path has no per-node slot to stamp, and a global cap still bounds spoofed transmissions - which is the point. Add a native test exercising the fallback throttle window. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Make NodeInfo staleness/throttle wrap- and sentinel-safe (T4, T9) T9: the millis-based fields that use 0 as a "never" sentinel (lastObservedMs, lastResponseMs, nodeInfoFallbackLastResponseMs) could be stamped with a literal 0 during the one-millisecond clockMs()==0 instant at each ~49.7-day wrap, momentarily colliding with the sentinel and disabling the staleness/throttle gate for that entry. Route all such stamps through a new nowStampMs() that maps 0 -> 1; the 1 ms skew is irrelevant to every window these fields feed. T4: the staleness gate's modular age compare is only unambiguous while true age < 2^32 ms (~49.7 days); an entry that lingered unrefreshed that long could wrap to a small age and read as fresh, defeating the gate. Add a NodeInfo eviction pass to the maintenance sweep that drops entries past the serve window, so an entry is removed long before its age can approach the wrap boundary. This also frees slots holding stale identities. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Stamp PSRAM throttle entry by captured index, not a rescan (T5) The post-send throttle stamp did a second full O(n) scan of the PSRAM NodeInfo array under a fresh lock, even though findNodeInfoEntry() had already located the slot at the top of shouldRespondToNodeInfo(). Capture the slot index during that initial lookup and address the entry directly on the stamp path. Because the cache lock is released between the two accesses, the slot could have been evicted or reused, so re-validate node == p->to under the lock before stamping. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Document accepted per-target throttle tradeoffs (T1, T2) Convert the T1/T2 TODO markers into a NOTE: the per-target PSRAM throttle keying and its lack of an aggregate bound are deliberate design choices, not pending work. A distinct requestor being throttled for one window is harmless on a redundant mesh, and keeping the PSRAM path per-target preserves throughput for legitimate multi-target responders (the fallback path already bounds aggregate via its global stamp). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Track signed-provenance of cached NodeInfo public keys Add keySignerProven to NodeInfoPayloadEntry, set when an observed NODEINFO frame's XEdDSA signature was verified (mp.xeddsa_signed). This distinguishes a trust-on-first-use key from one proven to belong to a signer. The flag is monotonic - once proven it stays proven, and the existing key-pin checks forbid the underlying key from changing - so a later unsigned frame cannot downgrade it. A signature can only be verified against a key we already held, so a first-contact key is always TOFU until a later signed frame upgrades it. Groundwork for using the TMM cache as a last-resort public-key source, where this flag serves as a trust tier. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Draw public keys from the TMM NodeInfo cache as a last resort Add TrafficManagementModule::copyPublicKey() and consult it from NodeDB::copyPublicKey() after the hot (NodeInfoLite) and warm (WarmNodeStore) tiers miss. This extends the pool of peers the node can encrypt to: a key the NodeInfo direct-response cache overheard for a node that has since aged out of both NodeDB tiers can still be used. The getter reports whether the key is signer-proven or trust-on-first-use. NodeDB serves TOFU keys here too - the same first-contact trust NodeDB already applies in updateUser() - so the pool actually expands to new long-tail nodes rather than only re-confirming known keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Retain keyed NodeInfo entries as a pubkey pool; trust-tier eviction Now that NodeDB::copyPublicKey() draws keys from the NodeInfo cache, the flat 6 h serve-window eviction would discard useful keys the moment a node stops being servable. Split retention: an entry carrying a 32-byte public key is kept for kNodeInfoKeyRetentionMs (7 d), while a keyless entry still expires at the serve window. Both windows stay well under the ~49.7-day millis wrap, preserving the T4 wrap-safety guarantee. Make LRU victim selection trust-tiered to match: a keyless slot is sacrificed before any keyed one, and a trust-on-first-use key before a signer-proven key; within a tier the oldest loses. Mirrors WarmNodeStore's keyed-first admission so the most valuable keys are the stickiest under memory pressure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Test signed-provenance flag and copyPublicKey key-pool source PSRAM-gated tests (run on the ESP32 build, alongside the existing NodeInfo PSRAM tests): - copyPublicKey serves a TOFU key learned from an unsigned NodeInfo and reports signerProven=false - a later signature-verified NodeInfo upgrades provenance to signer-proven while the pinned key bytes stay unchanged - copyPublicKey reports a miss for an uncached node Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Inherit signer provenance from NodeDB when caching a re-found node When the TrafficManagement NodeInfo cache re-caches a node, mark its key signer-proven if NodeDB already knows the node as a verified signer for that same key - even if this particular (unicast/unsigned) frame carried no signature. Previously the flag only upgraded on a frame we verified ourselves, so a node we had already proven elsewhere looked TOFU here. Add NodeDB::isVerifiedSignerForKey(), which checks both tiers - the hot store's signed bitfield and the warm tier's cached signer bit - and requires the key to match so a rotated/mismatched key never inherits a stale verdict. Add WarmNodeStore::isVerifiedSigner() to expose the warm signer bit (the rebase onto develop added the bit itself; this surfaces it for lookups). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Lock NodeInfoPayloadEntry packing with a size assert keySignerProven cost zero bytes: sourceChannel, the two bools, and decodedBitfield are four 1-byte fields that fill a single 4-byte tail word (struct alignment is 4), so the flag consumed former padding rather than growing the 2000-entry PSRAM array. Add a static_assert pinning the entry to sizeof(meshtastic_User) + 20 so a future 5th trailing byte - which would open a fresh word (~8 KB PSRAM across the array) - fails the build instead of silently costing memory, prompting new flags to be packed into existing bytes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Pack NodeInfo cache booleans into 1-bit fields Fold hasDecodedBitfield and keySignerProven into adjacent uint8_t:1 bitfields so they share a single byte, reserving 6 spare bits for future flags without growing the 2000-entry PSRAM array. sizeof is unchanged (still one packed tail word, sizeof(meshtastic_User) + 20); access is by name exactly as before, so no call sites change. Reorders decodedBitfield ahead of the flags so the two 1-bit members stay adjacent and the compiler packs them together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Gate NodeInfo replay on signer-proven provenance (compile-time, default on) Add TMM_NODEINFO_REPLAY_REQUIRE_SIGNED (default 1): the direct-response path now only spoofs a reply for a node whose key is signer-proven, in addition to the staleness gate - so replay is based on flagging AND staleness. Replay is a courtesy feature, and vouching for an unverified (trust-on-first-use) identity to other nodes is the risk this closes, so signed-only is the safer default. Define the macro to 0 at build time to also serve fresh TOFU-only nodes. Both paths are gated: the PSRAM path checks the cached keySignerProven flag, the NodeDB fallback checks nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned(node). The effective gate (TMM_NODEINFO_REPLAY_SIGNED_GATE) is bypassed when PKI is excluded from the build, since nothing can be signed there and the courtesy feature would otherwise be disabled outright. Tests: existing reply-expecting tests establish signer-proven state (a new markKeySignerProvenForTest hook for the PSRAM cache, the NodeDB signed bit for the fallback path); add fallback and PSRAM tests asserting an unsigned/TOFU node is withheld under the default gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Rehydrate re-admitted node names from the TMM NodeInfo cache The warm tier keeps an evicted node's key but not its name (the 40-byte record has no room), so a re-admitted long-tail node is nameless until its next NodeInfo broadcast. The TrafficManagement NodeInfo cache is much larger (2000 PSRAM entries) and commonly still holds the full User, so use it as a name reservoir the warm tier structurally cannot be. On re-admission (getOrCreateMeshNode), after the warm-tier restore, copy the cached identity from the TMM cache via a new copyUser() getter - but only when its cached key matches the key just restored from warm, so a name never attaches to a different identity than the one we encrypt to (key-matched trust). Guarded by HAS_TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT and a null check; a no-op without the PSRAM cache or when no key is present. CopyUserToNodeInfoLite sets only user-related bits, so the warm-restored signer bit is preserved. Limitations (by design): PSRAM-only, and the TMM cache is RAM-only, so this helps within an uptime session, not across reboot. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Drop non-portable NodeInfoPayloadEntry size assert (fixes pico build) The static_assert pinned sizeof(NodeInfoPayloadEntry) to sizeof(meshtastic_User) + 20, but nanopb packs the generated User struct differently per platform: on pico its size is not a multiple of 4, so alignment padding before the uint32 timestamps makes the overhead 22, not 20, and the assert failed the build (native happened to be +20 and passed, hiding it). The bitfield packing it was guarding still stands; replace the fixed-count assert with a comment, since no portable byte count exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G7QggdwMM1CJkguuCmMfZs * Run the NodeInfo cache paths in native tests (TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE) The NodeInfo direct-response cache and everything layered on it - key pinning, signer provenance, staleness, throttle - was compiled only for ARCH_ESP32 + BOARD_HAS_PSRAM, so its entire test set was skipped by the native CI suite and ran nowhere but real hardware. Fold the scattered platform guards into one TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE macro that also enables the cache (plain heap, delete[] path already existed) for ARCH_PORTDUINO unit-test builds. Production portduino and embedded test builds are unchanged. Tests that exercise the NodeDB fallback path drop the cache explicitly via a new dropNodeInfoCacheForTest() hook, so both response paths are covered in one binary. Native suite: 60/60 (was 50 with the 10 cache tests compiled out). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit b2dafbbbd6501b42fc27175e599fb38be292b0e3) * Pin NodeInfo cache keys against the warm tier, not just the hot store cacheNodeInfoPacket() mirrored NodeDB::updateUser()'s key pin but checked only getMeshNode() - the hot store. updateUser's own pin effectively covers the warm tier too (getOrCreateMeshNode rehydrates the warm key before the check), so the mirror had a gap: for a node evicted to the warm tier whose cache slot was also gone, an attacker's NodeInfo with a bogus key passed the pin, and the cache's TOFU pin then locked the genuine node's frames out until the poisoned entry aged away. Split the authoritative lookup out of NodeDB::copyPublicKey() as copyPublicKeyAuthoritative() (hot store, then warm tier - never the opportunistic TMM tier, which would compare the cache against itself) and pin against that. Test: warm-tier-only key rejects a mismatching NodeInfo and accepts the matching one. Native suite: 61/61. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit 28e880875ef1f8bf16bdf301a4e6036537a84b4b) * Convert NodeInfo cache clocks to uint8 tick counters Replace the entry's uint32 millis stamps (lastObservedMs, lastResponseMs) with three uint8 free-running tick clocks - the same modular scheme the UnifiedCache counters already use: obsTick 3 min/tick (12.8 h period) - replay staleness gate respTick 5 s/tick (21.3 min) - per-target response throttle retTick 1 h/tick (10.67 d) - retention TTL + LRU age Validity is an explicit flag bit (hasObserved / hasResponded), not a 0 sentinel, and the maintenance sweep saturates a stamp (clears its flag) once its window passes, so no stamp can age toward its ~256-tick aliasing horizon. That retires the wrap/sentinel special cases (T4, T9) - nowStampMs() survives only for the fallback path's module-global millis stamp. obsTick is separated from retention by design: only a genuinely heard NODEINFO frame stamps it, so later membership-based retention refresh can never make a silent node look servable. Also drops lastObservedRxTime, which was only echoed in a debug log. Entry shrinks 136 -> 128 B; the 2000-entry array 272 kB -> 256 kB, 8 kB below the original develop footprint while keeping the throttle and retention features. Tick granularity costs at most one tick per window (+-5 s on 30 s, +-3 min on 6 h, +-1 h on 7 d). Native suite: 61/61. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit e48ed9cfacfed0131b77ed2f1992e8720720d387) * Keep the NodeInfo cache a superset of NodeDB (seed + keep-alive) The cache learned identities only from overheard NODEINFO frames, so its membership was opportunistic: a NodeDB-tier node whose frame was never heard this boot had no entry (no key pin to protect it, no name to rehydrate), and the retention TTL evicted entries for nodes that still lived in the hot store or warm tier. Add an anti-entropy pass to the maintenance sweep (reconcileNodeInfoMembershipLocked): every hot-store / warm-tier node gets an entry - full identity from the hot store (hasFullUser), key-only from the warm tier - with signer provenance inherited key-matched, and NodeDB's key adopted wholesale on conflict. Member entries (isMember) are re-stamped each sweep, so they never age toward the retention TTL; when a node leaves both tiers the keep-alive stops and its entry ages out from its final member re-stamp. Membership also outranks key trust in LRU victim selection, and the reconcile pass skips seeding rather than churn one member out for another when hot+warm exceeds the cache. Two properties are load-bearing: - seeding/keep-alive never touch obsTick/hasObserved, so a seeded or retained entry is never served as a spoofed reply - only genuinely heard frames make a node servable; - copyUser() now requires hasFullUser, so a key-only warm seed can never stamp HAS_USER onto a nameless node via name-rehydration. Native suite: 64/64. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit 4f1b30d838b2f7b11173373b8f1ba97cf91bef6b) * Write-through NodeDB identity commits into the NodeInfo cache updateUser() is the single chokepoint through which every remote identity/key write enters NodeDB (key-verification keys stay in CryptoEngine's pending buffer until a NodeInfo carries them here), so one hook at its tail lets the NodeInfo cache reflect a commit immediately instead of waiting up to a minute for the reconcile sweep - which stays in place as the anti-entropy backstop. onNodeIdentityCommitted() upserts the full User: NodeDB's key is authoritative (a conflicting cached key is stale residue - replaced, provenance dropped), a keyless commit keeps an already-cached TOFU key, and signer provenance transfers only for the committed key. The observation stamp is never touched: knowledge is not observation, so a hook write can never make a never-heard node servable - covered by the new test alongside immediate copyUser/copyPublicKey visibility. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit e160b899728be8d951d4e7bdf5106c777832b917) * Purge TrafficManagement caches on explicit node removal NodeDB::removeNodeByNum() already forgets the node everywhere NodeDB owns - hot store, satellite stores, warm tier - but the TrafficManagement caches kept the deleted identity: the NodeInfo entry went on feeding the key pool (NodeDB::copyPublicKey) and name rehydration, and the unified slot kept its role/next-hop/dedup state, resurrecting the node on next contact. Add purgeNode(): clears both the unified cache slot and the NodeInfo cache entry, called from removeNodeByNum() alongside the warm-tier removal. Removal means full removal; passive eviction never calls this, and the reconcile sweep will not re-seed a node absent from both NodeDB tiers. Test: an observed identity plus a next-hop hint both vanish after removeNodeByNum(). Left for CI to execute per request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT (cherry picked from commit b5564c173337de99e15ef998a5c698550238fd3c) * Document the tmm-fix-2 / tmm-fix-superset reconciliation decisions Two parallel implementations of the same superset design are being combined on this branch. This decision matrix records every divergence and which side each reconciled feature takes, ahead of the code commits that apply them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT * Reconcile retention: no timed eviction, obsTick LRU, hourly seeding Adopt tmm-fix-superset's retention model (reconciliation decisions #3, #4, #9 in .notes/tmm-super-superset-reconciliation.md): - Entries are never evicted on a timer. The 7-day retention TTL and its third tick clock (retTick) are gone; wrap-safety rests entirely on the sweep's presence-bit saturation, and a quiet entry keeps its value (pubkey pool, name rehydration). Slots are reclaimed only by trust/membership-tiered LRU on insert - age scored by obsTick, with never-observed entries counting oldest - or by an explicit purge. - Membership refresh (entry -> NodeDB contains checks) runs every sweep; the heavy seeding pass runs at boot and then hourly, with the write-through hooks carrying immediacy in between. - Tick constants and helpers move into the header beside the existing UnifiedCache tick idiom, with static_asserts tying the tick windows to the fallback path's seconds/ms forms. Kept from tmm-fix-2 (decision #4): the warm tier is still seeded (key-only records via WarmNodeStore::entryAt) so the invariant remains cache superset-of hot AND warm, and the spareMembers guard still stops seeding from churning one member out for another when hot+warm exceeds the cache. Entry shrinks to 128 B (2000 entries = 256 kB). The TTL-based retention test is superseded by a no-timed-eviction test: a quiet keyed entry survives 9 days of sweeps while the serve gate saturates as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT * Reconcile hooks: key-commit write-through, purgeAll, key-matched signer Adopt tmm-fix-superset's hook coverage (reconciliation decisions #5-#8): - onNodeKeyCommitted(): write-through for the two key-write sites that bypass NodeDB::updateUser - the Router's admin-key learn (TOFU-grade) and KeyVerificationModule's manual-verification commit (proven=true, the strongest provenance the cache can carry). Both were coverage gaps in the tmm-fix-2 write-through design. - updateUser's hook call now transfers signer status key-matched (isVerifiedSignerForKey) instead of the node's bare signed flag, and runs on acceptance rather than only on change. - purgeAll(): factoryReset() and resetNodes() clear both TMM tables - removal-is-full-removal applies to bulk resets too, without relying on the usual post-reset reboot. - purgeNode() reuses the existing finders instead of open-coded scans and logs the (user-initiated) purge. - peekNodeInfoFlagsForTest(): flag introspection so saturation and membership tests can assert sweep effects directly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT * Merge the two branches' test suites for the reconciled design Port tmm-fix-superset's unique tests, adapted to run natively under TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE (reconciliation decision #11): - keyHook_upsertsAndGovernsProvenance: TOFU learn -> manual-verification upgrade -> NodeDB-senior rotation resets provenance. - tickSaturation_sweepClearsObserved: the sweep saturates hasObserved past the serve window, the entry persists (no TTL), and a full 256-tick clock wrap cannot alias a saturated stamp back to fresh. - sweepMembershipMarking: reconciliation seeds a hot identity as member+fullUser+unobserved; the next sweep clears membership once the node leaves NodeDB, while the entry itself persists. tmm-fix-2's tests (warm pin, hot/warm seeding, updateUser write-through, removal purge - now also asserting the entry is gone via the new peek hook - and the no-timed-eviction rewrite) were already on this branch. Suite now counts 70 test functions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT * Adapt cherry-picked and seeding tests to the reconciled semantics Two tests needed updating for interactions the validation run surfaced: - The #11035 test (ignoresUnsignedSignerIdentity) was written for a world without the native NodeInfo cache: it needs the NodeDB fallback path (dropNodeInfoCacheForTest) and the signed replay gate satisfied for its target, like the other fallback tests on this branch. - The hot-seed test's "observed frame makes it servable" step now sends a signature-verified frame: its node is a known signer, and per #11035 an unsigned frame from a signer must not (and does not) drive cache writes - the gate working as designed. Full native suite: 70/70 under ASan. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KWHDDxY4U2XLYW2WJJ2oLT * trunk fml * Doc tidyup * TrafficManagement: key NodeInfo-cache maintenance to its own guard runOnce() nested the entire NodeInfo maintenance block (tick-stamp saturation, membership refresh, boot/hourly reconcile) inside #if TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT_CACHE_SIZE > 0, so a variant overriding the unified cache to 0 on a PSRAM board would compile the NodeInfo cache without its maintenance: hasObserved would never saturate, obsTick would alias past its 12.8 h wrap, and the 6 h staleness gate - whose wrap-safety explicitly depends on the sweep - would serve spoofed replies for long-gone nodes. Extract maintainNodeInfoCacheLocked(), guarded by TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE alone, and give runOnce() the same independent-guard structure purgeAll() already has. Also close the runtime cousin of the same mismatch: the write-through hooks (onNodeIdentityCommitted / onNodeKeyCommitted) now no-op while moduleConfig.has_traffic_management is off. Previously they kept filling the cache from NodeDB commits while runOnce() returned INT32_MAX, accumulating entries that were never swept or reconciled. Purges and reads stay ungated: removal must always work, and reads just miss an empty cache. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * TrafficManagement: forward throttled NodeInfo requests instead of consuming them The direct-response throttle returned true, which made handleReceived() STOP the request: within the 30 s window a repeat request was neither answered nor forwarded toward the genuine target, and the call site still logged "respond" and bumped nodeinfo_cache_hits for a reply that was never sent. A requester whose first reply was lost on a noisy link got silence for the whole window. Return false instead: the request flows through normal relay handling, so the genuine node (or another cache-holder) can answer, while our own spoofed TX stays bounded. Repeats of the same packet id are already absorbed by the router's duplicate detection, and the stats counter now only counts replies actually sent. Also log purgeNode() only when a slot was actually cleared - it runs for every NodeDB removal, including nodes the caches never tracked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * TrafficManagement: consolidate NodeInfo-cache #if sprawl into one region Fourteen scattered #if TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE guards (one per function, each with its own #else stub of (void) casts) collapse into a single guarded region holding every NodeInfo-cache-only function, terminated by one #else block of no-op stub definitions. Because the stubs now exist on every build, the call sites in runOnce(), purgeNode() and purgeAll() drop their guards too; inner guards remain only for orthogonal features (PKI, warm tier) and for real conditional work (constructor allocation, PSRAM paths in shouldRespondToNodeInfo). No behavior change. Compile-checked on both sides of the macro: the native app build (stubs) and the native unit-test build (region). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Router: resolve sender key only for PKI-decrypt candidates perhapsDecode() resolved the sender's public key unconditionally for every encrypted packet, before even checking whether the packet could be PKI-decrypted (channel 0, unicast to us). Since copyPublicKey() grew its TrafficManagement fallback tier, a full hot+warm miss - the common case for channel traffic from senders outside both NodeDB tiers - additionally walked the 2000-entry NodeInfo cache under its lock, per packet, for a key that was then discarded. Move the resolution inside the PKI-candidate branch; remotePublic and haveRemoteKey had no consumers outside it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * TrafficManagement: refresh NodeInfo membership hourly, not per-sweep The 60 s sweep re-derived isMember with a per-entry NodeDB lookup: O(entries x members) - about 700k node-number comparisons per minute on a full PSRAM cache (2000 entries x 250 hot + 100 warm), with strided PSRAM reads, all while holding cacheLock against the packet path. Move the refresh into the hourly reconcile pass, which is already O(members x entries): after the seeding loops (so the upsert pass still sees last pass's bits for spareMembers protection), clear every isMember bit and re-mark from both NodeDB tiers - including keyless warm records, which seed nothing but are still members. Accepted tradeoff, now documented on the field: membership lags a passive NodeDB eviction by up to an hour (the entry just stays LRU-sticky slightly longer). Additions stay immediate via the write-through hooks, explicit removals via purgeNode(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * NodeDB: centralize bare-key commits in commitRemoteKey() The two key-write sites that bypass updateUser() (admin-channel learn in Router::perhapsDecode, manual verification in KeyVerificationModule) each carried their own #if HAS_TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT write-through boilerplate - the pattern this PR itself had to retrofit twice, and which any future direct key write would silently miss, leaving the TrafficManagement cache divergent until the next hourly reconcile. Add NodeDB::commitRemoteKey(n, key32, KeyCommitTrust): writes the key to the hot store and routes the TrafficManagement write-through in one place, with provenance explicit at the call site (AdminChannelProven maps to TOFU-grade, ManuallyVerified to proven). The bypass sites keep their reason for existing - bare-key commits with provenance that updateUser's User-payload/TOFU-pin path cannot express - but no longer know about TrafficManagement at all; both stale includes are dropped (Router's was already unused on develop). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: tick wrap-safety analysis, updated cadences, CodeRabbit doc fixes node_info_stores.md gains a "Tick clocks and wrap safety" section recording which mechanism keeps each modular tick clock honest: the unified-cache clocks pair the 60 s sweep with read-time window resets, the NodeInfo obs/resp clocks are sweep-only (hence the compile-time invariant that maintainNodeInfoCacheLocked() is guarded by TMM_HAS_NODEINFO_CACHE alone), and the warm tier is immune by design - absolute unix-seconds, no wrap until 2106. Also brought current with this series: membership refresh moved to the hourly reconcile, throttled direct-response requests forward instead of being consumed, the commitRemoteKey() bare-key funnel, and the module-disabled gate on the write-through hooks. CodeRabbit doc review (PR #11050): present the NodeInfo payload cache as the third *identity* tier with the unified cache beside the chain, and describe NodeInfoLite's flattened fields / satellite copy-out accessors instead of the removed nested members. Two stale docs/tmm_node_stores.md references in the header now point at the real file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * TrafficManagement: adapt tests to forwarded throttles and hourly membership Throttle tests (PSRAM and NodeDB-fallback paths): a request inside the 30 s window now CONTINUEs into normal relay handling instead of being consumed - assert no spoofed TX, no NAK suppression, and (PSRAM path) that nodeinfo_cache_hits counts only replies actually sent. Membership test (renamed reconcileMembershipMarking): the per-minute sweep no longer refreshes isMember, so the test now pins down both halves of the new contract - the very next sweep after a passive NodeDB eviction still shows the stale member bit (the documented up-to-an-hour lag), and a reconcile interval's worth of sweeps clears it. Disabled-module test additionally proves the write-through hooks share the has_traffic_management gate: a key commit while disabled must not land in the NodeInfo cache. Not covered here: a build permutation with TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT_CACHE_SIZE overridden to 0 (the configuration the maintenance-guard fix protects) would need its own PlatformIO env plus guards on every unified-cache test - left as a follow-up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * expand test coverage * nitpicks and docs update * more comment fixes * nitpicks * test: make TMM fixture cleanup abort-safe in tearDown() Several tests reset per-test global state (trafficManagementModule pointing at a stack `module`, owner.public_key, the RTC fake clock) only after their assertions. A TEST_ASSERT_* failure longjmps out and skips that trailing cleanup, leaving the state to dangle into later cases - concretely, the next setUp()'s resetNodes() would call trafficManagementModule->purgeAll() on a destroyed object. Move the resets into tearDown(), which runs unconditionally between tests, and drop the now-redundant per-test cleanups. Addresses a CodeRabbit review comment on PR #11050. clod helped too * docs tidy * Throttle NodeInfo direct responses A direct response is addressed to the requesting packet's from field, which is unauthenticated, and is sent by every neighbour that holds the target in cache. One request therefore makes several nodes transmit at an address the requester chose, and nothing limited how often that could be repeated. Replies are now spaced per requester, which bounds how much any single node can be made to receive, plus a global floor on how much airtime the feature can consume. The check sits where a reply is about to be sent, so requests declined for other reasons do not consume the budget. * test: reconcile TMM direct-response tests with #11104 throttle Makes the suite green for now. #11104's per-requester + global-floor throttle (60 s) is layered over the branch's per-target throttle, so the three existing "served again" checks (psram, fallback, sweep) now use a fresh requester to avoid the per-requester window masking the mechanism each one actually exercises. Adds a dedicated test for the new per-requester + 1 s global-floor behaviour (the reflector-flood gap the per-target throttle leaves open, and the bound that survives on non-PSRAM builds). Deferred: the branch's now-redundant fallback global stamp (nodeInfoFallbackLastResponseMs) is left in place as a follow-up cleanup. Clod wants credit. * TMM: unify direct-response throttles into per-sender + per-target RAM tables Replace the two path-specific NodeInfo-spoof throttles (per-entry respTick on the PSRAM cache path, single global stamp on the fallback path) with three symmetric bounds that behave identically with and without PSRAM: - per requester (60 s): how much any one node can be made to receive; - per target (60 s): how often we vouch for the same identity; - global floor (1 s): total airtime, the backstop once an attacker cycles requester/target past the 8-slot tables. Both axes are fixed 8-slot LRU tables in internal RAM (not the PSRAM NodeInfo cache), compared by wrap-safe uint32 ms subtraction, so there is no tick clock and no sweep to maintain. directResponseAllowed() resolves both slots before stamping either, so a reply one axis throttles never consumes the other's budget, and records the send itself. Retires: nodeInfoFallbackLastResponseMs, kNodeInfoResponseThrottleMs, nowStampMs, the respTick byte + hasResponded bit on every cache entry, currentRespTick/kNodeInfoRespTickMs/kNodeInfoThrottleTicks, and the sweep's respTick clear. Renumbers peekNodeInfoFlagsForTest (drops the responded bit). Tests: the psram/fallback throttle tests now assert the per-target axis at 60 s, isolated via a different requester, proving it holds with and without PSRAM; perRequesterAndGlobalFloor isolates the other two axes; the obsolete respTick wrap-safety test is removed. 83/83 native cases pass. clod helped too * whats up, doc? * trimming the comments * test: bump native-suite-count to 38 after upstream rebase Upstream develop carries 38 test_* suite directories but its native-suite-count file still reads 37 (a suite was added without bumping the count). Rebasing onto develop inherits that stale file, so the runner flags AMBER. Correct the registered total to 38. clod helped too --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Thomas Göttgens <tgoettgens@gmail.com> |
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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0165e914a9 | fix: gate module replies by request port (#11094) | ||
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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7bdc2569e8 | Budget the admin-key PKI decrypt fallback (#11100) | ||
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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077c6e72f4 | Corroborate traceroute next-hop updates against the relaying node (#11108) | ||
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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b299cc2427 | Honour which_payload_variant on MQTT client-proxy ingress (#11097) | ||
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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d9f8839241 |
Accept a pending key only for the key-verification exchange (#11107)
perhapsDecode fell back to the not-yet-verified key held during a key verification handshake for any incoming PKI unicast. That key is supplied by whoever opened the handshake and proves only that they hold it, not that they are the node they claim to be, so until the session ended they could send DMs on any port that decrypted and were marked pki_encrypted. perhapsEncode already restricts the pending key to KEY_VERIFICATION_APP. The receive path now applies the same rule. |
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Ben Meadors
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1317176f78 |
test: accept DECODE_OPAQUE/DECODE_POLICY_REJECT in perhapsDecode fuzz assertion
The packet-auth-policy change extends the DecodeState enum with DECODE_OPAQUE and DECODE_POLICY_REJECT. test_E1_perhaps_decode_fuzz drives arbitrary ciphertext through perhapsDecode and asserted the verdict was one of the original three states; random ciphertext that matches no channel with no PKI attempt now returns DECODE_OPAQUE, tripping the assertion. Broaden the check to accept all five valid verdicts, matching the test's stated 'any verdict is fine' contract. |
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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6f522aad17 |
Return the secret sentinel for remote admin config gets (#11093)
writeSecret is a setter, so calling it on the NETWORK_CONFIG get path was a no-op: the buffer already holds the stored psk, never the sentinel. MQTT_CONFIG returned the broker password verbatim. Both get paths now return secretReserved when req.from != 0, and the matching set paths call writeSecret so a read-modify-write round trip keeps the stored value. |
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Benjamin Faershtein
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08cfb3d683 | Merge upstream develop into packet authentication policy | ||
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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5cf346311c |
fix: don't wipe admin keys when regenerating the keypair (#11088)
A client's "regenerate keys" action sends a blank SecurityConfig carrying only the new private key rather than the config it read from the device, so assigning it wholesale cleared admin_key, is_managed, serial_enabled, debug_log_api_enabled, admin_channel_enabled and packet_signature_policy. Losing the admin keys locks the owner out of remote admin with no recourse but a physical connection to the node. Detect that bare-rotation shape and swap in just the keypair, leaving the rest of the security config intact. Deliberately clearing admin keys still works through a SET that leaves the private key alone. Fixes #11073 |
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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290967f739 | Release packets the interface declines to send (#11087) | ||
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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5ded0ec8c5 | Gate identity learning on signature in NodeDB::updateUser (#11084) | ||
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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405a6bfd8a | Strip inner-message padding when sizing unsigned broadcasts (#11083) | ||
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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ba8b1b1038 | Treat backslash as a path separator in XModem filename validation (#11085) | ||
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Benjamin Faershtein
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59ab12675a | Merge develop into packet authentication policy | ||
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TomandGitHub
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b8b5582943 |
Regioninfo (#11056)
* advertise a superset of EU regional presets to client devices. * trunk |
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TomandGitHub
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ff951059cf |
test: correct native-suite-count to 37 (#11059)
native-suite-count drifted from the actual test/test_*/ directory count: #10669 added two suites (test_admin_session_repro, test_pki_admin_fallback) but bumped the count by only one, and #11037 added test_xmodem without bumping it at all. The file reads 35 against 37 real suites, which bin/run-tests.sh reports as AMBER on every full run. Correct it to 37. |
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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8147970957 |
AdminModule: only accept admin responses to requests we sent (#11024)
* AdminModule: only accept admin responses to requests we sent An admin *_response short-circuited the auth and session-passkey checks that gate every other admin message, so any node could deliver one. On a channel the module listens to unauthenticated, a get_module_config_response drives the remote-hardware pin handler with attacker-supplied values. Track the destination of outgoing admin requests (per remote, with the pinned PKC key when there is one) and accept a response only from a node with a matching outstanding request, inside the same window as the session passkey. Local (from == 0) admin is unchanged; PhoneAPI already gates it. Also fix the response dispatch: get_module_config_response.which_payload_variant is a ModuleConfig oneof tag, but it was compared against the AdminMessage ModuleConfigType enum (different numbering), so the handler never ran. Compare against the oneof tag. * AdminModule: rollover-safe request window, bind response to request type Two review refinements to the request/response pairing: Use Throttle::isWithinTimespanMs for the outstanding-request expiry instead of comparing millis()/1000 sums, which mis-expired across the millis() rollover. Bind each accepted response to a request type actually sent to that node. Each outstanding record now carries a bitmask of the response variants its requests authorize, so a get_owner request no longer admits a get_module_config response. The mask accumulates per remote, so a client may still pipeline several request types to one node and have every answer accepted. * AdminModule: track admin requests per-request, not per-node Reworks the outstanding-request table so each request is its own entry with its own expiry window and pinned key, replacing the per-node bitmask that shared one timestamp and one key across every response variant. That sharing let a later request to the same node extend an earlier one's window and, worse, clear its PKC pin: an unpinned request cleared keyValid, so a plaintext response to an earlier PKC-pinned request was then accepted. Per-request entries keep each pin intact. Identical requests are de-duplicated (a client may fetch several config subtypes, all answered by one response variant) and eviction compares elapsed time, which is rollover-safe. Test: a pinned request's response still requires its key after an unpinned request to the same node. * AdminModule: match module-config subtype and consume answered requests Two refinements to the request/response pairing: Only remote_hardware get_module_config_response mutates state (the pin table), so it must answer a request for that exact ModuleConfigType, not just any module-config request. Each entry records the requested subtype and the gate checks it. A matched request is now consumed on accept, so a node cannot replay a state-mutating response within the window. Because one request yields one response, request de-dup is dropped (a client's N indexed get_channel requests are N entries, each consumed once). Tests: a non-remote-hardware request does not admit a remote_hardware response, and a second copy of an answered response is rejected. |
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d5f78a37d3 |
XModem: reject path-traversal filenames in the transfer handler (#11037)
The SOH/STX control frame carries a client-supplied filename that was passed straight to FSCom open/remove/exists, so a ".." component could write, read, or delete outside the filesystem root. On embedded LittleFS this is largely inert (no parent of the partition root); on the Portduino daemon FSCom is the host filesystem under a mountpoint, so it is a real arbitrary-path write/read/delete. Validate the filename before any FS access: reject empty and any ".." path component, and NAK the transfer. Absolute and subdirectory paths are still accepted - the file manager transfers them from the manifest and PortduinoFS confines them to its mountpoint - so only traversal out of the root is blocked. Reachable only from a local client connection (PhoneAPI: BLE/USB/serial/TCP), not over the RF mesh; on the daemon the TCP API makes it network-reachable. native-suite-count goes to 34: +1 for the new test_xmodem suite and +1 correcting a pre-existing miscount (it read 32 for 33 suite directories). Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> |
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a7fde715c6 |
PhoneAPI: gate local admin on the connection, not the wire from (#11033)
* PhoneAPI: gate local admin on the connection, not the wire from The lockdown admin check in handleToRadioPacket only ran when p.from == 0. from is a client-supplied wire field, and MeshService::handleToRadio rewrites it to 0 before AdminModule sees the packet. A client could therefore set from != 0 to skip the !getAdminAuthorized() drop, then have the packet normalized back to a local-admin identity and executed - unauthorized admin from an unauthorized connection. Every packet in handleToRadioPacket already comes from the local connection, so locality is a property of the connection, not of from. Move the decision into classifyLocalAdminPacket(), which ignores from and keys only on the admin variant and the connection's authorization: lockdown_auth is delivered inline, any other admin from an unauthorized connection is dropped, authorized admin passes through. The classifier is compiled unconditionally and unit-tested; the guarded caller (built only in the nRF52 lockdown config) calls it. Test: an unauthorized connection's ADMIN_APP packet with from != 0 is classified DropUnauthorized. * PhoneAPI: wipe the encoded lockdown passphrase, shorten comments --------- Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> |
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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ed3afdbc61 | TrafficManagement: don't learn identity from a signer's unsigned NodeInfo (#11035) | ||
    Jonathan BennettGitHubThomas Göttgenscoderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>IxitxachitlCopilot Autofix powered by AI |
8d1fbbf55f |
Snake! (#10936)
* Snake! * Add spiLock to snake score saving * Check fixes * More careful locking * WIP: Big Display Node * Update src/graphics/HUB75Display.cpp Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Add HUB75 Native * Add Tetris game module with core logic and UI integration - Implement TetrisGame class for game logic, including piece movement, rotation, and line clearing. - Create TetrisModule class to manage game state, input handling, and rendering on OLED display. - Introduce high score tracking with persistence and optional mesh broadcasting. - Define UI states for title, playing, paused, game over, and high scores. - Implement input handling for game controls and state transitions. - Add rendering functions for the game board, high scores, and title screen. * feat(snake): add snake graphics and update display logic in SnakeModule * Prompt for Initials for Tetris, too * refactor games module * Games refactor * hub75 native double buffer * Games tuning * Make joystick repeat events on held button * Add clouds and colors * Fix breakout and more color * difficulty tuning * trunk * refactor game announcements, etc * Scale chirpy gravity as game speed increases * Portduino, check for hub75 display before reading in hub75 options * Final(?) games tuning * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * Properly ignore input when games screen not shown * Fail gracefully when HUB75 is selected but not supported. --------- Co-authored-by: Thomas Göttgens <tgoettgens@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ixitxachitl <kramerfm@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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d3d02af817 |
AdminModule: don't return the device private key to remote config reads (#11030)
A SECURITY_CONFIG get_config response copied config.security verbatim, so a remote request was answered with the device identity private_key and sent over the air. Only the local owner needs it, for backup. Zero private_key in the SECURITY_CONFIG response when the request is remote (from != 0); the local BLE/USB/TCP path (from == 0) still receives it. public_key and admin_key are public and stay as they were. |
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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381f9c196d | NodeDB: clear only the slots removeNodeByNum() vacates (#11022) | ||
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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e219e24b09 | WarmNodeStore: carry the XEdDSA signer flag through the warm tier (#11020) | ||
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Thomas GöttgensandGitHub
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f52d7753ad | Router: size the fit check from the decoded Data (#11018) | ||
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952c825167 |
Allow key verification to work for unknown nodes. (#10669)
* Allow key verification to work for unknown nodes. * trunk * More reliable admin key decryption * Add admin key fallback tests * Actually check haveRemoteKey * Logging cleanup * Address review feedback - Persist the committed key + manually-verified flag in commitVerifiedRemoteNode via saveToDisk(SEGMENT_NODEDATABASE), replacing the "todo: initiate save" - Guard the CryptoEngine pending-key slot with a dedicated internal lock; the Router reads it while already holding the non-recursive cryptLock, so the accessors cannot reuse that lock - Draw the security number from the hardware RNG (CryptRNG fallback) under cryptLock instead of random(); on nRF52 the entropy fill toggles the same CC310 the BLE task's packet crypto uses - Return true after fully handling the hash2 response (restores develop behavior; consistent with the hash1 branch) - Take uint32_t in the number-picker callbacks so 8-digit hex nodenums can't truncate through int - Trim over-long comments flagged by review * feat(tests): add deterministic tests for admin session-key behavior --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> |
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dd509a8ecf |
Compute GeoCoord's UTM/MGRS/OSGR/OLC lazily instead of eagerly (#10996)
GeoCoord's constructor unconditionally computed all five coordinate representations (DMS, UTM, MGRS, OSGR, OLC) via setCoords(), even though most callers only ever read one. The UTM conversion alone pulls in a chain of libm trig functions (atan, __kernel_tan, __ieee754_acos, __ieee754_pow, __kernel_rem_pio2/__ieee754_rem_pio2) that then have to be linked in regardless of whether anything is ever displayed. The only screen consumer (UIRenderer.cpp's GPS coordinate display) already dispatches on a single configured format and reads exactly one representation per call - never more than one. Compute DMS eagerly (cheap, most commonly needed) and defer UTM/MGRS/OSGR/OLC to first access via their own getters, tracked with per-representation mutable dirty flags, so a caller that never touches a given representation never pulls in its conversion code or the trig functions it needs. On stm32wl, GeoCoord's heavy constructor is reached only through NMEAWPL.cpp's NMEA/CalTopo serial export (GPS-gated, so wio-e5 only), which only ever reads the DMS getters - so this recovers 8,288 bytes flash there (of the 10,172-byte ceiling if the whole feature were cut) with the feature fully intact and zero behavior change on any platform. Updated test_geocoord_extreme_coords_no_oob (the existing regression test for a historical out-of-bounds crash in the UTM/MGRS conversion on extreme lat/lon) to explicitly call each representation's getter, since it previously relied on the constructor eagerly triggering all four conversions - which this change intentionally defers. Verified: full native test suite passes (586/586 test cases, including this one under ASan), and rak4631 (nRF52, screen-equipped, where the UTM/MGRS/OSGR/OLC getters are actually reachable) builds successfully. Assisted-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Yong <me@ndoo.sg> Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> |
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5513c36757 |
Add helpful checks of channel names and PSK (#10792)
* added warnings from firmware for simple channel setting mistakes * more and better checks * one ping only * Drop literal 'AQ==' from blank-PSK channel warnings The base64 encoding of the default channel key isn't something a user should type in by hand; state the condition instead of a raw key value. --------- Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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c5355641d3 |
Add MEDIUM_TURBO modem preset (#10988)
* Protobufs * Wire up MEDIUM_TURBO modem preset MEDIUM_TURBO (500 kHz, SF9, CR 4/5) already existed in the protobuf enum but was never wired into firmware, so selecting it silently fell through to the LONG_FAST default and rendered an "Invalid" display name. Add its bw/sf/cr mapping (modemPresetToParams), display name (MediumTurbo/MedT), PRESETS_STD membership (standard regions only — 500 kHz does not fit EU868's 250 kHz band, so it stays out of PRESETS_EU_868 and is rejected/clamped there), and the MEDIUM SNR-grading bucket. Includes positive coverage in test_radio, EU868-reject + US-accept coverage in test_admin_radio and test_mesh_beacon, the STD preset count 9->10, an extended fuzz range, and the client-spec doc. * Address review feedback on MEDIUM_TURBO tests - test_mesh_beacon: assert has_mesh_beacon before checking the invalid preset was cleared, so the EU868-cleared test can't pass on a dropped message (matches the existing SHORT_TURBO test). - test_fuzz_packets: draw modem presets from _ModemPreset_ARRAYSIZE instead of a hard-coded 17 so the fuzz range tracks future enum additions automatically. |
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 p0nsandGitHub
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ca833d944c |
Fix serial protobuf corruption on short USB CDC writes (#10976)
* Fix serial protobuf corruption on short writes SerialConsole shared raw debug output and framed protobuf traffic on one HWCDC stream. Raw text could interleave inside an active frame when API logging was disabled. Separately, HWCDC deliberately returns a short write after bounded backpressure; StreamAPI abandoned that frame after PhoneAPI had already advanced, so the next 0x94c3 header landed inside the previous declared payload. Suppress all unframed output after protobuf mode starts and honor the existing config-replay log pause. For HWCDC, retain short frame tails in the persistent tx buffers and finish them on later loop passes before dequeuing another FromRadio packet. Logs remain best-effort and only start when their complete frame fits; main packets are deferred rather than dropped if a synchronous log is pending. Do not call HWCDC flush for framed serial output, since its no-progress path can discard queued bytes. TCP and non-HWCDC transports keep their existing behavior. Validated on Cardputer ADV (200-node DB) and Heltec Tracker V2: 400 initial full-DB sessions plus 140 final sessions across both API-log settings, zero malformed frames/timeouts/incomplete DBs; 2-20s forced reader stalls resume with complete DBs; abrupt stalled-client replacement 5/5 per board; 150s post-close reboot counts stable. Builds pass for Cardputer, Heltec, tbeam, and rak4631. * Add serial frame continuation regression tests Extract the HWCDC pending/deferred frame state machine into a small transport-independent helper so native tests exercise the same production logic used by SerialConsole. Keep framing, persistent buffer ownership and locking in SerialConsole. Cover short-tail continuation, deferred main-frame ordering, best-effort log admission, bounded zero-progress calls, generic StreamAPI failure semantics, PhoneAPI advancement gating, framed-log gating and raw output suppression. The coverage suite passes 31/31 suites and 582/582 tests. * Address review: guard flush, assert deferred invariant, dedup framing - Make SerialConsole::flush() a no-op in protobuf mode: HWCDC::flush()'s no-progress path discards queued TX bytes, which would tear a framed stream when the sleep path flushes with a stalled host. - Assert the single required-frame producer invariant in StreamFrameWriter::writeFrame() instead of silently dropping a second required frame. - Hoist 0x94C3 header construction into StreamAPI::buildFrameHeader() so SerialConsole no longer re-hardcodes the framing constants. * Test retained serial tail across client replacement Model a replacement client arriving while an older required frame has an unwritten tail. Require the old frame to complete before the new frame starts, so a new 0x94C3 header can never land inside the old declared payload. * Document serial frame APIs and regression tests Add concise Doxygen comments for the frame continuation hooks, production helper, native test doubles, and regression scenarios. Document why retained frame tails intentionally survive client disconnects: HWCDC may still hold the accepted prefix, so dropping metadata could insert a new frame header inside the old declared payload. |
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Benjamin Faershtein
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d6b12ea3f1 | feat(security): enforce packet authenticity policies | ||
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Ben Meadors
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515fe8b94f | Clamp bw for malformed use_preset false with empty bandwidth | ||
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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8d20606203 |
feat(config): make position & telemetry broadcast opt-in (#10929)
Position sharing was opt-out (the default primary channel shipped position_precision=13) while device telemetry was already opt-in, and a normal firmware upgrade preserves saved config, so existing nodes stayed position-on. This makes both broadcasts opt-in, both on a fresh flash and via a one-time migration for upgrading nodes. - Fresh default: initDefaultChannel now sets position_precision=0. - One-time migration in loadFromDisk, gated on a dedicated POSITION_TELEMETRY_OPTIN_VER (26) watermark kept separate from DEVICESTATE_CUR_VER (bumping that would re-run the NodeDatabase v24 legacy decoder on already-migrated v25 DBs): disables position broadcast on PUBLIC/default-PSK channels and forces every device-telemetry mesh-broadcast flag plus the MQTT map-report location off. - Private-PSK channels are left untouched: a channel with a custom key is a deliberate trusted-group setup, so its configured precision is preserved. - Idempotent: ordinary saves never re-stamp .version, so a user who re-enables sharing is not re-disabled on the next boot. - Added pure channelFileUsesPublicKey() (operates on the raw ChannelFile, since the channels singleton isn't initialized during loadFromDisk) and refactored Channels::usesPublicKey() to delegate to it. - New test/test_optin_migration native suite (14 cases). |
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d846780a9b |
More fuzz tests and small fixes for the findings (#10864)
* first pass tests * more tests * Fix two crafted-admin-packet crashes found by the E5 fuzzer Both are reachable from an authorized admin (local from==0, admin channel, or PKC) - remote DoS: 1. SIGFPE in LoRa config validation. A set_config LoRaConfig with use_preset=false and bandwidth=0 makes freqSlotWidth 0, so numFreqSlots is 0 and `hash(name) % numFreqSlots` (RadioInterface.cpp) divides by zero. Guard the modulo; the existing channel_num check then rejects/ clamps the config. 2. Stack overflow in Channels::getKey. A SECONDARY channel at the primary slot with an empty PSK recursed into getKey(primaryIndex) forever. Skip the primary-key borrow when chIndex == primaryIndex. Re-enable the E5 admin fuzzer to hit both triggers again (use_preset both ways incl. bandwidth 0, plus the set_channel tag) as regression guards. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Correct fuzz-test invariants after the crash fixes - E5 admin fuzz: node eviction under a filling NodeDB is legitimate, so assert only the bounded-count invariant, not that a specific seed node survives 6000 mutating ops. - TMM blitz: scope off the nodeinfo direct-response send path (it needs a fully-wired MeshService/phone queue the fixture doesn't provide; the deterministic directResponse tests cover it). The crafted-nodenum rate/unknown/position cache stress is unchanged. clod helped too * realistic tests * test: dedup fuzz RNG into shared test/support/DeterministicRng.h The four in-tree fuzz suites (test_fuzz_decode, test_fuzz_packets, test_hop_scaling, test_traffic_management) each carried a byte-identical copy of the seeded 64-bit LCG (rngSeed/rngNext/rngByte/rngRange). Hoist it into one shared header so there is a single generator to reason about and no risk of the copies drifting. static inline keeps per-suite state per translation unit and avoids -Wunused-function for suites that don't use every helper. Also corrects a stale comment in test_traffic_management (the blitz's nodeinfo direct-response path is intentionally left off). No behavioral change: same constants, same per-suite seeds. clod helped too * test: fuzz uncovered ProtobufModule handlers and the MQTT downlink ingress Extend the in-tree fuzz coverage to packet sources that previously had none: - test_fuzz_packets E8/E9/E10: drive PositionModule, DeviceTelemetryModule and NeighborInfoModule at handleReceivedProtobuf directly (via using-shims, bypassing the ProtobufModule reply/send path so no router is needed). The fixture already stands up nodeDB/service/channels, and nodeStatus/powerStatus are auto-initialized in main.cpp, so no new globals are required. Adds a shared fuzzRxHeader() helper for crafting adversarial RX packet headers. - test_fuzz_decode: add meshtastic_KeyVerification to the decode table. The KeyVerification and StoreForward handler paths are documented as decode-level only, with the concrete reason each is intrinsic (private-state gating / PSRAM + self-pointer wiring), not a fixture gap. - test_mqtt: test_receiveFuzzServiceEnvelope blitzes the non-RF broker-push ingress (onReceiveProto) two ways - raw garbage bytes that must fail envelope decode cleanly, and a well-formed ServiceEnvelope wrapping a crafted inner MeshPacket over crafted channel_id/gateway_id - exercising the channel match, isFromUs, XEdDSA receive policy and perhapsDecode chain. Adds a deliverRaw() passthrough to MQTTUnitTest. All under the coverage env (ASan/LSan). No firmware/src changes. Full sweep GREEN 27/27, 544 cases. clod helped too * Harden LoRa/channel config against crafted admin messages; consolidate test helpers Production (review findings on the hot-fuzz crash fixes): - Clamp bandwidth at the source (clampBandwidthKHz) in checkOrClampConfigLora and applyModemConfig so numFreqSlots can never be 0 for any consumer; a bandwidth-0 set_config previously passed validation and re-armed the SIGFPE on the next applyModemConfig. - Guard applyModemConfig's hash % numFreqSlots (the validator's sibling modulo was fixed earlier but this one was still unguarded). - Enforce the primary-channel invariant in Channels::onConfigChanged: a config demoting every slot now re-promotes the stale SECONDARY slot (keeping its key) or restores the default channel if the slot is DISABLED, instead of leaving every getPrimaryIndex() reader on a non-primary slot. The getKey recursion guard stays as defense-in-depth. Tests: - New test/support/MockMeshService.h and AdminModuleTestShim.h replace four byte-identical mocks and three divergent admin shims (test_mqtt's capturing mock is genuinely different and stays). - DeterministicRng.h: add rngFill() (replaces 14 hand-rolled fill loops) and rngEdgeNodeNum() (unifies the three NodeNum boundary pools). - Extract fuzzChannelSettings() shared by the set_channel case and fuzzBeacon. - fuzzBeacon: the un-terminated branch now fills the whole buffer with non-NUL bytes so the strnlen bound is actually stressed (~50% of iterations, not ~4%). - E6 beacon fuzz: replace the TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(true) tautology with real invariants (handler never consumes; offers land in lastReceivedOffer keyed to the sender). - Trim the seven over-long comment blocks flagged against the 1-2 line rule; the FINDINGS trailer moves to this commit message (see production notes). Full native suite GREEN 27/27 under the coverage (ASan/LSan) env. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Clamp UTF-8 char length in the emote walkers; add test_fuzz_emotes A TEXT_MESSAGE payload is opaque protobuf bytes, so PB_VALIDATE_UTF8 never screens it - invalid UTF-8 and truncated multi-byte lead bytes reach the emote/width render path verbatim. EmoteRenderer's walkers advanced by utf8CharLen(lead) without clamping to the bytes actually remaining, so a truncated lead (e.g. a lone 0xF0, which claims 4 bytes) near the end of the buffer made getUtf8ChunkWidth's memcpy read past the string. ASan confirms a heap-buffer-overflow READ from measureStringWithEmotes. Add utf8CharLenClamped() and use it at every walk site (width measure, truncation cut-loop, and the draw-path text-run/chunk builders); the one already-guarded site (matchAtIgnoringModifiers) is unchanged. New test/test_fuzz_emotes drives measureStringWithEmotes and truncateToWidth over adversarial byte strings (biased to embed/end in truncated multi-byte leads) in exact-sized heap buffers so any over-read is a hard ASan fault. Its headless display uses a synthetic font (firstChar 0, fontData centered in a large buffer) so the stock OLEDDisplay::getStringWidth - which indexes the font jump table with a signed char and over-reads for any byte >= 0x80 - does not mask the finding. native-suite-count bumped 27 -> 28. Full native suite GREEN 28/28 under the coverage (ASan/LSan) env. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Keep emote width measurement in-bounds for non-ASCII bytes OLEDDisplay::getStringWidth (the utf8=false path EmoteRenderer uses on default builds) indexes the font jump table by (c - firstChar) with a signed char and no bounds check, so any byte outside printable ASCII - high bytes from UTF-8 text, but also a stray control byte like 0x0A - reads outside the font array. On-device this reads adjacent flash and returns a garbage width; under ASan the test_fuzz_emotes fuzzer flags it as a global-buffer-overflow, and it made the non-ASCII width measurement meaningless either way. The OLED driver is a pinned upstream dependency, so guard it firmware-side in EmoteRenderer's getStringWidth helper: measure a sanitized copy where any byte outside [0x20, 0x7E] counts as a '?' placeholder. Printable ASCII is unchanged and the UA/RU lookup path is untouched. test_fuzz_emotes now drives a real ArialMT font instead of the synthetic in-bounds font it needed before this fix, so the suite exercises the true production width path (utf8CharLen clamp + this sanitizer) end to end. The same fuzzer tripped the global-buffer-overflow before this change. Full native suite GREEN 28/28 under the coverage (ASan/LSan) env. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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6c7ee8afc7 |
Add MemAudit: per-subsystem heap accounting in the boot log (#10900)
* Add MemAudit: per-subsystem heap accounting in the boot log The 2.8.0 nRF52840 heap-exhaustion field reports had to be diagnosed by hand, reconstructing each subsystem's heap footprint from source and build flags one report at a time. This makes every future report self-diagnosing from the serial log: a tiny fixed-size registry (src/memory/MemAudit.*) that big long-lived allocations report into, printed as one line at the end of setup() and alongside the periodic "Heap free:" log: MemAudit[boot]: tmm=2500 warm=4000 pkthist=5824 nodedb=13440 msgstore=2200 pktpool(live)=3270 total=31234 Instrumented: NodeDB hot vector (nodedb) + satellite maps (satmaps, rb-tree overhead estimated), WarmNodeStore (warm), PacketHistory records and hash index (pkthist), TrafficManagement caches (tmm/tmm_ni), MessageStore text pool (msgstore), TFT line/repaint buffers (display), and live in-flight packets (pktpool(live)) via an optional audit tag on the packet pool allocator - the one hot path, counted with a relaxed 32-bit atomic add (single instructions on Cortex-M, no locks). Cost: 128 B RAM for the 16-tag table, well under 1 KB flash on rak4631. MESHTASTIC_MEM_AUDIT=0 compiles it out to inline no-op stubs (call sites need no ifdefs); STM32WL, the tightest flash target, defaults off. New native suite test_mem_audit covers add/set/snapshot arithmetic, tag reuse (pointer and cross-TU strcmp fallback), null/unknown tags, and table-full behavior; test/native-suite-count bumped to 28. * native-wasm: add src/memory/ to the curated source filter The wasm env denies all sources and adds an explicit file list; MemAudit callers (main, MeshService, NodeDB, PacketHistory) are in that list but src/memory/MemAudit.cpp was not, so wasm-ld failed on undefined memaudit:: symbols. |
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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ed03a69555 |
Right-size nRF52 heap tiers after 2.8.0 heap-exhaustion field reports (#10898)
* Right-size nRF52 heap tiers after 2.8.0 heap-exhaustion field reports Field reports on 2.8.0 show nRF52840 devices at 99% heap (114/115 KB) within minutes of boot; operator new asserts on OOM, so these devices are one allocation from a reboot. The 2.8.0 cache sizing ladders gave nRF52 the largest non-PSRAM tiers on the assumption that a BLE-only part has a roomy heap - the arena is actually ~125 KB shared with the FreeRTOS task stacks. Per-target retiers (nRF52840 unless noted): - Traffic Management cache 1000 -> 250 entries (10 KB -> 2.5 KB); the unclassified fallthrough drops 1000 -> 400 to match the classic-ESP32 tier (also affects RP2040/RP2350) - Warm node store 200 -> 100 entries (8 KB -> 4 KB); the non-XXAA fallthrough drops 320 -> 100 so an unclassified RAM-constrained part can't boot-allocate 12.8 KB - MESSAGE_HISTORY_LIMIT 20 -> 10 (text pool 4.4 KB -> 2.2 KB), the tier classic ESP32 already ships - MAX_RX_TOPHONE 32 -> 16, shrinking the static packet pool 70 -> 54 slots (~6.6 KB of .bss returned to the heap arena) - PacketHistory hash index off arch-wide (1 KB); O(n) over 240 records is negligible at LoRa packet rates - OLEDDISPLAY_REDUCE_MEMORY arch-wide (~1 KB OLED back buffer); the five TFT variants -U it because TFTDisplay.cpp needs buffer_back for dirty-window diffing - Drop the stale "for testing" 1024-entry TMM override on T1000-E Measured on rak4631: heap arena grows 124,572 -> 131,180 B and boot allocations drop ~15.7 KB, roughly +22 KB free heap on the field-report device class. Migration: the nRF52840 warm flash ring replays through place() (LRU), so the newest 100 identities survive the shrink; the file backend rejects oversized snapshots cleanly (new test covers this). Native suites pass (536/536 Docker, 13/13 native-macos warm store); rak4631, heltec-mesh-node-t114 (TFT) and tracker-t1000-e build green. * Drop stale OLEDDISPLAY_REDUCE_MEMORY -U on t114 / mesh-solar-tft Only USE_TFTDISPLAY variants (t1, t096, wismeshtap) compile TFTDisplay.cpp and need the lib's buffer_back; t114 and mesh-solar-tft render through the meshtastic-st7789 driver, which handles the reduced-memory configuration fine - as #10894 (merged from develop) already established by defining the flag there. Remove the -U guard and the per-variant -D (redundant with the arch-wide define in nrf52_base on this branch). Both variants verified building. |
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Ben MeadorsandGitHub
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b4dd76a4db |
Harden against crafted-packet crashes + adversarial fuzzing (#10862)
Audit and fuzzing of the RF-packet decode -> dispatch -> display/phone paths for the "crash a node or phone with a crafted packet" surface, beyond the XEdDSA authenticity work. Crash fixes (reproduced under AddressSanitizer / UBSan): - GeoCoord::latLongToUTM/latLongToMGRS read fixed letter tables out of bounds on extreme latitude_i/longitude_i from a received Position, and narrowed out-of-range easting/northing doubles to unsigned (float-cast-overflow UB). Clamp the UTM zone, the easting/northing narrowing, and the band/col/row indices. Regression: test_geocoord_extreme_coords_no_oob. - EnvironmentTelemetry/AirQualityTelemetry render attacker floats via String(float), which on nRF52/RP2040/STM32/portduino formats into a fixed char[33] (dtostrf) and overflows near FLT_MAX. Clamp the rendered metrics via UnitConversions::displaySafeFloat (finite + magnitude <= 1e9), unit-tested in test_type_conversions. Defense-in-depth + robustness: - TraceRouteModule::printRoute: fix an snr_back[-1] OOB read (wrong count in the guard) and stop formatting the INT8_MIN "unknown SNR" sentinel as a dB value. - WaypointModule/NodeDB: sanitize untrusted strings before the OLED renderer and the phone-facing ClientNotification (belt-and-suspenders vs PB_VALIDATE_UTF8). - MeshService::sendToPhone: withhold NODEINFO/WAYPOINT packets whose nested string won't cleanly decode, protecting strict phone protobuf decoders without affecting mesh relay. Tests: new test_fuzz_decode (protobuf decode + UTF-8 sanitizer fuzz) and test_fuzz_packets (perhapsDecode / module-handler / traceroute / phone-gate fuzz), all under AddressSanitizer; native-suite-count 25 -> 27. Full suite 515/515 green. |