* Allow key verification to work for unknown nodes. * trunk * More reliable admin key decryption * Add admin key fallback tests * Actually check haveRemoteKey * Logging cleanup * Address review feedback - Persist the committed key + manually-verified flag in commitVerifiedRemoteNode via saveToDisk(SEGMENT_NODEDATABASE), replacing the "todo: initiate save" - Guard the CryptoEngine pending-key slot with a dedicated internal lock; the Router reads it while already holding the non-recursive cryptLock, so the accessors cannot reuse that lock - Draw the security number from the hardware RNG (CryptRNG fallback) under cryptLock instead of random(); on nRF52 the entropy fill toggles the same CC310 the BLE task's packet crypto uses - Return true after fully handling the hash2 response (restores develop behavior; consistent with the hash1 branch) - Take uint32_t in the number-picker callbacks so 8-digit hex nodenums can't truncate through int - Trim over-long comments flagged by review * feat(tests): add deterministic tests for admin session-key behavior --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>
154 lines
6.3 KiB
C++
154 lines
6.3 KiB
C++
// Deterministic reproduction of the admin session-key behavior discussed on PR #10669
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// (ndoo's "Admin message without session_key!" report).
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//
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// Drives the REAL incoming-admin path (AdminModule::handleReceivedProtobuf) with a remote
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// (from != 0) PKC-authorized set_owner, exercising the exact checkPassKey/setPassKey gate.
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// A local (from == 0) admin bypasses that gate, so the bug only reproduces from != 0.
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#include "MeshTypes.h" // include BEFORE TestUtil.h
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#include "TestUtil.h"
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#include <unity.h>
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#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
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#include "mesh/Channels.h"
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#include "mesh/NodeDB.h"
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#include "modules/AdminModule.h"
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#include "support/AdminModuleTestShim.h"
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#include "support/MockMeshService.h"
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#include <cstring>
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static constexpr NodeNum LOCAL_NODE = 0x0A0A0A0A;
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static constexpr NodeNum ADMIN_NODE = 0x0B0B0B0B; // authorized admin, sends remote admin to us
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static const uint8_t ADMIN_KEY[32] = {0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb,
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0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
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0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x20};
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static MockMeshService *mockService = nullptr;
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static AdminModuleTestShim *admin = nullptr;
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// A remote, PKC-authorized set_owner. `session` (if non-empty) is the session_passkey the client presents.
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static meshtastic_MeshPacket makeRemoteSetOwner(const char *newLongName, const uint8_t *session, size_t sessionLen,
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meshtastic_AdminMessage &out)
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{
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out = meshtastic_AdminMessage_init_zero;
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out.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_AdminMessage_set_owner_tag;
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strncpy(out.set_owner.long_name, newLongName, sizeof(out.set_owner.long_name) - 1);
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if (session) {
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out.session_passkey.size = sessionLen;
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memcpy(out.session_passkey.bytes, session, sessionLen);
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}
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meshtastic_MeshPacket mp = meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_zero;
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mp.from = ADMIN_NODE; // REMOTE: this is what makes the session gate apply
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mp.channel = 0;
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mp.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag;
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mp.pki_encrypted = true; // arrived over PKC
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mp.public_key.size = 32;
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memcpy(mp.public_key.bytes, ADMIN_KEY, 32); // matches config.security.admin_key[0] -> authorized
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return mp;
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}
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void setUp(void)
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{
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mockService = new MockMeshService();
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service = mockService;
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admin = new AdminModuleTestShim();
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admin->deferSaves(); // no disk/reboot side effects when a setter is accepted
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if (!nodeDB)
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nodeDB = new NodeDB();
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myNodeInfo.my_node_num = LOCAL_NODE;
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config = meshtastic_LocalConfig_init_zero;
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// Authorize ADMIN_NODE's key as an admin key so the PKC path accepts it and we reach the session gate.
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config.security.admin_key[0].size = 32;
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memcpy(config.security.admin_key[0].bytes, ADMIN_KEY, 32);
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owner = meshtastic_User_init_zero;
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strncpy(owner.long_name, "Original", sizeof(owner.long_name) - 1);
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channels.initDefaults();
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channels.onConfigChanged();
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}
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void tearDown(void)
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{
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service = nullptr;
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delete mockService;
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mockService = nullptr;
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delete admin;
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admin = nullptr;
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}
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// ndoo's report: a setter from a remote node with NO valid session is rejected, and the node's
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// expected session key is all-zero because it has minted none since boot.
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void test_remote_setter_without_session_is_rejected(void)
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{
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meshtastic_AdminMessage m;
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meshtastic_MeshPacket mp = makeRemoteSetOwner("Hijacked", nullptr, 0, m);
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admin->handleReceivedProtobuf(mp, &m);
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admin->drainReply();
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// Rejected at the session gate -> owner unchanged (this is ndoo's "Admin message without session_key!").
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TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_STRING("Original", owner.long_name);
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}
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// The node's session key is minted only by setPassKey (which runs when it answers an admin GET),
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// so before any GET the expected key is all-zero and any presented key mismatches.
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void test_expected_session_key_is_zero_before_any_get(void)
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{
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uint8_t zero[8] = {0};
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meshtastic_AdminMessage probe = meshtastic_AdminMessage_init_zero;
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probe.session_passkey.size = 8;
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memcpy(probe.session_passkey.bytes, zero, 8); // even all-zeros must not authorize a state change
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// A fresh module has minted no session; a stale/guessed key does not match.
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// (checkPassKey also requires size==8 AND session_time freshness.)
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uint8_t stale[8] = {0x29, 0x04, 0xb4, 0x78, 0xd8, 0x68, 0xa7, 0xff}; // ndoo's presented key
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meshtastic_AdminMessage staleMsg = meshtastic_AdminMessage_init_zero;
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staleMsg.session_passkey.size = 8;
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memcpy(staleMsg.session_passkey.bytes, stale, 8);
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TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(admin->checkPassKey(&staleMsg)); // Expected: 00..00 vs Incoming: 29 04 b4 78.. -> reject
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}
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// The fix path: once the node answers a GET (setPassKey mints/returns the key), the session gate
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// accepts a setter carrying that key. Asserting the gate (checkPassKey) directly is the mechanism;
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// driving the full handleSetOwner would need the NodeInfoModule scaffolding, out of scope here.
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void test_session_gate_accepts_key_from_a_get_response(void)
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{
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// Simulate the node answering an admin GET: setPassKey mints the session and writes it into the response.
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meshtastic_AdminMessage getResponse = meshtastic_AdminMessage_init_zero;
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admin->setPassKey(&getResponse);
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TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(8, getResponse.session_passkey.size); // node handed the client a session key
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// A setter carrying that exact key passes the gate (would be accepted).
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meshtastic_AdminMessage good = meshtastic_AdminMessage_init_zero;
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good.session_passkey = getResponse.session_passkey;
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TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(admin->checkPassKey(&good));
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// A setter carrying a stale/guessed key still fails (no session replay).
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meshtastic_AdminMessage bad = meshtastic_AdminMessage_init_zero;
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bad.session_passkey.size = 8;
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uint8_t stale[8] = {0x29, 0x04, 0xb4, 0x78, 0xd8, 0x68, 0xa7, 0xff};
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memcpy(bad.session_passkey.bytes, stale, 8);
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TEST_ASSERT_FALSE(admin->checkPassKey(&bad));
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}
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#endif // !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
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void setup()
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{
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delay(10);
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initializeTestEnvironment();
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UNITY_BEGIN();
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#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
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RUN_TEST(test_remote_setter_without_session_is_rejected);
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RUN_TEST(test_expected_session_key_is_zero_before_any_get);
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RUN_TEST(test_session_gate_accepts_key_from_a_get_response);
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#endif
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exit(UNITY_END());
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}
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void loop() {}
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