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meshtastic_firmware/src/mesh/Router.cpp
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#include "Router.h"
#include "Channels.h"
#include "CryptoEngine.h"
#include "MeshRadio.h"
#include "MeshService.h"
#include "NodeDB.h"
#include "PositionPrecision.h"
#include "gps/RTC.h"
#include "configuration.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "mesh-pb-constants.h"
#include "meshUtils.h"
#include "modules/RoutingModule.h"
#include <pb_encode.h>
#if HAS_TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT
#include "modules/TrafficManagementModule.h"
#endif
#if HAS_VARIABLE_HOPS
#include "modules/HopScalingModule.h"
#endif
#if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_MQTT
#include "mqtt/MQTT.h"
#endif
#include "Default.h"
#if ARCH_PORTDUINO
#include "Throttle.h"
#include "platform/portduino/PortduinoGlue.h"
#include "serialization/MeshPacketSerializer.h"
#endif
#define MAX_RX_FROMRADIO \
4 // max number of packets destined to our queue, we dispatch packets quickly so it doesn't need to be big
// I think this is right, one packet for each of the three fifos + one packet being currently assembled for TX or RX
// And every TX packet might have a retransmission packet or an ack alive at any moment
#ifdef ARCH_PORTDUINO
// Portduino (native) targets can use dynamic memory pools with runtime-configurable sizes
#define MAX_PACKETS \
(MAX_RX_TOPHONE + MAX_RX_FROMRADIO + 2 * MAX_TX_QUEUE + \
2) // max number of packets which can be in flight (either queued from reception or queued for sending)
// Live in-flight packet bytes are tracked under "pktpool(live)" in the MemAudit breakdown
static MemoryDynamic<meshtastic_MeshPacket> dynamicPool("pktpool(live)");
Allocator<meshtastic_MeshPacket> &packetPool = dynamicPool;
#elif defined(ARCH_STM32WL) || defined(BOARD_HAS_PSRAM)
// On STM32 and boards with PSRAM, there isn't enough heap left over for the rest of the firmware if we allocate this statically.
// For now, make it dynamic again.
#define MAX_PACKETS \
(MAX_RX_TOPHONE + MAX_RX_FROMRADIO + 2 * MAX_TX_QUEUE + \
2) // max number of packets which can be in flight (either queued from reception or queued for sending)
// Live in-flight packet bytes are tracked under "pktpool(live)" in the MemAudit breakdown
static MemoryDynamic<meshtastic_MeshPacket> dynamicPool("pktpool(live)");
Allocator<meshtastic_MeshPacket> &packetPool = dynamicPool;
#else
// Embedded targets use static memory pools with compile-time constants
#define MAX_PACKETS_STATIC \
(MAX_RX_TOPHONE + MAX_RX_FROMRADIO + 2 * MAX_TX_QUEUE + \
2) // max number of packets which can be in flight (either queued from reception or queued for sending)
// Static pool RAM is BSS, not heap; "pktpool(live)" still shows in-flight packet bytes
static MemoryPool<meshtastic_MeshPacket, MAX_PACKETS_STATIC> staticPool("pktpool(live)");
Allocator<meshtastic_MeshPacket> &packetPool = staticPool;
#endif
static uint8_t bytes[MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN + 1] __attribute__((__aligned__));
/**
* Constructor
*
* Currently we only allow one interface, that may change in the future
*/
Router::Router() : concurrency::OSThread("Router"), fromRadioQueue(MAX_RX_FROMRADIO)
{
// This is called pre main(), don't touch anything here, the following code is not safe
/* LOG_DEBUG("Size of NodeInfo %d", sizeof(NodeInfo));
LOG_DEBUG("Size of SubPacket %d", sizeof(SubPacket));
LOG_DEBUG("Size of MeshPacket %d", sizeof(MeshPacket)); */
fromRadioQueue.setReader(this);
// init Lockguard for crypt operations
assert(!cryptLock);
cryptLock = new concurrency::Lock();
}
bool Router::shouldDecrementHopLimit(const meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
{
// First hop MUST always decrement to prevent retry issues
if (getHopsAway(*p) == 0) {
return true; // Always decrement on first hop
}
// Check if both local device and previous relay are routers (including CLIENT_BASE)
bool localIsRouter =
IS_ONE_OF(config.device.role, meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_ROUTER, meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_ROUTER_LATE,
meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_CLIENT_BASE);
// If local device isn't a router, always decrement
if (!localIsRouter) {
return true;
}
// router_preserve_hops: not suitable right now - removed from config until
// the right heuristics for when to preserve vs. exhaust hops are established.
// #if HAS_TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT
// if (moduleConfig.has_traffic_management &&
// moduleConfig.traffic_management.router_preserve_hops && ...) { ... }
// #endif
// For subsequent hops, preserve hop_limit only when the previous relay is UNAMBIGUOUSLY a favorite
// router. The relay_node byte is just the last byte of a 32-bit node number, so on a dense mesh it
// collides; the old "first matching node wins" scan could preserve hops for the wrong node
// (non-deterministic, depends on NodeDB order). resolveLastByte() reports a collision instead, and
// we re-check the favorite/router predicate on the single resolved node. On ambiguity/none we
// decrement (the safe default).
NodeNum resolved = 0;
if (nodeDB->resolveUniqueLastByte(p->relay_node, /*requireDirectNeighbor=*/false, &resolved)) {
const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(resolved);
if (node && nodeInfoLiteIsFavorite(node) && nodeInfoLiteHasUser(node) &&
IS_ONE_OF(node->role, meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_ROUTER, meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_ROUTER_LATE,
meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_CLIENT_BASE)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Identified unique favorite relay router 0x%08x from last byte 0x%x", resolved, p->relay_node);
return false; // Don't decrement hop_limit
}
}
// No unambiguous favorite router match found, decrement hop_limit
return true;
}
/**
* do idle processing
* Mostly looking in our incoming rxPacket queue and calling handleReceived.
*/
int32_t Router::runOnce()
{
meshtastic_MeshPacket *mp;
while ((mp = fromRadioQueue.dequeuePtr(0)) != NULL) {
// printPacket("handle fromRadioQ", mp);
perhapsHandleReceived(mp);
}
// LOG_DEBUG("Sleep forever!");
return INT32_MAX; // Wait a long time - until we get woken for the message queue
}
/**
* RadioInterface calls this to queue up packets that have been received from the radio. The router is now responsible for
* freeing the packet
*/
void Router::enqueueReceivedMessage(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
{
// Try enqueue until successful
while (!fromRadioQueue.enqueue(p, 0)) {
meshtastic_MeshPacket *old_p;
old_p = fromRadioQueue.dequeuePtr(0); // Dequeue and discard the oldest packet
if (old_p) {
printPacket("fromRadioQ full, drop oldest!", old_p);
packetPool.release(old_p);
}
}
// Nasty hack because our threading is primitive. interfaces shouldn't need to know about routers FIXME
setReceivedMessage();
}
/// Generate a unique packet id
// FIXME, move this someplace better
PacketId generatePacketId()
{
static uint32_t rollingPacketId; // Note: trying to keep this in noinit didn't help for working across reboots
static bool didInit = false;
if (!didInit) {
didInit = true;
// pick a random initial sequence number at boot (to prevent repeated reboots always starting at 0)
// Note: we mask the high order bit to ensure that we never pass a 'negative' number to random
rollingPacketId = random(UINT32_MAX & 0x7fffffff);
LOG_DEBUG("Initial packet id %u", rollingPacketId);
}
rollingPacketId++;
rollingPacketId &= ID_COUNTER_MASK; // Mask out the top 22 bits
PacketId id = rollingPacketId | random(UINT32_MAX & 0x7fffffff) << 10; // top 22 bits
LOG_DEBUG("Partially randomized packet id %u", id);
return id;
}
meshtastic_MeshPacket *Router::allocForSending()
{
meshtastic_MeshPacket *p = packetPool.allocZeroed();
if (!p)
return nullptr;
p->which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag; // Assume payload is decoded at start.
p->from = nodeDB->getNodeNum();
p->to = NODENUM_BROADCAST;
p->hop_limit = Default::getConfiguredOrDefaultHopLimit(config.lora.hop_limit);
p->id = generatePacketId();
p->rx_time =
getValidTime(RTCQualityFromNet); // Just in case we process the packet locally - make sure it has a valid timestamp
return p;
}
/**
* Send an ack or a nak packet back towards whoever sent idFrom
*/
void Router::sendAckNak(meshtastic_Routing_Error err, NodeNum to, PacketId idFrom, ChannelIndex chIndex, uint8_t hopLimit,
bool ackWantsAck)
{
routingModule->sendAckNak(err, to, idFrom, chIndex, hopLimit, ackWantsAck);
}
void Router::abortSendAndNak(meshtastic_Routing_Error err, meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
{
LOG_ERROR("Error=%d, return NAK and drop packet", err);
sendAckNak(err, getFrom(p), p->id, p->channel);
packetPool.release(p);
}
void Router::setReceivedMessage()
{
// LOG_DEBUG("set interval to ASAP");
setInterval(0); // Run ASAP, so we can figure out our correct sleep time
runASAP = true;
}
meshtastic_QueueStatus Router::getQueueStatus()
{
if (!iface) {
meshtastic_QueueStatus qs;
qs.res = qs.mesh_packet_id = qs.free = qs.maxlen = 0;
return qs;
} else
return iface->getQueueStatus();
}
ErrorCode Router::sendLocal(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, RxSource src)
{
if (p->to == 0) {
LOG_ERROR("Packet received with to: of 0!");
}
// No need to deliver externally if the destination is the local node
if (isToUs(p)) {
printPacket("Enqueued local", p);
enqueueReceivedMessage(p);
return ERRNO_OK;
} else if (!iface) {
// We must be sending to remote nodes also, fail if no interface found
abortSendAndNak(meshtastic_Routing_Error_NO_INTERFACE, p);
return ERRNO_NO_INTERFACES;
} else {
// If we are sending a broadcast, we also treat it as if we just received it ourself
// this allows local apps (and PCs) to see broadcasts sourced locally
if (isBroadcast(p->to)) {
handleReceived(p, src);
}
// don't override if a channel was requested and no need to set it when PKI is enforced
if (!p->channel && !p->pki_encrypted && !isBroadcast(p->to)) {
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite const *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->to);
if (node) {
p->channel = node->channel;
LOG_DEBUG("localSend to channel %d", p->channel);
}
}
// If someone asks for acks on broadcast, we need the hop limit to be at least one, so that first node that receives our
// message will rebroadcast. But asking for hop_limit 0 in that context means the client app has no preference on hop
// counts and we want this message to get through the whole mesh, so use the default.
if (src == RX_SRC_USER && p->want_ack && p->hop_limit == 0) {
p->hop_limit = Default::getConfiguredOrDefaultHopLimit(config.lora.hop_limit);
}
return send(p);
}
}
/**
* Send a packet on a suitable interface. This routine will
* later free() the packet to pool. This routine is not allowed to stall.
* If the txmit queue is full it might return an error.
*/
ErrorCode Router::send(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
{
if (isToUs(p)) {
LOG_ERROR("BUG! send() called with packet destined for local node!");
packetPool.release(p);
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_BAD_REQUEST;
} // should have already been handled by sendLocal
// Abort sending if we are violating the duty cycle
float effectiveDutyCycle = getEffectiveDutyCycle();
if (!config.lora.override_duty_cycle && effectiveDutyCycle < 100) {
float hourlyTxPercent = airTime->utilizationTXPercent();
if (hourlyTxPercent > effectiveDutyCycle) {
uint8_t silentMinutes = airTime->getSilentMinutes(hourlyTxPercent, effectiveDutyCycle);
LOG_WARN("Duty cycle limit exceeded. Aborting send for now, you can send again in %d mins", silentMinutes);
meshtastic_ClientNotification *cn = clientNotificationPool.allocZeroed();
if (cn) {
cn->has_reply_id = true;
cn->reply_id = p->id;
cn->level = meshtastic_LogRecord_Level_WARNING;
cn->time = getValidTime(RTCQualityFromNet);
snprintf(cn->message, sizeof(cn->message), "Duty cycle limit exceeded. You can send again in %d mins",
silentMinutes);
service->sendClientNotification(cn);
}
meshtastic_Routing_Error err = meshtastic_Routing_Error_DUTY_CYCLE_LIMIT;
if (isFromUs(p)) { // only send NAK to API, not to the mesh
abortSendAndNak(err, p);
} else {
packetPool.release(p);
}
return err;
}
}
// PacketId nakId = p->decoded.which_ackVariant == SubPacket_fail_id_tag ? p->decoded.ackVariant.fail_id : 0;
// assert(!nakId); // I don't think we ever send 0hop naks over the wire (other than to the phone), test that assumption with
// assert
// Never set the want_ack flag on broadcast packets sent over the air.
if (isBroadcast(p->to))
p->want_ack = false;
// Up until this point we might have been using 0 for the from address (if it started with the phone), but when we send over
// the lora we need to make sure we have replaced it with our local address
p->from = getFrom(p);
p->relay_node = nodeDB->getLastByteOfNodeNum(getNodeNum()); // set the relayer to us
#if HAS_VARIABLE_HOPS
// Apply HopScaling hop recommendation to routine outgoing broadcasts
if (isFromUs(p) && isBroadcast(p->to) && hopScalingModule && p->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag) {
switch (p->decoded.portnum) {
case meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP:
case meshtastic_PortNum_TELEMETRY_APP:
case meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP:
case meshtastic_PortNum_NEIGHBORINFO_APP: {
uint8_t variableHopLimit = hopScalingModule->getLastRequiredHop();
// Never exceed user-configured hop_limit
if (variableHopLimit < p->hop_limit) {
LOG_DEBUG("[HOPSCALE] hop_limit %u -> %u for portnum %u", p->hop_limit, variableHopLimit, p->decoded.portnum);
p->hop_limit = variableHopLimit;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
#endif
// If we are the original transmitter, set the hop limit with which we start
if (isFromUs(p))
p->hop_start = p->hop_limit;
// If the packet hasn't yet been encrypted, do so now (it might already be encrypted if we are just forwarding it)
if (!(p->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag ||
p->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag)) {
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_BAD_REQUEST;
}
fixPriority(p); // Before encryption, fix the priority if it's unset
// Position precision is an originator-only privacy policy. Relays keep
// p->from as the original sender, so do not rewrite their POSITION_APP payload.
if (isFromUs(p)) {
if (!applyPositionPrecisionForChannel(*p, p->channel)) {
LOG_ERROR("Dropping malformed position packet before send");
packetPool.release(p);
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_BAD_REQUEST;
}
}
// If the packet is not yet encrypted, do so now
if (p->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag) {
ChannelIndex chIndex = p->channel; // keep as a local because we are about to change it
DEBUG_HEAP_BEFORE;
meshtastic_MeshPacket *p_decoded = packetPool.allocCopy(*p);
DEBUG_HEAP_AFTER("Router::send", p_decoded);
auto encodeResult = perhapsEncode(p);
if (encodeResult != meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE) {
packetPool.release(p_decoded);
p->channel = 0; // Reset the channel to 0, so we don't use the failing hash again
abortSendAndNak(encodeResult, p);
return encodeResult; // FIXME - this isn't a valid ErrorCode
}
#if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_MQTT
// Only publish to MQTT if we're the original transmitter of the packet
if (moduleConfig.mqtt.enabled && isFromUs(p) && mqtt && p_decoded) {
mqtt->onSend(*p, *p_decoded, chIndex);
}
#endif
packetPool.release(p_decoded);
}
#if HAS_UDP_MULTICAST
if (udpHandler && config.network.enabled_protocols & meshtastic_Config_NetworkConfig_ProtocolFlags_UDP_BROADCAST) {
udpHandler->onSend(const_cast<meshtastic_MeshPacket *>(p));
}
#endif
assert(iface); // This should have been detected already in sendLocal (or we just received a packet from outside)
return iface->send(p);
}
/** Attempt to cancel a previously sent packet. Returns true if a packet was found we could cancel */
bool Router::cancelSending(NodeNum from, PacketId id)
{
if (iface && iface->cancelSending(from, id)) {
// We are not a relayer of this packet anymore
removeRelayer(nodeDB->getLastByteOfNodeNum(nodeDB->getNodeNum()), id, from);
return true;
}
return false;
}
/** Attempt to find a packet in the TxQueue. Returns true if the packet was found. */
bool Router::findInTxQueue(NodeNum from, PacketId id)
{
return iface->findInTxQueue(from, id);
}
/**
* Every (non duplicate) packet this node receives will be passed through this method. This allows subclasses to
* update routing tables etc... based on what we overhear (even for messages not destined to our node)
*/
void Router::sniffReceived(const meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, const meshtastic_Routing *c)
{
// FIXME, update nodedb here for any packet that passes through us
}
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI) && !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
/** Size a decoded Data as the sender's signedDataFits() gate would have, with padding stripped:
* unknown fields inside Data.payload survive in payload.size and would otherwise let a forger
* inflate an unsigned broadcast past the signable budget. Returns false only if sizing failed.
* Sizing only what this build's schema decodes, so a signable type that later grows needs its
* legitimate maximum re-checked against the budget or honest unsigned broadcasts get dropped. */
static bool canonicalSignableSize(meshtastic_Data *d, size_t *size)
{
const pb_msgdesc_t *fields = nullptr;
switch (d->portnum) {
case meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP:
fields = &meshtastic_Position_msg;
break;
case meshtastic_PortNum_TELEMETRY_APP:
fields = &meshtastic_Telemetry_msg;
break;
case meshtastic_PortNum_WAYPOINT_APP:
fields = &meshtastic_Waypoint_msg;
break;
case meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP:
fields = &meshtastic_User_msg;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (fields) {
// Scratch kept off the stack: these decoded structs are large for the smaller MCU targets.
// Safe as file-static state because both callers of checkXeddsaReceivePolicy hold cryptLock.
static union {
// cppcheck-suppress unusedStructMember ; written by pb_decode through &inner
meshtastic_Position position;
// cppcheck-suppress unusedStructMember ; written by pb_decode through &inner
meshtastic_Telemetry telemetry;
// cppcheck-suppress unusedStructMember ; written by pb_decode through &inner
meshtastic_Waypoint waypoint;
// cppcheck-suppress unusedStructMember ; written by pb_decode through &inner
meshtastic_User user;
} inner;
memset(&inner, 0, sizeof(inner));
size_t canonicalPayload;
if (pb_decode_from_bytes(d->payload.bytes, d->payload.size, fields, &inner) &&
pb_get_encoded_size(&canonicalPayload, fields, &inner) && canonicalPayload <= d->payload.size) {
// Only the length matters when sizing a bytes field, so swap it in place instead of
// copying the whole Data; restored below because modules still need the real payload.
const pb_size_t prevSize = d->payload.size;
d->payload.size = (pb_size_t)canonicalPayload;
const bool sized = pb_get_encoded_size(size, &meshtastic_Data_msg, d);
d->payload.size = prevSize;
return sized;
}
}
return pb_get_encoded_size(size, &meshtastic_Data_msg, d);
}
bool checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
{
// Only a signature we verify below may mark this packet signed; never trust an inbound flag.
p->xeddsa_signed = false;
if (p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.size == XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE) {
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from);
if (node && node->public_key.size == 32) {
p->xeddsa_signed =
crypto->xeddsa_verify(node->public_key.bytes, p->from, p->id, p->decoded.portnum, p->decoded.payload.bytes,
p->decoded.payload.size, p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.bytes);
if (p->xeddsa_signed) {
// Learn this node as a signer, so a later unsigned signable broadcast from it is dropped
nodeInfoLiteSetBit(node, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_XEDDSA_SIGNED_MASK, true);
LOG_DEBUG("Verified XEdDSA signature from 0x%08x", p->from);
} else {
LOG_WARN("XEdDSA signature verification failed from 0x%08x, dropping", p->from);
return false;
}
} else {
LOG_DEBUG("No public key for 0x%08x, cannot verify XEdDSA signature", p->from);
}
} else if (p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.size != 0) {
// A signature field that is neither empty nor a full 64 bytes is malformed - honest
// senders emit only those two sizes (perhapsEncode sets 0 or XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE). Drop
// it: a crafted partial signature would otherwise land in the unsigned branch below while
// its bytes inflated the size estimate, letting a forged broadcast dodge the downgrade drop.
LOG_WARN("Malformed XEdDSA signature (%u bytes) from 0x%08x, dropping", (unsigned)p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.size,
p->from);
return false;
} else {
// Truly unsigned (signature size 0) - only reject the class a signing node always signs: a
// non-PKI broadcast whose signed encoding would still fit the LoRa frame. Size p->decoded
// canonically so this counts the same fields the sender's signedDataFits() gate counted;
// adding XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_FIELD_BYTES to that unsigned base mirrors it exactly, whatever
// fields the Data carried, with padding hidden inside Data.payload stripped. Unicast/PKI
// packets and broadcasts too big to carry a signature are never signed, so they must not be
// hard-failed here even for a known signer.
const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from);
if (node && nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned(node) && !p->pki_encrypted && isBroadcast(p->to)) {
size_t canonicalSize;
if (!canonicalSignableSize(&p->decoded, &canonicalSize))
return true; // can't size it; never drop on a sizing failure
if (canonicalSize + XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_FIELD_BYTES + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH <= MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN) {
LOG_WARN("Dropping unsigned broadcast from 0x%08x that previously signed", p->from);
return false;
}
}
}
return true;
}
#endif
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
// The fallback costs three X25519 ops before the AEAD tag is checked. Budget is global because p->from is
// attacker-controlled; successful runs refund, and their key is then persisted for the fast path.
#define ADMIN_KEY_FALLBACK_BURST 8
#define ADMIN_KEY_FALLBACK_REFILL_MS 250
static uint32_t adminKeyFallbackTokens = ADMIN_KEY_FALLBACK_BURST;
static uint32_t adminKeyFallbackRefillMs = 0;
static bool adminKeyFallbackAllowed()
{
bool haveAdminKey = false;
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
if (config.security.admin_key[i].size == 32) {
haveAdminKey = true;
break;
}
}
if (!haveAdminKey)
return false; // nothing to try, so do not spend a token
uint32_t now = millis();
if (adminKeyFallbackRefillMs == 0)
adminKeyFallbackRefillMs = now;
uint32_t elapsed = now - adminKeyFallbackRefillMs;
if (elapsed >= ADMIN_KEY_FALLBACK_REFILL_MS) {
uint32_t refill = elapsed / ADMIN_KEY_FALLBACK_REFILL_MS;
adminKeyFallbackRefillMs += refill * ADMIN_KEY_FALLBACK_REFILL_MS;
if (refill >= ADMIN_KEY_FALLBACK_BURST - adminKeyFallbackTokens)
adminKeyFallbackTokens = ADMIN_KEY_FALLBACK_BURST;
else
adminKeyFallbackTokens += refill;
}
if (adminKeyFallbackTokens == 0)
return false;
adminKeyFallbackTokens--;
return true;
}
static void adminKeyFallbackRefund()
{
if (adminKeyFallbackTokens < ADMIN_KEY_FALLBACK_BURST)
adminKeyFallbackTokens++;
}
#endif
DecodeState perhapsDecode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
{
concurrency::LockGuard g(cryptLock);
if (config.device.rebroadcast_mode == meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_RebroadcastMode_KNOWN_ONLY &&
!nodeInfoLiteHasUser(nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from))) {
LOG_DEBUG("Node 0x%08x not in nodeDB-> Rebroadcast mode KNOWN_ONLY will ignore packet", p->from);
return DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE;
}
if (p->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag)
return DecodeState::DECODE_SUCCESS; // If packet was already decoded just return
size_t rawSize = p->encrypted.size;
if (rawSize > sizeof(bytes)) {
LOG_ERROR("Packet too large to attempt decryption! (rawSize=%d > 256)", rawSize);
return DecodeState::DECODE_FATAL;
}
bool decrypted = false;
ChannelIndex chIndex = 0;
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
// Resolve the sender's public key: prefer the one stored in NodeDB (hot store or warm tier), else
// fall back to a not-yet-committed key held during an in-progress key-verification handshake.
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t remotePublic = {0, {0}};
bool haveRemoteKey = nodeDB->copyPublicKey(p->from, remotePublic);
// A pending key is an unverified identity claim supplied by whoever opened the handshake, so it is
// accepted only for the exchange itself (checked after decode). perhapsEncode applies the same rule.
bool havePendingKey = false;
if (!haveRemoteKey) {
havePendingKey = crypto->getPendingPublicKey(p->from, remotePublic);
haveRemoteKey = havePendingKey;
}
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *ourNode = nullptr;
if (p->channel == 0 && isToUs(p) && p->to > 0 && !isBroadcast(p->to) && rawSize > MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD &&
(ourNode = nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->to)) != nullptr && ourNode->public_key.size > 0) {
// Try the sender's known key first, then each configured admin key so an authorized admin can
// reach a node that has not yet learned their key. AES-CCM AEAD rejects wrong candidates.
bool viaAdminKey = false;
bool viaPendingKey = false;
if (haveRemoteKey && crypto->decryptCurve25519(p->from, remotePublic, p->id, rawSize, p->encrypted.bytes, bytes)) {
decrypted = true;
viaPendingKey = havePendingKey;
}
if (!decrypted && adminKeyFallbackAllowed()) {
for (int i = 0; i < 3 && !decrypted; i++) {
if (config.security.admin_key[i].size != 32)
continue;
remotePublic.size = 32;
memcpy(remotePublic.bytes, config.security.admin_key[i].bytes, 32);
if (crypto->decryptCurve25519(p->from, remotePublic, p->id, rawSize, p->encrypted.bytes, bytes)) {
decrypted = true;
viaAdminKey = true;
break; // stop after first successful decryption
}
}
if (decrypted)
adminKeyFallbackRefund();
}
if (decrypted) {
LOG_INFO("PKI Decryption worked!");
meshtastic_Data decodedtmp;
memset(&decodedtmp, 0, sizeof(decodedtmp));
size_t payloadSize = rawSize - MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD;
if (pb_decode_from_bytes(bytes, payloadSize, &meshtastic_Data_msg, &decodedtmp) &&
decodedtmp.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_UNKNOWN_APP) {
if (viaPendingKey && decodedtmp.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_KEY_VERIFICATION_APP) {
// The pending key only proves the handshake initiator holds it, not that they are
// p->from. Beyond the exchange it would let them send DMs that look authenticated.
LOG_WARN("Refusing pending-key decrypt of port %u from 0x%08x", (unsigned)decodedtmp.portnum, p->from);
return DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE;
}
decrypted = true;
rawSize = payloadSize; // commit the overhead subtraction only on full success
LOG_INFO("Packet decrypted using PKI!");
p->pki_encrypted = true;
memcpy(p->public_key.bytes, remotePublic.bytes, 32);
p->public_key.size = 32;
p->decoded = decodedtmp;
p->which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag; // change type to decoded
if (viaAdminKey) {
// Persist the admin key for the sender so future packets take the fast path and we can
// PKI-reply; p->from is bound into the AEAD nonce, so the trusted admin authenticated it.
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *fromNode = nodeDB->getOrCreateMeshNode(p->from);
if (fromNode != nullptr)
fromNode->public_key = remotePublic;
}
} else {
// AEAD already authenticated this ciphertext, so no other candidate could decode it -
// the payload is simply malformed.
LOG_ERROR("PKC Decrypted, but pb_decode failed!");
return DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE;
}
}
}
#endif
// assert(p->which_payloadVariant == MeshPacket_encrypted_tag);
if (!decrypted) {
// Try to find a channel that works with this hash
for (chIndex = 0; chIndex < channels.getNumChannels(); chIndex++) {
// Try to use this hash/channel pair
if (channels.decryptForHash(chIndex, p->channel)) {
// we have to copy into a scratch buffer, because these bytes are a union with the decoded protobuf. Create a
// fresh copy for each decrypt attempt.
memcpy(bytes, p->encrypted.bytes, rawSize);
// Try to decrypt the packet if we can
crypto->decrypt(p->from, p->id, rawSize, bytes);
// printBytes("plaintext", bytes, p->encrypted.size);
// Take those raw bytes and convert them back into a well structured protobuf we can understand
meshtastic_Data decodedtmp;
memset(&decodedtmp, 0, sizeof(decodedtmp));
if (!pb_decode_from_bytes(bytes, rawSize, &meshtastic_Data_msg, &decodedtmp)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Invalid protobufs in received mesh packet id=0x%08x (bad psk?)", p->id);
} else if (decodedtmp.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_UNKNOWN_APP) {
LOG_DEBUG("Invalid portnum (bad psk?)");
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
} else if (!owner.is_licensed && isToUs(p) && decodedtmp.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP) {
LOG_WARN("Rejecting legacy DM");
return DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE;
#endif
} else {
p->decoded = decodedtmp;
p->which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag; // change type to decoded
decrypted = true;
break;
}
}
}
}
if (decrypted) {
// parsing was successful
p->channel = chIndex; // change to store the index instead of the hash
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI) && !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
// Runs before the bitfield merge below: that merge can set want_response, adding wire bytes
// the sender never encoded and skewing the policy's sizing of p->decoded.
if (!checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(p))
return DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE;
#endif
if (p->decoded.has_bitfield)
p->decoded.want_response |= p->decoded.bitfield & BITFIELD_WANT_RESPONSE_MASK;
/* Not actually ever used.
// Decompress if needed. jm
if (p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_COMPRESSED_APP) {
// Decompress the payload
char compressed_in[meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN] = {};
char decompressed_out[meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN] = {};
int decompressed_len;
memcpy(compressed_in, p->decoded.payload.bytes, p->decoded.payload.size);
decompressed_len = unishox2_decompress_simple(compressed_in, p->decoded.payload.size, decompressed_out);
// LOG_DEBUG("**Decompressed length - %d ", decompressed_len);
memcpy(p->decoded.payload.bytes, decompressed_out, decompressed_len);
// Switch the port from PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_COMPRESSED_APP to PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP
p->decoded.portnum = meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP;
} */
printPacket("decoded message", p);
#if ARCH_PORTDUINO
if (portduino_config.traceFilename != "" || portduino_config.logoutputlevel == level_trace) {
LOG_TRACE("%s", MeshPacketSerializer::JsonSerialize(p, false).c_str());
} else if (portduino_config.JSONFilename != "") {
if (portduino_config.JSONFileRotate != 0) {
static uint32_t fileage = 0;
if (portduino_config.JSONFileRotate != 0 &&
(fileage == 0 || !Throttle::isWithinTimespanMs(fileage, portduino_config.JSONFileRotate * 60 * 1000))) {
time_t timestamp = time(NULL);
struct tm *timeinfo;
char buffer[80];
timeinfo = localtime(&timestamp);
strftime(buffer, 80, "%Y%m%d-%H%M%S", timeinfo);
std::string datetime(buffer);
if (JSONFile.is_open()) {
JSONFile.close();
}
JSONFile.open(portduino_config.JSONFilename + "_" + datetime, std::ios::out | std::ios::app);
fileage = millis();
}
}
if (portduino_config.JSONFilter == (_meshtastic_PortNum)0 || portduino_config.JSONFilter == p->decoded.portnum) {
JSONFile << MeshPacketSerializer::JsonSerialize(p, false) << std::endl;
}
}
#endif
return DecodeState::DECODE_SUCCESS;
} else {
LOG_WARN("No suitable channel found for decoding, hash was 0x%x!", p->channel);
return DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE;
}
}
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI) && !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
/** Exact sender-side sign gate: would this Data still fit the LoRa frame with a 64-byte
* signature attached? Sized with the real encoder so it tracks whatever fields are present. */
static bool signedDataFits(meshtastic_Data *d)
{
const pb_size_t prevSize = d->xeddsa_signature.size;
d->xeddsa_signature.size = XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
size_t encodedSize;
const bool sized = pb_get_encoded_size(&encodedSize, &meshtastic_Data_msg, d);
d->xeddsa_signature.size = prevSize;
return sized && encodedSize + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH <= MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN;
}
#endif
/** Return 0 for success or a Routing_Error code for failure
*/
meshtastic_Routing_Error perhapsEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
{
concurrency::LockGuard g(cryptLock);
int16_t hash;
// If the packet is not yet encrypted, do so now
if (p->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag) {
if (isFromUs(p)) {
p->decoded.has_bitfield = true;
p->decoded.bitfield |= (config.lora.config_ok_to_mqtt << BITFIELD_OK_TO_MQTT_SHIFT);
p->decoded.bitfield |= (p->decoded.want_response << BITFIELD_WANT_RESPONSE_SHIFT);
// We own signing for packets we originate; discard any signature a client preset.
// Outside the XEdDSA guard: the field exists in the protobuf on every build, and a
// stale/garbage signature transmitted by a non-signing build would hard-fail
// verification at every XEdDSA-enabled receiver that knows our key.
p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.size = 0;
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI) && !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
// Sign broadcast packets when the Data still fits a LoRa frame with the signature
// attached. This must be the exact encoded-size criterion, not a payload-size
// heuristic: a heuristic band where we sign-then-fail-TOO_LARGE breaks packets that
// were deliverable unsigned, and perhapsDecode() applies the mirror-image rule when
// deciding whether an unsigned broadcast from a known signer is a downgrade.
if (!p->pki_encrypted && isBroadcast(p->to) && signedDataFits(&p->decoded)) {
if (crypto->xeddsa_sign(p->from, p->id, p->decoded.portnum, p->decoded.payload.bytes, p->decoded.payload.size,
p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.bytes)) {
p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.size = XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
LOG_DEBUG("XEdDSA signed packet 0x%08x", p->id);
}
}
#endif
}
size_t numbytes = pb_encode_to_bytes(bytes, sizeof(bytes), &meshtastic_Data_msg, &p->decoded);
/* Not actually used, so save the cycles
// TODO: Allow modules to opt into compression.
if (p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP) {
char original_payload[meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN];
memcpy(original_payload, p->decoded.payload.bytes, p->decoded.payload.size);
char compressed_out[meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN] = {0};
int compressed_len;
compressed_len = unishox2_compress_simple(original_payload, p->decoded.payload.size, compressed_out);
LOG_DEBUG("Original length - %d ", p->decoded.payload.size);
LOG_DEBUG("Compressed length - %d ", compressed_len);
LOG_DEBUG("Original message - %.*s ", (int)p->decoded.payload.size, p->decoded.payload.bytes);
// If the compressed length is greater than or equal to the original size, don't use the compressed form
if (compressed_len >= p->decoded.payload.size) {
LOG_DEBUG("Not using compressing message");
// Set the uncompressed payload variant anyway. Shouldn't hurt?
// p->decoded.which_payloadVariant = Data_payload_tag;
// Otherwise we use the compressor
} else {
LOG_DEBUG("Use compressed message");
// Copy the compressed data into the meshpacket
p->decoded.payload.size = compressed_len;
memcpy(p->decoded.payload.bytes, compressed_out, compressed_len);
p->decoded.portnum = meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_COMPRESSED_APP;
}
} */
if (numbytes + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH > MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN)
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_TOO_LARGE;
// printBytes("plaintext", bytes, numbytes);
ChannelIndex chIndex = p->channel; // keep as a local because we are about to change it
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
// Resolve the destination's public key: prefer NodeDB (hot store or warm tier - evicted
// long-tail nodes keep their key there), otherwise (for a key-verification follow-on packet
// that explicitly requested PKI) fall back to the not-yet-verified key held during an
// in-progress handshake. This lets us DH-encode the follow-on packet before the peer's key
// has been committed to NodeDB.
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t destKey = {0, {0}};
bool haveDestKey = nodeDB->copyPublicKey(p->to, destKey);
if (!haveDestKey && p->pki_encrypted && p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_KEY_VERIFICATION_APP &&
crypto->getPendingPublicKey(p->to, destKey)) {
haveDestKey = true;
}
// We may want to retool things so we can send a PKC packet when the client specifies a key and nodenum, even if the node
// is not in the local nodedb
// First, only PKC encrypt packets we are originating
if (isFromUs(p) &&
#if ARCH_PORTDUINO
// Sim radio via the cli flag skips PKC
!portduino_config.force_simradio &&
#endif
// Don't use PKC with Ham mode
!owner.is_licensed &&
// Don't use PKC on 'serial' or 'gpio' channels unless explicitly requested
!(p->pki_encrypted != true && (strcasecmp(channels.getName(chIndex), Channels::serialChannel) == 0 ||
strcasecmp(channels.getName(chIndex), Channels::gpioChannel) == 0)) &&
// Check for valid keys and single node destination
config.security.private_key.size == 32 && !isBroadcast(p->to) &&
// Some portnums either make no sense to send with PKC
p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_TRACEROUTE_APP && p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP &&
p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP && p->decoded.portnum != meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP &&
// We allow Key Verification messages to be sent without a known destination key, since the point of those messages is
// to exchange keys. The first exchange (no usable key yet) falls through to channel encryption; the follow-on packet
// uses the pending key resolved into haveDestKey/destKey above.
// Though possible the first packet each direction should go non-pkc
// to handle the case where the remote node has our key, but we don't have theirs.
!(p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_KEY_VERIFICATION_APP && !haveDestKey)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Use PKI!");
if (numbytes + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH + MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD > MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN)
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_TOO_LARGE;
// Check for a usable public key for the destination (NodeDB or a pending key-verification key)
if (!haveDestKey) {
LOG_WARN("Unknown public key for destination node 0x%08x (portnum %d), refusing to send legacy DM", p->to,
p->decoded.portnum);
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_PKI_SEND_FAIL_PUBLIC_KEY;
}
if (p->pki_encrypted && !memfll(p->public_key.bytes, 0, 32) && memcmp(p->public_key.bytes, destKey.bytes, 32) != 0) {
LOG_WARN("Client public key differs from requested: 0x%02x, stored key begins 0x%02x", *p->public_key.bytes,
*destKey.bytes);
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_PKI_FAILED;
}
crypto->encryptCurve25519(p->to, getFrom(p), destKey, p->id, numbytes, bytes, p->encrypted.bytes);
numbytes += MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD;
p->channel = 0;
p->pki_encrypted = true;
} else {
if (p->pki_encrypted == true) {
// Client specifically requested PKI encryption
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_PKI_FAILED;
}
hash = channels.setActiveByIndex(chIndex);
// Now that we are encrypting the packet channel should be the hash (no longer the index)
p->channel = hash;
if (hash < 0) {
// No suitable channel could be found for
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_NO_CHANNEL;
}
crypto->encryptPacket(getFrom(p), p->id, numbytes, bytes);
memcpy(p->encrypted.bytes, bytes, numbytes);
}
#else
if (p->pki_encrypted == true) {
// Client specifically requested PKI encryption
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_PKI_FAILED;
}
hash = channels.setActiveByIndex(chIndex);
// Now that we are encrypting the packet channel should be the hash (no longer the index)
p->channel = hash;
if (hash < 0) {
// No suitable channel could be found for
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_NO_CHANNEL;
}
crypto->encryptPacket(getFrom(p), p->id, numbytes, bytes);
memcpy(p->encrypted.bytes, bytes, numbytes);
#endif
// Copy back into the packet and set the variant type
p->encrypted.size = numbytes;
p->which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_encrypted_tag;
}
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE;
}
NodeNum Router::getNodeNum()
{
return nodeDB->getNodeNum();
}
/**
* Handle any packet that is received by an interface on this node.
* Note: some packets may merely being passed through this node and will be forwarded elsewhere.
*/
void Router::handleReceived(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, RxSource src)
{
bool skipHandle = false;
// Also, we should set the time from the ISR and it should have msec level resolution
p->rx_time = getValidTime(RTCQualityFromNet); // store the arrival timestamp for the phone
// Store a copy of the encrypted packet for MQTT.
// Local, not a class member: handleReceived re-enters itself when a module
// reply broadcast goes through MeshService::sendToMesh -> Router::sendLocal,
// and a member would be silently overwritten without release on the inner
// call. Each invocation now owns its own copy (issue #9632, #10101, #8729).
DEBUG_HEAP_BEFORE;
meshtastic_MeshPacket *p_encrypted = packetPool.allocCopy(*p);
DEBUG_HEAP_AFTER("Router::handleReceived", p_encrypted);
// Take those raw bytes and convert them back into a well structured protobuf we can understand
auto decodedState = perhapsDecode(p);
if (decodedState == DecodeState::DECODE_FATAL) {
// Fatal decoding error, we can't do anything with this packet
LOG_WARN("Fatal decode error, dropping packet");
cancelSending(p->from, p->id);
skipHandle = true;
} else if (decodedState == DecodeState::DECODE_SUCCESS) {
// parsing was successful, queue for our recipient
if (src == RX_SRC_LOCAL)
printPacket("handleReceived(LOCAL)", p);
else if (src == RX_SRC_USER)
printPacket("handleReceived(USER)", p);
else
printPacket("handleReceived(REMOTE)", p);
#if MESHTASTIC_PREHOP_DROP
// Pre-hop firmware drop, post-decode half: the bitfield that proves the origin populated hop_start is
// encrypted under the channel key, so it can only be evaluated now that the packet is decoded. A packet
// whose hop_start is still missing/unknown comes from pre-hop firmware - keep it out of module
// processing, admin handling, phone delivery, MQTT and rebroadcast. Local-origin packets are exempt.
if (!isFromUs(p) && classifyHopStart(*p) != HopStartStatus::VALID) {
logHopStartDrop(*p, "post-decode pre-hop drop");
cancelSending(p->from, p->id);
skipHandle = true;
}
#endif
// Neighbor info module is disabled, ignore expensive neighbor info packets
if (p->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag &&
p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_NEIGHBORINFO_APP &&
(!moduleConfig.has_neighbor_info || !moduleConfig.neighbor_info.enabled)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Neighbor info module is disabled, ignore neighbor packet");
cancelSending(p->from, p->id);
skipHandle = true;
}
#if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_BEACON
// Beacon listening is disabled: drop beacon packets so they are neither surfaced to the
// phone nor handled on-device (same pattern as the disabled neighbor-info case above).
if (p->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag &&
p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_MESH_BEACON_APP &&
(!moduleConfig.has_mesh_beacon ||
!(moduleConfig.mesh_beacon.flags & meshtastic_ModuleConfig_MeshBeaconConfig_Flags_FLAG_LISTEN_ENABLED))) {
LOG_DEBUG("Beacon listening is disabled, ignore beacon packet");
cancelSending(p->from, p->id);
skipHandle = true;
}
#endif
bool shouldIgnoreNonstandardPorts =
config.device.rebroadcast_mode == meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_RebroadcastMode_CORE_PORTNUMS_ONLY;
#if USERPREFS_EVENT_MODE
shouldIgnoreNonstandardPorts = true;
#endif
if (shouldIgnoreNonstandardPorts && p->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag &&
!IS_ONE_OF(p->decoded.portnum, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_COMPRESSED_APP,
meshtastic_PortNum_POSITION_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_NODEINFO_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_ROUTING_APP,
meshtastic_PortNum_TELEMETRY_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_ADMIN_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_ALERT_APP,
meshtastic_PortNum_KEY_VERIFICATION_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_WAYPOINT_APP,
meshtastic_PortNum_STORE_FORWARD_APP, meshtastic_PortNum_TRACEROUTE_APP,
meshtastic_PortNum_STORE_FORWARD_PLUSPLUS_APP)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Ignore packet on non-standard portnum for CORE_PORTNUMS_ONLY");
cancelSending(p->from, p->id);
skipHandle = true;
}
} else {
printPacket("packet decoding failed or skipped (no PSK?)", p);
}
// call modules here
// If this could be a spoofed packet, don't let the modules see it.
if (!skipHandle) {
MeshModule::callModules(*p, src);
#if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_MQTT
if (p_encrypted == nullptr) {
LOG_WARN("p_encrypted is null, skipping MQTT publish");
} else {
// Mark as pki_encrypted if it is not yet decoded and MQTT encryption is also enabled, hash matches and it's a DM not
// to us (because we would be able to decrypt it)
if (decodedState == DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE && moduleConfig.mqtt.encryption_enabled && p->channel == 0x00 &&
!isBroadcast(p->to) && !isToUs(p))
p_encrypted->pki_encrypted = true;
// After potentially altering it, publish received message to MQTT if we're not the original transmitter of the packet
if ((decodedState == DecodeState::DECODE_SUCCESS || p_encrypted->pki_encrypted) && moduleConfig.mqtt.enabled &&
!isFromUs(p) && mqtt) {
if (decodedState == DecodeState::DECODE_SUCCESS && p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_TRACEROUTE_APP &&
moduleConfig.mqtt.encryption_enabled) {
// For TRACEROUTE_APP packets release the original encrypted packet and encrypt a new from the changed packet
// Only release the original after successful allocation to avoid losing an incomplete but valid packet
auto *p_encrypted_new = packetPool.allocCopy(*p);
if (p_encrypted_new) {
auto encodeResult = perhapsEncode(p_encrypted_new);
if (encodeResult != meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE) {
// Encryption failed, release the new packet and fall back to sending the original encrypted packet to
// MQTT
LOG_WARN("Encryption of new TR packet failed, sending original TR to MQTT");
packetPool.release(p_encrypted_new);
p_encrypted_new = nullptr;
} else {
// Successfully re-encrypted, release the original encrypted packet and use the new one for MQTT
packetPool.release(p_encrypted);
p_encrypted = p_encrypted_new;
}
} else {
// Allocation failed, log a warning and fall back to sending the original encrypted packet to MQTT
LOG_WARN("Failed to allocate new encrypted packet for TR, sending original TR to MQTT");
}
}
mqtt->onSend(*p_encrypted, *p, p->channel);
}
}
#endif
}
packetPool.release(p_encrypted); // Release the encrypted packet (release() handles nullptr)
}
void Router::perhapsHandleReceived(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
{
#if ARCH_PORTDUINO
// Even ignored packets get logged in the trace
if (portduino_config.traceFilename != "" || portduino_config.logoutputlevel == level_trace) {
p->rx_time = getValidTime(RTCQualityFromNet); // store the arrival timestamp for the phone
LOG_TRACE("%s", MeshPacketSerializer::JsonSerializeEncrypted(p).c_str());
}
#endif
// assert(radioConfig.has_preferences);
if (is_in_repeated(config.lora.ignore_incoming, p->from)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Ignore msg, 0x%08x is in our ignore list", p->from);
packetPool.release(p);
return;
}
meshtastic_NodeInfoLite const *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from);
if (nodeInfoLiteIsIgnored(node)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Ignore msg, 0x%08x is ignored", p->from);
packetPool.release(p);
return;
}
if (p->from == NODENUM_BROADCAST) {
LOG_DEBUG("Ignore msg from broadcast address");
packetPool.release(p);
return;
}
if (config.lora.ignore_mqtt && p->via_mqtt) {
LOG_DEBUG("Msg came in via MQTT from 0x%08x", p->from);
packetPool.release(p);
return;
}
if (shouldDropPacketForPreHop(*p)) {
logHopStartDrop(*p, "pre-hop drop");
packetPool.release(p);
return;
}
if (shouldFilterReceived(p)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Incoming msg was filtered from 0x%08x", p->from);
packetPool.release(p);
return;
}
// Note: we avoid calling shouldFilterReceived if we are supposed to ignore certain nodes - because some overrides might
// cache/learn of the existence of nodes (i.e. FloodRouter) that they should not
handleReceived(p);
packetPool.release(p);
}
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